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ABSTRACT 
The first official history of the Great Patriotic War appeared in the Soviet Union 
in 1960-1965.  It evolved into a six-volume set that elicited both praise and criticism from 
the reading public.  This dissertation examines the creation of the historiographical 
narrative of the Great Patriotic War in the decade following de-Stalinization in 1956. The 
debates historians, Party and state representatives engaged in, including the responses 
they received from reviewers and readers, shed new light on the relationship between the 
government, those who wrote state-sponsored narratives, and the reading public.   
The narrative examined here shows the importance and value placed on the war 
effort, and explores how aspects of the Stalinist period were retained during the Thaw.  
By focusing on previously unexplored archival material, which documents debates and 
editorial decisions, an examination of how officials sought to control the state’s 
explanation of events, motivations and consequences of the war can be examined in-
depth.  To date, the periodization, terminology and areas of concentration that define the 
course of the Great Patriotic War are fixated on topics that Stalin’s war narrative favored, 
assigning significance to events according to Stalinist preferences rather than objective 
analysis.  My study of the war’s historiography shows how contentious its memory 
became at every level, making it difficult to clearly discern who represented and opposed 
the party line throughout Soviet society.   
The author argues that the collective memory of the war, as propagated by the 
state, became so all-encompassing that it was often the preferred version, infiltrating 
individual memories and displacing or blending with personal recollections and factual 
documentation.  Because the war touched the entire population of the Soviet Union, its 
 ii 
story became the foundational myth of the USSR, replacing the October Revolution, and 
was used as a legitimizing tool by Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev.  Most 
recently, it has experienced a revival in the post-Soviet period by Vladimir Putin as a way 
to unify Russia and build popular support for his administration.  Viewing how the public 
interacted with representatives of the state over the creation of the official history of the 
war suggests that like no other event, war compels any state, even a totalitarian state, to 
reexamine its foundations, historical memory, foreign and domestic policies and views on 
censorship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the Great Patriotic War is absolutely implausible…It is not a history that 
existed but a history that was written.  It was written in the spirit of the time.  Who to 
praise, [and] whom to be silent about. 
- Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov1  
 
 The first official history of the “Great Patriotic War” – designating the Soviet war 
effort against Germany during the Second World War – appeared in the Soviet Union in 
1960-1965.  It evolved into a six-volume set that elicited both praise and criticism from 
commission members themselves and the reading public.  One veteran writing to the 
Minister of Defense in the early 1960s claimed that “there is a feeling of resentment 
arising against the authors” for what he believed was undeserved praise for the Germans 
and an inability to highlight Soviet accomplishments, while a letter written by three 
members of the communist party in 1962, to the head of the Army and Navy’s Political 
Department, commented how the war’s official history contained “a lot of useful and 
enlightening material.”2  Letters from readers were received by various media outlets and 
the Institute of Marxism-Leninism itself, the creator and publisher of the official history, 
and the admiration and condemnation they offered attest to the contested nature of the 
war’s history and history within the Soviet state in general.   
 This dissertation examines how the first official history of the Soviet Union’s 
World War Two experience was crafted in the decade following de-Stalinization in 1956. 
                                                 
1 Undated interview with Literaturnaia gazeta, cited in Vladimir Melnikov, Ikh poslal na smert Zhukov? 
Gibel’ armii generala Efremova (Iauza, Eksmo: Moscow, 2011), 5. 
 
2 The letter to the Minister of Defense was undated and signed “veteran-frontovik” but included in a folder 
with letters from the early 1960s.  The letter written to Aleksei Epishev was by P. A. Aleskandrov, I. G. 
Starinov (a famous partisan and former member of the commission), and N. F. Avramenko, dated 22 
September 1962.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 39, 104. 
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The debates the editorial team engaged in when they produced this multi-volume history, 
as well as the responses they received from reviewers and readers, shed new light on the 
relationship between Nikita Khrushchev’s administration, those who wrote state 
sponsored narratives, and the reading public.  Because the war and its victory affected the 
entire population of the Soviet Union, its story became a myth of triumph and unification 
for the postwar USSR and post-Soviet Russia.   
Viewing how the public interacted with representatives of the state adds a new 
dimension to our understanding of the ways the war and its history altered life in the 
Soviet Union.  Studying how the first official history was crafted and contested before, 
during and after its publication illustrates how contentious the memory of the war was at 
every level.  Whereas the Soviet Union has traditionally been viewed as characterized by 
a state juxtaposed to the society it ruthlessly ruled, this dissertation unveils just how 
difficult it is to discern who represented and who opposed the party line; in the case of 
what became the most important event in Soviet history, there was a fluidity visible at all 
levels of society.   
In exploring this dynamic, this dissertation also provides a prism through which to 
view the transition of the Stalin Cult to the Cult of the Great Patriotic War.  Although not 
without opposition, the war was portrayed as the culmination and justification of Stalin’s 
industrialization, collectivization and purges.  Victory in the war, which the public could 
not question but only celebrate, was the one event the Soviet Union could take pride in, 
but that Stalin could not be fully divorced from.   
While aspects of the Second World War continue to be debated to this day, from 
the United States and France to China and Japan, for the Soviet Union, the Second World 
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War was a defining event.  The “Great Patriotic War” offered a profound memory for the 
entire country to unite around.  Every family participated in the war experience, whether 
on the frontlines, in the rear, or under occupation.  Tens of millions were left dead, tens 
of thousands of villages were obliterated and tremors from the war years continued to 
impact Soviet society in the postwar period with famines, homelessness, labor shortages 
and countless orphans.   
The war’s history attracted immense attention but researchers were met with 
restrictions and obstacles.  Documenting the war in the immediate postwar period, while 
Stalin was alive, was practically impossible.  Under Stalin the war’s narrative was tightly 
controlled and disseminated by a limited number of publications that reproduced a 
discourse the reading public was already familiar with.  Military archives remained off-
limits while censorship was often all-encompassing with bans on publishing even well-
known and publicized orders from the war period.  State sponsored narratives – 
collections of Stalin’s speeches on the war, pamphlets, articles and laudatory texts – 
monopolized the collective memory of the war until the Thaw under Khrushchev.   
The decision to create an official history of the war created conditions for a 
narrative, dominated by Khrushchev and his close associates, of the war experience to 
take center stage and clash with the individual and collective memories of the reading 
public, including members of the commission organized to craft the war’s official history.  
This dissertation will explore how authors and editors openly debated sensitive issues 
while reviewers and readers attempted to voice concerns in meetings and through letters 
about inaccuracies, weaknesses, omissions, and the continued concentration on Stalin’s 
role in the war.  Yet despite the tremendous amount of time, emotions, and energy 
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lavished on this project, the end result was deeply flawed, and the nature of its flaws 
provide further insight into why and how the Soviet Union was unable to truly escape the 
inherent framework of the Stalinist system.  
In looking at the state-endorsed narrative of the war under Khrushchev and the 
public’s criticism – that the history produced was tainted by Stalin’s cult – the traditional 
concept of the binary between Soviet state and society does not help to explain the 
politics of the historical discussions; however, this did not mean that state and society 
were synonymous.  Agreement and disagreement over all issues were evident at all 
levels.  The war temporarily rearranged the boundaries between elites, state institutions, 
and society, hence its history became the one history to which all Soviet citizens felt they 
could lay claim.   
Debates over the war years showcase the interplay of both individual and 
collective memory, and of memory and history.  While history relies on evidence based 
evaluation and analysis, dominated by trained historians, memory allows for a broader 
interpretation in order to equally serve the needs of artists, historians, literary writers and 
politicians, whose interpretations help define culture and society for the public.  I found 
in keeping with Pierre Nora’s work, that memory, serving as a connection to the past, yet 
a phenomenon of the present, is comparable to but different from history, a representation 
of the past that is written, discussed, and experienced in the present.3  History and 
memory are intertwined, but they are also distinct, unstable and in constant flux.  Hence 
the contested nature of the war experience was a consistent phenomenon during the 
                                                 
3 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996), 2-3. 
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writing of the official history, and certainly not limited to the Soviet Union.  In analyzing 
the state-sponsored narrative of the Great Patriotic War, I was able to find that “unstable” 
and “partial” memory, partly a remnant from the war and immediate postwar period, 
which became contested territory not only for the editors and authors of the war’s history 
but also for veterans and civilians who wanted to add their voice to the collective.   
Discussing “memory” means inevitably dealing with the concept of “collective 
memory.”  For this study, “memory” or “individual memory” will refer to events that 
individuals can recall having lived through, while “collective memory” will reference the 
creation of a framework based on social interactions that individuals within a state can 
utilize to organize the history of their country.4  The contested nature of “collective 
memory” can become deceptive as it leaves the impression that a collective can 
“remember” in the same way an individual can.  As memory and history are in a constant 
struggle, so is collective memory and history.  Where history is complex, inclusive of 
multiple viewpoints and detached from obvious biases, collective memory relies on 
oversimplifications and familiar stereotypes.  Although aspects of “collective memory” 
are regularly challenged, there is some agreement among historians with respect to who 
creates memories and how they impact everyday life or governmental policies and 
politics.  Collective memory is a reflection of numerous variables and conditions that 
through a selective process become defining moments of significant historical events 
within a collective body.5   
                                                 
4 Jan-Wener Muller, “Introduction: the Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over 
Memory,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past, ed. Jan-Wener 
Muller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3. 
 
5 Other terms used to describe “collective memory” are “national memory,” “collective remembrance,” 
“public recollection,” “public memory,” “political memory,” “collective conceptions,” “mass memory,” 
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Looking at “collective” or “historical” memory allows for historians to gain a 
better understanding of where current popular concepts, ideas, and policies come from.  
In studying the influence of collective memory and who the intended audience is, as well 
as how those on the receiving end interpret, utilize or simply ignore the end result, we can 
view the transformation of individual and collective memories into national “memories“ 
or “myths.”  When these “myths” enter the public sphere they become both contested 
territory for all levels of society and a means to unite society around a greater idea or 
ideal.  It is a broader goal of this dissertation to provide a case study for such a process. 
An essential question that arises in the midst of these ideas and attitudes toward 
“memory” is whether individual memory and “collective” or “national” memory can be 
kept separate.  As soon as individual memory joins the greater collective it no longer 
solely belongs to the individual but assumes a place in something that is not constructed 
based on distinctly personal past experiences and traumas but by present day needs – in 
many ways it retains a type of truth but also mixes in aspects of “myth,” which in this 
case need not mean something fictitious.  On the contrary, the “myth” that is created 
around a collective war experience offers order and significance to the inherent chaos of 
war, a consumable narrative in its simplicity and relies on previously examined and 
                                                 
“social memory,” “popular history making” and “historical memory.”  All are quite distinct from 
“individual memory” – an entire other topic is the fleeting nature of individual memory that has often 
proved malleable when being recalled.  For discussions about memory and collective memory, see Jan-
Wener Muller, ed.,  Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of 
Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Richard Ned Lebow, ed., The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006); Maria Ferretti, “Memory Disorder: Russia and Stalinism,” Russian Politics and Law 41, no. 6 
(2003): 38-82; Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Aleksandr S. Seniavskii and Elena S. Seniavskaia, “The 
Historical Memory of Twentieth-Century Wars as an Arena of Ideological, Political, and Psychological 
Confrontation,” Russian Studies in History 49, no. 1 (2010): 53-91. 
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resolved historical issues.6  It could be argued that “collective memory” provides the 
framework onto which details from individual memories are inserted, establishing a 
simplistic narrative that conveys the “myth,” which constitutes a learned truth an 
authority aims to entrench within the public sphere.  The political scientist Thomas D. 
Sherlock views the final product as “political myth” which creates “a narrative of past 
events that gives them special significance for the present and the future.”7  Similar to 
other states, the Soviet government remained continually dependent on maintaining a 
number of myths in order to legitimize its existence and actions.  Thus collective 
memory, and the myths it supports, are provided to a ready population of readers and 
listeners. 
Memories associated with the Second World War in the USSR had no parallel 
with the First World War, which was a fragmented rather than collective memory.8  
There was some public commemoration of the latter among émigré circles – who were 
able to develop an alternative narrative due to their experiences outside the Soviet state – 
and within Soviet newspapers, which marked the first of August, when Germany declared 
                                                 
6 This type of constructed myth was what Maurice Halbwachs had in mind when he commented how 
“Society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, 
but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our 
memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess.”  Maurice Halbwachs, On 
Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 51.  For another 
way to look at “myth” in the context of memory and war, see Samuel Hynes, “Personal Narratives and 
Commemoration,” in Winter and Sivan, 207; Thomas D. Sherlock, Historical Narratives in the Soviet 
Union and post-Soviet Russia Destroying the Settled Past, Creating an Uncertain Future (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.   
 
7 Sherlock, 3. 
 
8 Karen Petrone, The Great War in Russian Memory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 7. 
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war on Russia in 1914.9  But the Bolsheviks had no need to commemorate a war they 
consistently denounced as imperialist, rather it was the revolution that followed and 
disrupted the war that was celebrated. 
However, the October Revolution and Civil War that followed were disjointed 
and disproportionately affected parts of the Russian Empire, lacking the collective war 
experience that the Second World War would offer.  The October Revolution was 
concentrated in the cities, leaving much of the countryside without a unifying memory of 
the events that brought the Soviets to power.  The Civil War that followed divided Russia 
and Russian families, whereas the Second World War united them on an unprecedented 
level.  A unified collective memory of events, therefore, needed support from all levels of 
society to become an enduring legacy and rallying point for a nation and the Second 
World War provided that needed collective experience for the entire state, which has 
translated into an enduring legacy. 
The Soviet Union’s remembrance of the Second World War went through varied 
phases which will be outlined in detail later.  Its contentious nature was hardly visible 
under Stalin and only entered the public sphere under Khrushchev.  There was no 
denying that the Soviet Union achieved an unprecedented victory but the cost of its 
realization left deep scars on the state and its people.  Acknowledging anything that could 
point to a weakness in the Soviet system was impossible for Stalin, thus the memory of 
the war could not be utilized as a “usable past” until Khrushchev’s tenure.    
                                                 
9 Aaron J. Cohen, “Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the Russian Emigration and the Soviet 
Union,” Slavic Review 62, no. 1 (Spring, 2003): 71, 72-73. 
 9 
George L. Mosse, in his study on the memory of the two world wars, comments 
how in the Soviet Union “war memorials honoring the fallen after the Second World War 
duplicated those built in the rest of Europe after the First World War.  These were often 
mammoth memorials topped by heroic figures, guarded day and night by an honor guard 
of regular soldiers or youth.”  But these memorial complexes were only built under 
Khrushchev.  After Khrushchev began a de-Stalinization campaign, the accomplishments 
of the 1930s were no longer tenable for appropriation, only the war was left for the 
leadership to grasp onto.  In both cases, the memorialization of war allowed for the 
ability to not only remember the past but also create conditions by which to understand 
the present and help legitimize leaders.  What Mosse has highlighted as the “Myth of the 
War Experience,” initially cemented in the wake of the First World War, was not revived 
in Western Europe after the Second World War and only endured in the Soviet Union.10   
As this dissertation will argue, for many Soviet citizens, the myth of the war 
experience became so all-encompassing that in some instances it was the preferred 
version, displacing or blending with personal recollections and factual documentation.  
The collective memory of the war was propagated by multiple outlets within the Soviet 
Union and, due to the shortage of war histories, the dominance of literary publications 
centered on the war, themselves often quasi-documentary productions that explored the 
allowed limits between fact and fiction, resulted in individual reminiscences becoming at 
times intertwined with literature, which began to infiltrate memories.  In some ways the 
collective memory of the war in the Soviet Union became not so much reflective of a war 
                                                 
10 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 213. 
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experience but rather a superimposed “universality of experience” where not only were 
significant events similarly recalled but their interpretations were practically pre-
packaged and standardized for easier consumption.11 
The “Great Patriotic War,” including its historiography, has been a sorely 
neglected topic in Western scholarship due to restricted archival access; because the war 
became central to the Soviet Union’s identity, the state never relinquished full control 
over what could be written or even researched about it.  Historians covering the war have 
benefited from the opening of former Soviet archives but their work continues to have a 
limited presence in academic studies.12  Military historians and hobbyists dominate the 
genre, while social, cultural, and political studies dealing with the war remain in their 
infancy.13   
                                                 
11 Olga Kucherenko, Little Soldiers: How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941-1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 16. 
 
12 For some recent publications, see Reina Pennington, Wings, Women, & War: Soviet Airwomen in World 
War II Combat (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001); Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas: Soviet 
Partisans in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Alexander Hill, The War Behind 
the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West Russia 1941-1944 (London: Frank Cass, 
2005); Evan Mawdsley, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945 (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2016); Roger Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in 
World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011); Jochen Hellbeck, Stalingrad: The City that 
Defeated the Third Reich (New York: Public Affairs, 2015).  
 
13 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-
1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments; Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 
1939-1945 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation 
and Survival in the Soviet Union at War (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2009); Kucherenko, Little Soldiers: 
How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941-1945; Anna Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of 
Violence on the Eastern Front (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Karel C. Berkhoff, 
Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2012); Julie K. deGraffenried, Sacrificing Childhood: Children and the Soviet State in the 
Great Patriotic War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014); Frank Ellis, The Damned and the 
Dead: The Eastern Front Through the Eyes of Soviet and Russian Novelists (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2011).  
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One of the first publications on the historiography of the war was a 1968 article in 
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, by A. Grylev.14  Two collections of articles followed in 
1976 and 1980.15  Historians in the post-Soviet period have produced few publications on 
the war’s historiography.16  More recently, Valentin Pron’ko, a retired colonel and 
candidate of historical studies, head editor of the ten volume Velikaia Otechestvennaia 
voina sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945, published a text that is almost wholly based on 
secondary source material looking at foreign and domestic concepts and ideas about the 
war’s historiography.17  However, none of these studies utilized the rich archival 
collection associated with the publication of the first official history of the Great Patriotic 
War.  Similarly, Russian studies on the memory of the war are also limited.18   
                                                 
14 A. Grylev, “Sovetskaia voennaia istoriografiia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny I poslevoennyi 
period,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal No. 1 (1968): 90-100. 
 
15 Istoriografiia sovetskogo tyla perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Sbornik statei (Moscow: Institute of 
History SSSR, 1976); Istoriografiia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Sbornik statei (Moscow: Nauka 1980). 
 
16 This includes two chapters in an edited volume, on History and Stalinism, published in 1991.  The editor, 
Andrei Mertsalov, a veteran of the Second World War and doctor of historical studies, previously wrote 
two volumes on the western historiography of the Second World War.  Vasilii Kulish, who previously 
authored a book on the history of the Second Front, and Nikolai Pavlenko, a military historian and head 
editor of Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, wrote the two chapters within Mertsalov’s volume.  Vasilii 
Mikhailovich Kulish, “O nekotorykh, aktual’nykh problemakh istoriografii Velikoi  
Otechestvennoi Voiny,” in Istoriia i Stalinism, ed. A. N. Mertsalov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi 
Literaturi, 1991); Nikolai Grigorevich Pavlenko, “Staliniskie Kontseptsii Voennoi Istorii,” in Istoriia i 
Stalinism, ed. A. N. Mertsalov (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1991).  
 
17 V. A. Pron’ko, Srazheniia istorikov na frontakh Vtoroi Mirovoi i Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voin (1939-
1945) (Moscow:  ITK ‘Dashkov i K’, 2016). 
 
18 Mikhail Gabovich, ed., Pamiat’ o Voine 60 Let Spustia: Rossiia, Germaniia, Evropa (Moscow: Novoe 
Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2005); Iu. A. Petrov, Velikaia Otechestvennaia – izvestnaia i neizvestnaia: 
istoricheskaia pamiat’ i sovremennost’ (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2015).  The latter is 
based on a 2015 conference. 
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Existing western studies of the historiography of the war and the cult created 
around it limit their discussions to then available newspapers, journals and interviews.19  
A few historians have explored the Thaw by analyzing responses, addressed to authors 
and publishers, from readers of literary works about the war but have not looked at the 
Thaw’s impact on official publications.20  Jochen Hellbeck recently analyzed the 
commission created to document the history of the “Great Patriotic War” during the war, 
and although some of its members then participated in crafting the war’s official history 
under Khrushchev, the documentation and interviews he examined were never published 
but relegated to the archives and were not commented on by the public.  Hellbeck’s work 
utilized the commission’s interviews with Stalingrad veterans to weave a mosaic of the 
Soviet war effort through the recollections of soldiers and officers, while my work looks 
at the inner dialog of the commission members themselves.21  Conversely, whereas Amir 
Weiner looked at how Soviet citizens attempted to make sense of the war and occupation 
and how veterans tried to find their place in Soviet society in the western borderlands, he 
did not discuss the creation of an official history of the war or their reactions to it.22  To 
date, I am the first scholar who has examined the voluminous records of the commission 
housed in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). 
                                                 
19 Matthew P.  Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1976); Nina Tumarkin, The Living and The Dead: The Rise and Fall of the cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 
 
20 Denis Kozlov, The Readers of Novyi Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013); Polly Jones, “Between Post-Stalinist Legitimacy and Stalin’s Authority: Memories 
of 1941 from Late Socialism to the Post-Soviet Era,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 54:3/4 (Sep-Dec 2012): 
357-376; Polly Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953-70 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 
 
21 Hellbeck, Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich. 
 
22 Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
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The majority of the original archival research for this dissertation is based on the 
archival collection of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (1931-1991) at RGASPI.  Four 
repositories contain materials dealing with the History of the Great Patriotic War, dating 
from 1941.  They include stenographic records of commission meetings, reviews and 
commentary on submitted manuscripts, as well as letters received from the public 
responding to the eventual publication of the multi-volume history.23  In researching this 
topic, I looked through dozens of folders, including records of meetings and hundreds of 
letters from readers and solicited reviewers, dating mainly from 1957-1966, a 
periodization that sheds light on the changeover from the Khrushchev administration into 
Leonid Brezhnev’s early time in power.  There was one visible gap in the records in that 
every volume published had a specific folder dedicated to reader letters that were 
received except the second volume, which dealt with the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union through the Soviet counteroffensive outside Stalingrad in November 1942.24   
 The production of an official history under Khrushchev was influenced by 
professional historians, who themselves have had a turbulent history with the Soviet state.  
Historians in the Soviet Union have always had to walk a thin line between history and 
myth/patriotic propaganda.   Control over Soviet historians by the government can be 
traced to Vladimir Lenin.  Aleksandr Nekrich, a historian and Soviet dissident, 
commented in his 1991 memoirs that “History, like all other fields of study in the USSR, 
                                                 
23 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22-25, 28.  This is the Fond of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism associated with the 
Central Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.   The repositories themselves (22-25, 28) 
were under the heading of “Section [on the] History of the Great Patriotic War.”  Letters from readers are 
found in opis 22, mainly in folders 309, 585, 586, 587, 796, and 916, totaling over fifteen hundred pages. 
 
24 The archivist could not tell me why this gap existed, but responses to the second volume proved so all-
encompassing that they were evident throughout numerous other folders and help to show the continued 
interest of the war’s initial period for both commission members and readers. 
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is the preserve of the Communist party and the state.  The state, virtually the only 
employer in the country, subsidizes such study.  Therefore, every scholar is, at the same 
time, a state official: he must constantly keep this in mind and construct his work in such 
a way as to render useful service to the state.”25  Under Stalin, historians flattered and 
prostrated themselves before the state.  Scholarship for historians was determined by the 
party line, which they needed to elaborate and reinforce, rather than create, let alone 
challenge. 
A characteristic dilemma that soon appeared was that when previously tightened 
controls over historical publications were loosened, studies that did not adhere to the 
status quo were automatically labelled as “revisionist” and “unorthodox” due to a 
previous lack of alternative discussions among sensitive topics.  This affected party 
history as much as it did other aspects of Soviet historical scholarship.26  In looking at the 
transition of the war’s narrative from Stalin to Khrushchev, this dissertation employs 
Alexei Yurchak’s premise that literature after Stalin’s death was only allowed to be 
interpreted either as true or false with no middle ground for an original debate that would 
dare to move beyond the confines of previous discussions.  Yurchak argues that Stalin 
existed outside his own “ideological rule” while acting as a “master” manipulator of 
“ideological discourse[s]” the origins of which could never be questioned.  From his 
external position Stalin controlled the production of a “widely circulating metadiscourse” 
where “linguistic formulations” and texts, among other productions, were evaluated 
throughout the public sphere based on Marxist-Leninist ideals and suggestions could be 
                                                 
25 Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Forsake Fear: Memoirs of an Historian (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), 263. 
 
26 Nancy Whittier Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), vii. 
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made for their improvement.  After Stalin’s death the position of outside “master,” who 
could evaluate or interpret knowledge, was left vacant and the country was left in a cycle 
of repetition of previous ideas made by Stalin or Lenin to support positions and decisions 
undertaken by the new leadership.27  Examining the arguments among commission 
members shows that there were no real debates when it came to fundamental ideas about 
the war or the foundations of the Soviet system.  When it came to the war’s history, 
inadequacies were mentioned repeatedly but no decisions were undertaken that deviated 
from previously acknowledged resolutions.  Contested ideas were addressed by leaning 
on previous statements made by Stalin and, in some instances, Lenin. 
Yurchak relies on John Austin’s analysis of “performatives” to distinguish Soviet 
society of the Stalin period from the “late socialism” that came after.  While Stalin lived, 
aside from holding the “master” position, he utilized “performative utterances” or 
“performatives,” which were allowed to alter “social reality” instead of simply describing 
it.  His speeches did something, dictating order into Soviet society, no matter its 
contradictory nature.  After his death performative speech was replaced by “constative,” 
which simply stated things.  Instead of altering “social reality” constative speech 
described it.  Thus, without Stalin the best the Party and Komsomol could do was 
participate in “ritualized acts and texts” whereby they reproduced “social norms, 
positons, relations and institutions.”  As Yurchak explains, “It became increasingly more 
important to participate in the reproduction of the form of these ritualized acts [meetings, 
parades, elections, etc.] of authoritative discourse than to engage with their constative 
                                                 
27 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 10, 13-14, 41, 43. 
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meanings.”  In the case of historians and literary personalities, a possible outlier were 
those who refused to participate in the reproduction of these rituals and “wrote for the 
drawer,” awaiting a time when ideas that went against the status quo would be welcomed.  
Others participated in a discourse that “experienced progressive normalization” as texts 
went through constant edits that whittled away any type of identity and became 
practically inseparable from previous writings.28   
An additional difficulty for historians was the constantly changing political 
environment that surrounded them.  It was not out of the ordinary for a publication to be 
issued, recalled, amended, and reissued with a revised list of authors or editors, reflecting 
how the “historical identity” of enemies of the people were excised from historical 
memory.29  Since a regular feature of the Stalinist period was the continuous rewriting of 
history to suit immediate political needs, the population’s exposure to this process meant, 
in part, that no figure, no matter their previously perceived importance, was safe from the 
cutting board of Soviet history.  This process continued in the post-Stalin period as the 
former Soviet leader himself became a contested territory and, after his removal from 
office, Khrushchev also began to disappear from the pages of previous histories.  
The rewriting of history to suit immediate political and Party needs was not the 
only holdover from the Stalinist system under Khrushchev.  Letter writing continued to 
be viewed as an important tool in the hands of the population.  Consequently, this 
dissertation’s reliance and emphasis on letters received from the public reflects the 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 19, 25, 26, 47. 
 
29 Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon, “Writing History for Stalin: Isaak Izrailevich Mints and the Istoriia 
grazhdanskoi voiny,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 6, no. 1 (2005): 21.  
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seriousness with which state representatives took letter writing.  Historians, as 
representatives of the state, participated in the letter writing process that was a regular 
feature of life in the Soviet Union.  Sheila Fitzpatrick analyzed letter writing in the Soviet 
Union during the 1930s and commented that the “two-way communication” that was 
expected by authors of letters meant their complaints, praise, and denunciations needed to 
be addressed and were treated seriously by the recipient, whether individual or 
organization.30  It was an official and unofficial way to communicate discontent or 
preference by circumventing well-established bureaucratic channels.  Writing letters was 
encouraged by the system, which considered them a reinforcement of the link between 
the Party and population and viewed the letters as “input from below” and representative 
of the democratic process at work in the Soviet state with direct participation of the 
people.  Those who submitted their thoughts to publications were “usually applauded.”31   
Letter writers became adept at what Stephen Kotkin labeled “speaking 
Bolshevik,” which identified the “writer as an active participant of the system.”  Soviet 
citizens were able to absorb state propaganda and utilized “Soviet idols, icons and 
legends” when addressing state representatives or revealing weaknesses and failures of 
official policies.  They utilized the tools the government had created for and given to 
them in order to criticize.32  While most letters were signed some were left anonymous, 
                                                 
30 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” 
Slavic Review 55, no. 1 (Spring, 1996): 102. 
 
31 Juliane Fürst, “In Search of Soviet Salvation: Young People Write to the Stalinist Authorities,” 
Contemporary European History 15, no. 3 (2006): 327–328; Kozlov, 17; Stephen White, “Political 
Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party, State and Press,” Political Studies XXXI (1983): 45. 
 
32 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 198-238.  Fürst contends that “Communist Party leadership considered the letters of Soviet 
people to be of such explosive significance that they had them filed in the secret part of their archives, 
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with the latter usually containing accusations that portrayed the regime or authorities in a 
poor light.  According to Fitzpatrick, citizens who wrote letters to officials offered their 
opinions and criticisms along with suggestions that they claimed represented the public’s 
interest; their right to be heard was acknowledged by state representatives.33   
In systematically going through the letters included in the archival collection I 
utilized, I concentrated on those that dealt with issues that were consistently debated, 
forming a contested territory, for authors, editors, and readers.34  The most significant, as 
will become apparent, dealt with feedback on the second volume, which dealt with the 
invasion of the Soviet Union and Germany’s advance on Stalingrad in 1942, and the 
interpretations and attacks against the presence of Stalin’s Cult of Personality.  Many of 
those who wrote to the editors and various media outlets about the war’s official history 
mentioned their wartime experiences and service.  While often offering their gratitude for 
the work put into the official history of the war, they simultaneously pointed out 
numerous deficiencies and weaknesses, including examples from their own time at the 
front, hoping that their individual memories of the wartime experience could alter the 
collective memory of the war and official history making it that much more 
                                                 
restricting access to the tightest of circles. Here they were preserved side by side with all the other 
embarrassing moments of Soviet life – oppositional activity, suicides, terrible accidents, mass poisonings 
and major fraud.”  Fürst, 327–328. 
 
33 Fitzpatrick, 104-105. 
 
34 An aspect of the war that was readily accepted and featured no debate, as one example, was that 
Germany controlled all of Europe and her industries, which it utilized to wage war on the Soviet Union.  As 
will become evident, this holdover of the Stalinist period added to the exceptional nature of the Soviet war 
effort and omitted the drain on German resources and manpower that the occupation of so many territories 
had on the Third Reich.  Additionally, there were no discussions about the validity of the Soviet invasion 
and occupation of Eastern Poland or the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union. 
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representative of the war’s “true” nature.  In other words, they were trying to portray 
themselves as reasonable, sympathetic, and helpful critics. 
 This dissertation follows a chronological order starting with the beginning of the 
war through Khrushchev’s time in power.  The first chapter discusses the documentation 
of the war’s narrative in the wake of the German invasion through the immediate postwar 
period until Stalin’s death.  The second chapter analyzes how the post-Stalin period, 
including Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Party Congress, allowed for the creation of an 
official multi-volume history of the war.  The next four chapters discuss the initial stages 
of the official history’s creation and document the reviews, feedback and letters received 
that showcase the war’s importance and its contested nature throughout all levels of 
society.   
Concentrating on newspaper coverage, letters from readers, and supported by a 
foundation of previous studies on wartime reporting and propaganda, the first chapter 
traces major changes that the narrative of the Great Patriotic War underwent during the 
war and in the immediate postwar period.  Modern war narratives in general are regularly 
altered as journalists and editors adhere to the rules of wartime military censorship.  The 
chapter explores how the system that created that narrative operated and discusses some 
of the myths that were developed to explain defeats suffered and eventual victories 
achieved by the Red Army, many of which are still prominent today.  Additionally, 
mention is made of how wartime heroism among the rank-and-file in the Red Army was 
defined by the state and propagated by the press.  While Stalin and various Soviet 
organizations attempted to control what was said about the war, the raw, emotionally 
laden prose offered by writers resonated with much of the population even if they often 
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offered cliché, exaggerated reports of selfless courage from the frontlines.  These reports 
were a mixture of art and reality and have continued to influence the war’s history, as the 
wall separating fact from fiction was often broken down.  The narrative produced by the 
end of the war – before Stalin’s cult of personality could fully dominate its history and 
historiography – was formed from a combination of efforts on the part of Stalin and his 
censors, the editors and correspondents of leading newspapers, and the reading public 
itself.  All three “authors” continually influenced each other while developing a narrative 
of the war’s progress which become heavily entrenched in the public’s memory – both 
those who went through the war and those who were born after.  The ability to influence 
the war’s narrative by information producers, censors and consumers means a flexibility 
was evident even under Stalin that once more challenges the familiar simplistic binary 
associated with the Soviet system – the production and propagation of information was 
not a solely top-down affair.  
The atmosphere surrounding the war’s history in the postwar period until Stalin’s 
death demonstrates what limits were placed on Soviet historians and participants of the 
Second World War in regards to what could be said about the war.  By 1947 Stalin 
dominated the war’s narrative, historical and literary publications that did not follow the 
party line – created and enforced by a few select texts – were heavily criticized in the 
public sphere.  This resulted in a weakening of any possibility for the Soviet armed forces 
to learn from their mistakes and prepare for future conflicts.  Meanwhile, Stalin was able 
to enrich his cult of personality with all the credit for the victories achieved by the Red 
Army during the war.  Many of these ideas meshed with those propagated during the war, 
both internally and via the mass media, and only minor instances of disagreement could 
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be found among the public.  Although the Stalinist version of the war was denounced by 
Khrushchev in 1956, aspects the Stalinist postwar narrative, intertwined with the history 
of the war crafted during the war itself, continued to impact the country’s understanding 
of the war’s course.  
The second chapter looks at Khrushchev’s succession struggle and documents the 
initial changes that began to take place after Stalin’s death through Khrushchev’s secret 
speech and the decision of the Central Committee to publish a multi-volume history of 
the Great Patriotic War.  Chapters three through six encompass the majority of the 
original archival research that was done for this dissertation.  The third chapter examines 
the decision to publish an up-to-date history of the war and examines the creation of the 
commission put in charge of the publication, including the background of some of its 
more vocal members.   Analyzing the numerous meetings of the editorial staff, historians, 
and various experts and party representatives, who debated numerous issues when it 
came to the history of the war, the chapter offers a rare glimpse into the contested 
memory of the war and how in the post-Stalin period commission members attempted to 
appease the population while simultaneously being the mouthpiece of the party.   
The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the reactions to the publication of the six-
volume history, both official reviews and unofficial comments and criticisms.  While 
many readers greeted the publication as a welcome relief to the numerous translated 
western volumes available that many considered “falsified,” the letters received by 
various public outlets speak to the contested nature associated with the memory of the 
war.  What becomes evident is that many readers were caught up in familiar themes and 
discourses but simultaneously were also attempting to utilize the only tools at their 
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disposal to attack the familiar in order to reach a point where Stalin’s cult was no longer 
able to dictate how they should act, react, feel and think. 
The final chapter focuses on select meetings in 1963 and 1964 that discussed the 
continued impact of Stalin’s cult on the war’s history.  By this this point in time, 
Khrushchev’s position within both the Soviet state and the war’s history was becoming 
untenable.  Stalin’s Cult of Personality was the main topic of concentration as authors 
and editors attempted to analyze his presence in the war’s history and what could be done 
to reduce it in future editions.  Simultaneously, however, there were calls for taking a 
more “objective” approach to Stalin and his actions while Khrushchev’s role was slowly 
reduced, signifying a turn in the Soviet historiography of the war that would continue 
under Brezhnev and eventually transform into the Cult of the Great Patriotic War.   
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CHAPTER 1 
CRAFTING THE WAR’S INITIAL NARRATIVE IN THE WAR AND POSTWAR 
PERIOD UNDER STALIN 
Historian Catherine Merridale in Ivan’s War argued that “Red Army troops were 
presented, effectively, with two wars simultaneously.  The first, the one that they alone 
could know, was the war of the battlefield, the screaming war of shells and smoke, the 
shameful war of terror and retreat.  But the other, whose shape was crafted by writers, 
was a war that propaganda created.”1  This binary, which draws on the traditional 
dichotomy through which the relationship between the Soviet masses and state have been 
viewed by scholars, does not fully explain the situation that developed during the war.  In 
numerous instances the language and rhetoric used by Stalin, newspaper correspondents 
and readers came to resemble each other throughout the war and left a lasting memory 
preference that many turned to when recalling the war period.  This raises the question of 
to what extent each influenced the others and whether the discourse created during the 
course of the Great Patriotic War was a combination of efforts from information 
producers and consumers as well as censors, all of whom initially occupied a partly 
flexible territory thanks to the limited openness created by the German invasion.   
The main purpose of this chapter is to understand how the system that created the 
war’s narrative operated, and to showcase some of the myths that were developed around 
the reasons for the Red Army’s early defeats.  I raise the question of how much influence 
journalists and writers at the forefront of reporting on the progress of the war had on the 
creation of its history and memory.  To help answer that question, this chapter draws on 
                                                 
1 Merridale, Ivan’s War, 109. 
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letters from previously published collections and some unpublished letters, written by 
civilians and veterans, and archival sources to strengthen and reinforce my central 
arguments about the creation of the war’s narrative.2   
In conjunction with dismantling the traditional dichotomy of state vs. society, this 
chapter reinforces but also creates a space for inquiry into the concept of “speaking 
Bolshevik,” where Soviet citizens were involved in a system that provided them with 
tools which they could in turn utilize to criticize the Soviet state.3  It will become evident 
that the textual language available to state representatives, correspondents and the reading 
public often mirrored each other but the question of who wielded the greater influence or 
if it was shared rather than directed is open-ended.  The analysis offered here creates a 
foundation for later chapters that will deal with how much of that narrative remained 
ingrained in both literature and people’s minds, especially during Nikita Khrushchev’s 
“Thaw.” 
It has been well established that the German invasion of the Soviet Union created 
an opening within Soviet society, literally and metaphorically.  Although the publications 
that appeared were hardly free of censorship, this period was consistently viewed as 
defined by a “freedom” that many fondly recalled years after the war.  The topic of 
censorship has received scant attention, and even less when it comes to the war period 
itself.  A recent article mentioned that to date there are no publications in Soviet 
                                                 
2 Benedikt Sarnov, Stalin i Pisateli, kniga Pervaia (Moscow: EKSMO, 2010); Benedikt Sarnov, Stalin i 
Pisateli, kniga chetvertaia (Moscow: EKSMO, 2011); I. I. Anisimov, ed., Sovetskie Pisateli Na Frontakh 
Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, kniga pervaia (Moscow: ‘Nauka”, 1966); B. Ia. Frezinskii, ed., Pochta Ili 
Erenburga: Ia slyshu vse…1916-1967 (Moscow: AGRAF, 2006). 
 
3 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 198-238. 
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historiography “concerning actual censorship during the Great Patriotic War.”4  The few 
scholarly works that exist concentrate on literature rather than newspapers and omit any 
systematic analysis of the day-to-day inner-workings of state censors and archival 
document collections only tangentially touch on the war.5   
Even though there are examples of censors at work, including Stalin personally, 
there have been no in-depth studies to fully ascertain to what degree articles appearing in 
less ideologically important newspapers during the war were scrutinized or which 
organization and personality had the final say about each and every publication.6  During 
the war there were hundreds of full-time and thousands of part-time censors – including 
all newspaper editors – and secret reports were periodically created (every 10 days, 
month, and half-a-year) about censored and corrected material from newspapers and 
journals.7   Newspaper censorship was under the control of the Main Directorate of 
Literature and Presses (Glavlit).  This directorate, in conjunction with the Main Political 
Administration of the Army (GlavPUR), headed by Aleksandr Shcherbakov, as well as 
                                                 
4 E. M. Petrovicheva, I. S. Triakhov, “Tsenzura v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg. (po 
materialam Vladimirskogo kraia),” Vestnik LGU imeni A. S. Pushkina 1, no.4 (2015): 50. 
 
5 For instance, see Herman Ermolaev, Censorship in Soviet Literature, 1917-1991 (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1997); L. V. Maksimenkov, ed., Bol’shaia Tsenzura. Pisateli i zhurnalisty v 
Strane Sovetov 1917-1956 (Moscow, 2005); D. L. Babichenko, Pisateli i tsenzory. Sovetskaia literature 
1940-x godov pod politicheskim kontrolem TsK (Moscow: Rossiia Molodaia, 1994); G. V. Kostyrchenko, 
“Sovetskaia tsenzura v 1941– 1952 godakh,” Voprosy istorii, nos. 11-12 (1996): 87-94; A. V. Blium, 
Sovetskaia tsenzura v epokhu total’nogo terrora. 1929– 1953 (St. Petersburg, 2000). 
 
6 For a more information on Soviet censors during the war, see Berkhoff, 30-34.  The GlavLit archival 
collection (1922-1991) can be found in GARF, f. R-9425, consisting of 9 repositories and 7,905 folders.   
 
7 As an example of the control exercised by censors, from 1 July 1941 through 1 November 1944, of 
1,210,671 pieces of written text (excluding army and fleet publications), 44,331 were not published due to 
military secrecy concerns and 10,790 due to political and ideological reasons.  Kostyrchenko, 89, 90, 91, 
92; A. Ia. Livshin and I. B. Orlov, comps., Sovetskaia propaganda v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: 
“Kommunikatsiia ubezhdeniia” i mobilizatsionnye mekhanizmy (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007), 254-255. 
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Stalin and other central organizations, made decisions about what should be publicized as 
the war’s narrative and heroic imagery among the Red Army’s soldiers was shaped and 
formed.8  Newspapers with the greatest ideological importance received the most scrutiny 
and attention.  In his study of the Stalin Cult, Jan Plamper posits that the galleys of any 
articles in a central newspaper like Pravda were routinely sent to Stalin’s secretariat for 
approval.9 
This chapter’s initial sections discuss Stalin’s role in the media along with the 
importance of newspapers, correspondents and the propaganda that was utilized to define 
the Soviet war experience.  These are followed by an examination of how the war’s initial 
narrative, including the “cult of heroes,” was created in 1941 and 1942, followed by a 
section on “internal language” which offers an examination of select military studies – 
produced during the war – to measure whether and to what extent the discourse that was 
presented to the public in newspapers mirrored internal dialogs within the military and 
academic community.  Further sections look at the final developments within the war’s 
narrative from 1943-1945.  The final parts of the chapter examine how the memory of the 
war was treated in the immediate postwar period and what, if any, opposition was visible 
from the public.   
By examining newspaper articles I analyze the war’s initial period and the various 
threads developed to explain its course.  As a result, the reader will encounter numerous 
references to the more prolific writers, such as Vasilii Grossman, Konstantin Simonov, 
                                                 
8 Ermolaev, 3.  According to Roger Reese, GlavPUR regularly disregarded the truth and manipulated 
information so as to create a ready framework for the rest of the country to emulate.  Reese, 191. 
 
9 Jan Plamper, The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012), 33. 
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Ilia Ehrenburg and Alexander Werth.  Werth, a British correspondent originally born in 
Russia, offers a look at the war that is a cross between an “insider” and an “outsider.”  
Grossman began his writing career in the late 1920s and worked as a correspondent for 
Krasnaia zvezda throughout the war, establishing him as a “household name” throughout 
the Soviet Union during the war.10  Simonov also became famous thanks to the war and 
his widely popular poem “Wait for Me.”11  Ehrenburg, who was already well-known for 
his reports during the First World War from the Western Front, and his coverage of the 
Spanish Civil War, features in much of the material presented in the coverage of the war.  
He was one of the most popular authors in the USSR, writing hundreds of articles for 
domestic newspapers and the foreign press.12  He also received a constant stream of 
letters from veterans and civilians during the war and after.  Ehrenburg represents one of 
the central foundations of this chapter in that he helped define the war’s narrative and, in 
part through orders from above and in conversation with readers themselves, helped craft 
an initial narrative of the war’s history that has continued to influence our views.  Thus, 
one of the most fruitful sources proved to be his articles, letters and memoirs, which have 
helped to enrich and enliven much of the other material presented in this chapter.13   
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Replacing Stalin in the Media 
Following the German invasion, Stalin’s presence in the media was altered.  The 
triumphs and successes of the 1930s, built on the shoulders of Lenin and the Revolution, 
were put in jeopardy.  As it would inevitably transform Soviet society, so the war would 
modify the Stalin Cult in its wake as well.  With news of initial defeats suffered by the 
Red Army a situation arose where the leader’s name and image were increasingly 
marginalized for fear of defeat being identified with his leadership.14  Ehrenburg, looking 
through newspapers from July through November 1941, wrote in his 1960s memoirs how 
“Stalin’s name was hardly ever mentioned.  For the first time in many years there were 
neither portraits of him nor rapturous epithets…”15 
As journalists were accustomed to having Stalin in the center of their reporting, it 
would have been out of the norm for him to wholly disappear.  The truth of the first days 
of the war, although a disaster on the frontlines, could still be hidden from the majority of 
the population while using the familiarity of Stalin’s image as a rallying cry for the 
defense of the state.  Soviet journalists also began appealing to Russian patriotism as they 
bypassed Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and linked this theme to Stalin’s name.16   
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The war’s official title came from a Pravda article on 23 June by Emel’ian 
Iaroslavskii, a revolutionary, journalist and historian, entitled “The Great Patriotic War of 
the Soviet People.”  The “Patriotic War of 1812” described the Napoleonic invasion of 
Russia, consequently the new title associated well known tales of Russian resilience, 
courage, and eventual triumph to the current war.  In addition to the exceptionalism that 
the title “Great Patriotic War” imbued the Soviet war effort with, another possibility for 
why the war was “rebranded” in such a way could be to separate it from the war’s 
previous events, to which the Soviet Union was not party, which described it as a conflict 
unleashed by two sides of the same capitalist coin (Britain and France – imperialists, and 
Germany and Italy – fascists).17   
As attention shifted away from the Soviet leader, a lack of references to Stalin’s 
words in the press was replaced by popular reporters such as Ehrenburg and Simonov.  
With Stalin failing to dictate all aspects of society and becoming a closed off figure, in 
order to deflect present and future blame, new narratives were allowed a place in the 
spotlight, which often resulted in more open conversations.  Thus, argues Jeffrey Brooks, 
“the war had spawned a plurality of intertwined narratives and a range of perspectives.  
The press abandoned its single-minded effort to center all Soviet identity on Stalin.”18   
Between August and October, as the situation deteriorated further at the front, 
Stalin’s image slowly faded from reports.  It was only with Stalin’s decision to remain in 
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Moscow, while government institutions and party personnel were in the midst of 
evacuation, and his speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution in early 
November, that Stalin’s image was published in Pravda on 7 November for the first time 
in many weeks.  His cult was soon reinvented with the added qualities of a victorious 
general.  As the Germans came to the end of Operation Typhoon before the gates of 
Moscow, Stalin’s cult was once more evident in the press.19 
Reactions to Stalin’s role, and that of authorities in general, varied, ranging from 
silence and absolution to a type of “spontaneous de-Stalinization,” to use historian 
Mikhail Gefter’s words.20  Boris Gorbachevsky, a veteran, writing in 2011 noted that “in 
those first tragic days of the war, I never heard a single reproach directed at the 
authorities.”  Viktor Nekrasov, a journalist and author of one of the most famous war 
novels, admitted in 1990: “We forgave Stalin everything, collectivization, 1937, his 
revenge on his comrades…And we, lads from intelligentsia families, became soldiers and 
believed the whole myth with a clear conscience.”21  Ehrenburg, however, detected a 
sense of confusion and even hostility towards the leader and his advisors as a result of the 
defeats suffered in the war’s first months.  In October 1941, the writer met a colleague in 
Kuibyshev who claimed “that Stalin had been warned over and over again of the 
impending attack, that he knew nothing of how the country lived and that he was being 
misled.”  A general, in the summer of 1942, asked Ehrenburg whether he thought if 
“Stalin has the slightest idea what’s going on?” and answered his own question: “I 
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believe he doesn’t know a thing, and they misled him, told him we were well prepared.”  
Such beliefs might have been a necessary precondition for the creation and propagation 
of Stalin’s cult.22   
In part, the partial and unannounced “de-Stalinization” that some saw taking place 
during the war, whether real or imagined, gave hope to many citizens that a change for 
the better awaited them as soon as the war was over.  Ehrenburg recalled how many 
soldiers thought the postwar period “would be better, sounder, more just.”23  Historian 
Peter Kenez called the war period “a small oasis of freedom” and David Shneer echoed 
this idea in his study of Jewish Soviet photographers during the war period, who in many 
ways were restricted in the same way that journalists were.  With certain cultural 
regulations relaxed during the war “artists, photographers, filmmakers, and others had 
more license.”  They might have been told what subjects to concentrate on but they were 
given some latitude in deciding how to portray them.24  The enemy the Soviet Union 
faced was no longer hiding in secret among neighbors, co-workers, friends, and relatives.  
It was an existential threat, an external enemy that was visible and identifiable.     
The hope and freedom many associated with the war years endured into the 
postwar period and made for a sense of failure when the expected changes never 
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materialized.  Ehrenburg recalled how he “firmly believed that after victory everything 
would suddenly change.”  In retrospect he could only “confess” his “naivety and 
blindness.”  Looking over the letters he received, it was clear to Ehrenburg that “at the 
time everybody expected that once victory had been won people would know real 
happiness.”  One frontline soldier, writing to his parents in April 1942, claimed within a 
year of the war’s conclusion “we will have wonderful life” full of “abundance” with 
“foreign goods from America” while the Germans would rebuild everything they 
destroyed.25 
 
Journalists, Newspapers, and Propaganda 
Newspapers became the “primary literary medium of wartime.”  Correspondents 
themselves “waited for each communique with bated breath.”26  While the Stalin cult was 
already entrenched in the Soviet media and in many citizens’ minds, the myths and 
legends that would soon permeate the histories and recollections of the Great Patriotic 
War were just becoming established during the first days of the war as heroic feats 
performed by soldiers at the front were reconfigured into symbolic, stylized productions.   
Since the creation of the Soviet Union, there were rumors of war breaking out 
with references to the supposed “cordon sanitaire” built around the Soviet Union.27  For 
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Stalin, the end of the Civil War did not mean an end to hostilities.  Until the beginning of 
the Second World War he was convinced the state was under threat from a coalition of 
capitalist powers.  These fears were played out within the Soviet press during a number 
of “War Scares.”28  As a result, the idea of war was not new for the population, but the 
surprise of an unannounced invasion became entrenched in the collective memory of the 
war and began to reinforce in Soviet minds the existence of an external threat.   
The war provided a space where published reports were a result of the conflated 
needs of the population and government – simplistic wartime accounts and heroic tales 
that downplayed and concealed the administration’s prewar miscalculations while 
playing up the population’s penchant for self-sacrifice based on love for the motherland.  
Consequently, one of the most enduring aspects of the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet 
Union was the creation of what came to be the Cult of Heroes (or the Cult of Martyrs).29 
Wartime correspondents in general, since they first appeared on the scene in the 
mid-nineteenth century during the Crimean War, have been known to fudge facts, make 
up stories, and suffer from censorship – both from the military and their own 
conscience.30  In that respect Soviet wartime accounts were in many ways the norm, the 
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real issue became their continued dominance of the war’s narrative in the postwar 
period.31   
Frontline reports by journalists during the first days of the war included crude 
reprints of articles from central papers exhibiting a low level of professionalism.  
Therefore, in the early days of the war when correspondents were told of the importance 
newspapers carried for the war effort, they responded by requesting the removal of “stock 
phrases” and that they “be allowed to speak to readers in their own voices.”  The 
atmosphere of the early period allowed such instances of “freedom” in creative thought to 
permeate articles on the war and Ehrenburg noticed the difference: “War inevitably 
brings with it the censor’s scissors, but in Russia during the first eighteen months of the 
war writers felt much freer...”32   
According to Ehrenburg, the “best agitator” was a writer who utilized his own 
voice, vocabulary, and tone when publishing.  Especially in the harsh days of 1941, 
Ehrenburg claimed that writers could help the cause with their voice and literary skills.33  
Authors were highly regarded by both the state and the people.  So much so, that as Osip 
Mandelshtam described, “In no other country is poetry so highly regarded as here; poets 
are killed for it.”34   
                                                 
31 Even in this respect the Soviets, to a degree, were not alone.  It took until the late 1950s and early 1960s 
for a fuller account of the “Miracle of Dunkirk” to become available to the British public.  Knightley, 253. 
32 S. V. Shpakovskaia, “Sovetskie gazety v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” in Voprosy istorii 5 
(2014): 65; Ehrenburg, The War 1941-1945, 13, 20. 
 
33 RGASPI, f. 629, op. 1, d. 110, l. 1.  Letter sent by Ehrenburg to Petr Pospelov and Emel’ian Iaroslavskii 
on January 30, 1942. 
 
34 Mandelshtam died before the war in 1938.  Cited in John Garrard and Carol Garrard, Life and Fate of 
Vasily Grossman (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), xxxvii. 
 35 
The daily news provided to Soviet readers, in part, came from Sovinformburo 
communiques, which tracked changes on the frontlines and were tasked with controlling 
print and broadcast media as well as counterpropaganda work against “German and other 
enemy propaganda.”  Much of the wartime reporting was undertaken by well-known 
authors, rather than journalists.  As a result, writers offered newspapers pieces that 
reflected a “literary style” that deviated from traditional journalism. Throughout the war 
Soviet periodicals, above all, were tasked with fostering feelings of hatred toward the 
enemy.  This was accomplished first and foremost by publications that related German 
atrocities throughout occupied Soviet territory.35 
Authors took up the fight in their own way and while serving on the frontlines 
they were fulfilling a separate although equally important role in “‘arming people’s souls 
with hatred’ toward the enemy...”  Works by Simonov and Ehrenburg were akin to holy 
symbols and icons for soldiers.  Some carried with them Simonov’s poem, Wait for Me, 
or Ehrenburg’s portrait and articles.  They were “valuable documents” helping “in 
difficult times.”36  The importance of journalists was commented on by Viacheslav 
Molotov who said Ehrenburg was “worth several divisions.”37  Wartime accounts created 
a direct link between the readers and correspondents, forging a partnership.   
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Due to the proximity of correspondents to soldiers, often readers could picture 
their own suffering or that of their families within wartime reports by authors like 
Ehrenburg, who received a letter in April 1942 from a Red Army captain mentioning how 
his mother remained in Kiev and asking if Ehrenburg “perchance” wrote “about her 
tears?  Maybe you described her suffering?”38  A letter from A. F. Morozov at the end of 
1943 compared Ehrenburg’s productions with his memories of the war, filled with “blood 
clots, feelings and passionate convictions and exhortations.”  Letters from readers could 
also point to their utilization of wartime propaganda, which they imbibed and reiterated 
with relish and conviction as when another Red Army captain wrote “… we shall have no 
mercy on our enemies…Our vengeance and our wrath are sacred.”39 
The importance accorded to newspapers was summed up by Ehrenburg in 1943: 
“In peacetime the newspaper is a supplier of information, but in wartime the newspaper 
becomes the very air one breathes…people open the newspaper before they open a letter 
from a friend, for their fate is tied up with what is printed in the newspaper.”40  A day 
after the war began, in a directive signed by the head of GlavPUR, it was purported that 
newspapers needed to “help soldiers, commanders and political workers to better and 
more quickly acquaint themselves with the theater of military actions…to highlight the 
experiences of past wars, as well as [present] facts about the experiences of current 
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battles.”  Finally, “The main tasks of the press in battle must be to develop heroism, 
bravery, military art, and selflessly carry out the commander’s orders.”41   
Letters to Ehrenburg from frontline soldiers consistently reiterated the popularity 
and necessity of his articles.  On 21 October 1941 Ehrenburg was sent a letter by a junior 
lieutenant who commented that “We read and value your articles, like bombs, they help 
us smash the enemy.”  A letter written by a battalion commissar in April 1942 described 
the importance attributed to newspapers and how before going into the attack, he read 
Ehrenburg’s latest article from Krasnaia zvezda to his troops and “Everyone’s spirits 
were raised.  We carried out our assignment with honors.”  Ehrenburg often took the time 
to reply to letters and in response, Andrei Fedulov, writing in August 1942, commented 
how much the soldiers appreciated not only his articles but his generosity with his time.  
Partisans also wrote and pleaded for him to “send your leaflets to us in the rear more 
often.  The people like them, read them with interest, learn to make fun of the fascists, 
and, what is more, carry out what is written in them.”42   
Much of the language incorporated and utilized in reports appealed to the soldiers 
at the front.  Correspondents were regularly found among soldiers and in the midst of 
battles, entwining themselves and their struggles with those on the frontlines.  Ehrenburg 
claimed that “on the first day of the war I forgot that I had previously written novels and 
poems.  I became a journalist, only a journalist, whose place is on the firing line.  I 
breathe the air of battle.”  In one instance, correspondent Alexander Poliakov was 
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encircled with the 24th Rifle Division during the first days of the war.  His reports 
regularly appeared in Krasnaia zvezda and were eventually published as a volume, in 
1942, describing the division’s struggles to get back to Soviet lines.  Letters written to 
Ehrenburg from soldiers at the front attested to their feelings toward the author with one 
lieutenant telling him, “I write to you the way I would to an old friend” while another 
called him by the diminutive “Iliusha.”43   
In all, the war’s propaganda effort encompassed the work of more than 1000 
writers.  Hundreds participated on the front with 140 dying and 300 receiving 
decorations.44  Many lived through much of what the Red Army suffered; utilizing their 
experiences, writers employed imagery and played up emotions as they crafted a tapestry 
of Soviet heroism based on a few select facts that often went unchallenged.  Within the 
pages of Alexander Korneichuk’s play, The Front, written in 1942, the war correspondent 
Krikun proudly proclaims to the front commander, “I get all important material here [at 
the front] and work it up.  A hundred and five of my articles on heroes have already been 
published.”  All he needed was a single fact, “I create everything else.”45   
An editorial in Literaturnaia gazetta discussed the place of writers in the war less 
than two months after its beginning.  It explained that writers were provided with enough 
material by the numerous occurrences of heroism, both individual and collective, 
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exhibited by soldiers of the Red Army and Navy at the front.  Writers needed “to create 
generalizations from these facts so as to reveal artistically in every example of heroism 
the national character of the Soviet people, the nobility of their ideas, which inculcate a 
scorn of death and hatred of the enemy.”  Ehrenburg claimed many of his articles “were 
written at the front… I was not thinking about the objective truth when I was writing…I 
was thinking of one thing only: of victory…”46  “Truth” and “objectivity” were 
overshadowed by the need for examples of heroism and the required slogans authors and 
censors wanted imbibed by soldiers and civilians. 
Although Soviet authors had plenty to work with, they also operated within the 
confined space set up by Stalin, who limited talk of military defeats.  At the same time, 
Stalin predicated the idea that surrender was the equivalent of treason and a brave death 
in battle was considered the norm.  Heroic exploits, including death, became expected 
and acceptable for soldiers and their families.  Stories of selfless heroism were crafted 
and refined by authors as Stalin personally edited drafts, while censors continually 
checked text and photographs for transgressions before and after publications were put 
out.47  Stymieing newspapers and correspondents in their ability to report on events 
meant a repetition of stories and heroic exploits that became fixed in Soviet minds and 
were soon internalized and reiterated on a regular if not daily basis.  
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Making Sense of Defeat – 1941 
 In the wake of the German invasion, the war was transformed into a people’s war 
with Stalin and the Party relegated to the background.48  Like an assembly line, stories 
began to be churned out about the heroism of individuals and improvised small-unit 
resistance to the inexorable advances of the Wehrmacht.49  Momentary control was even 
handed over to the population behind enemy lines as Stalin’s 3 July speech emphasized 
an “all-out partisan war” against the invading forces of Nazi Germany.  Soon, Red Army 
soldiers who found themselves behind enemy lines joined the partisan war effort.   
Soviet pre-war propaganda that had portrayed fighting a future war on the 
enemy’s territory with little blood lost proved erroneous.  A high-ranking former Soviet 
general and defector, Victor Kravchenko, reminisced in his memoirs, published 
immediately abroad after his defection following victory in 1945, about how “for two 
decades we had been starved and tortured and driven in the name of military 
preparedness…Our leaders had boasted of Soviet superiority in training manpower and 
armament.  Now the humiliating rout of our armies was being explained by lack of guns, 
planes, munitions.”50   
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The extent of initial defeats was enormous and the population noticed the silence 
they were greeted with.  Some evidence exists that they also understood they were being 
lied to.  It should be noted that readers viewed Sovietinformburo communiques and 
reports from frontline correspondents differently.  The former seem to have been 
regularly questioned while the latter were eagerly consumed and internalized.  In 
September 1941 an anonymous letter arrived at the Sovinformburo claiming “You do not 
systematically inform [readers] about the situation on the front, instead, reports for more 
than a week [contain] the stereotypical phrase – ‘fighting along the entire front.’”51  
Kravchenko claimed that war communiques proved so misleading “that few Russians 
believed them at any time thereafter.”52  Soviet citizens approached reports with 
skepticism as confidence in their press was undermined by what they witnessed with their 
own eyes in contrast to what they read in newspapers.53  Looking back on the war period, 
Boris Polevoi, a correspondent and author, portrayed the Soviet distrust of official 
communiques in one of the most popular novels written about the war.  He described how 
a cavalry officer known as the “commissar” responded to stories he encountered in 
newspapers:  
When the newspapers were brought in he eagerly snatched them from the nurse’s 
hand and hurriedly read the communique of the Soviet Information Bureau, and 
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after that calmly and slowly read the reports of the war correspondents from the 
different fronts.  He had a way of his own in reading, which might be called 
“active reading.”  At one moment he would repeat in a whisper a passage in a 
report that pleased him and mutter “that’s right,” and mark the passage; or 
suddenly he would exclaim: “He’s lying, the sonofabitch!  I bet my head to a beer 
bottle he was not near the place.  The rascal!  And yet he writes!”  One day he got 
so angry over something a highly imaginative war correspondent had written that 
he at once wrote a postcard to the newspaper stating in irate terms that such things 
don’t and can’t happen in war, and requesting that some restraint be put on this 
“unmitigated liar.”54 
 
The Red Army High Command bulletin on the first day of the war reported the 
downing of 65 enemy planes and said that the enemy’s blows were being repelled 
everywhere, setting a standard for the rest of the war.55  As defeat followed defeat, Soviet 
press reports continued to describe the fighting as “fierce,” “stubborn,” and “heavy.”  
Soon the vocabulary proved more adaptable with “fought to the end,” “fell back to a new 
defensive line,” and “shift of positions” making an appearance.56  Unlike the British, who 
portrayed Dunkirk as a “national epic” or the Germans who utilized the struggle for 
Stalingrad “to energize their forces,” the loss of Soviet cities was concealed throughout 
the summer of 1941.57   
Instead, Soviet authors concentrated on familiar cultural differences and utilized 
history and culture to depict Germany as uncivilized while emphasizing the Russian 
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national character and Russia’s cultural heritage.  Even Ehrenburg, a Jew, when 
addressing American Jews, commented how “my country, and in the forefront the 
Russian people, the people of Pushkin and Tolstoy, have accepted the battle.”  A week 
after the war began there was an announcement in Pravda about the imminent 
publication of a series of books dealing with the Soviet fight against the German 
“occupiers” in 1918.  When mention was made of Soviet partisans, Ehrenburg asked 
“Who are the partisans?” and answered with “ordinary Russian people.”58   
In mid-1942 Ehrenburg justified his previous singling out of “Russians.”  “The 
older brother in the Soviet family, the Russian people, has gained the respect of other 
peoples not through self-assertion, but by self-denial; they have marched and are 
marching ahead of others along the road where man meets not only flowers but also 
bullets.  That is why the Russian people and the Russian language are treated with such 
honor.”59  Readers noticed how often “Russians” were being written about, stirring 
feelings of Russian patriotism.60  Simonov also emphasized “Russians” most visibly in 
his play, Russian People, which appeared on the pages of Pravda in the summer of 
1942.61  In effect, when Stalin in 1945 famously singled out the Russian people as being 
the victors of the war, he could have been leaning on the numerous discussions of them 
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as such throughout the war.  Unfortunately, where the emphasis on “Russians” originated 
from during the war is a question left unanswered but the roots of Russocentrism could 
be found in the 1930s.62 
As the German invasion unfolded Soviet Sovinformburo announcements needed 
to conceal the true extent of the chaos engulfing the frontlines.  In turn, readers soon had 
an understanding of how to read between the lines of official reports.  When Minsk fell 
on 29 June the Sovinformburo announced “in the direction of Minsk…Red Army troops 
continued their successful struggle with the tanks of the enemy, opposing his movement 
to the east.”  The British correspondent Alexander Werth commented on the “codes” that 
became familiar to all readers of communiques.  Reports often consisted of three phrases, 
“fierce fighting,” “stubborn fighting,” and “heavy fighting,” the last of which meant 
“things are going very badly.”63  On 5 July Soviet sources denied German claims of 
capturing large numbers of Red Army prisoners but ceased mentioning the plight of Red 
Army troops defending Minsk as new reports began to reference battles “in the direction 
of Mogilev-Podolskii,” east of the Belorussian capital.64  Gorbachevsky, a veteran, 
commented that “with each passing day of the war, people began to understand better 
what the disappearance of some directions and the appearance of new directions of 
German advance really meant…The communiques [from the Sovinformburo] were so 
                                                 
62 See Brandenberger, Propaganda State in Crisis. 
 
63 Knightley, 268; Similar occurrences and techniques could also be found during the retreats of 1942 when 
cities were being lost newspapers continued to report fighting “in the area,” which while not untrue hid the 
real situation.  Werth, The Year of Stalingrad, 113, 129-130, 138, 215. 
 
64 Richard Stites, “Introduction: Russia’s Holy War,” in Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia, ed. 
Richard Stites (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 12. 
 45 
brief, illogical and unclear while the newspapers primarily trumpeted news of the first 
heroic pilot and the exploits of tankers who’d given a fitting rebuff to the aggressor.”65   
Descriptions of Red Army actions were sometimes censored or altered by Stalin 
or the head of the Red Army’s Political Directorate, but they seemingly strove for a type 
of uniformity rather than simple embellishments.66  Furthermore, it was not always Stalin 
or the censors who altered the narrative of the war.  On 3 July 1941 a letter to the 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, described how an article presented 
an inaccurate compilation of previously published articles from at least two separate 
newspapers, Pravda and Komsomolskaia pravda.  The author, Seliushkin, inflated figures 
of enemy killed and the number of aircraft a Soviet pilot engaged in combat, enhancing 
his deed.  A reply followed on 7 July from the Department of Agitation and Propaganda 
(Agitprop) claiming the author was “instructed on the unacceptability of [the] misuse of 
facts previously published in newspapers.”  Thus, the question arises of how much 
influence correspondents wielded when it came to creating the initial narrative of the war.  
From the above, it seems censors wanted uniformity rather than exaggerations that 
enhanced Soviet heroism and achievements.67 
 When Stalin finally addressed the nation, one of the events he discussed was the 
signing of the non-aggression pact with Germany in August of 1939.  Stalin’s radio 
address on 3 July claimed the peaceful policy pursued by the Soviet Union made it 
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impossible to ignore the actions of the Western Allies and compelled him to negotiate 
with Nazi Germany – prewar propaganda highlighted the duplicitous nature of the 
Western Allies.  Signing the pact, however, also meant the USSR gained a year-and-a-
half to strengthen its borders and defenses.  The idea that the Western Allies backed 
Stalin into a corner and forced him to make a deal with the devil became a part of future 
Soviet narratives of the war.68    
Stalin’s radio address came a few days after the Wehrmacht’s first major victory, 
the encirclement of Minsk on 29 June.  The speech masked the loss of the city with 
mention of heroic Red Army resistance and the destruction of the enemy’s “finest” 
divisions and air force units, as fresh enemy forces continued to advance.  Stalin blamed 
the Red Army’s first major defeat on the commander and command staff of the Western 
Front.  The shifting of blame onto the shoulders of commanding generals seemingly set a 
precedent and Stalin continued to place mistakes and miscalculations onto the shoulders 
of commanders and away from the Supreme Command, which he headed.69 
The 3 July address included assessments of the German invasion and the 
aftermath of the Minsk encirclement.  Stalin leaned on the idea that not only was the 
Wehrmacht mobilized, while the Red Army was not, the Germans were also able to apply 
their previous battle experience and achieve a “sudden and treacherous” attack by 
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breaking the non-aggression pact.  Stalin overlooked the fact that he himself ignored the 
proposals of his military commanders, among them Georgii Zhukov and Semen 
Timoshenko, and forbade any mobilization in the border districts.70   
 The ambiguous nature of reports about activities on the front by the Red Army 
translated into problems for the troops themselves.  Petro Grigorenko, a Red Army 
commander, reflected in his memoirs, written and published in the west after his 
defection, on some of the issues Soviet forces faced: 
…the communiques were written in such a way that it was difficult to know 
whether our armies were attacking, on the defense, or in full flight.  “With 
crushing blows our armies dealt serious losses to the enemy and, driving him 
back, our advance units are conducting battles on the line…”  Naturally, after 
reading such language, we would look for the line of the advance units out in 
front of the front line of yesterday.  Not finding it, we would look for it back a bit, 
but not far.  Finally, we would find it forty to sixty kilometers back.71   
 
In his memoirs, written in the late 1960s, Khrushchev recalled that the situation at the 
front, combined with the atmosphere created by the purges, dictated “that a commander 
dared not say he was abandoning a defensive position.  This was totally ruled out, 
because he might have to pay for it later.  The standard formulation was to express a kind 
of hope that perhaps the Germans would not break through here, or even a certainty that 
they could not, and later to say that under the pressure of superior enemy forces our 
troops had had to abandon the area after all – that was the standard…”72  As such, in part 
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it could be argued that military reports in 1941 were reflective of Sovinformburo 
announcements, where the reality of the situation at the front was reconfigured as a 
hopeful evaluation. 
Aside from fraudulent reports on the frontline situation, communiques routinely 
concealed the real number of casualties the Red Army suffered.  Altering figures, 
however, was something most participants of the war, including Britain and Germany, 
were guilty of.73  When there were instances of losses published and broken down by 
category they seemed to be a response to German victory claims in their own reports 
rather than needed information for readers.  It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the 
Soviet population, aside from those under German occupation or soldiers on the 
frontlines, were exposed to German propaganda efforts, but Soviet claims in major 
newspapers addressing German assertions about losses might have also been for the 
benefit of the Western Allies.  A Sovinformburo announcement in Pravda on 30 June 
claimed the last seven-to-eight days saw German losses of no less than 2,500 tanks and 
up to 1,500 planes, with 30,000 prisoners of war.  In the same period Red Army losses 
were listed as 850 planes, up to 900 tanks and 15,000 missing and prisoners of war.  A 
report on 14 July announced that Soviet losses, including dead, wounded and missing, 
were up to 250,000.  Soviet forces claimed to have destroyed up to 2,300 enemy planes 
and 3,000 tanks while suffering losses of 1,900 planes and 2,200 tanks.74  What was not 
made clear, however, was why after suffering such losses the Germans continued to 
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advance, especially since newspaper reports in 1941 about captured Germans claimed 
these men did not want to fight, were doing it under duress and were “tired of the war.”75 
In response to these claims, V. Kazik, an invalid Soviet citizen, wrote to the 
editors of Pravda in the summer of 1941 stating that readers of a newspaper entitled 
“Truth” expected the truth, no matter how harsh.  Listening to daily reports, Kazik 
noticed a consistency to Soviet military prowess when compared to the Germans.  While 
the Luftwaffe lost hundreds of planes, Soviet losses were in the tens.  The ratios when it 
came to tanks ranged from 1:3 up to 1:9 in the Red Army’s favor.  Yet somehow 
information gleamed from reports that presented general numbers contradicted day-to-
day announcements.  According to the above two articles, between 30 June and 14 July 
the Germans lost 800 planes and 500 tanks.  Soviet losses for the same period were listed 
as 1,050 planes and 1,300 tanks.  Thus, Kazik asked, “how is it that we have lost in this 
period 2.6 times more tanks than the Germans?” As well as “30% more aircraft…Check, 
how can this be?  Every German tank knocked out almost 3 of ours?”76   
Soviet readers, eager for information, were keeping daily track of the numbers 
newspapers supplied and yet less than a month into the war inconsistencies were already 
creeping into Pravda reports.  Soviet censors were more interested in seeing a wide range 
between the Red Army’s losses and that of the Germans, as reported, but seemed less 
concerned with checking previously provided general figures while readers wanted the 
bitter “truth.”  This reliance and need to see “truthful” numbers by readers could be 
interpreted as a relic of the 1930s, a decade filled with reports on collectivization, 
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industrialization, party purges, and Five Year Plans that pushed Soviet industry to great 
heights.  Reports and speeches from the period were filled with figures and percentages 
that regularly touted Soviet advances and achievements.  Internalizing these ideas, 
relying on statistics as a barometer of progress, Soviet readers utilized the numbers they 
were presented with to either praise or criticize the government.77   
Red Army defeats could not be portrayed as the result of an inherent German 
superiority on the field of battle.  Thus, an early October article mentioned how “the 
whole industry of Europe” was “working for” the “powerful military machine” that was 
the Wehrmacht.  Germany’s “one idea” was “to prepare for war” and now a “technically 
powerful country” had directed its “weight” in the direction of the Soviet Union, leaving 
only “forty-year-old men, Austrians, and half-cripples” in occupied territories.  
Conversely, battles were a learning experience for the Red Army, a bloody arena for 
gaining an understanding of German strengths and weaknesses.78  
Supporting Soviet resistance was allied economic aid in the form of Lend Lease, a 
subject that was featured in high profile articles.  However, such reports slowly ceased 
after 1941 and 1942.  Timothy Johnston contends that Lend Lease was ignored by the 
media because it took attention away from the idea that the Soviet Union could win the 
war with its own technology and production capabilities, as well as weapons.79  Soviet 
reports, when they did focus on Lend Lease, greatly played up what material was sent.  
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Praise for United States manufacturing in the press inadvertently created a powerful aura 
around American technical capabilities.  Nonetheless, when the media made mention of 
Lend Lease tanks being used by Red Army troops, the praise went to Soviet tankers and 
their skills, including how they quickly familiarized themselves with western equipment 
and dealt defeats onto the enemy.80  Thus, allied support was juxtaposed with Soviet 
education and ingenuity. 
Stalin’s speech on 6 November 1941 saw the reasons for the Red Army’s defeats 
multiply.81  After Minsk, the German army achieved major encirclements at Smolensk, 
Kiev, and Viaz’ma-Briansk.  An evacuation of the capital in mid-October followed.  
Ehrenburg’s article on 25 October attempted to describe the Soviet mindset: “We are not 
discouraged by failures.  Since olden times our military leaders have learned and grown 
from failures.  Since olden times our nation has been tempered by misfortune…we shall 
correct our deficiencies…we shall withstand and defend ourselves – not only the history 
of Russia, but also the defense of Moscow gives proof of this.”82  In justifying the failures 
of 1941 he made allowances for future mistakes, from which the Red Army would learn. 
 With defeats mounting months after the initial German invasion, it was 
impossible to continue claiming surprise as the reason for the October encirclement at 
Viaz’ma-Briansk.  Enemy superiority and experience was still stressed, as Stalin 
explained how “the German Army was more of a professional army, a ‘cadre army’ 
(kadrovaia armiia)” while the Red Army was still “young.”  But two additional 
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explanations were added to clarify the “temporary setbacks” experienced by Soviet 
forces: German numerical superiority as well as the lack of allied support in the form of a 
second front.  Here, another oft-cited justification became part of the Soviet narrative of 
the war on the Eastern Front, as Stalin claimed that the reason the Germans had more 
tanks was due to their ability to “exploit the tank industry of Czechoslovakia, Belgium, 
Holland, and France.”83   
As newspapers continued to explain away recent defeats, continued German 
advances meant additional figures could be found in newspapers for both Red Army and 
Wehrmacht casualties setting a precedent among Red Army commanders.  German 
claims continued to be challenged by Soviet reports as both in part exaggerated or hid the 
real casualties they inflicted and losses they suffered.84  In some respects the losses were 
unavoidable given the state of the Red Army and Stalin’s refusal to mobilize, but they 
seemingly set a precedent.  The high rates of casualties sustained by the Red Army were 
regarded as acceptable by commanding officers and the troops themselves, so much so 
that even after the Red Army went over to the offensive similar levels were encountered 
in operations where Soviet advantages in men and equipment should have avoided such 
                                                 
83 Berkhoff, 250-251; Kulish, 316; Mawdsley, “Explaining Military Failure,” 136-137, 145, 146.  Earlier 
articles matched Stalin’s tone and reasoning, see Ehrenburg, The Tempering of Russia, 62, 75, 206.  Recent 
studies show that as much as the Third Reich benefited from conquered territories, Germany’s resources 
were also continually stretched due to occupation duties and helping facilitate the continued delivery of 
needed material and supplies.  For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Adam Tooze, The Wages of 
Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Penguin Books, 2007). 
 
84 Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht.  The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2007), 48; Sovinformburo, “Smekhotvorenye izmyshleniia gitlerovskikh 
fal’shivomonetchikov o poteriakh sovetskikh voisk,” Krasnaia zvezda, November 26, 1941, 1.  For the Red 
Army, “official figures” would only appear in 1993.  Geoffrey Jukes, Stalingrad to Kursk: Triumph of the 
Red Army (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 205. 
 53 
excessive human and material costs.  The mentality of many commanders in the wake of 
1941, however, allowed for a ready justifications for disproportionate future casualties. 
There is evidence that the “heroic” narrative propagated by the Soviet media 
affected how junior officers came to define “heroism” in the early period of the war.  In 
one instance, in 1941, the sniper Joseph Pilyushin recalled a conversation in his memoirs 
(published in 1958) between assembled company commanders and their battalion 
commander.  After continued retreats one company commander insisted “that it was 
better to die in battle, than to remain in the foxhole, waiting for the Germans to shoot you 
down or grind you to pieces.”  He maintained that “there’s only one way out…attack and 
sell our lives as dearly as possible!” To which the battalion commander replied: “it’s a bit 
too early, friend, to think of dying.  We need to know how to fight…there’s no point in 
spilling our own blood for nothing.  To hurl ourselves headlong straight into the barrels 
of enemy guns and machine guns – that isn’t heroism; that’s cowardice in the face of 
enemy strength.”85  Thus, one junior officer viewed needlessly sacrificing the entirety of 
the battalion as exemplifying “heroism” while the battalion commander had a rather 
different understanding of a reckless headlong attack into an entrenched enemy position.   
According to press reports, Red Army losses reflected the noble nature of the 
Soviet system.  Ehrenburg’s 4 November article, “To the Czechoslovaks,” painted a 
picture of the Red Army not only fighting for the liberation of its own territory but also 
for the freedom of enslaved nations.86  Similarly, an article in Krasnaia zvezda contained 
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words of encouragement and respect toward the allied war effort, yet simultaneously 
exclaimed “Moscow is fighting for itself, for Russia, and for you, distant friends, for 
humanity and for the whole world.”  For Ehrenburg, Moscow remained “a beacon for 
tortured humanity.”87   
 
Heroes and Martyrs 
 As much as Ehrenburg’s articles inspired readers so did tales of undaunted 
heroism and self-sacrifice.  Since the first days of the war, Soviet readers were presented 
with articles mentioning ramming attacks by Red Air Force pilots against the German 
Luftwaffe and dive ramming attacks by pilots whose planes had caught fire and they were 
left with few other options.  One of the most famous heroes was Captain Nikolai Gastello 
who purportedly flew his damaged plane into an enemy column of fuel trucks, or in some 
accounts enemy tanks, killing himself (and his crew) and inflicting damage and death on 
the enemy.  For his selfless action, Gastello was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet 
Union posthumously, the rest of his crew became the recipients of the Order of the 
Patriotic War, First Degree – although sharing the same fate they reached different 
heights of glory.88   
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However, while ramming in general was described as a heroic feat, some 
disagreed.  When Grossman visited a fighter regiment, he was met with a variety of 
views on the heroic nature of ramming.  One thought ramming was representative of the 
“Russian character” and “Soviet upbringing” but another claimed that “Ramming isn’t 
heroism. Heroism is to shoot down as many of them as possible” and a third insisted on 
asking: “What sort of a hero is a man who has a full load [of ammunition] and doesn’t 
manage to shoot [an enemy plane] down and has to ram [it]?”89   
Heroism on the ground was epitomized on the approaches to Moscow where 
supposedly 28 men of Ivan Panfilov’s 316th Rifle Division made the ultimate sacrifice.90  
On 16 November 1941, to the east of Volokolamsk, at the railroad junction of 
Dubosekovo, the Germans launched an attack against the 1075th Rifle Regiment, which 
sustained hundreds of casualties in hours of fierce fighting.  The following day, before 
news about the German attack made its way through to higher headquarters, the division, 
at Zhukov’s request, was renamed the 8th Guards Rifle Division “in view of its 
staunchness.”  Panfilov was killed on 18 November, making it that much easier to 
associate the heroic deed with a fallen commander.91 
Among the many threads that made up the myth of the Panfilovtsy was the role 
played by a politruk (political instructor), who purportedly exclaimed to the men “Russia 
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is big, but there is no place to retreat to, because Moscow is behind us!”  He then threw 
himself under an enemy tank with a bundle of grenades.  More important than heroic 
actions or slogans was the role played by journalists and editors who, without the 
involvement of state representatives on the ground, knew without any direction from 
above what was required of them.  Soviet authors took the initiative and aimed to serve a 
higher goal; they needed to mobilize soldiers for battle.92  The popularity of the 
Panfilovtsy was then readily utilized to define “heroism,” resulting in countless 
reiterations of similar actions by other individuals or groups.93  Additionally, the tale of 
the 28 Panfilovtsy can be dated to a similar story in a 1931 Soviet play, The Final Battle, 
which highlighted the idea of an imminent war for Soviet citizens.94  It could be argued 
that the writing was already on the proverbial wall, the deeds described and entrenched in 
Soviet memory and consciousness, all that was missing was a war to superimpose 
familiar memories onto.   
Another hero appeared in the form of Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia, a high-school 
girl selected to go behind enemy lines as a partisan but was caught torching a stable of 
German horses.  Although tortured, she refused to give the enemy any useful information 
and died while defiantly proclaiming “it is happiness to die for my people” and “Stalin is 
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with us” before being hanged.95  A few weeks later, in the midst of the Red Army’s 
Moscow Counter-Offensive, a reporter from Pravda glorified her deeds in an article after 
her frozen corpse was discovered – thus began one of the most recognized and repeated 
stories.  It became a national cry for vengeance and an assurance of eventual victory.  
Werth remarked in 1946 that while there were others were performed similar deeds and 
suffered a similar fate, Kosmodem’ianskaia “was the name people were made to 
remember.”96 
The state never struggled to find heroes to embrace and emulate, especially since 
histories and facts could be amended to suit the needs of the greater collective.  Similarly, 
journalists reporting on heroic events proved the state could just as easily ignore as cast 
them into celebrity status.  Thus, when it came to Kosmodem’ianskaia, two articles 
appeared, in Pravda and Komsomolka.  Petr Lidov’s “Tania” appeared in the former and 
received the nation’s attention because of its “vivid” quality.97  Elena Seniavskaia 
recounts that according to “legend,” “Stalin, on reading the newspaper account of the 
partisan’s response to the Hitlerites’ question, ‘Where is Stalin?’ namely, ‘Stalin is at his 
post!’ – himself uttered the words that decided her posthumous fate: ‘There is a true 
national heroine.’”  The propaganda apparatus went into action and Tania, an unknown 
member of the Komsomol, was turned into Zoia, the first woman to be awarded the title 
of Hero of the Soviet Union in the war.98  Details surrounding how Kosmodem’ianskaia 
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was found and the local response to her capture remained in the shadows, as did the fact 
that the sabotage she was responsible for in the village of Petrishchevo left several 
families without a roof as winter was fast approaching.   
 
Turning Defeat into Victory: Reasserting Stalin’s Role 
Soon, the defeat of the Wehrmacht outside Moscow marked a physical as well as 
psychological turning point.  The German invasion had altered Soviet society, “We were 
a people at construction.  We became a people at war.”  Writing in the latter period of the 
war, Ehrenburg claimed that “…if politicians and lovers of politics discuss how many 
months separate us from the defeat of Germany, it is because Russia held out in 1941 and 
’42.”  Not only did Germany’s defeat signal an eventual end to the war as a possibility, 
but, according to Ehrenburg, it also created the conditions for England and the United 
States to “calmly prepare for the coming battles.”99 
By the end of the year, attention was drawn to the role played by the party with 
references to “Bolsheviks” and their influence on the reversal of German fortunes outside 
Moscow.  In October 1941, Ehrenburg had written in Krasnaia zvezda that “all 
distinctions between Bolsheviks and non-party people, between believers and Marxists, 
have been obliterated…”100  As Simonov recalled the darkest days of the initial Red 
Army retreat, in a December 1941 article he described how journalists “were searching 
and in most cases found, those whose stories inspired faith in victory: these were the 
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Bolsheviks of the Army, the soldiers with Bolshevik training; during the most difficult 
days they took the whole brunt of the struggle onto their shoulders.”101   
Among the justifications the Soviet population was offered by the press, there 
remained one major omission, Stalin, the government and Party were absent from any 
criticism or accusations when it came to miscalculations either before or during the 
war.102  Luckily, by the time of the Moscow Counter-Offensive, some could foresee an 
eventual victorious end to the struggle unleashed just six months earlier.  For Simonov, in 
December 1941, German arrogance transformed into something new as German prisoners 
“tremble and cry and breathlessly spill all that they know; others are sullenly silent, 
locking themselves up in their despair.” The German army had “changed,” previously 
accustomed to “easy victories” they now had to endure defeat.103  Not only had a Red 
Army with “Bolshevik training” stood up to German advances longer than any other 
nation, they had also inflicted the first major reverse to a previously undefeated foe. 
With the retreat of German forces outside Moscow in January 1942, Stalin began 
to dictate how much public recognition commanders like Zhukov could receive.  At the 
start of 1942, Stalin crossed out Zhukov’s name from a list of commanders awarded 
orders for their role in the Battle of Moscow on January 2, 1942.  Those at the editorial 
offices of Krasnaia zvezda responded by altering the next day’s caption.  Originally, it 
was supposed to have read “Troops on the central front press the enemy,” but the editor 
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crossed it out and in its place wrote “General Zhukov’s Troops Press the Enemy.”  “I do 
not know whether anyone noticed this tribute from Red Star to the commander of the 
front,” wrote Ortenberg, “but such a heading was a first for us!”104  Although Stalin’s 
attempts to take attention away from Zhukov was met with some opposition from 
newspaper editors, the Soviet leader’s role in the war was about to be redefined. 
If 1941 was defined by Stalin’s marginalization in the press, the beginning of 
1942 found the Soviet leader portrayed as a strategic genius.  On 4 January, writing in 
Pravda, Major General Konstantin Golubev, commented on how he was “fulfilling the 
instructions of Comrade Stalin about destroying the German fascist occupiers.”  He was 
sure that “Comrade Stalin’s practical plan establishes a basis for the more grandiose 
defeat of the enemy.  The Maloiaroslavets operation is only part of the brilliant 
commander’s general plan.”105  Now, previous defeats could begin to be portrayed as part 
of Stalin’s grandiose plans to lure the Germans into the hinterland, while preparations 
were made for their ultimate defeat, a rehashing of 1812.106  Commanding generals were 
not the only proponents of this new approach; similar ideas could be found among 
soldiers at the front.  In a letter to his parents in April 1942, a frontline soldier wrote how 
Stalin’s “ingenious strategy” was responsible for the successful defense of Moscow.107  
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Some authors could readily see through the fog of propaganda that was ever-
present in the media.  In early 1942 Grossman grew “extremely impatient with much of 
the propaganda that tried to conceal the incompetence of Soviet military leadership” 
throughout 1941.  He saw the line being drawn between the “Kutuzov myth about the 
strategy of 1812” during the Patriotic War and the current Great Patriotic War: “The 
blood-soaked body of war is being dressed in snow-white robes of ideological, strategic 
and artistic convention.  There are those who saw the retreat and those who dressed it.  
The myth of the First and the Second Great Patriotic War.”108   
In Stalin’s Order of the Day on 23 February 1942 he introduced a 
“definitive…interpretation” for understanding the war’s beginning.  With 1941 over, five 
“permanent operating factors” were formulated by Stalin to explain future Red Army 
performance.  They included “the strength of the rear, the state of the army’s morale, the 
quantity and quality of divisions, the army’s weaponry, and the command element’s 
organizing capabilities.”109  These operating factors were partly created by the Red Army 
retreats in 1941 when the enemy was regularly checked and his strength “exhausted.”  
With the enemy’s inferiority now evident, it appeared that the end of the war might be 
near.110  Unfortunately, this idea was based on an erroneous understanding of the Red 
Army’s capabilities.   
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By early 1942 Stalin was once more a central figure in both the Red Army’s 
ability to dictate the course of events and the German defeat outside Moscow.111  Soviet 
aspirations of victory were restrained by a Krasnaia zvezda article on 7 March that 
quoted General Andrei Vlasov mentioning how German reserves, material resources, 
experience, and discipline still merited attention.  Whether consciously or not, Vlasov’s 
language and ideas matched those from the previous year, excusing the Red Army’s 
unpreparedness and poor performance by leaning on German experience.  Another article 
claimed the Red Army during 1941 was “without experience.”  In addressing the cadres 
of the Red Army the author explained that the Wehrmacht “crushed us with the numerical 
superiority” of their armaments but, referencing Stalin’s 3 July radio address, the article 
mentioned how Soviet forces “in the first months rooted out Hitler’s best divisions, they 
cleared the way to victory…” for a new generation of Red Army troops.112   
Soviet failures in 1942 were omitted, covered up or excused in a variety of ways.  
Due to strict censorship, Rostov’s regional newspaper, Molot, was denied the ability to 
cover any defensive or offensive actions of the city’s defenders for sixteen months.  As 
the Germans began their advance in the spring of 1942 Ehrenburg was warned to not 
“mention the Kharkov direction” as there were “instructions” to refrain from doing so.  A 
few weeks later Soviet forces were surrounded outside Kharkov, in part a result of a 
failed offensive.  In the beginning of June, Shcherbakov called Ehrenburg ordering him 
to “write articles for the foreign press about the Second Front.”  Undoubtedly this order 
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was to deflect attention away from the Soviet failure and the German encirclement at 
Kharkov and possibly an authentic and urgent plea for a second front.113   
Taking attention away from the continuing German advances at the front was a 
continuous stream of names, dates, and battles consisting “of interchangeable tales of 
military heroism and feats.”  Some 14,400 names of soldiers were mentioned during the 
war.  Soviet newspapers often presented long lists of heroes and their achievements, 
which mirrored a practice of the 1930s when the achievements of shock workers were 
cited on an individual basis in newspapers.114   
Although Soviet propaganda continued to tout heroic acts performed by the Red 
Army, there were limits placed on what could be reported.  Early in 1942 Aleksei 
Mares’ev’s plane was downed near Novgorod.  To rescue himself, Mares’ev crawled 
through the snow for eighteen days.  His legs were amputated, but he resumed flying and 
scored additional victories against the German Luftwaffe.  However, recognition of the 
courageous fighter’s deeds was missing from the media.  As it turned out, Stalin refused 
to allow publication of Boris Polevoi’s article on the pilot in Pravda, adding comments to 
the article’s page proofs that German propaganda might take advantage of the report to 
portray the Red Army as exhausted.  Only in the summer of 1943 did Krasnaia zvezda 
publish an article about Mares’ev, another Hero of the Soviet Union.115  Similar stories of 
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courageous deeds, performed before Mares’ev, by pilots who also lost their legs to 
frostbite after being shot down by the enemy were readily forgotten.116   
While ordinary soldiers and pilots were praised in the press, the scapegoating of 
defeats onto the shoulders of commanders intensified in 1942.  After the capture of 
Rostov by the Germans, Werth noticed how the press “dropped” hints that relegated the 
loss of the city onto the shoulders of panicky Red Army units and their commanding 
officers.  The result was an introduction of “iron discipline” and a “cry of ‘pull 
yourselves together’ went through the country.”117   
Continued Red Army retreats in 1942 were met with a stern order from Stalin at 
the end of July, an order that soldiers intended to fulfill and the media regularly 
emphasized as the Battle for Stalingrad began.  Order 227 was read out to every unit in 
the Red Army but was never published in Stalin’s lifetime.  On 30 July Pravda exclaimed 
“Not a step back!” at the top of its front page and a leading article invoked the feat of the 
28 Panfilovtsy during the defense of Moscow.  The same day Krasnaia zvezda featured 
an article exhorting the troops to stand their ground.  “Not one step back! – such is the 
country’s order, such is the order of the Commissar of Defense, our leader and general 
comrade Stalin.”  For those who retreated without orders, no “mercy” was to be expected 
as soldiers were allowed to utilize all the “powers given” to them by the “state.”118  Soon 
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soldiers themselves exhibited the same mindset.  Iosif Gil’man, in an August 1942 letter 
commented how “Every day we beat the Fascists under the slogan ‘Not one step back,’ 
and we fulfill this slogan with honor.”119 
While order 227 attempted to stem the tide of retreats in the south of the country, 
an answer needed to be found for why those withdrawals occurred in the first place.  The 
pages of Pravda soon provided an answer.  Frontline correspondent Alexander 
Poliakov’s Russians Don’t Surrender (originally entitled V tylu vraga) presented a 
description of the fighting the Red Army experienced in 1941.  Poliakov portrayed a 
battle hardened division and a commander, Kuzma Nikitovich Galitskii, with enough 
self-assurance that when presented with a German propaganda leaflet outlining the dire 
situation his division was in, within days of the invasion, through the use of a diagram, 
responded with “Well, thanks for orienting us…”120   
Removing responsibility from Stalin and his leadership and supporting this 
cheerleading of a younger, more educated generation was another 1942 text.  In August a 
major publication appeared in the pages of Pravda, Aleksandr Korneichuk’s play, The 
Front.121  How important the play was for Stalin is “evidenced by the fact that members 
of military councils of the fronts were required to provide reports on the views and 
statements of the command staff on Korneichuk’s play.”122  Amir Weiner describes how 
it led to the “uneasy coexistence of conflicting myths at the core of” the Soviet Union’s 
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“social and political legitimacy.”123  The play featured a battle between generations, a 
front commander who made his reputation during the Civil War, a relic of an outdated 
past, and an army commander, who quickly rose through the ranks after the war began, 
exemplifying the new breed of officers needed to win the war.  This narrative worked 
well in reinforcing the idea that the Red Army was previously inexperienced, and had to 
learn to wage war as a result of Germany’s surprise attack. 
Similar to 1941, Stalin continued to scapegoat battlefield failures onto the 
shoulders of commanders, but now he had a playwright and author supporting his 
position and propagating it to the reading public.  General Aleksei Zygin, a Civil War 
veteran and an army commander during the Second World War, considered the play 
reflective of the true situation at the front, complaining only that it took so long to be 
published.  Marshal Timoshenko, however, viewed it as damaging “for centuries to 
come” and wanted the author and those connected with the publication of the play to be 
investigated.  No doubt Timoshenko was also concerned that he was representative of 
those under attack by the play, especially as he had just suffered a major defeat in May 
1942 outside Kharkov.  In reply, Stalin thought Timoshenko incorrect, stating “the play 
will have enormous educational significance for the Red Army and its command staff; 
the play correctly notes the Red Army’s shortcomings and it would be incorrect to close 
our eyes to these deficiencies.  It takes courage to acknowledge shortcomings and to take 
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measures to liquidate them.”  It was, according to Stalin, the only way to improve Red 
Army performance.124   
The Front presented a fundamental explanation to the setbacks the Red Army 
experienced in 1942.  Ehrenburg recalled how the retreat in 1942 seemed “more 
frightening than that of 1941,” which was explained by the factor of “surprise.”125  
Explanations for defeats in 1942 could be justified by leaning on Korneichuk’s play and 
commanders could be singled out for blame.  According to a recent publication, based on 
interviews with Red Army veterans, officers “noted a growing divide within the military” 
and an army commander blamed the play for inciting criticisms and accusations among 
the rank-and-file against commanding officers as the Germans advanced on Stalingrad.126 
Throughout the text of The Front there is no doubt that Gorlov, the front 
command, is of the generation that came up the ranks through sheer force of will and 
without adequate military education.  He is “neither an academician nor a theoretician” 
but simply “an old battle horse.”  Gorlov relied on personal bravery of his troops in 
overcoming his narrow-minded views of modern warfare.  The main ideas within 
Korneichuk’s play revolved around the notion that Civil War era commanders were in 
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need of replacement, their old ways caused grievous losses and reverses at the front that 
new, younger, talented commanders reared in Soviet institutions needed to correct.127   
Gorlov is eager to admit his faults and limits, almost forcefully, somewhat 
reflecting Stalin’s need to have the public understand on whose shoulders the defeats rest.  
Even the answer to the question of what should be done reeks of Stalinist rhetoric as 
Miron, Gorlov’s brother, exclaims that “we must smash them, these conceited 
ignoramuses, beat them till they bleed, beat them to pulp, and replace them as soon as 
possible with new young talented people.  If we don’t, our great cause is in danger.”128   
The end of The Front assures the reader that Stalin is working behind the scenes 
to ensure a final victory is made possible.  His actions are reminiscent of how during 
industrialization vydvizhentsy assumed many top positions within industries thanks to the 
Central Committee of the Party.  By the end of the play, a member of the military council 
pontificates on how “Stalin says that it’s necessary to advance young, talented military 
commanders to leading positions, to work together with the older men to conduct war 
along modern lines and not in the old-fashioned way.”129  Consequently, Gorlov is forced 
to hand over command of the front to the young, educated and talented Ognev. 
In conjunction with the failure of older Soviet commanders, the Western Allies 
were discussed in Soviet articles to help explain the course of events on the Eastern 
Front.  An April 1942 article mentioned how German forces were siphoned off from the 
west and transferred to the Eastern Front.  These references become more frequent as the 
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German summer offensive unfolded.  In part they were a ready tool to be used to explain 
away Soviet defeats.  Another article mentioned the help Germany received from her 
allies while waging war in Southern Russia.  While Soviet forces clearly saw the threat of 
constant German advances against the Red Army, the continued lack of a second front 
meant allied inaction was resulting in dangerous delays to the war effort.130  In a speech 
delivered in November of 1942, Stalin, while avoiding the question of why exactly it was 
that the allies had yet to invade mainland Europe, argued that the absence of an invasion 
allowed for the success Germany enjoyed throughout 1942.131  Thus, not only was all of 
Europe working for Hitler’s war machine, but, in addition, the inactivity of the allies 
allowed German forces and her allies to advance as far as Stalin’s namesake city. 
While stressing the lack of a second front, Soviet newspapers increasingly 
emphasized that other fronts were merely “appendages” to the definitive nature of the 
Eastern Front.  Reports were expected to prioritize the Soviet-German front and put into 
context allied victories.  Red Army resistance was claimed to have “saved the neutral 
countries” of Europe.  The invasion of the Soviet Union was continually underlined as 
the main event of the war, “in one brief June night the war suddenly blazed up and 
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embroiled the world.  The Tommy and the Russian soldier clasped each other’s hands.  
We were in the war alone, on us had descended all the military might of Germany.”132   
Articles described how England, thanks to Germany’s defeat outside Moscow, 
was given “a chance to create a powerful army.”  It was thanks to Soviet workers and 
collective farmers that “the English now can talk about a second front, it is only because 
through the winter our front, the first and only one, held firm.”  The Soviet war effort also 
gave “America a chance to mobilize her industry, to build transports, to dispatch 
American troops to Europe.  We were alone all that year.  Now we are waiting on the 
front line for our friends in battle.”133   
Simultaneously, articles pointed out how Red Army soldiers questioned their 
hope for an eventual appearance of a second front.  If in the middle of June 1942 
Ehrenburg wrote how “we are awaiting the second front as one awaits a good comrade at 
the front line – it is jollier to fight together,” by the end of July he held a more subdued 
stance: “now I should say that our men are awaiting the second front in silence and 
intently…”  The second front within the pages of Soviet newspapers might not have been 
described as crucial to the war effort, but it was portrayed as a welcomed relief.  Pravda 
described Europe waiting for a second front “as in the shaft of a mine men wait for a draft 
of air.”134  Consequently, according to Soviet reports, Europe’s need for a second front 
was the equivalent of waiting for a draft of air, while Russia waited for a second front 
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because “it is jollier to fight together.”  One needed it to survive, the other to share in the 
jollity.   It appeared the Soviet Union not only bought time for the western allies to arm 
themselves and “mobilize” their industries, but additionally inflicted significant casualties 
on the Germans making it that much easier for an eventual allied invasion to occur. 
As the Red Army’s performance on the field of battle offered potential help to the 
Western Allies, simultaneously the war was not only uniting but also strengthening the 
population of the Soviet Union.  By late June a Krasnaia zvezda article discussed what 
the end of the war would signify for the Soviet population: “We are not conceited: we 
know how much inertia, bureaucracy, and stupidity we had.  In one year of war we 
learned a great deal.  When we return to our work benches, to our tractors, to our books, 
we shall be different and better, we shall work more intelligently, we shall live more 
honestly.”  The war became a device by which to unite the nation and people.  Although 
large swaths of territory were lost, Ehrenburg argued that “we can say that we are 
stronger now than in the 22nd of June, 1941...”  Ehrenburg urged his audience to 
“remember about what has been acquired and tell ourselves that the man who will return 
from the Front is worth ten prewar men…In the war we have acquired initiative, 
discipline, and inner freedom.”135  Ehrenburg’s thoughts were reflected in a letter he 
received from a Guards First Lieutenant in the summer of 1942 who exclaimed: “We 
shall return from the war, not purer, not more upright – before the war we were as pure as 
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white snow and completely upright.  We shall return wise, more clear-sighted, and 
sterner.”136 
If the above offered an example of when reader’s thoughts matched Ehrenburg’s, 
the summer of 1942 also witnessed an exchange where Ehrenburg reflected the thoughts 
of this readers.  On 14 July a letter from S. Kazantsev to Ehrenburg read: 
…we, the men at the front, beg you to write articles which may still more 
effectively summon the Russian men, small and great, to fine deeds and to 
heroism.  It is necessary to arouse in our Russian people such fury, such hatred for 
the Germans that the Russian will fight the German with whatever is available.  
So that a woman, and a little girl, an old man, and a boy may arm themselves with 
axes, scythes, stones, and in any encounter with a German kill him.  It is 
necessary to say more loudly to the Russian man: he who does not kill a German 
is helping the Germans.137 
 
Undoubtedly Ehrenburg’s response was an article he became quite infamous for, “Kill!,” 
published in Krasnaia zvezda on 24 July: 
We know everything.  We remember everything.  We have understood: the 
Germans are not human beings.  From now on the word ‘German’ is for us the 
most horrible curse.  From now on the world ‘German’ discharges a rifle.  We 
shall do no talking.  We shall not express indignation.  We will kill.  If you have 
not killed one German during the day, you have lost a day.  If you think that 
instead of you your neighbor will kill a German, you have failed to understand the 
menace.  If you will not kill a German, a German will kill you.  He will take away 
your people, and will torture them in his accursed Germany.  If you cannot kill a 
German with a bullet, kill him with a bayonet.  If there is a momentary calm in 
your sector, if you are awaiting a battle, kill a German before the battle.  If you 
leave a German alive, a German will hang a Russian man and will dishonor a 
Russian woman.  If you have killed one German, kill another – nothing gladdens 
us more than German corpses.  Do not count the days.  Do not count the miles.  
Count one thing: the Germans you have killed.  Kill a German! – this is what an 
old mother begs of you.  Kill a German! – this is what a child implores you to do.  
Kill a German! – this is what your native land cries to you.  Do not miss fire.  Do 
not let him by.  Kill!138   
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The above exchange between the reader and Ehrenburg’s response in the form of 
one of his most often quoted pieces is one example of the population working in tandem 
with correspondents during the war, or even of readers as muses.  Ehrenburg himself 
comments in his memoirs that he received “hundreds” of requests from soldiers at the 
front to “tear the Fritzes to pieces in Red Star.”139  Not only were correspondents like 
Ehrenburg taking cues from Stalin and the censors, but readers themselves offered 
support and championed the creation of a narrative of the war that became inseparable 
from themes focused on by journalists and at times enforced by the Soviet leadership.   
 Another letter sent to Ehrenburg on 25 September 1942 was a mixture of 
emotions and exhibited once more the intertwining of the official narrative with how 
soldiers viewed the course the war was taking.  Giorgii Kobyl’nik began the war on 22 
June 1941 and witnessed Red Army retreats from Lithuania of 40-50 kilometers a day.  
Eventually, his unit remained entrenched outside Leningrad while the Germans advanced 
in the south.  He could not make sense of the situation and confessed that “I lost my 
mother, wife, son, [but] I do not cry, as I have seen more grief than I have tears.  But we 
lost all of Ukraine, the Kuban and northern Caucasus – this is what hurts [my] heart, and 
the enemy moreover is at Stalingrad and crawls further.”  Having read many of 
Ehrenburg’s articles Kobyl’nik attested to the fact that “Russians” fight well: “They go 
into the attack, die, but they go and go.”  But Russian bravery could only achieve so 
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much.  The author reiterated familiar ideas in that the army needed more tanks and 
planes, which they lacked compared to the Germans who had all of Europe working for 
them.140 
By the end of 1942 Soviet journalists began authoring articles that pointed to the 
tangible differences evident between the Red Army of June 1941 and December 1942.  
When visiting a general at his observation post, Simonov witnessed the report of a 
German tank advance.  After listening to the report, the general “calmly gives orders to 
fire at the tanks from all available artillery, and issues a few additional orders regarding 
artillery support.”  Simonov wrote how “The calmness of the division commander is not 
the ostentatious calmness of a man who only wants to inspire bravery in the hearts of 
subordinates, but the inner calmness of a man who is confident that the danger will be 
overcome.  I am convinced that the same commander would not have been as calm 
fifteen months ago when confronted with the same report about advancing tanks…”141   
By the end of 1942 Soviet reporters perceived a radical change in the course of 
the war, if Moscow signaled the Germans could be defeated, victory at Stalingrad meant 
they would be.  While the Wehrmacht advanced to Stalingrad and held the city under 
siege for months, by the end of November a Soviet counter-offensive encircled the largest 
German army on the Eastern Front.  The end of large-scale retreats and the ability to 
counter the enemy with commanders engrained with a confidence they lacked fifteen 
months previously proved a turning point for the Red Army.  In the latter phase of the 
war Ehrenburg wrote, “if all the enslaved peoples have gained hope, it is because in 
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October 1941 Russia…did not surrender; it is because Stalingrad was the personification 
of the Russian and Soviet soul.”142  By the end of 1942, those who might question 
Stalin’s actions during the first six months of the war now had new scapegoats to fixate 
on, while a new narrative was spun around the mistakes made and turned them into 
foreseen consequences of a grandiose strategy meant to disorient and destroy an opponent 
that all of Europe quaked under and worked for.   
German advances against Stalingrad and their eventual defeated lined up with 
Soviet attempts to tighten control over the media as there was a fear of reporters 
inadvertently divulging military secrets due to inadequate experience.  Limits were 
placed on the number of reporters at the front as the state hoped to control the flow of 
information.  Correspondents went through additional training, while lists were circulated 
with pre-approved subjects for both journalists and photojournalists to adhere to.  
Simultaneously, censors continued their work.  In 1943 Ehrenburg’s book One Hundred 
Letters, a collection of articles and letters received from soldiers at the front, was about to 
be published when all of a sudden it was “withdrawn.”  When inquiring for a reason 
about its rejection from publication he was told: “This isn’t 1941.”143   
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Studying War while Waging War 
As the war unfolded, there were academic and military publications that 
documented and attempted to explain its course.  Major General Mikhail Galaktionov’s 
June 1942 article in Voennaia Mysl, put forward an analysis behind the reasons for 
Germany’s failed Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union and provided the initial framework 
for what became the concept of “active defense,” which Stalin soon appropriated in order 
to explain away the defeats of 1941 and 1942.  Galaktionov stressed that German forces 
were insufficient to take on the great expanses of Russia and described how Soviet 
defensive tactics strained the Wehrmacht’s ability to advance.  In viewing the results of 
the 1941-42 campaign against the Red Army, Galaktionov saw only “inglorious ruin” for 
the Germans among “the boundless Russian expanses.”144   
Similarly, in July 1943, another article in Voennaia Mysl’, written by Lieutenant 
General Evgenii Shilovskii, a professor at the General Staff Academy, gave a more 
objective overview of Soviet operations during the Moscow Counter-Offensive stating: 
“the troops mastered and successfully applied mainly the more simple methods of 
operations; more complex methods – operations of encirclement, deep penetrations – 
were less successful, and sometimes failed completely.”  The overestimation of Red 
Army abilities could be further seen as Shilovskii observed how “decisive objectives 
were set as soon as possible before the beginning of operations.  Sometimes, the scope of 
these objectives exceeded available forces and means.  In the future, we learned better to 
match operational tasks with forces available for their execution.”145  Where Galaktionov 
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championed “active defense,” Shilovskii spoke of the Red Army’s education through 
war, both ideas supported Stalin’s dominant narrative of the war.   
In conjunction with the above examples, a “historic” narrative was being created 
by a commission – authorized by a decision of the Moscow Committee in December 
1941 – tasked with compiling a history of the defense of Moscow.  The result of the 
commission’s initial work was a 360 page study entitled “The Defense of Moscow with 
troops from the Moscow Defensive Zone,” submitted on 22 February 1942.146  It 
contained not only “historic” but “current value.”  The study offered a description of the 
defense of Moscow, a very dry and technical document meant for academic and military 
consumption.  It included material on the formation of volunteer units, the movements 
and creation of units assigned to the Moscow defensive zone, and discussed some of the 
inadequacies of the Red Army but never listed casualties sustained by Soviet troops while 
sometimes mentioning German trophies and losses in passing.  The significance of this 
work lies in that it was one of the first, if not the first, attempts to document aspects of the 
war’s development for future academic studies. 
In examining this document it becomes apparent that the internal language used in 
studies created for military experts to describe the war mirrored that which the population 
was regularly exposed to.  Throughout the report there is little to no mention about the 
beginning of the war or what lessons could be drawn from it.  The text described the 
German strategy up to the Moscow Counter-Offensive as “vicious and adventurous” 
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while opposing it with “full force” the “Stalinist strategy” was revealed and enriched 
existing Soviet military doctrine.147   
Stalin’s role was emphasized as his 3 July 1941 radio address was treated as the 
reason for a surge of “patriotic enthusiasm” unleashed by the “masses of Soviet citizens,” 
leading to the swelling of the people’s militia ranks with “patriots of our country.”  In 
describing the German lunge toward Moscow, the report noted that when confronted 
“with the tactics of active defense and persistent counter-attacks by the Red Army, the 
German command was forced to quickly abandon the frontal attack against 
Moscow…”148  This mention of an “active defense” ran counter to orders issued by Red 
Army commanders.  For instance, Konstantin Rokossovskii’s commanding officer, Ivan 
Konev, forbid any mention of a “mobile defense” and insisted that Rokossovskii’s forces 
fight stubbornly on their defensive line.149  The idea of an active defense, soon to become 
entrenched in Soviet thinking about 1941, masked the true situation the Red Army 
encountered. 
At the gates of Moscow, the Wehrmacht was met with a “carefully thought-out, 
wise Stalinist strategy,” which came to define the initial period of war on the Eastern 
Front.  Concentrated from the far rear were new armies, moved up in a timely manner for 
measured counter-strikes at specific strategic points.  Stalinist strategy not only came to 
mean the use of “active defense” to lure the enemy into the hinterland, but also 
everything that was needed to eventually defeat the Wehrmacht on the approaches to 
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Moscow.  This included husbanding resources and manpower within the Red Army.  The 
timing of the attack was also left up to Stalin to dictate, as a perfectly timed counter-
strike would result in the creation of a “fracture” along the front.150   
This internal study was initially set to expand its parameters as a 2 January 1943 
letter to the secretary of the Central Committee, Shcherbakov, and the head of Agitprop, 
Aleksandrov, described how the commission’s work had evolved since its creation 
“beyond the original assignment.”  Studies about the defense of Moscow needed to 
encompass discussions of operations around Tula and Kalinin, which were heavily tied 
into the defensive operations around Moscow as the Germans were planning to encircle 
Moscow from the north and south.  The Academy of Sciences of the USSR created a 
group consisting of researchers to collect and organize materials dealing with the entire 
Great Patriotic War.151  Their assignment was to collect material and compile histories of 
the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Tula, Sevastopol, and Odessa as well as a 
general compilation chronicling the events of the Second World War and the histories of 
individual combat formations, primarily the accomplishments of Guards units.   
Soon, the creation of numerous commissions to outline the war’s history meant 
the NKVD felt a need to intervene and create barriers to the perceived unlimited use of 
archival information.  In May of 1943 Aleksandrov received a letter from Beria’s deputy, 
Sergei Kruglov, outlining how commissions on the history of the war have formed in 
each republic as well as the formation of regional and provincial commissions.  These 
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organizations began soliciting files from institutions, which Kruglov insisted contradicted 
decision No. 723 of the People’s Commissar of the USSR from 29 March 1941 in that the 
access to materials violated the historical orderliness of the documents that was created 
by institutions during the war.  The use of archival information by so many different 
organizations made it more difficult to utilize needed information on a scientific and 
historical basis as well as for “practical purposes,” and created the possibility that 
valuable materials might become lost or damaged.152   
With the archives under the aegis of the NKVD, Kruglov outlined conditions for 
their continued use and simultaneously placed limits on future research.  The forwarding 
of materials for the purpose of study or publication should only be done by copies and 
they should be “certified” as authentic copies.  All commissions needed to include a 
representative of the Department of the State Archives of the NKVD and their local 
organs.  The removal of individual documents from the archives was to be prohibited and 
the commission, in tandem with the Department of the State Archives of the NKVD, 
needed to develop a procedure for the use of documents.  The implementation of these 
measures would “enable the commissions, on the basis of already collected material from 
state archives, to comprehensively study the history of the Patriotic War.”153  These 
procedures, although cloaked in some necessary concerns over archival collections, 
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undoubtedly served an ulterior purpose and helped limit future research and publications 
on the war.  
Another internal document, published in 1943 under the aegis of the General 
Staff’s military-historical section, was the study of the Battle of Moscow, originally titled 
“Razgrom nemetskikh voisk pod Moskvoi.”154  While the previous study was authored by 
mid-ranking Red Army commanders, this General Staff study was edited by Marshal 
Boris Shaposhnikov, and compiled by a commission headed by previously mentioned 
Lieutenant General Evgenii Shilovskii, working with colonels and generals.  In some 
ways this report can be seen as the culmination of the previous study on the Moscow 
Defensive Zone.  Whereas the account of the defensive zone attempted to explain how 
the Germans were stopped, the discussion of the German defeat outside Moscow brought 
to closure the initial period of the war and signaled a turning point.  The study discussed 
the reasons for why the German armed forces were able to achieve victories in the initial 
period of the war.  They included: 1) Germany’s armed forces were mobilized and were 
superior to their Red Army opponent; 2) Germany had two years of wartime experience; 
3) The Wehrmacht enjoyed a superiority in mechanized forces and air power; 4) 
Germany began the war with a “perfidious attack” against the Soviet Union without a 
declaration of war; 5) German troops were “drunk” on previous victories and raised in the 
“spirit of ‘invincibility’ and disdain for the enemy.”155   
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The study epitomized ideas and the textual language of future Soviet literature on 
the war years while Stalin was alive.  Superior German equipment permitted the 
Wehrmacht to attack in multiple directions and “carry out maneuver operations” allowing 
for large advances.  The Red Army, compared to the Wehrmacht, was a “still young” 
force that “having fought only four months” had yet to become a “fully cadre force, while 
facing at the same time the Germans cadre navy and army, which have been waging war 
for two years.”  Soviet operations were presented as if part of a larger plan to defeat the 
Germans at Moscow, masking the ad hoc measures being implemented by Stalin and his 
commanders.  German losses were regularly stated while mention of general Soviet 
losses was avoided.156   
Stalin took center stage while Red Army commanders were hardly mentioned and 
members of military councils were omitted.  Commanding officers, like Zhukov, when 
mentioned were described as “executors” of “the operational plans of the Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief.”  Stalin was portrayed as the “manipulator” of events as due to his 
“wise leadership” Red Army troops were able to wear down the enemy.  German plans 
“proved to be impracticable and adventuristic and led the German-Fascist troops to defeat 
at Moscow.”  Stalin’s speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution “answered all 
the questions which at that moment were agitating the soldiers and commanders.  They 
learned of the reasons behind our armies temporary setbacks...”  Stalin’s words “literally 
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transformed” how the “rank and file” viewed the war.  The result was “a sharp turning 
point…in the consciousness and attitudes of the soldiers and commanders.”157 
It is quite telling that both internal studies meant for professional military analysis 
were riddled with such inaccuracies and hosannas toward Stalin.  He not only led the 
army, including the air force and people, but also managed to organize reserves and their 
timely arrival at needed sectors of the front, which “played a decisive role in the course 
of the Battle of Moscow.”158  References to “active defense” were continuously made as 
orders from the Supreme High Command called for “waging a stubborn and active 
defense” in the face of the German advance so as to “delay” the enemy “until favorable 
conditions arose for passing over to a decisive counteroffensive.”  By the end of 
November and beginning of December the previously mentioned “permanent operating 
factors” were now at work and signaled that “realistic conditions for changing the overall 
course” of the war on the Soviet-German front existed.”159  The eventual victory before 
Moscow was made possible by “the grand patriotism of the Soviet people, the bravery 
and skill of the Red Army, and comrade Stalin’s wise leadership.”160  Thus, the seeds of a 
Stalinist dominated wartime and postwar narrative can be seen to have been planted 
within this study.   
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The Red Army Victorious and on the Offensive – 1943-1945  
 By the beginning of February 1943, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus’s Sixth Army 
was destroyed by Red Army forces in and around Stalingrad and Stalin’s place within the 
war’s narrative assumed a new form.  Werth found a change in official reports that now 
began to mention “Stalinist strategy” and “the Stalinist military school of thought” 
combined with “the military genius of Stalin.”161  From this point on Soviet advances 
against the Wehrmacht were the norm with slight reverses giving Germans false hope and 
the Red Army continued awareness that the enemy had yet to be critically weakened.   
With Red Army forces attacking, Stalin still searched for answers as to why the 
Red Army was defeated in the initial period of the war while putting into context the 
Soviet Union’s role in the anti-Hitler coalition.  The “laws of history” (perhaps leaning 
on a Marxist interpretation) were put forward as an explanation, stating that the aggressor 
nation is always better prepared for war than peace-loving nations.162  Simultaneously, 
the second front remained a significant issue.  The Sovinformburo insisted that 
Ehrenburg’s articles for the foreign press needed to “stress” Soviet loyalty to the allies 
but at the same time “not fail to remind them that it was time to open the Second 
Front.”163  Stalin considered the activities of the Western Allies on secondary fronts as 
creating the necessary conditions for an eventual invasion of mainland Europe, ultimately 
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treating the second front as a means to a quicker conclusion, rather than a necessity for 
victory.164 
 Soviet advances coincided with an increase in Lend Lease deliveries but a 
reduction in reportage on allied aid.  While the lack of a second front was regularly 
singled out as part of the reason for German victories, the import of allied war materials 
was a “sensitive issue” for the Soviets.  Industrialization needed to be justified as part of 
the crash program Stalin created in order for the country to catch up to the west.  As a 
result, one of the reasons the defeats in 1941 came as such a shock to Soviet citizens was 
due to their continuous exposure to propaganda assurances about the amount of 
technology that stood behind the Red Army.  Lauding the enemy’s technological prowess 
could result in accusations of a defeatist attitude.  1943, however, was not 1941.  By the 
beginning of 1943, Soviet technological and scientific achievements were declared one of 
the causes for the war’s crucial turn against the Germans and the press went as far as to 
deny “that Germany had enjoyed a technological advantage at the start of the war.”165 
 Previously, there was an omission of any open condemnation of military 
ineptitude regarding the deployment of the Red Army during the initial period of the war.  
On 14 January 1943 an article argued that “we had no combat experience in 1941, we 
learned to fight by fighting.”  This explanation, however true, fit well with existing 
circumstances.166  By February 1943, earlier shortcomings within Soviet forces were 
allowed mention as it was claimed “stupid and harmful linear tactics” were now replaced 
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by maneuver warfare.167  Simonov’s 22 July article, “In the District of Ponyry,” echoed 
the above change.  Speaking from the point of view of a Red Army Brigade commander, 
Simonov saw how officers “had acquired experience and calm…they were becoming 
cured of the ‘infantile’ disorders which had tormented them during the first months of the 
war.”168  While the Red Army was apparently learning to wage war on a more 
professional level, casualty reports continued to downplay Soviet losses while 
exaggerating German casualties.169 
 At the end of 1943 Stalin spoke to a crowd gathered in Moscow and justified the 
legacy of his leadership.  The Red Army might have played its part in defeating Germany 
at the gates of Moscow and Stalingrad, but he emphasized “that it had not been working 
on its own.  It was time to celebrate the party and the government, the men and women 
who had stayed at home.”  For Stalin, “Soviet power that was established twenty-six 
years ago has turned our country – in a brief historical period – into an inviolable 
fortress.”170  The war served as vindication for the 1917 revolution and Stalinist practices 
in the 1920s and 1930s, Stalin and those who remained close to him were justified in 
their decision-making process which had resulted in an eventual ability to defeat the 
Germans and turn the war in the Red Army’s favor. 
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The long-awaited invasion of mainland Europe by the Western Allies took place 
in June 1944.  Successive news broadcasts treated the landing in “glowing terms” the 
next day.  Two full pages were devoted by Pravda to the story and Ehrenburg wrote in 
Krasnaia zvezda that “It has Begun!” while expressing “the pride of the Soviet people in 
their ‘brothers-in-arms.’”  Over the next few days, the success enjoyed by the allies was 
“widely praised” with Stalin commenting that “the history of war does not know a similar 
undertaking in breadth of intention, grandiosity of scale and mastery of execution.”171 
 Even with the success of the Normandy landings the Soviet press continued to 
stress the important position the USSR maintained in comparison to the other allies, 
positioning the Soviet Union as “the moral and military head of the Grand Alliance.”  
The enthusiasm of the initial invasion in the days that followed was soon forgotten as 
coverage once more reverted to stale descriptions of strategic and operational movements 
in the West.  The main concentration of the Soviet press remained the German-Soviet 
front.  Soviet media fixated on the number of German divisions opposing the Red Army 
as Stalin himself joined in on November 1944 by noting “that there were 75 German 
divisions in the West and 200 in the East.”172  
Early 1945 saw a continuation of the Soviet media’s propaganda in regards to the 
burden the Red Army faced compared to the other allies.  Pravda’s weekly summary of 
world news stressed that the vast majority of the fighting was taking place on the Eastern 
Front while German forces located in the “West were undertrained and undergunned.”173  
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An article by Ehrenburg on 11 April entitled “Enough!” described German soldiers 
surrendering to the western allies with “fanatical enthusiasm” in contrast to costly Red 
Army advances.  He exclaimed that Soviet forces “did not take Koenigsberg by 
telephone” nor were they going to take Vienna with “cameras.”174
  
Ehrenburg was soon 
rebuked by the head of Agitprop, Aleksandrov, for “over-simplifying” the situation.175  
Although Aleksandrov agreed that German troops were being moved east, he argued this 
was “an attempt to sow mistrust among the members of the anti-Hitler coalition.”176  In 
response, Ehrenburg wrote to Stalin that he did not see himself guilty of Aleksandrov’s 
accusations, claiming instead that he was not expressing his own “line [but] the feelings 
of the people.”177
  
Consequently, Ehrenburg seemed to believe that he retained a freedom 
and ability to portray and interpret events as he saw fit.
 
The public, to some extent, agreed with Ehrenburg’s line of thinking, 
demonstrating that they preferred the line some journalists were championing over that of 
highly placed officials who undoubtedly represented Stalin’s position.  Ehrenburg 
himself commented how he “received so many sympathetic letters” in the wake of 
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Aleksandrov’s article.178  A letter from Major Grigorii Kobylnik claimed that frontline 
troops were surprised by Aleksandrov’s stance, and that Ehrenburg correctly described 
Germany as “one huge gang.”  Another frontline soldier wrote that “comrade 
Aleksandrov speaks from the point of view of the TsK [Central Committee] and reflects 
the party line, however my voice and the voice of my comrades are with you.”  
Consequently, at least some evidence exists that correspondents had support for their 
version of the war and even public opposition by highly ranked officials did not always 
mean the party line would be blindly followed by readers and the opinions of 
correspondents ignored.  Ehrenburg’s rebuke did not mean an end to Soviet reports on 
Germany’s lackluster performance in the west as articles continuously placed the USSR 
at the center of the allied effort and as the driving force behind the anti-Hitler coalition.179 
As the Soviet Union’s role as liberator was being played out in the press, authors 
continued analyzing the significance of 1941.  Ehrenburg’s 16 June 1945 article 
commented on the “greatness” of the Soviet Union, whose “stoutness of heart is not 
tested by roses, but by iron.”  Ehrenburg saw 1941 and 1942 as years of “suffering” from 
which “our victory rose.”  As the German Army advanced past burnt cities and Red 
Army divisions were encircled and destroyed, the Soviet population “did not lose heart, 
they did not submit.”180  Grossman connected the liberation of Europe to the initial 
suffering the Soviet population underwent: “He who has not tasted the grief of the 
                                                 
178 Ehrenburg, The War 1941-1945, 178. 
 
179 Frezinskii, 210, 211; Johnston, 59-60. 
 
180 Ehrenburg and Simonov, 489. 
 90 
summer of 1941 will not understand in the depths of his being the happiness of our 
victory.”181   
A minor concession was made by Stalin in May of 1945 when he addressed the 
Red Army’s victorious generals in the Great Kremlin Palace.  Stalin admitted that “our 
government made not a few mistakes, there were times in 1941-1942 when we were in a 
desperate situation, when our army retreated…” but such an admission made little impact 
as publications on the war were forbidden and attention was soon taken up by a new 
enemy that had appeared on the cold horizon.182 
 
Controlling the Memory of the War 
In the immediate postwar period Stalin started to do away with anything that was 
not part of a polished, sanitized version of Soviet experiences in the Second World War.  
The “freedom” of the early war years was forgotten as long as the memory of the war 
constituted a threat to Stalin’s power.  According to a 1969 samizdat article, even private 
thoughts could result in arrest.  Colonel Mikhail Meshcheriakov’s letter to Stalin, wherein 
he questioned aspects of the Stalinist narrative of the war, serves as one example – he lost 
six teeth during the ensuing “interrogation.”  Consequently, Stalin’s cult of personality 
reached its zenith as it “manifest” itself to its greatest degree in the postwar period while 
his status as demigod was cemented in the minds of the population.183   
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As Stalin’s cult dominated the war’s narrative, there appeared limits on 
publications of personal experiences.  The idea of a “strategy of active defense,” as 
championed by many in the wake of 1941, depicted the war as all part of Stalin’s “genius 
plan” that consisted of luring the enemy into the depths of the country, while 
simultaneously preparing the necessary conditions for a counterattack at the gates of 
Moscow.  The theme of sacrifice, so familiar to many during the war years, was played 
down by Soviet media outlets.184  Many understood their memories needed to be 
amended to fit the state’s version of events and mirror Stalin’s interpretations, creating a 
shared war experience that extended from the top to the bottom.  Deviation from the 
Stalinist version of events was initially evident but soon extinguished as memories that 
opposed the party line were publicly attacked.   
With Stalin continuously found at the center of events, historians were left with 
nothing to do but repeat well known myths.  Khrushchev would comment when recording 
his memoirs in the late 1960s that in general “no one else had the right to think as Stalin 
did.  He was the only genius.  Therefore he should be the only one to say anything 
new…” while everyone else could only “propagandize” and “popularize” his ideas, no 
matter the topic under discussion.185  Military science, as a result, made no progress as 
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publications leaned on Stalinist rhetoric.  Phrases snatched out of context became the 
backbone of historical arguments and publications.186 
Aside from amending the war’s historiography, moves were also made to 
discourage discussions and public expressions revolving around the memory of the war.  
Moscow Radio announced on 9 May 1945 that in honor of the war’s conclusion the day 
would be treated as a “festival” and a general holiday.   The Victory Day parade was held 
on 24 June 1945.  There was no parade the following year with localized events taking its 
place.  In 1947 Victory Day was done away with as a state holiday, not to be resurrected 
until 1965.  This decision, combined with the prohibition of demobilized soldiers to form 
veterans’ organizations in the immediate postwar period, severed the ability of veterans 
to gather for public recognition.  Another reason for abolishing Victory Day as a state 
holiday might have stemmed from its memory being entwined with the victory over Nazi 
Germany being an allied affair rather than remembered and commemorated mainly as a 
Russian/Soviet victory.187  Finally, Stalin did not want the public to dwell on the damage 
sustained during the war years, instead the war needed to be seen as a stepping stone with 
focus oriented on the future rather than the past.  Not only was the victory over Germany 
a justification of the 1930s, but it was a bridge to a new society, built on the blood and 
sacrifice of millions. 
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Stalin also felt threatened by famous and well-known commanders and some, like 
Zhukov in June 1946, were reassigned to remote outposts for command duties while 
others suffered incarceration or execution.  Zhukov’s transfer came as a response to a 
denunciation by Aleksandr Novikov, Chief Marshal of aviation of the Soviet Air Force, 
who on 30 April 1946 accused Zhukov of appropriating many of the victories of the 
Great Patriotic War for himself while downplaying Stalin’s role in them.  Novikov’s 
statements were in response to his own arrest and denunciation by Sergei Khudiakov, an 
air force commander who was arrested, interrogated and eventually executed in 1950.188  
However, when Stalin turned on a figure Soviet propaganda had regularly praised, he was 
met by opposition from Zhukov’s wartime comrades.  Marshal Konev believed it was 
only a matter of time before others would be targeted if Zhukov went undefended.189  
Thus, the war had given commanding officers something of a cushion when it came to 
defending their reputations in the face of Stalin’s hostility – although that did not mean 
that consequences were not forthcoming.  Further humiliations followed as Zhukov was 
excluded from the war’s history.190   
As Zhukov was being written out of the memory of the war, some, like Marshal 
of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevskii, who considered publishing his memoirs, was 
told by Stalin that “to write memoirs right after great events, at a time when passions 
were still too high and unbalanced, the memoirs would not have the required 
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objectivity.”191  Similarly, Zhukov recalled how Stalin approached him to ask “What, are 
you going to write the history of the war?  Don’t.  Let historians handle it when we are 
dead.”192     
Historians, however, were hard pressed to publish anything as they “were 
muzzled” and their inability to explore the war period meant additional suffering for 
many of the war’s victims.  Lazar Lazarev comments that “Historians quickly understood 
that their job was to embroider prepared patterns using beautiful materials to delight the 
eye, not to conduct research into facts.”  With no access to archival documentation or 
original research taking place, former prisoners of war, survivors of Nazi concentration 
camps, and those who lived through the German occupation were discriminated against 
and continued to suffer based on the false assumptions propagated by the state during the 
war and the postwar period.193 
As veterans lost their identity within war literature, the film industry was another 
area where censorship about the war became the norm.  Until Stalin’s death there was a 
“film famine” as for political and economic reasons Soviet film production was 
practically halted.  What films did appear featured Stalin as the central figure; he soon 
became the only recognized “hero” of the war.  While two successful movies appeared on 
Soviet screens relating the heroism of Soviet soldiers and partisans, specifically Story of a 
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Real Man and The Young Guard, Denise J. Youngblood argues how Soviet directors 
understood that in fact their films were really about Stalin, “the one true war hero.”194  
 Other memories of the war were also suppressed or brought under Stalin’s 
control.  For instance, few war photographs were allowed to be republished until the late 
1950s.195  Furthermore, one account claims that in the war’s aftermath, Stalin ordered all 
Soviet war photographers to destroy their negatives.  Only those that best represented the 
“heroic struggle” of the war period escaped destruction.196  Additionally, captured 
German photographs were stored away until decades after the war.197  Thus, every aspect 
of the memory of the war came under attack as Stalin silenced literary figures, historians, 
film makers, photographers and veterans themselves.198   
 
Appropriating the Correct Terminology and Writing the War’s History 
While veterans were silenced and historians “muzzled,” the state still needed to 
address the war’s history and in order to craft a narrative that centered on Stalin a familiar 
framework needed to be utilized.  Thus, publications in the postwar period leaned on the 
idea of “active defense” to describe how German advantages were nullified as time was 
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gained for the reorganization of the country’s economy for war and for the mobilization 
and deployment of the Red Army’s major forces for an eventual “counteroffensive.”199   
What began as military jargon entered the public sphere and was appropriated by 
Stalin.  The concepts of active defense and the counteroffensive were reconfigured for 
political expediency to signify how retreats were preplanned defensive actions that were 
utilized “until the permanently operating factors of war could be brought into play.”  
Initially both terms were contextualized by Major-General N. Talenskii in an article 
published in Voennaia mysl’ in 1946 under the title “The Strategic Counteroffensive.”200 
The concept was introduced to the public in a letter written by Stalin to a Colonel 
Razin, published in February 1947.  In essence, Razin’s letter consisted of the idea that 
Stalin implemented a highly complex yet subtle strategy against the German invasion, 
that of the “counteroffensive.”  The theory of the counteroffensive was “more 
sophisticated” and helped explain why an active defense was needed in the first place.  
From the arena of military historians the concept was transported into the public sphere 
after it appeared on 22 June 1947 in an article in Pravda, written by the above mentioned 
Talenskii.  He argued the strategy of the counteroffensive was brought to perfection in 
the battles of the Second World War – under Stalin’s guidance.201 
Although initially both concepts were propagated among military minds within 
military publications, they created a framework during the war that eventually allowed 
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Stalin to not only take the credit for military operations but to also utilize pieces written 
by military commanders and point to them as evidence of his own genius.202  The stage 
was now set for the creation of a history of the Great Patriotic War dominated by Stalin’s 
Cult of Personality.203  The limits Stalin placed on studying the Soviet war experience 
meant few could outright question his claims of genius in strategic planning and his 
command achievements.204   
One of the most important sources for understanding the war’s progression 
became Stalin’s speech from 9 February 1945.  With the war coming to an end, the 
speech spelled out an official formula made ready for “highly stylized recitations” that 
many others began to emulate.  Historians agree that this speech, covering the lessons of 
victory, began to codify various themes that were previously present during the war.205  
Stalin focused on three main lessons from the war years.  In successfully withstanding 
and opposing the German invasion, the Soviet system demonstrated how popular it truly 
was and showcased that a socialist system could accomplish something many of its 
capitalist counterparts could not.  Secondly, the unity of the population strengthened the 
Soviet war effort, providing evidence that the Soviet Union, as a multinational state, 
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offered the best answer to cooperation among nationalities.  Finally, the Soviet Union’s 
power was confirmed through the strength and success of the Red Army’s victory.206   
The Stalinist narrative created the impression that victory was made possible due 
to the measures taken in the prewar period.  The Soviet Union’s entrance into the war 
was facilitated by the production and material potential of collectivization and 
industrialization, including the huge bureaucracy created as Stalin assumed greater 
control over the country.  This was all preparation for an eventual showdown with Nazi 
Germany, while the purges of the 1930s strengthened the state.  Stalinist methods were 
presented to the population as being central to saving the USSR from the German 
invasion, rather than guilty of making the war so costly for Soviet citizens.207   
The baptism of fire encountered in the war forged an unbreakable bond between 
the Party and the rest of the population, creating a “morale-political unity of Soviet 
society.”208  Attention was shifted away from the soldiers themselves and onto the system 
that sustained, taught, and led them.  Inherent was the idea that behind the gallantry of the 
Red Army was the wise decision-making Party, the strengthened Soviet economy, and 
the preparations undertaken in the prewar period relying on “active defense” to see the 
country through its most desperate moments.  Thus, the bravery and valor of Soviet 
troops took second place to Party policies and politics. 
Stalin’s speech signified a shift from military campaigns and achievements to the 
economic and political foundations that were able to sustain them.  Such an adjustment to 
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the war’s history facilitated two shifts that remained intrinsic parts of the postwar 
narrative.  The role of the Party became enlarged while that of the people, soldiers and 
military leadership was diminished.  The war’s portrayal relied on abstract notions, rather 
than bloody encounters that left a marked trace on every frontline veteran and defined the 
war experience for more than one generation.209  With the war depicted as a “bloodless” 
affair, the memories of the defeats in 1941 were erased to be replaced by universal myths.   
Propaganda put out by the state either outright ignored or denied the failures of 
the government and military during the initial period of the war.  Arguments leaned on 
Stalin’s 3 July 1941 speech in regards to Germany’s advantages during the invasion and 
the unfavorable position Red Army forces found themselves in.  Unlike German troops, 
Soviet forces needed to be mobilized and sent to the front.  Success of the attack on the 
Soviet Union was said to have been aided by secret preparations, the suddenness of the 
invasion, and the violation of the non-aggression pact of August 1939.210   
These initial arguments were soon supplemented by a select group of publications 
that covered the Great Patriotic War and all focused on Stalin.  The war was consigned to 
becoming a chapter of Stalin’s biography, one of his achievements.  These texts, building 
on wartime themes, along with other speeches and publications by Stalin, were the 
starting position for all research undertaken on the war.  Additional support was provided 
by “laudatory articles” about Stalin and a few select pamphlets and texts, which further 
helped standardize the military narrative of the war, and Fasifiers of History – A 
Historical Rectification, which attacked western “falsifications” of the German-Soviet 
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war.211  Those who tried to utilize sources material deemed unacceptable were denied the 
use of key documents.212  Any literature that appeared before Stalin’s death reiterated and 
leaned on these publications.   
By 1948 the Stalinist narrative of the war was virtually complete in its dominance.  
That year Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Nikolai Bulganin, presented a 
report entitled “Thirty Years of the Soviet Armed Forces.”  The report echoed previous 
Stalinist clichés while adding “the source of power of the Soviet Armed Forces is the 
wise leadership…of the organizer of our victories, our leader and teacher, Comrade 
Stalin.  Comrade Stalin prepared our country for defense, [he] developed and 
implemented a program to defeat the enemy, uniting and directing all efforts of the 
people and army to achieve victory.”213  By 1949 the war’s narrative existed within a 
self-contained system that relied on previous publications to continuously reiterate 
themes that set a precedent for future publications.214  Stalin, as the external voice of 
authority, cultivated his image and role within the Second World War and made sure to 
silence any perceived opposition. 
The existence of the idea of a “strategy of active defense” allowed for a number 
of erroneous conclusions to be reached when operations were evaluated.  Although this 
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cover-up of failure was mainly concentrated on the first two years of the war, there were 
also operations in the latter period that were deemed too sensitive.  For instance, the 
results of the German counteroffensive that became the third battle of Kharkov in 1943 
were suppressed.  When the official history of the war covered the battle in the third 
volume, the head editor recalled “how difficult it was to find materials and give an 
assessment of the facts, because these pages of history were simply suppressed.  Nothing 
intelligible was ever published on this issue.”215   
Members of the commission assigned to write the war’s history under 
Khrushchev recalled how the “manifestation” of Stalin’s cult within histories of the war 
was most evident in how Stalin’s military talents were glorified.  Lenin’s legacy “was 
consigned to oblivion” while the Party’s leadership abilities, the people and armed forces 
were “belittled.”  Successful operations, such as Stalingrad, the “ten blows of 1944” and 
the final stages of the war, were attributed entirely to Stalin.  The “ten blows of 1944,” as 
they were initially called, soon assumed the title of “Stalin’s blows.”  During Stalin’s 
lifetime, in literature on the operations of 1944, the heroic actions of Soviet troops were 
overshadowed by the greater attention devoted to Stalin.  Commanding officers were 
simply shown to be “transmitters of STAVKA directives to the troops,” a middleman 
who deserved little glory.  Stalin’s “leadership, his insights, his alleged extraordinary 
military genius” dominated virtually all publications on the history of the war.216   
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Opposition  
While Stalin’s genius was championed and Soviet failures continued to be 
covered up there was an initial attempt at questioning the true reasons behind the retreats.  
In a 1945 article, the writer Fedor Panferov championed the need for “truthfulness in 
literature…in describing and analyzing the course of the war and the situation behind the 
front lines.”  In turn, he was heavily criticized within the pages of Literaturnaya gazeta 
and Pravda.  Panferov attacked Stalin’s portrayal of the initial period of war: “what kind 
of planned retreat was it when at one time the fate of our country was hanging by a hair.”  
Criticism of Panferov’s stance relied on the foundation set up during the war, including 
the idea of “active defense.”  The Pravda article argued how “Panferov completely fails 
to understand the significance of the period of our active defense…and is inclined to see 
in it only its dark sides.”217  Panferov contended that these issues needed to be studied, 
including that of “heroism.”  He saw how the heroism of wartime was treated by the state 
and commented that “the truth of life says that heroism is not a continuous triumphal 
procession.  Heroism is the surmounting of the most terrible difficulties…”218  
Unfortunately, altering the definition and Soviet view of heroism was impossible.   
In 1946 another article by Panferov appeared in the literary journal Oktiabr’.  The 
article attacked the postwar treatment of the war’s history denouncing “the literary 
bureaucracy…for promoting a false, prettified version of the sufferings, terrors, and 
majestic achievements of the war.”  He concluded his article with a discussion of the poor 
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portrayal of the enemy in Soviet literature, disagreeing with the official tendency to 
denigrate the Wehrmacht’s military competence.  Panferov argued that diminishing the 
German military’s abilities reduced the achievements of the Soviet Armed Forces and in 
turn “minimized the significance of the victory achieved by the Red Army.”  A memo 
from the Central Committee’s Agitprop department criticizing the article mentioned how 
Panferov’s article did not even point out how the Red Army’s fighting retreat “exhausted 
the enemy.”219  Dmitrii Shepilov, the deputy chief of Agitprop in 1947, claims Stalin 
“sometimes displayed a surprising tolerance” when it came to certain writers, one of 
whom turned out to be Panferov.220  Thus, while Panferov’s article was criticized in other 
journals, it was initially allowed to be published and went uncensored as his writing 
career continued until his death in 1960.   
Another public attack against a text on the war took place against Olga 
Dzhigurda, who published her diary in 1948.  She served as a doctor on a battleship 
during the war years and Znamia took up the publication of her Teplokhod ‘Kakhetiia.  
She was accused of opposing the war’s “official line” as her text included more 
representative descriptions of the war years that portrayed “unflattering moments...”  
Veterans came to her defense, both officers and rank-and-file soldiers.  Dzhigurda’s 
account, condemned by critics in Literaturnaia gazeta and Zvezda, gained support in a 
discussion held in May 1948.  Participants were, like Dzhigurda, veterans of the war and 
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Matthew Gallagher argues that this was “not simply a literary meeting, but a broader 
public demonstration.”221  In one spirited defense of Dzhigurda’s diary the “moral right 
of veterans” was proclaimed, including the argument that veterans had a right to tell their 
own version of events.  One frontovik was said to have exclaimed “I shed enough blood 
for our people…to have the right to see their shortcomings and defects.”222 
Petro Vershigora, a famous partisan commander, author and winner of the Stalin 
Prize, supported Dzhigurda.  He argued against her critics saying they only encouraged 
“a hypocritical portrayal of the war instead of the honest accounts the people’s sacrifices 
deserved.”  Additional support was found among military naval officers, such as Major 
General P. Musiakov, editor of the newspaper Red Fleet who claimed he could testify to 
the accuracy of Dzhigurda’s work through personal experiences while Colonel D. 
Kornienko, Deputy Chief of the Political Administration of the Navy, offered support to 
the author by showing her documentation that might enrich her work.223   
Taking the presented opportunity, Vershigora drew attention to the lack of 
literature on the siege of Leningrad, and pointed to a “highly placed conference” that 
discussed literature produced on the war “at which one writer justifiably complained that 
he had not been able to write the truth about the feat of Leningrad ‘since the literary and 
critical channels filled up with people who never had a taste of blockade.’”224  The 
collective memory of the war was seemingly created by those who never went through 
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the experiences they were describing on paper.  Vershigora’s protest of the presentation 
of the war’s history showed the issue was, to some extent, a field of contested memory.  
In the case of Dzhigurda’s diary, Weiner sees the voices of support as evidence of 
veterans “carving a space” for themselves “to voice their own versions of the wartime 
experience; it was also an expression of their desire to belong and participate…”225  And 
while perhaps many understood that they could not pen their own memories of the war, if 
they saw authentic accounts enter the public sphere they attempted to stand up in their 
defense. 
Due to the continued limits placed on historical literature, readers were forced 
into analyzing the war’s course through literary publications, from which much was 
expected.  Not all were successful in their attempts.  In 1946 Boris Polevoi’s A Story 
about a Real Man was published, based on the previously mentioned heroic exploits of 
Meres’ev, and was able to get away with a subtle reference to the ideas being propagated 
by the administration.  As Meres’ev sits next to an old man on an electric train in 
Moscow, the old man exclaims: 
You mustn’t think that because I’m a civilian that I don’t understand our plan.  I 
understand it perfectly.  It’s to entice the enemy into the steppes of the Volga, yes, 
and get him to stretch his lines of communication…then…cut his communications 
and smash him.  Yes.  And it’s a very clever plan.  We haven’t got only Hitler 
against us.  He is whipping the whole of Europe against us.  We are fighting 
singlehanded against six countries.  Singlehanded!  We’ve got to weaken the 
force of their blow at least with the aid of space. 
 
Here, in one example, came together numerous threads the Soviet public was 
exposed to for so long since the beginning of the war.  The reader is presented with the 
idea that Stalin’s ingenious plan was to lure the enemy into the Soviet hinterland only to 
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then defeat him with a well-planned and timed counteroffensive.  Additionally, there is 
mention of the numerous advantages Germany enjoyed, while the USSR was left to its 
own devices by the Western Allies.  And yet to this monologue Meres’ev’s response is to 
think the old man is talking “piffle,” claiming “Our native land is too precious to use as a 
shock absorber…”226  Thus, with one sentence Polevoi subverts Stalin’s genius planning. 
Unlike Polevoi, when Aleksandr Fadeev published his famous novel, Malaia 
Gvardiia, in 1945, two years later, after an initially favorable reception, it was attacked 
for ignoring the role of the Party in the events portrayed.  Fadeev took the next four years 
to rewrite the novel and by the time the second edition appeared, in 1951, the disclosures 
on the initial period of war were gone.  The panic and retreats of the early period were 
replaced with sections concentrating on the role of the Party and its organizing of the 
partisan underground against the Germans.  In all he would have to rewrite the novel 
twice.  Grossman suffered a similar fate.  His publications on the war, which received 
praise as late as 1946, were never again published while Stalin lived.  Ehrenburg finished 
his novel, The Storm, in 1947 and was immediately criticized for his descriptions of the 
first months of the war.  Although the population well remembered what happened, one 
criticism claimed that “Everything has been explained by Comrade Stalin.”227   
Consequently, novels and novellas about the war experience collapsed the line 
between fact and fiction.  An August 1952 letter to Grossman from A. Adamovich, a 
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major in the reserves, claimed that “the Soviet reader requires good historical fiction 
literature on the Great Patriotic War from writers, but authors should work carefully and 
painstakingly around recent history, many pages of which are written in our blood.”  To 
aid such a development within fictional literature, highly ranked veterans were ready, 
able, and willing to lend their expertise and “services” so that historical episodes could be 
“truthfully” recounted.228  Consequently, Grossman’s work was highly valued as a 
historical document, as testified by another letter from an “old miner,” sent in August 
1952, which commented how Grossman’s For a Just Cause was the best thing written 
about the war.  The author also took the opportunity to question how it was that 
Stalingrad was not evacuated in time, even though it was already the second year of the 
war.  When evacuations did occur, they were in the midst of enemy bombardments – this 
signified an unforgiveable lack of foresight.229   
Although authors that decided to discuss the war in the immediate postwar period 
were not punished for their views, even if criticized, they were the exception to the rule.  
In some ways literary authors were once again at the forefront as they could readily write 
about their own experiences without needing to consult government documents or 
archival information.  Unfortunately, the function of the majority of literary works in this 
period was to reiterate previous ideas about the Party’s leadership and mobilizing 
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abilities, and highlight Stalin’s genius.230  But a few literary figures started a process that 
would progress into the period after Stalin’s death by allowing Soviet readers a more 
unvarnished appraisal of the war, including depictions of cowardice, ineptitude, and 
heroism at the front.231   
Opposition to the official narrative of the war’s history was evident among the 
population, even if not regularly encountered.  More so, Gallagher argues that since the 
history of the war was not subject to the usual propaganda campaign that other aspects of 
Soviet society were exposed to, this showed that “The official history of the war…was 
propagated more by indirection and innuendo than by the more usual methods of 
bandwagon publicity.”  From the available evidence, only a few publications made a 
lasting impact and censorship against anyone who tried to write on the war was evident.  
Gallagher thus contends, “The fact that prominent opponents of the official line suffered 
no immediate or open reprisal for their temerity testifies to the noiselessness of the 
campaign and the disinclination of the authorities to draw attention to embarrassing 
issues.”  Consequently, it can be argued that since there was no single officially 
propagandized narrative, subjects that were mentioned yet omitted from general 
discussion within available literature could not be easily dismissed without delving into 
issues that were best left forgotten.  Although various investigations might have been 
carried out during this period, as when the attorney general investigated the 28 
Panfilovtsy, the myth persisted.  Without an official declaration of what could be 
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discussed the limited freedom enjoyed by editors and authors meant they could “probe 
for the outer limits of official tolerance...”232 
 
Voroshilov Cements Stalin’s Reputation 
With an official publication on the war continually missing and Stalin selecting 
what parts of the wartime narrative to keep in place and what to relegate to the dustbin of 
history, the stage was set for a culminating twenty-four page publication in 1949 by 
Kliment Voroshilov.  Voroshilov served in the war, although disgraced on a number of 
occasions, he was apparently deemed competent enough to claim authorship of A 
Commander of Genius of the Great Patriotic War.233  Voroshilov created a periodization 
of the war based on specific wartime events.  The first period included operations from 
June 1941 through the German encirclement at Stalingrad, which, according to 
Voroshilov, was the result of “active defense” in combination with “counterattacks” 
culminating in a “counteroffensive in the most important strategic directions.”  Soviet 
strategy “broke during this period the striking force of the fascist army and buried the 
German strategy of ‘lighting’ war.”  This in turn set the stage for optimal conditions to 
coalesce where the Red Army gained operational and strategic initiative that altered the 
nature of the confrontation on the Eastern Front.234   
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The exploitation of German weaknesses and Soviet strengths was due to “the 
genius of Stalin’s leadership” in conjunction with the courage of the Red Army’s troops.  
Accolades were heaped on the Soviet population, those who manufactured war materials 
and those who fought on the front and behind enemy lines.  The unity of the population 
was “never seen before on such a scale...”  While praise and gratitude was shared in the 
general sense, the admiration Voroshilov showed in fact reflected the population’s 
capacity to wage battle thanks to Stalin’s leadership abilities on and off the field of battle.  
Furthermore, not one mention of the generals who were responsible for many of those 
victories achieved in the first year-and-a-half of war was made.235     
For Voroshilov, Stalin’s genius extended to his “foreseeing even at the beginning 
of the war the inevitable defeat of the Hitlerite army,” which was “founded on knowledge 
of the relative political-economic and social weakness of Hitlerite Germany…and on the 
certitude of the stability of the Soviet rear, that is, of our whole state.”  By drawing 
attention to the Soviet rear and the ability of the Red Army to successfully perform its 
duty, Voroshilov in turn praised the collectivization and industrialization of the 1930s, 
which created the infrastructure necessary for Germany’s eventual defeat.236 
Stalin’s genius was not, however, limited to brilliant analysis of the enemy and 
the Soviet Union’s potential.  Voroshilov explained how Stalin paid “very serious 
attention” to Red Army reserves while deciding where and when to husband resources 
while “creating command cadres.”  Hence, “during the course of the war new Soviet 
military commanders, generals and cadres of officers grew up who proved in action their 
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devotion to their Motherland, to the Bolshevik Party and who were able in huge battles to 
turn Stalin’s strategic and operational-tactical plans into living reality.”  Stalin’s strategic 
genius served as inspiration for generals, officers, and rank-and-file soldiers to perform 
“heroic feats in the name of their Socialist Motherland.”  It was brilliant Stalinist 
planning that allowed for numerous Soviet fronts to work in tandem and achieve victory, 
all while being coordinated by the “unity of Stalin’s strategic plan.”  All Soviet victories, 
from Moscow and Stalingrad to the taking of Berlin were attributed to Stalinist genius.237  
With the Stalinist narrative of the war firmly in place, by 1953 there was evidence 
that Soviet historians had virtually abandoned work on the war’s history.  The war was 
deemed too sensitive a topic in the realm of politics “to be entrusted to historians.”238  An 
example of a permitted military publication was a 1952 text by Musheg Minasian, about 
Operation Bagration, one of the “ten Stalinist blows” of 1944.  The fifty-six page work 
was entitled Pobeda v Belorussii: Piatyi stalinskii udar, showcasing once more the 
reliance on Stalin as the primary vehicle of victory with the length of the work speaking 
volumes about how much was allowed to be written on even victorious campaigns.239 
 
During the war’s initial period, with the country facing its greatest threat, writers 
and correspondents dominated the war narrative and served at the behest of a system and 
leader who regularly justified their actions while avoiding mention of their mistakes.  As 
such, much of the war’s history was written through socialist realistic hues and often 
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presented events as they should have been – a leadership that understood what was 
needed to win and just needed time and a population regularly willing to make needed 
sacrifices.240  Journalists replaced Stalin’s muted voice during the war’s initial period and 
signaled a freer atmosphere.  The proximity of journalists to the frontlines ensured that 
their descriptions and commentary often resonated with soldiers’ own experiences.  
Journalists began to offer examples of courage and self-sacrifice that the rest of the army 
and country needed to emulate while readers and the state’s propaganda apparatus 
decided which actions best defined Soviet bravery and valor.   
Correspondents and editors were responsible for crafting heroic symbols that were 
appropriated and endorsed by the state and idealized by society as all three continuously 
participated in the propagation of heroic achievements throughout the war.  During the 
war there were numerous instances when journalists attempted to oppose an 
acknowledged party line, seeing how far they could push against established boundaries 
as they tried to avoid criticism and reprimands.  While they were not always successful, 
these attempts show the beginning of what would become contested territory of the 
memory of the war and its representation in the media. 
The war years, according to Boris Pasternak, brought “real horrors, real danger, 
and the threat of real death” which “were beneficial in comparison with the inhuman 
reign of fiction, and brought relief, because they limited the magic power of the dead 
letter.”241  Others shared this feeling.  The children of those who took part in the war 
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recalled how their parents fondly reminisced about their time in the trenches.242  
Although the “freedom” of the war years might have been more so perceived than lived 
through, it was still something many veterans fondly recalled decades after the war’s 
conclusion.  A Jewish scientist in the 1970s claimed that the war was “the best time of 
our lives…Because at that time we all felt closer to our government than at any other 
time…It was not their country then, but our country…It was not their war, but our war.  It 
was our country we were defending, our war effort.”243  The war offered the state an 
ability to unite a divided country tormented by constant trials against enemies of the 
people and concentrated their attention toward a visible external threat.   
In many respects the journalistic reports found among Soviet newspapers 
discussing heroic actions and feats were a genuine part of the general war experience that 
was turned into the “Myth of the War Experience.”  Writing on the memory of the World 
Wars, George L. Mosse explains, “those concerned with the image and the continuing 
appeal of the nation worked at constructing a myth which would draw the sting from 
death in war and emphasize the meaningfulness of the fighting and sacrifice…The aim 
was to make an inherently unpalatable past acceptable,” while justifying the regime “in 
whose name the war had been fought.”  The result was a validation of the war experience, 
displacing and masking the war’s reality in order to legitimize the state and leadership.244   
In many ways the narrative of the war that emerged during the war itself was a 
combination of efforts, including that of Stalin imposing his will through censors and 
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literature as well as reporters who utilized the atmosphere left in the wake of the German 
invasion to craft a version of the war that resonated with the majority of the population.  
While Stalin was an instrumental figure during the war we would do well to recall that it 
was not Stalin who coined the term “Great Patriotic War,” the term which created an aura 
of exceptionalism for the Soviet war effort, embodied in the postwar period by the 
Soviets celebrating Victory Day on May 9 while the rest of Europe celebrated a day 
earlier.245  It was also not Stalin who created the lyrics for “Sacred War,” nor did he take 
the most iconic pictures of the war or craft tales of Soviet heroism that often enough 
turned out to be based on the imagination and whims of correspondents and editors.  The 
death and destruction left in the wake of Germany’s advance and retreat was part of the 
Soviet wartime experience.  Combined with photographic evidence and journalistic 
exhortations to seek revenge for a population and land defiled, in part endorsed from 
above, but also supported and pleaded for from below, it gives us reason to view the 
initial narrative of the Great Patriotic War as a flexible collaboration by information 
producers – including censors – and consumers rather than an imposed history/memory 
from above.     
One of the defining features of the war years and the immediate postwar period 
was that much of the literature being published on the war was authored by literary 
figures and not trained historians.  In essence, the propaganda apparatus created an 
environment where wartime reporting collapsed the line separating fact from fiction as 
long as the needed emotions and socialist realism were injected into the public sphere.   
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The culmination of a war narrative that forfeited realistic portrayals of heroic acts 
and propagated a specific archetype a hero and feat needed to fit into, meant a revised 
understanding of what was defined as heroism and victory while steering discussion away 
from fundamental errors perpetrated by the leadership and armed forces.  The state and 
Stalin’s failures “did not necessarily diminish” the “psychological utility” of drawing 
attention to “painful experiences” which became “meaningful memory” that was 
packaged by the state and adopted by survivors.246  The ability of the Soviet media to 
create a heroic narrative around the selfless sacrifices of the population paved the way for 
Stalin to reconfigure the portrayal of the war’s initial period.  Defeats were transformed 
into preplanned retreats, serving as part of a greater plan to defeat the enemy.  The 
continued link to heroic names and cities within the public’s collective memory has 
currently made it possible for Volgograd to be revived as Stalingrad six days out of the 
year.247   
Wartime depictions of frontline and partisan heroism made a lasting impression 
that intertwined the war’s narrative with its collective memory.  During the war, in 1944, 
the film “Zoia” appeared in Soviet cinemas.  The movie was shown at the front and a 
soldier, in a March 1945 letter to his family, commented on how the film “made a great 
impression” on him and he could “not find words to describe this movie.  Here is the real 
truth [istinnaia pravda], [down] to the smallest detail.”248  After the war, the film’s 
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director met a friend, a war correspondent, who arrived from the front and hinted that the 
“real” story of Zoia differed from the cinematic production.  The director, rather than 
being upset, replied: “I would have made the film just the same.  The story is more 
important than the actual details.”  Margarita Aliger, a poet who wrote about Zoia’s feat, 
agreed with this notion.  Almost three decades after the war she continued to insist “that 
her depiction of Zoia was not invented, but ‘reflected the truth we believed in.’”249  Thus, 
the various representations of “Zoia” reflected stylized depictions that people wanted to 
believe in as the “truth,” superimposed onto their memories by wartime correspondents 
and state endorsed propaganda.   
In the Soviet Union, writers found that while ideological controls still existed, 
their efforts on behalf of the Soviet war effort coincided with the needs of the state.  In 
the immediate postwar period the history and memory of the war were marginalized, 
abused, and redirected for immediate government needs.  Attention was refocused on 
Stalin and the Party whose contributions to the war effort overshadowed the courage and 
role of the Red Army’s leadership and rank-and-file.  The connections veterans had to the 
war were severed as films, photographs, literature, and even commemorations like 
Victory Day were done away with or whitewashed for Stalin’s needs.  Aspects of the 
war’s narrative were altered to meet immediate requirements, cementing Stalin’s cult 
while disparaging states previously considered allies.250   
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Historians were forced into repeating Stalin’s statements to support their 
assertions, abandoning any type of objective analysis.  While Stalin lived, his military 
reputation was solidified as that of a wise leader.  He assumed responsibility for concepts 
developed by military minds during the war’s progress.  Censors limited publications on 
the war so that by 1949 a “deep freeze” settled over the topic.  Literary attempts to 
disclose a truth about the war that differed from the party line were met with 
condemnation or were simply never again published during Stalin’s lifetime.   
Opposition or criticism signified the public’s interest in the war years as veterans 
felt entitled to a say in the collective memory of the war and resented the truth they were 
being denied.  Evidence from letters received by public figures shows how much the 
omission of the war’s discussions in literature was questioned by the public.  For 
instance, Ehrenburg received a letter in January 1953 questioning the neglect of Jewish 
participation in the war.  How was it, the author demanded, that the Jewish struggle, from 
the frontlines, where Jews served with much distinction, to the homefront, where Jews 
were factory laborers and directors, was forgotten.  “Why does not a single novel, which 
describes those terrible years, contain the description of the heroic actions of Jewish 
soldiers and officers?...Why is it that not in any war or Soviet Army yearly anniversaries, 
not in one picture, illustrating its multinational [character], is it possible to find a Jewish 
hero of the Soviet Union (and there were not a few of them!)…?”251   
Stalin in many ways built upon the foundation that was provided by wartime 
literature.  Numerous statements were recycled and entered the Soviet vernacular, from 
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the contribution of the Western Allies, to the significance of specific battles.  The few 
strands of information repeated by the Soviet propaganda apparatus made a dent in Soviet 
minds that continued to influence perceptions, ideas and beliefs.  Olga Kucherenko 
comments that “as the war was gradually mythologized and limited to a handful of 
allowed narratives, the remembered events and interpretations also became standardized, 
creating an impression of universality of experience.”  In such a way, “uncomfortable 
truths were either bent or concealed to fit the overall heroic picture, and personal 
experiences made irrelevant to the master narrative.”252 
An immediate impact of a postwar period seemingly devoid of any propaganda or 
discussions centered on the war years was a population starved of information.  Gallagher 
comments that, “a striking paradox of the Soviet postwar reinterpretation of the war is 
that it was effected without a propaganda campaign, in the usual sense of the word, and 
without a history text.”253  Although there was no officially sanctioned publication 
created specifically to describe the Soviet Union’s war experience in the Second World 
War, there were numerous texts crafted on ideas previously discussed by both the 
military and the population, ideas that soon became the backbone of the war’s history 
well into the post-Stalin period.  The public and military saw the war’s history was taking 
on a face they did not recognize, but little could be done until Stalin’s death.  
Consequently, as the war was experienced by the entirety of the Soviet population, its 
history was contested territory during the war and in the immediate postwar period, and 
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under Khrushchev’s administration the memory of the war was reconfigured into a 
political tool to use domestically and on the international arena.   
 120 
CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAR’S OFFICIAL 
HISTORY 
Starting on March 19, two weeks after Stalin’s death, neither journals nor 
newspapers wrote about Stalin.  Letters flooded into the Central Committee from the 
public asking for an explanation but were only greeted with silence.  Stalin’s name was 
omitted from all May Day slogans on 22 April and on 9 May it was decided to remove all 
portraits of leaders from parades and demonstrations, living and dead; the latter decision 
was rescinded two months later.1  This hasty reaction by high ranking officials seemingly 
set a tone that divided the population.  It took an additional three years for Nikita 
Khrushchev to denounce Stalin before the 20th Party Congress and as previously, any 
personality charged with being an “enemy of the people” was ripe for the status of 
“ghost” in historical publications.  Stalin’s wholesale disappearance from the press, even 
if temporary, spelled a precedent that many in the public would soon want to see 
replicated in historical texts, especially the war’s official history. 
Stalin’s death meant a multitude of changes for the Soviet Union were on the 
horizon.  Guidance that emanated from Stalin disappeared and his administration was 
soon discredited as targets were found for grievances and praise.  Under Stalin, the 
system he created was well attuned to avoiding questions.  After his death much of that 
infrastructure remained but the inevitable appearance of questions meant they were 
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greeted by “a void” rather than ready answers.2  Khrushchev assumed the mantle of 
leadership of the world’s second superpower and the internal “Thaw” that followed 
unsettled many in their previous beliefs and convictions.  When Stalin’s crimes were 
exposed to the public, the people’s perception of their former leader changed, as did their 
views of those who would succeed him, they lost their “inviolability,” in the words of the 
post-Soviet historian Elena Zubkova, and “became mere mortals.”3  Stalin’s “heirs” could 
not look to the 1930s if they wanted their own legitimizing myths, especially since during 
their denunciation of Stalin in 1956 Khrushchev concentrated on post-1936 events while 
those that came before remained off-limits, instead they turned to the war period and 
what soon turned into the Cult of the Great Patriotic War. 
This chapter sets the stage for the eventual decision in 1957 to create an official 
history of the Great Patriotic War, and in so doing discusses the succession struggle that 
placed Khrushchev in the position as head of the Soviet Union, followed by a look at the 
government’s treatment of history and historians in the immediate post-Stalin period.  
Although changes in history were noticeable overall, Stalinist thinking was still a 
formidable obstacle to questions and interpretations that might devalue the Soviet war 
effort when it came to the Second World War.  For Khrushchev, the history of the Great 
Patriotic War was a tool to attack Stalin’s memory and his now described “Cult of 
Personality.”  Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s role in the war “opened the door” 
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for revisionism in the war’s history, a topic he called on historians to research “as much 
for its ‘political, educative and practical significance’ as its ‘historical significance.’”4   
 
The Succession Struggle and the Military’s Rising Influence  
With Stalin dead the country contradictorily yearned for reforms and 
simultaneously stability, which meant that Soviet institutions essentially remained 
Stalinist at their core and Stalin’s “heirs” remained in powerful positions throughout the 
country with few of his accomplices brought to justice.5  William Taubman comments 
that when posthumously exonerating Stalin’s victims, Khrushchev’s “sympathy was 
reserved for Stalin’s Communist victims, many of whom died with non-Communist blood 
still on their hands.  Khrushchev not only spared Lenin and the Soviet regime itself but 
glorified them.”6  As there were no previous plans that could be put into place in the 
wake of Stalin’s death, outwardly the state appeared to move along a similar path as 
before his death – there were no guarantees that a Stalinist “revival” was out of the 
question.  Reforms were implemented in the long run, but short-term solutions relied on 
“not rocking the ship of state.”7  The “contradictory reality” that existed in the immediate 
post-Stalin period meant continued problems for the ruling elite during Khrushchev’s 
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tenure.8  In the midst of Khrushchev’s time in power the memory of the Second World 
War served as a source of pride and a foundational myth for the state.  Unfortunately, the 
war’s inherent entanglement with Stalin’s cult meant the process of de-Stalinization, with 
regards to the war, was “complex” since Khrushchev regularly degraded Stalin’s legacy 
while implementing his methods.9   
Almost immediately after Stalin’s death Lavrentii Beria began implementing a 
new type of order and called for a series of reforms that soon led to his arrest.  These 
reforms were akin to an anti-Stalinist campaign that in many respects revealed Beria’s 
desire to survive while blaming Stalin for recent terror campaigns.  In turn Beria became 
Khrushchev’s first target.  Beria was accused of incorrect foreign and domestic policies, 
which eventually led to his arrest, trial, and execution.10  During his interrogation and 
trial, Beria was used as a scapegoat and accused of Stalinist excesses that in many 
respects cleared Stalin’s reputation for the time being.11  Beria’s manipulation of Stalin 
meant not only a separation of Stalin from the crimes that occurred under his leadership, 
but, more significantly, a distinction between the flaws of the man and that of the system.  
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The eventual inability to separate Stalin from the system he operated offers an 
explanation for the continued ad hoc measures adopted by Khrushchev.   
With Beria out of the way, Malenkov was perceived by many as the next 
successor and Khrushchev’s next target.  Khrushchev isolated and accused him of being 
Beria’s “right hand,” with the end result that Malenkov was removed from his position as 
prime minister.12  The final obstacle for Khrushchev remained Molotov who was soon 
forced to relinquish his position in the Foreign Ministry.13  The final test to Khrushchev’s 
rule came with an attempted coup in 1957.14  The coup attempt occurred during a Plenum 
in June of 1957 and conspirators quickly found themselves having to defend their own 
histories of Stalinist complicity rather than continue to launch accusations against 
Khrushchev.  In the end, it was Molotov’s continued hostility to the process of de-
Stalinization, and his stance on Yugoslavia, that resulted in his loss of power.15   
However, Khrushchev, in pointing out the complacency and acquiescence of 
many of the conspirators and himself during Stalin’s rule, continued to offer reasons for 
the government’s dependency on Stalinist methods and ideas, thus in effect slowly 
beginning a reversal of many previous anti-Stalinist positions.  The coup attempt, 
combined with the Hungarian Uprising, convinced Khrushchev that a full nullification of 
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Stalin was impossible as it could lead to the discrediting not only of himself and the new 
elite but the entire socialist system in the Soviet Union and the new Soviet empire in 
Eastern Europe.16  
From Stalin’s death to the attempted coup against Khrushchev, military figures 
continued to play a dominant role in decisive events and accumulated political influence 
that they could soon use to help create the war’s historical narrative.  The arrest of Beria 
was entrusted to Khrushchev’s wartime allies and the denunciations of Malenkov and 
Molotov featured a role for the representatives of the military as well.  Garthoff argues 
that the military might have been “a decisive force in tipping the balance of decision.”  
The Party leadership’s “disunity” from mid-1953 to mid-1957 “weakened the ability of 
the political leadership to maintain the military in a subordinate position.  Instead, during 
those four years the military were wooed and, under the pressure of circumstances, 
virtually invited to become a political force.”  The end result might very well have been 
that a newly dominant “political force” within the Party wanted to have a greater say in 
how the history of the Second World War was going to be presented to the public.  Soon 
Khrushchev’s role in the war would be magnified, including military commanders who 
found themselves around him, while others began to fade away from the memory of the 
war, like Malenkov and Stalin.17 
The military’s greater presence in the Party’s hierarchy was partly matched by the 
process that took place in the war’s aftermath.  Commanding officers were 
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overwhelmingly made up of members (eighty percent) of the Party and Komsomol.  
While the Party’s membership sustained massive losses in the war, the recruitment 
campaign launched during the war meant those numbers were soon replaced.  Of the 8.4 
million members and candidates recruited, close to eighty percent, over six million, came 
from the armed forces.  The Party’s membership was thus heavily influenced by wartime 
enrollment and differed greatly from the Party of the 1930s – it was less ideological and 
more “pragmatic.”  Cynthia Kaplan comments that “The new mood was summarized by 
Pravda when it argued, in June 1944, in sharp contrast to the Party’s pre-war principles, 
that the ‘personal qualities of every Party member should be judged by his practical 
contribution to the war effort’ rather than by his class origins or ideological correctness.”  
More importantly in some ways, those newly enrolled in the Party presented a younger 
membership with those under twenty-five making up less than 9% of the Party before the 
war and over 18% after.18  In the postwar period, as demobilized soldiers re-entered 
society, it was proximity and relevance to the war and the war effort that came to be 
increasingly utilized in defining a person’s worth and future career advancements.   
These veterans became a new type of citizen.  Their assertiveness and wartime 
experience created someone who no doubt expected some entitlements when it came to 
the history and memory of the war.19  As much as the war experience altered how 
veterans viewed their past and surroundings, so too did the veterans themselves alter the 
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Party whose ranks they now dominated.  Those propelled into positions of power, taking 
over from previously denounced victims, had yet to achieve a similar level of experience 
or knowledge and the losses sustained during the war only added to the inexperience that 
defined much of the Party leadership in the postwar period.  Through the fires of war a 
new generation of Party leadership emerged.  Although not possible until after Stalin’s 
death, the myths created around the war effort in the postwar period reinforced a need 
and desire for veterans, occupying high and low positions throughout Soviet society, to 
define their war experience against that of the official narrative in order to justify their 
current standing and continue to propagate the war’s importance.20 
 
History after Stalin 
With Stalin gone, changes soon began to take place in the realms of 
historiography as the process of de-Stalinization was begun.  The director of the Institute 
of History, Arkadii Sidorov, recommended a new editor-in-chief and deputy editor for 
Voprosy istorii, Anna Pankratova and Eduard Burdzhalov.21  All were loyal to the regime 
during Stalin’s time, especially Sidorov, who according to Roger Markwick, “had played 
a leading role in the viciously anti-Semitic ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ campaign.”  The 
“paradox” of the post-Stalin administration was in part mirrored in the historical 
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community.  Just as the new ruling elite who attempted to initiate a process of de-
Stalinization were made up of former Stalinists, so too were some of the historians, who 
previously walked the sometimes shifting Stalinist party line.  Now they assumed 
positions of importance in the historical community responsible for laying “the ground 
work for the reinvigoration of historiography in the post-Stalin era.”22  Unfortunately, 
initially historical publications continued to offer little to nothing in terms of original 
research and analysis.  When 600 historians participated in a conference in January 1956, 
Pankratova “lamented” how the articles appearing in Voprosy istorii consisted of 
numerous “shortcomings” including “dogmatism, rote-learning, vulgarization, political 
fashionableness and black-and-white representation of the past.”23   
Throughout the de-Stalinization process history continued to be transformed into 
patriotic propaganda as the Second World War was utilized by Khrushchev’s 
administration as a tool to inspire and educate future generations.  The memory of the 
war was dominated by the current political elites in power and both foreign and domestic 
policies often utilized memories of the unfolding and outcome of the Second World War.  
Political institutions needed to be legitimized, most established myths reinforced and 
official policies rationalized.24  The foundation of the Soviet Union needed to be 
portrayed as incorruptible and as such, while Stalin might have altered the path the Soviet 
state was following, his injustices were said to have taken place solely on the surface.  
The core remained good in essence.  The process of de-Stalinization that ensued with 
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Khrushchev’s ascent to power walked a fine line in holding Stalin and those closest to 
him culpable of criminal actions yet steered any criticism away from the liability of 
Khrushchev’s administration.  Therefore, once initiated it was practically impossible to 
forgo employing the same Stalinist methods that were previously vilified in keeping the 
population docile and convinced that the new leadership was not entwined with previous 
Stalinist policies.  As Abraham Rothberg comments, the aim of Khrushchev’s reforms 
“was modernization and amelioration, not democratization or liberalization, not even the 
very limited liberalization many Soviet intellectuals hoped for.”25   
The foundation of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign was his denunciation 
of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress.  The decade that followed Khrushchev’s secret 
speech heralded one of the “most significant” periods in Soviet war literature.26  The 20th 
Congress signified the first serious attempt at an examination of the Stalinist era, 
including a look at its significance, history and those who carried responsibility for it.27   
The shift in historical thinking was not signaled by trained historians but rather 
the Soviet intelligentsia.  The term “Thaw” itself was coined by Ehrenburg’s work The 
Thaw in early 1954.28  Aided by thick journals of the time, specifically Novyi Mir, where 
Ehrenburg’s “Thaw” first appeared, literature began to portray “public opinion” and 
served as a “catalyst” for the intelligentsia, including historians.29  Literature provided a 
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medium for historians to explore and confront the Soviet Union’s history, from the Civil 
War through the Second World War.  According to Denis Kozlov, “During the Thaw, 
politics, viewed as history, was debated via established literary channels.  Politics as 
history became the domain of readers.”30  Roger Markwick similarly comments that 
literature was the “vehicle for the appearance of a genuine ‘politic opinion’” as “art was 
transformed into politics and politics was aestheticized.”31 
Writers introduced questions, which in turn broadened the parameters of research.  
Professional historians as well as members of the military and Party entered discussions 
and confronted issues they would have rather ignored in part thanks to literary 
publications that required answers.  Writers began to push against previously imposed 
boundaries and topics as a result of the atmosphere of the Thaw and limited guidance 
from the Party.  This was undoubtedly aided by the fact that Khrushchev’s policy when it 
came to literature was founded simply on an “anti-Stalinism” platform without any other 
guidance for authors.  When it became apparent that liberal writers were thinking about 
their own agenda, Khrushchev attempted “to bully them back into line,” but the 
floodgates were already opened.32  Publications following an anti-Stalinist line, like 
Novyi Mir, were met with charges of “nihilism” by the Writers’ Union and irate Party 
members in 1954, but there were no decisive steps taken to silence dissenting voices in 
regards to how history was to be represented.33   
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If authors could not be silenced, editors could still be targeted and some, like 
Simonov, found themselves having to address their previous views of the war.  
Consequently, at the end of 1954, Aleksandr Tvardovskii was dismissed from his position 
as editor in chief of Novyi Mir and replaced by Simonov.  In letters to readers, Simonov 
was rather candid but simultaneously reserved about his participation in helping create 
the distorted image of the Great Patriotic War that was prevalent during the war itself and 
continued into the Thaw period, as was Alexei Surkov, the head of the Writers’ Union.  
Simonov believed he participated in a process that most others, although unwilling, also 
took part in, and Surkov, in a forward to his Old Field Notebook, published in 1957, 
admitted how during the initial period of the war he helped in “concealing the defeatism 
that had actually prevailed in the army” and instead played up the “imaginary altruistic 
patriotism of the troops.”34   
When it came to the war’s history, creating a more truthful account was part of a 
larger struggle for the nation’s “spiritual values” which were displaced by Stalin in the 
postwar period.  The war served as a defining moment for an entire generation, and 
Soviet intellectuals wanted an outlet for their feelings and experiences.  Stalin’s 
“enforced silence” led to pen- up emotions and their eruption under Khrushchev.  Those 
with the greatest conviction approached the ruling elite with a long-held belief that their 
suffering and sacrifice entitled them to a better life, spiritually and materially.35   
                                                 
34 L.I. Lazarev, ed., Konstantin Simonov: Pis’ma o voine 1943-1979 (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel’, 1990), 
113-114, 119, 142; Jones, Myth, Memory, Trauma, 175; Figes, 615-616; Gallagher, 147-148. 
 
35 Seweryn Bialer, Stalin and His Generals (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 20-21.   
 132 
Works that started to appear on the war by literary personalities, themselves 
soldiers and officers who had “seen sweat and blood on their tunics,” were of one mind in 
believing that the defeat of Nazi Germany was a result of the actions of the people, who 
in spite of Stalinist policies proved capable of victory.36  Lazar Lazarev describes how the 
publication of their fictional works during the Thaw, which often “resembled memoirs in 
their autographical perspective…aroused furious discussion about topics that were so 
new that they required unfamiliar phrases and neologisms, such as ‘the truth of the 
trenches (okopnaya Pravda), ‘deheroisation’ (degeroizatsiya)…the uncompromising 
assault of these works on official dogma aroused violent counterattacks by supporters of 
Stalinist myth.”37   
By 1963, close to the end of Khrushchev’s time in power, literature on the war 
portrayed the war experience in a way that would have been unimaginable a decade 
earlier.  Vorob’ev’s, Ubity pod Moskvoi, gave a more realistic portrayal of the war’s 
nature, describing how students, untrained and poorly equipped, were sent to the frontline 
to oppose the advancing enemy while in the chaos of war the chain of command stopped 
functioning.  Unlike Aleksandr Bek’s popular Volokolamskoe shosse, published in 1945, 
Vorob’ev’s work was a far more depressing novel that dealt with the defense of Moscow 
in 1941.38   
Soviet literary personalities attempted their best to widen discussions, questions, 
and debates about the war while the Party and censors continued to limit what could be 
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said or admitted about the true costs of the Soviet war effort.  As much as Stalin and his 
cult were blamed for the blunders encountered in the war, Khrushchev’s denunciation of 
Stalin portrayed the ensuing advances of the Red Army as a result of the Party’s 
organizational prowess while the “truth of the trenches” took away from the patriotic all-
people’s war that propaganda continued to try to impose onto the war’s narrative.  
Nonetheless, selfless admissions by the likes of Simonov and others allowed military 
historians to make their own additions to the war’s narrative, although throughout the 
entire process they would be met with a state and censors that were still unsure of what 
was allowed to be said and what should continue to be guarded as state secrets. 
 
Writing the War’s History and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech 
The first-ten year postwar period featured limited writing on the war years aside 
from Stalin’s short history and biography as well as laudatory articles written by select 
political and military personalities, which solely echoed the Stalinist narrative.  
Nonetheless, initial changes to the historiography of the war were evident soon after 
Stalin’s death.  In part, the changes were evidence of a legitimization of select 
personalities who were soon to compete for the leadership role of the country, thus the 
foundation of their own myths – intertwined with the history of the war – could be seen 
to already be established on paper.  The Party’s dominant position in the war was 
illustrated by a Central Committee document, published in July of 1953, which 
“portrayed the war as a triumph of Party policy and ignored Stalin.”39     
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 A further change was traced by Gallagher to an article in Voennaia Mysl’, 
published in the spring of 1955, which claimed military literature on the war contributed 
“not only to the distortion of the actual military events of 1941, but to the idealization of 
this form of combat.”  The editorial warned that a history of the war riddled with errors 
would “incorrectly orient our military cadres to the possibilities of repeating it in a future 
war.”  Military historians were also attacked and blamed for having developed a 
“subservient attitude toward Stalin.”  The Red Army’s performance in the initial period 
of the war was described as a defeat and the idea of a plan of “active defense,” which had 
become associated with 1941, was disparaged.  “Active defense,” it was claimed, was 
utilized to conceal the numerous errors perpetrated and the defeats sustained by the Red 
Army, simultaneously denying “due credit to the soldiers, commanders, and people for 
their patriotism, staunchness, and courage.”40  Furthermore, the editorial clearly pointed 
to an inherent weakness in Soviet military scientific studies, “It is necessary to say 
frankly that in connection with the cult of the individual, no science sinned so much as 
did military science.”  Finally, it was argued that publications on the war consisted of a 
regurgitation of Stalinist speeches and quotes “instead of objective research on military 
theory and historical facts…Such copying, freeing one from the necessity to think about 
serious problems, holds back creative thought, and clearly brings harm to our military 
science.”41  The redundancy of Soviet ritualized performances in texts was evident within 
the Soviet establishment, at least to some, but this voice proved an exception to the rule. 
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 There were attempts to mask the repetition of Stalinist positions.  Stalin’s 
“operating factors,” first published and discussed during the war itself, continued to make 
an appearance in Soviet military science and strategy discussions through 1956.  After 
Khrushchev’s denunciation, references to these factors seemingly disappeared, but it was 
solely the “old rubric” that was done away with.  The reiteration and confirmation of the 
“decisive significance” of the operating factors continued to be visible in publications and 
were soon related back to Lenin.  In 1957 Krasnaia zvezda published an article entitled 
“V. I. Lenin on the Fundamental Factors Which Decide the Course and Outcome of 
Wars.”  These “fundamental factors” were Stalin’s “permanently operating factors” 
repackaged and “paraphrased.”42     
Although some of Stalin’s positions were returned to, discussions that were 
previously disallowed were finally addressed.  Discussions centered around 1941 
assumed ever greater importance and one of the questions associated with this period was 
the factor of surprise, which led to an eventual reinterpretation of the initial phase of the 
war.  Those who survived the chaos and disasters of the first two years knew the bitter 
truth even though Stalin’s official narrative remained in place after his death.  Geoffrey 
Jukes comments that it was only in 1955 that it was “publicly admitted that the long 
retreats had not been voluntary.”  More substantial revelations would have to wait until 
Khrushchev’s speech.  Several prominent generals joined in the chorus of voices raised 
against Stalin and his leadership, tracing the disasters of 1941 back to the purges of the 
1930s and Stalin’s initial erroneous wartime decisions.  These allegations against Stalin, 
while containing more than a grain of truth, also served an ulterior purpose in helping to 
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mask the failures of the generals themselves, both in their preparations for the war and 
their initial conduct after hostilities began.43 
The initial period of the war, however, needed to serve an important function and 
lessons needed to be drawn from 1941 in order to prepare for future conflicts.  While 
military technology evolved, due to the “stagnation” experienced under Stalin military 
science suffered.44  In 1955 an article in Literaturnaia Gazeta, by the deputy chief of the 
Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General S. Shatilov, 
emphasized how the “increased peril to the Soviet Union posed by the existence of new 
nuclear weapons and delivery systems gave new significance to the question of surprise 
in war.”  Shatilov claimed, specifically, that the factor of surprise needed to be 
emphasized in order to show how it “had dominated the first period of the last war, since 
a false portrayal of this period might encourage erroneous notions about the nature of a 
future war…”45   
Unfortunately, a few articles, no matter how reflective of the past and present, 
could not do away with the ingrained rhetoric of the Stalinist period that so many were 
accustomed to.  As a result, a publication by Grigorii Deborin, doctor of economic 
sciences, marking the 10th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi 
                                                 
43 Jukes, 2. 
 
44 Provisions for a future war that included atomic weapons were absent from Soviet publications until 
1954, something very much entwined with the factor of surprise that was to become so important for Soviet 
studies of the Great Patriotic War.  Furthermore, the future importance of both surprise and nuclear 
capabilities soon meant the main obligation of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) during the Cold War 
“was to provide early warning against thermonuclear war from the United States.”  Gebhardt, 17-18; 
Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2015), 197.  
 
45 Cited in Gebhardt, 20. 
 137 
Germany, repeated practically verbatim many of the ideas cemented during Stalin’s time.  
A similar explanation was offered by a publication later in the year by the Institute of 
History of the Academy of Sciences by Boris Tel’pukhovskii. Both were participants in 
commission meetings during the creation of the war’s official history.46   
Soviet military historians were now faced with a need to reexamine the war’s 
initial period and ascertain what actual role the factor of surprise played in German 
victories and Soviet defeats.47  While Soviet military doctrine necessitated a reevaluation 
of the German invasion, due to the dearth of source material – published statistics and 
archival documents – discussions and debates consisted of familiar arguments about why 
the Red Army suffered such heavy losses and defeats.  One figure who might have been 
able to add to this conversation, Zhukov, when brought back from exile by Khrushchev, 
steered conversations away from 1941, choosing to concentrate on the purges of the Red 
Army in the 1930s.  After his dismissal by Khrushchev, in 1957, Zhukov became an 
additional target and was included in a broader attack by Khrushchev when discussing 
1941 and Zhukov’s failure at anticipating and preparing for Germany’s surprise attack.48   
 Aside from members of the military steering conversations away from needed 
analysis, another impediment to analyzing the history of the war was that the end of 
Stalin’s image as a master manipulator of events during the war meant a parceling out of 
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credit for the victories achieved by the Red Army to others, more often than not those 
who could immediately profit while shouldering Stalin with all the blame.49  Answers for 
inconvenient questions were partly given out, and usually encompassed Stalin’s name or 
cult in one form or another, but this change in the Soviet narrative of the war meant a 
continued impairment for historians to deal with one of the most defining events within 
Soviet history.50  Consequently, Stalin’s cult continued to impede discussions on the war.  
Unfortunately, it was easier to proclaim a liberation from the cult and its influence than to 
actually go through the process of “liberation.”  Some authors simply replaced Stalin’s 
name in their narrative with all-encompassing institutions like “Party,” “GKO,” 
“STAVKA,” etc.  This signaled a further removal of the human element from the history 
of the war.51   
If the first postwar decade witnessed limited changes in its historiography, the 
next period began with the 20th Party Congress on February 25, 1956, when Khrushchev 
denounced Stalin’s leadership and ushered in a radical change in Soviet perceptions of 
their past.  In a closed session Khrushchev laid bare his thoughts on Stalin and those 
responsible for the injustices meted out to the Soviet state and people.  Although the 
speech was “secret” it was a well-known secret.   Some 1,500 delegates were in session 
to hear it, including foreigners, while a slightly edited text was read out at Party meetings 
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across the entire country.  In this fashion a wide audience was presented with disclosures 
about Stalin’s crimes.52 
The speech held at its center a discussion of the war years and Stalin’s role.  
Khrushchev traced the accumulation of power into Stalin’s hands as leading “to serious 
consequences” throughout the war.  He stated: 
When we look at many of our novels, films and historical “scientific studies,” the 
role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable.  Stalin had 
foreseen everything.  The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared 
by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called “active defense,” i.e., tactics 
which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad.  
Using such tactics the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin’s genius, 
turned to the offensive and subdued the enemy.  The epic victory gained through 
the armed might of the Land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed 
in this type of novel, film and “scientific study” as being completely due to the 
strategic genius of Stalin.  We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has 
a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the 
political, educational and practical point of view.53 
 
The aspects of “surprise” and “unexpectedness” that characterized the initial period of the 
war, for Khrushchev, were nonsense since “as soon as Hitler came to power in Germany 
he assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism.”  The mass repression of the 
Red Army during the 1930s only served to “undermine military discipline” and had a 
“negative influence” on the initial period of the war.  Stalin was blamed for ignoring 
information from intelligence, military, and diplomatic sources, “because the leadership 
was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and 
assessed with reservation.”  Although warnings were received, “necessary steps were not 
                                                 
52 Smith, Remembering Stalin's Victims, 27; Stephen F. Cohen, The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag 
after Stalin (Exeter, NH: Publishingworks, 2010), 37. 
 
53 The Russian Institute Columbia University, ed., The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International 
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taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught 
unawares.”  Soviet industry was lauded and deemed “so developed that it was capable of 
supplying fully the Soviet army with everything that it needed.”  Such an assessment 
readily ignored the role of Lend Lease and was in part a praising of Stalin’s efforts during 
industrialization and collectivization.  Yet Khrushchev believed it was accurate since it 
was proven true “by the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our 
industry and important industrial and food production areas as the result of enemy 
occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the 
Soviet people was still able to organize the production of military equipment in the 
eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the Western industrial 
areas, and to supply our armed forces with everything which was necessary to destroy the 
enemy.”54 
 With Germany’s invasion Stalin’s mistakes only multiplied as “Moscow” was 
accused of issuing orders that Red Army troops could not return fire.  “Why?  It was 
because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this 
was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German 
army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.”  
Not only did warnings go unheeded, but reports from soldiers and commanders on the 
frontline were ignored as the Air Force was destroyed on the ground and the enemy’s 
armies “annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military 
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leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the 
country.”55   
Khrushchev called attention to Stalin’s breakdown and lack of leadership during 
the initial German advance claiming Stalin did not oversee operations or do much of 
anything.  The end result was a “threatening danger” hung over the Soviet state, which 
reflected Stalin’s “faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party.”  When he did 
regain his composure and went on to issue directives, they were far removed from reality 
as the actual situation on the frontlines could not support his orders and resulted in 
enormous losses for the Red Army.56   
When Khrushchev first mentioned who deserved credit for the victory in the war, 
it was the result of the Party, the Soviet Government, the people, and the army, including 
its “talented” commanders and “brave soldiers,” who in spite of Stalin’s leadership were 
able to emerge victorious.  The second mention, however, put the Party in the spotlight as 
he claimed that “the main role and the main credit for the victorious ending of the war 
belongs to our Communist Party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens 
of millions of Soviet people raised by the Party.”57   
In the wake of Khrushchev’s revelations new journals were published on both the 
history of the war and the Soviet state in general.58  The call for research would culminate 
in the publication of the six-volume history of the Great Patriotic War, and in a decade 
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hundreds of full-length books and articles appeared.  Lisa Kirschenbaum comments that 
“Khrushchev’s decision to lift the ban on war stories that focused on something other 
than Stalin’s military genius constituted the most durable, if least sensational, part of the 
de-Stalinization process…”59  But even with a wave of new publications, the history of 
the war remained in many ways linked to Stalin’s cult, its rhetoric, ideas, and nostalgia.   
 History in general in the post-Stalin period was being rewritten and adjusted for 
Khrushchev’s new tenure.  This also meant the entourage that grew around Khrushchev 
focused on his achievements during the war, one of the most important of which came to 
be his time spent at Stalingrad.  Once again the initial period of the war was omitted as 
both Khrushchev and the military men that united around him were more interested in 
discussing their glorious victory at Stalingrad than the defeats and chaos of the initial 
period of the war.  Concentrating on this key battle allowed for a look at a victorious 
period and event in the history of the Great Patriotic War and an omission of the realities 
of 1941 and early 1942 – an understanding of how the enemy arrived at Stalingrad. 
Khrushchev was careful in depicting the leading ranks of the party that continued 
to support him as victims of Stalin’s time in power rather than active accomplices or 
perpetrators, although select personalities, like Beria and Molotov, were included in the 
“cult of personality” as having robbed the Soviet state of so much.60  Without a more 
honest and open reflection on Stalin and his cult, the history of the war served the Party’s 
needs first and foremost as Stalin’s infallibility was replaced by institutions.  As Stalin’s 
name disappeared, into the vacuum were placed the general ideas of “Party” and “people” 
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to assume the role of responsibility for previous achievements, including victory in the 
Great Patriotic War and the Second World War in general.  The Party also become tightly 
entwined with the population.  The de-Stalinization process would bind the people with 
the new elite running the state.  As Khrushchev portrayed his administration as victims of 
Stalin’s cult, so he claimed the same was true for the Party and people; they were 
“victims and unwitting accomplices in the terror.”  Additionally, “he reminded people 
that they too had cheered Stalin and supported the death penalty for ‘enemies of the 
people.’”61  Consequently, the victory that Stalin previously took credit for now became a 
victory of the people led by the Party – a victory they could only take credit for if they 
appropriated Khrushchev’s new version of events and victimhood status as their own. 
  The removal of Stalin’s mistakes from the Soviet state’s development meant 
Lenin reassumed a position of importance, even though he died in 1924, well before 
WWII, a position Stalin previously coopted for his own needs during the production of 
the Short Course.62  This text offered a historical interpretation that was not marred by 
“difficulties, mistakes, and shortcomings” with no real need “to be understood but 
memorized, learned by heart.”63  With Khrushchev aiming to “modernize the Soviet 
system” the needed inspiration and “enthusiasm” came from “Leninist ideals,” which 
assumed the ideological position that Stalin’s death left vacant.64  Taking a cue from 
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Khrushchev’s reference to Lenin, others began to take apart the Stalin cult’s rhetoric and 
redirect it back to the thoughts, ideas, and actions of Lenin.  Debates raging around the 
war’s history, including the purges of the 1930s, invoked the Leninist legacy of the Party 
and the Red Army’s strategy.  Lenin would be intertwined with the Party of the 1930s 
while Stalinist rhetoric was omitted yet his repressions were simultaneously justified in a 
feat of political acrobatics.65 
 Thanks to Khrushchev’s invitation to begin questioning the war years, conditions 
were created to not only reevaluate the history of the war but also utilize the war as a tool 
to look at other aspects of Soviet history, including the 1930s, where Stalin played a key 
role.  Khrushchev traced the conditions that allowed the Germans to advance to Moscow 
and Stalingrad and what caused so much trauma and harm to the Soviet people and state 
as emanating directly from Stalin.66  If under Stalin any miscalculations and errors were 
avoided or denied then under Khrushchev the numerous deficiencies that occurred due to 
Stalin and were overcome by the Party, army, and people, were all achievements that 
could be claimed and utilized for the purpose of enhancing Soviet prestige domestically 
and internationally.  But it was no coincidence that most of the merit for the victories 
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attained went to those who continued to wield the most influence and had the most to 
gain within the Party.67   
Authors of memoirs finally found an outlet for their grief and attempted to 
rehabilitate their comrades, those who participated in the war and those purged in the 
1930s.  Members of the Armed Forces could undo the slander their reputations suffered 
as their commanding officers were accused of treason in the prewar period and their 
frontline commanders were accused of cowardice and defeatism throughout the chaotic 
initial period of the war.  They had previously attributed the entire course of events of the 
Second World War, the greatest military victory achieved in Soviet and Russian history, 
to Stalin.  As a result, the military’s status improved, once more providing a stronger 
foundation for moves inside the political realm of the state.68  Now, commanders could 
finally be avenged not through the sword, but through the pen.  Putting their support 
behind Khrushchev meant they could reinterpret the initial period of the war, “wherein 
their reputation was most tarnished.”69  Unfortunately, the end result was a “devaluation 
of Stalin’s military role” with no real in-depth look at the causes of the Red Army’s 
failures.70 
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Supporting Khrushchev meant following in his footsteps as he aimed for de-
Stalinization while utilizing Stalinist methods.  The resulting mixed signals meant 
disagreements were evident in publications as they attempted to keep up.  Nancy Whittier 
Heer documented how a Krasnaia zvezda article on 9 May 1956 contained “an indignant 
rebuff to the editorial board for the journal Voennii vestnik.”  As it turned out, a lead 
article in Voennii vestnik mentioned the numerous defeats the Red Army’s unprepared 
forces suffered at the beginning of the German invasion, which was perceived as 
“belittling the importance of Soviet victory in World War II.”  Krasnaia zvezda 
contended that the journal presented these events under the guise of opposition to Stalin’s 
cult, but the newspaper wanted such a campaign to keep in mind that attacks against the 
Party and its Central Committee would only undermine their role.  Both newspaper and 
journal were published by the Defense Ministry, yet the line followed in terms of ideas 
could be seen as diverging between a more honest look at the war and one entrenched in 
Stalinist thinking thanks to the atmosphere created in the wake of Khrushchev’s speech.71     
The new “great power status” of the Soviet Union combined with the military 
requirements of the new leadership, allowed for and stimulated the growth of military 
studies on the war.  The stagnation of literature on the war years under Stalin set a 
“dangerous precedent” since it continuously led to allowed research on the Second World 
War being subordinated “to narrow propagandistic and ideological schemes.”  If the Red 
Army wanted to prepare itself for future conflict then professional standards and military 
competence needed to be rooted in discussions that featured an exploration and in-depth 
analysis of the Soviet combat experience.  Khrushchev’s Thaw allowed not only for an 
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increase in literature dealing with the war period, but also an improvement in its quality 
and reliability.72  Additionally, the publication of documentary material, in conjunction 
with translated foreign publications, allowed for a “more open and deeply textured 
treatment” of the war years.73   
 Even with new disclosures in the wake of Khrushchev’s speech, some ideas and 
events began to mirror the Stalin period all too quickly.  Khrushchev’s 20th Congress 
speech leaned on aspects of the Stalinist narrative when it came to the initial period of the 
war, entwined with attacks on Stalin himself, as when he bemoaned the Soviet Union’s 
state of readiness and claimed that “had our industry been mobilized properly and in time 
to supply the army with necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been 
decidedly smaller.  Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time.  And 
already in the first days of the war it became evident that our army was badly armed, that 
we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.”74  
Censorship was not lifted as the country’s elite would never be able to survive a full 
investigation into their activities during the 1930s.75  According to Nekrich, some within 
the Soviet Union “made statements calling for restraint and caution.  Some hinted that 
Khrushchev, perhaps, should not have said all that he had, and others had doubts about 
the security of Khrushchev’s position.”  Nekrich’s colleague, “a very well educated 
historian but a hopeless careerist, said thoughtfully, ‘Well, now, for the next ten years it 
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will be better not to publish anything.’  And he took his own advice.  He wrote and 
defended his doctoral dissertation on the history of Soviet society, but published it only 
after Khrushchev’s removal.”76  Moreover, as in the Stalin period, history was still 
created to be shaped for the Party’s needs, often with the intention of altering the 
population’s attitudes.77   
 
 With Stalin gone and no plans for what to do in his absence, it came as no surprise 
that his successors continued to follow many of the previously developed procedures and 
attitudes with minor alterations.  Getting rid of his competition, Khrushchev utilized 
Stalinist methods and played one side off another until he had accumulated enough power 
to eliminate the rest of his competitors.  The military’s presence rose within the Party’s 
ranks as Khrushchev’s wartime comrades were relied on to not only support his positions 
but also initiate the arrest of Beria.  The creation of the war’s official history would 
undoubtedly both benefit and suffer from this development as defeats were marginalized 
and hidden while accomplishments, especially those that included Khrushchev and 
members of the armed forces that found themselves in the spotlight, were embellished. 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress created an opening 
for discussions, questions, and commentary on previously closed off aspects of the Soviet 
past.  The war narrative created under Stalin was so entrenched within the Soviet system 
that even those who attacked the cult still had misgivings about questioning his role in the 
Soviet victory.  As was shown earlier, the war cemented Stalin’s reputation and was used 
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to legitimize many of the Soviet Union’s policies, both foreign and domestic.  Thus, it 
was often the intelligentsia that began to probe previously created boundaries.  When it 
came to the Second World War, many participated or witnessed the war’s development 
and did not need access to archives or documentation to describe their own recollections 
and thoughts.  Thus journals like Novyi Mir, among others, were vehicles for literature 
that offered an original look into the Soviet past.   
A spring 1955 publication by a military specialist broached the subject of the 
defeats in 1941 and the silence and omissions of “military science” under Stalin with 
respect to the war years, but this article was an exception to the rule.  Stalinist ideas were 
repeated, cloaked in new forms and attributed to Lenin, and commanding officers who 
bore responsibility for the war’s disastrous initial period did their best to steer 
conversations away from defeats and concentrated on victories.  While much of Stalin’s 
narrative of the war years lived on, his reputation suffered as he was continuously blamed 
for inadequacies.  Khrushchev’s secret speech created a new template from which 
historians and intellectuals could work off of looking at the Soviet past and the war 
experience.  But the continued references to Stalinist accomplishments, like 
collectivization and industrialization, meant Stalin continued to receive some credit for 
the Red Army’s victory in the war. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WRITING THE SIX-VOLUME HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 
At the 5th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, held in July 1958, 
Khrushchev claimed in his speech that the peoples of the Soviet Union “bore the brunt of 
the war against Hitler's fascism and defeated it.  The entire world won [as a result] of this 
victory…”  Similar sentiments were expressed by members of the commission assigned 
to create the war’s official history.  They treated the event as one that had no equal in its 
“grandiosity and intensity.”1  This mentality, a relic of the war’s original narrative that 
portrayed the Soviet Union as head of the anti-Hitler coalition and cemented the Red 
Army’s reputation as liberator, mirrored the thought process of the collective team of 
authors and editors who would pen the war’s first official history, beginning in 1957. 
This chapter looks at the initial decision to create an official history of the Great 
Patriotic War and the meetings that were held to discuss its initiation and production, 
concentrating on the debates around the first and second volumes specifically.  Here I 
develop the themes discussed in the first chapter as historians, scholars, high ranking 
military commanders and party representatives scrambled to create a framework with 
which to understand the war’s motivations and consequences, while continuously 
exhibiting an inability to escape the Stalinist terminology, framework, and conclusions 
with which many were already well familiar.  But without Stalin to dictate the “laws” of 
the land, any attempts to author a history, even if based on archival source material, 
raised more questions than authors and editors were able or willing to answer. 
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In analyzing the numerous debates and discussions among authors and editors of 
the war’s multi-volume history, Alexei Yurchak’s arguments about the disappearance of 
Stalin’s external voice become all too clearly visible in how Stalin and his ideas were 
treated.  With Stalin dead, his “prophetic authority” and the position of “master” fell by 
the wayside and created contradictions within the realm of “knowledge” that were 
continually, although not head on, challenged by all sectors of society.  With the 
disappearance of an “external” voice, “language structures became increasingly 
normalized, cumbersome, citational, and circular…”  This result was an “unintended” 
consequence of authors attempting to relegate their own voices out of produced texts and 
in doing so they transformed themselves from a “producer of new knowledge to that of 
the mediator of preexisting knowledge.”  What Yurchak labelled a “hypernomalization” 
of text could be found throughout the Soviet Union and was especially evident in the 
writing and editing process for the war’s official history.2   
 
Initiating the Production of the War’s Official History 
Since Khrushchev was convinced that a lack of knowledge about the war would 
do more harm than good to the Soviet state, in 1957 the Institute of Marxism-Leninism 
was given the assignment of authoring the war’s history in an official capacity.  In 
looking at the records of the meetings held by commission members – many of whom 
were veterans of the war – it becomes apparent that the atmosphere created in the wake of 
Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s assumption of power was one of frankness and sincerity.  
Yet it is also evident that individuals sought to understand what could and should be said 
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and who or what needed to be avoided or lauded.  The ambiguous nature of the 
ideological direction emanating from the leadership meant that while there was a 
surprising level of openness to be found in many publications, there was also, 
unfortunately, consistent contradiction.3  Limits on what could be written were dictated 
by the dearth of publications on the war and historical works, especially those dealing 
with the war period, which still had to toe the “party line” and be aware of state and 
military secrets in regards to what could be included in an official history.4   
Compared to Stalin, there were differences in how history, especially the history 
of the Great Patriotic War, was written and presented under Khrushchev, but more often 
than not its foundations, including terminology and rhetoric, matched the Stalin period.5  
On 12 September 1957 the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union passed a resolution to create the war’s official history, entitled “The 
History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945.”6  The press initially 
promised all the volumes would be published by1961; as it turned out, the final volume 
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appeared in 1965.7  At least twenty-four meetings were held to discuss the creation of the 
war’s official history by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.  Records of the meetings 
usually recorded either full names or last names of participants with rare instances when 
“unnamed voices” were listed.   
Members of the editorial staff included some who were previously part of the 
commission created during the Second World War to document its history, including 
Isaak Mints and Petr Pospelov.8  Editors and authors of the commission set up under 
Khrushchev included representatives from a broad spectrum of institutions and public 
organizations and all had participated in the war effort in one capacity or another.  Most 
carried a rank of either colonel or general.  Pospelov headed the project, he was 
previously head editor of Pravda, directed the second edition of Stalin’s Short Biography, 
and was assigned by Khrushchev to head a commission focusing on “violations of 
socialist legality.”9  The more vocal participants among the commission members were 
Major-General Evgenii Boltin, an author and veteran of the war and former head editor of 
Krasnaia zvezda, Major-General N. Fokin, who previously authored two texts on Red 
Army offensive actions in December of 1942 and January of 1945, and Boris 
Tel’pukhovskii, who wrote his dissertation on the Stalingrad counteroffensive (without 
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having access to the original plans) and was the author and editor of numerous works on 
the Second World War.10  Dozens of veterans and specialists on the military and military 
history were among those chosen to participate on the creation of an official narrative of 
the war’s history, while additional experts included historians of Japan and the Far East, 
Germany, America and Poland.11   
The work was organized under the aegis of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, 
where the department on the History of the Great Patriotic War was headed by Boltin.  
This section was to undertake the work of collecting the needed documentation and 
material, including from government, institutional and party archives, and organizing the 
work of authors and editors.12  Source material was to be provided from a variety of 
institutions, scholars, and participants of the war.  The Soviet public was to play an 
“important role” in authoring the war’s history, including organizations such as the Union 
of Soviet Writers, the Union of Journalists, and the War Veterans Committee.  Similarly, 
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Gurii Zastavenko (colonel) was an author of publications on the United States and Poland. 
 
12 Some of the archives that were listed as being utilized included Arkhiv vneshnei politiki SSSR, 
Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Vsesoiuznogo Tsentral’nogo Soveta profsoiuzov, Arkhiv Istoricheskogo otdeleniia 
Glavnogo Shtaba Voenno-Morskogo Flota, Arkhiv Ministerstva oborony SSSR, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv 
Oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitel’stva Leningradskoi oblasti, Tsentral’nyi 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota SSSR, Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr’skoi 
revoliutsii i sotsialisticheskogo stroitel’stva SSSR, Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv RSFSR, 
Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sovetskoi Armii, Tsentral’nyi partiinyi arkhiv Instituta marksizma-
leninizma pri TsK KPSS, and Tsentral’noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR.  N. A. 
Fokin et al., Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945, Vol. 2 (Moscow: 
Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1961), 679. 
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the “personal memories” of the war’s “direct participants” would “serve as valuable 
material for the [war’s] history.”13  Editors had no qualms about writing to institutions to 
request material, as in one instance the head editor of the second volume wrote to the 
head of the Museum of the Heroic Defense of Brest Fortress asking for illustrations, 
orders, letters, and memoirs of participants and eye-witnesses of the fortress’s defense.14   
The press also mentioned the progress of the documentation of the war’s history 
and in turn letters were received with veterans hoping to add their experiences to the 
collective memory of the war.  For instance, after seeing an article in Pravda on 22 June 
1958, a veteran who served in a special detachment of the NKVD sent a letter to the 
institute of Marxism-Leninism commenting on how he would like the fighting for the city 
of Odessa to be highlighted, which he participated in.  Although he could provide 
commentary on what he witnessed he feared his letter was written too late to be 
included.15  Pravda, keeping the public up-to-date, contained at least a dozen articles 
specifically mentioning the progress of the official history of the war, from 1957–1963.16 
                                                 
13 ”Vazhnaia zadacha sovetskikh istorikov,” Pravda, September 29, 1957, 2; Boltin, 110, 111. 
 
14 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 395, l. 16.  Letter by N. Fokin to the head of the “Heroic Defense of Brest 
Fortress” Museum, Major Krupennikov.  Dated January 22, 1960.   
 
15 “Kak idet podgotovka k izdaniiu istorii velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” Pravda, June 22, 1958, 4; 
RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 395, l. 37-38.  The letter, written by D. F. Dupenko, was addressed to the 
editorial commission at the Institute of Marxism and Leninism and sent on July 6, 1958.    
 
16 For instance, see “Vazhnaia zadacha sovetskikh istorikov,” Pravda, September 29, 1957, 2; “Kak idet 
podgotovka k izdaniiu istorii velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” Pravda, June 22, 1958, 4; “Istoriia Velikoi 
Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg.,” Pravda, July 31, 1959, 2; “Uroki istorii: K 
vykhodu v svet pervogo toma ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza,’” Pravda, July 
24, 1960, 2; “Vtoroi tom ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 g.g.,’” 
Pravda, June 17, 1961, 4; “Letopis’ geroizma I stoikosti sovetskogo naroda: K vykhodu v svet vtorogo 
toma ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 g.g.,’” Pravda, June 21, 1961, 
3-4; “Tretii tom ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1495 gg.,’” Pravda, 
October 8, 1961, 2; “Letopis’ geroicheskikh pobed: Chetvertyi tom ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 
Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg.,’” Pravda, August 29, 1962, 3; “Nesokrushimoe mogushchestvo strany 
sotsializma: (K vykhodu v svet chetvertogo toma ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo 
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Boltin, the head of the “drafting committee,” recalled in February 1963 how it 
was with the “greatest happiness” that work was started on the “creation of ‘The History 
of the Great Patriotic War.’”17  Although this was an official history, it was not meant to 
devalue other publications but rather served as encouragement for future research since 
the history of the Second World War encompassed such a wide variety of topics.  More 
monographs and studies released on the war meant an increase in articles written and 
documentary collections published, which in turn would make the task set forth by the 
Central Committee for the Institute of Marxism-Leninism that much easier.  Meetings 
were convened at the end of 1957 and throughout the next two years to discuss the war’s 
periodization, its “nature,” and a variety of other topics.  By 1959 initial conclusions were 
already reached and an article in the journal Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, written by 
Boltin, outlined the progress of the multi-volume history.18 
In reading the stenographic records of the meetings of the draft commission, there 
was something of an urgency to publish a history of the war even if “the first edition will 
not be perfect.”  After all, a second can be just as quickly prepared, and in the end there 
might even be an option to publish a few editions.  There was a general admission that 
Soviet publications provided “too little factual material on the events of the Second 
                                                 
Soiuza 1941-1945’),” Pravda, October 5, 1962, 3-4; “Triumfal’nye pobedy: (K vykhodu v svet piatogo 
toma ‘Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945gg.’),” Pravda, September 19, 
1963, 4.  
 
17 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 108, l. 20.   
 
18 E. Boltin, “O khode raboti po sozdaniiu ‘Istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini.”  
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World War, outside the limits of the Soviet-German front.”19  Available Soviet 
publications were described as having a “cut and dry pattern.”20  The larger issue was the 
tendency for readers to clamor for translations of foreign books, which were considered 
“often of little value and always very tendentious” due to the dearth of material on the 
Second World War published by Soviet historians.  The end result was a “Soviet reader 
who may not always properly assess the events of the Second World War, [and] sees 
these events in a distorted mirror.”  Therefore, it was thought expedient that a history of 
the Second World War be written as a way for “bourgeois historiography” to be 
“countered by our interpretation of the events and lessons of the last war.”21   
Additionally, there was a need to share the history of the war with “our brotherly 
parties” in the Eastern bloc, undoubtedly to justify the Soviet presence, especially in light 
of what happened in Poland and Hungary in 1956.22  This multi-volume history was 
intended for a wide “audience” and to be a work for the “mass reader,” a “popular” 
history, written at an academic level, but devoid of academic language, and with a 
literary style to reach as many of the Soviet and international community as possible.  
                                                 
19 As an example, the “Great Soviet Encyclopedia” was used.   While it contained two-and-a-half pages on 
the subject of the “Second World War,” its British equivalent devoted 74 pages and the American, 212.  
RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 11, l. 35. 
 
20 The same accusations were soon to be leveled at the official history itself as it was consistently accused 
of presenting a “dry” history that lacked any “vivid” character for reader interest.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 
60, l. 10.  This folder contained a meeting with the authors of the second volume, dated 24 April 1958. 
 
21 That interpretation, however, did not need to fully omit foreign publications.  Arguments were made for 
utilizing the available diaries of German generals as they were “extremely vivid” in their descriptions of, 
among other things, heroic actions by Soviet soldiers.  Franz Halder (Chief of the German Army General 
Staff) and Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist (German Field Marshal) were mentioned.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, 
d. 11, l. 35, 36; d. 75, l. 11.  The latter folder contained a discussion of the first chapter of the second 
volume from 16 February 1959. 
 
22 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 12, l. 40.  At one point Khrushchev yelled at the Polish party leadership, “We 
spilled blood for the liberation of this country and you want to give it to the Americans, but you will not 
succeed!” Hopf, 199-211, 214. 
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The war’s official history needed to be “impactful not only on the mind but also on the 
feelings of readers…”23  And, importantly, this multi-volume set was to be written by a 
large team as a collective that had to cooperatively approve the basic foundational ideas 
behind the war’s history and the content of each volume. 
In the midst of arguments about what to include in each volume, one member of 
the commission suggested that readers may not want, or be able, to read all the volumes.  
One idea was for the final volume to “include the political, military, economic and 
ideological results of the war and show the world the historical significance of the victory 
of the Soviet people and the superiority of Soviet military art.  The final volume should 
focus on the lessons of the Great Patriotic War because this history is not only meant for 
us to look toward the past.”  “Concrete examples” were to be provided of the “heroic 
struggle of the party” which “managed to overcome difficulties” and sustain the Soviet 
war effort.  The history of the war was to serve a didactic purpose and be treated as “an 
instructive work that should awaken the minds of our Party, state, government, and 
military personnel, it should educate [them].”24  Others argued that readers would not 
make it past the first volume of such a large and sweeping work and thus the prewar 
period, which the first volume would outline and discuss, needed to contain an all-
                                                 
23 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 27, l. 18; d. 28, l. 8.  These two folders, from 14 May 1958 and 27 May 1959, 
respectively, contain the records of meetings of the editorial commission to discuss the creation of the 
official history’s second volume. 
 
24 These thoughts were expressed by E. S. Chalik.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 12, l. 38.  Looking at the 
contents of the final volume, readers would be overburdened with information as the first section included 
seven chapters outlining the significance of the Soviet victory in the war, including the socio-political and 
economic aspects of the Soviet state that made victory, on the frontlines and in the German rear, possible.  
The final two chapters discuss the significance and origins of the opposition to German occupation in 
Western and Central Europe and the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet victory.  Further aspects of 
the “education” that was sought by speakers like Chalik could be found in the second section, which 
discussed a short historiography of the Second World War, including histories from former allies and 
former enemies. 
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encompassing argument that included the economic, political and ideological aspects of 
the prewar period; those who only read the first volume when it was published would be 
left with an impression of western treachery, German imperialism, and Soviet altruism.  It 
was also admitted, however, that such a tome would be difficult to create as it would need 
“to present our preparations for the defense of the country, especially the military 
mistakes which led to serious consequences.”25  Thus, in some respects, the history of the 
war came to be front-and-end heavy in the territory it would cover, although the most 
controversial, and seemingly the most important, volume turned out to be the second, 
which covered the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the German advance 
on Stalingrad in the spring of 1942.  
The war’s history was intended to give a Marxist analysis of the economic, social 
and political development of the country, and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union on 
the eve of and during the war.  The Soviet people, in studying the history and experiences 
of the war, owed a thanks to the wise Leninist politics of the Communist Party, which 
brought about such “beneficent results.”  The victory in the war was a culmination of “all 
the activities of the Party and the people in the prewar years and their hard work during 
the war.”  Topics to be covered included the preparations for a war of aggression against 
the Soviet Union by Fascist Germany and “other imperialist powers,” a description of the 
heroic Soviet war effort on the frontlines and in the rear, as well as the major operations 
undertaken by the Soviet Army and Fleet which showcased Soviet military art.26  The 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 40.  The first volume began with an initial section looking at the prewar conditions in Germany and 
Japan, including the influence of capitalist states, and moved on to their aggressive behavior on the 
international arena, which also focused on the failed “attempt” to create a united anti-Soviet bloc. 
 
26 Boltin, 109-110. 
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“most important task” was to answer the question of “how did the Soviet population 
under the leadership of the Communist Party, in incredibly difficult circumstances, 
achieve a historic victory over” the “powerful enemy” that was Nazi Germany.27  
Additionally, a new official publication needed to “clear up the history of the war from 
the obvious layers of lies, from the direct praising of Stalin, [and] to revise those 
provisions of the history which were affected by Stalin’s cult of personality.”28 
A further topic that needed to be addressed was the portrayal of the Soviet-
German war in the West.  It was believed that in the United States, England and France 
there were “two schools,” one “progressive” and the other “reactionary.”  The 
progressive school offered an assessment of events that was considered “more or less” 
correct, including the role played by the Soviet Union as well as the place of the Great 
Patriotic War within the Second World War, while the reactionary eagerly sought “to 
diminish and falsify” Soviet efforts.  As a result, the history of the war needed to “clearly 
answer the question – how in this very difficult war did the Soviet Union come out the 
victor, what is the source of the unbreakable strength of the Soviet Union, and its armed 
forces.”  The volumes could not simply be military essays discussing strategy “but must 
be multi-sided and show events in all their diversity, [while] at the same time the work 
should clearly denounce and correct falsifiers of bourgeois historiography, who belittle 
the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Fascism and essentially justify the Fascist 
clique during the Second World War.”29  In correcting these “falsifiers” the history 
                                                 
27 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 7.   
 
28 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 108, l. 20. 
 
29 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 60, l. 5. 
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needed to “illuminate what impact the course and outcome of the Great Patriotic War had 
on the military operations of other theaters in the Second World War” so as to preserve 
the appearance of the primary role played by the Soviet Union in the allied coalition.30 
 
Debates around the Periodization of the War and the Initial Period of the War 
The official history of the war was to be imbued with ideas expressed not only at 
the 20th Party Congress but also by Khrushchev at the III Writer’s Congress, held in May 
1959.  It was to be written “in the spirit of socialist realism, bearing in mind that the 
darker parts should not overshadow the colossal” accomplishments of the Soviet Union, 
and they were continuously referred to and emphasized.  Participants were eager to 
“truthfully and vividly convey” the “complexity and diversity of the historical 
conditions” in which the war began.  Despite numerous “shortcomings and errors…which 
were unavoidable in the circumstances” the narrative needed to describe “the decisive 
force” of the Soviet people in the war against Germany while portraying the Communist 
Party as the “inspirer and organizer” of the struggle.  As a result of the Party’s 
organizational abilities, the Soviet population was mobilized and with all its strength was 
able to resist the German advance while undergoing great “sacrifices and hardships for 
the sake of the happiness of the Motherland, firmly believing in victory.”31 
With these ideas in mind, early meetings led to detailed discussions and debates 
about the periodization of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War and what 
                                                 
30 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 96, l. 6.  This meeting was held to discuss the historiography of the war on 2 
November 1959. 
 
31 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 28, l. 7, 8. 
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“character” the war carried.  The periodization needed to accurately portray the Soviet 
Union’s role in defeating fascism and present the USSR as “the major factor in the defeat 
of the fascist aggressors.”  Coordinating the breakdown by periods of the Second World 
War and the Great Patriotic War was viewed “as a positive trend in our historiography” 
since it allowed for clearly showing “the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its armed 
forces in the destruction of the entire fascist coalition [and] to illustrate the advantages of 
Soviet military art.”  In effect, this discussion gave authors and editors an excuse to make 
the Soviet participation in the war the primary vehicle for altering the war’s “character,” 
both politically (from “imperialist” to “just”) and militarily (from a defensive orientation 
to an offensive one).  Furthermore, the “basis” of the entire work was to be served by the 
“axiom” that the war waged by the Red Army was an all-people’s war which was defined 
by its “liberating nature.”  If this characterization of the war as “justifiable” was not 
developed from the very beginning, there were fears the entire “thesis” would “lose its 
guiding ideological character.”32   
Discussions about what to include in the first volume emphasized the 
“imperialist” nature of the western allies who “armed Hitler’s Germany” and highlighted 
“the prerequisites…for Fascist Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, because history 
repeats itself.”  Principled questions, such as the background of the war, needed to be 
explained, including the lead up to Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union.  Discussing the 
conditions on the eve of 1939 was a necessity as Soviet historians, utilizing Stalinist 
terminology, were looking “to repel the falsifications that have been presented on the 
subject.”  Among these “falsifications” were the “widespread…statements in the west 
                                                 
32 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 11, l. 7, 9, 35. 
 163 
that the Soviet Union was preparing to strike Germany” thus justifying Hitler’s invasion 
as a “preventative war.”  Not only was it believed that this idea was “impressed onto 
public opinion” through various Western publications, but it was also assumed to have 
formed “the modern strategy of NATO.”  As such, exposing the true nature of the events 
was “absolutely necessary.”33  Therefore, when outlining the first period of the Second 
World War, which began with the German invasion of Poland through 21 June 1941, 
there was no question that the emphasis was on Germany’s aggressive character as the 
driving force behind both the start of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. 
Previous uncertainty over how best to define and portray the war’s character was 
likely the result of Stalin’s description of the western powers as having a similar 
imperialistic nature to that of Germany.  Thus, the question of when the war’s character 
was “finally defined and fixed” remained open but all discussants agreed that the Red 
Army fought a “just war of liberation.”  Deborin, editor of the first volume, argued that a 
socialist state by its very nature could not wage an unjust war.  Consequently, events after 
22 June 1941 could only be characterized as part of a “just war” for the Red Army.  In 
effect, it was being argued that previous to Germany’s invasion of the USSR, the history 
of the Second World War was one of Germany invading and enslaving European states 
and their populations, but by invading the Soviet Union, the war was finally able to 
definitively take on a “liberating” character thanks to the primary role played by the Red 
Army and Soviet state.34  
                                                 
33 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 12, l. 40, 54; d. 27, l. 81. 
 
34 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 12, l. 16. 
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Speakers trying to understand the intricacies of the “imperialist” aspects of the 
Second World War leaned on Marx and Lenin.  Members were beseeched to “remember 
Lenin’s analysis of the First World War,” and although he wrote a great deal on the role 
war plays, he did not pay much attention to the purely military side of its development.  
Greater attention also needed to be paid to “Marxist thought in clarifying the nature of the 
war.”35  There was an effort to lean on a speech from the Fortieth Anniversary of the 
October Revolution, which sought to “deepen our understanding of the nature of the 
Second World War in the spirit of Lenin’s work and guidance, for Lenin taught that in 
every World War there are imperialist and liberating elements.”  Therefore, each period 
of the war needed to be approached individually while keeping in mind the role the 
USSR played by merely being involved.36   
Fokin, the head editor of the second volume, agreed that the war began as 
imperialist, which represented the nature of both Germany and the Western Allies, the 
latter of whom continued to exercise imperialist policies and even tried “to use the 
conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union for their own interests.”  However, he 
also argued that the thesis presented at the Fortieth Anniversary of the October 
Revolution, was simultaneously “misleading [to] historians” as while it said “that the war 
began as an imperialist war,” and then turned into an anti-fascist and liberating 
experience, it never specified from which moment the war’s nature was altered.37  The 
persistent concentration on the “liberating” nature of the war allowed arguments to be 
                                                 
35 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 11, l. 9. 
 
36 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 12, l. 15. 
 
37 Ibid., 26-27. 
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employed for a change to the criteria of the war’s periodization, which continued to lean 
on Voroshilov’s text and focused on the military aspects of the war. 
The war’s periodization, it was reasoned, “should take into account not only the 
changing methods of how the war was waged, but the role of the masses at the front and 
in the rear.”  Otherwise, the “function” of “liberator” was only mentioned in reference to 
the activities of the Red Army in 1944, when the Red Army began to physically cross the 
old Soviet border.  This was an integral aspect of the war against Germany since an 
emphasis on the liberating nature of the war against the axis in every period would 
further highlight the creation of the “anti-Hitler” coalition which was “headed by the 
Soviet Union.”38  The continued stress on “anti-Hitler” was once again a recycling of 
Stalinist era terminology.  The significance of “anti-Hitler” pointed to Stalin’s mistrust of 
the allies, as he believed that if Hitler ever disappeared, so would the “coalition” that was 
working against him, leaving the Soviets to face the Wehrmacht alone.39   
The Soviet role in the allied coalition also meant references to the allies and the 
allied war effort, both positive and negative, were regularly encountered in commission 
discussions.  For instance, clarity was needed with regard to Lend Lease.  There was a 
need to alter the “much distorted” view of the aid provided by the allies that had become 
entrenched “in the international press on the historiography of the Second World War.”  
Simultaneously, however, it was “wrong…to discount the help and close our eyes to it.”  
This was an opportunity to put Lend Lease into needed context and show what proportion 
of allied aid made up the Soviet war effort.  Reference was made to a statement by 
                                                 
38 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 11, l. 9, 10. 
 
39 Haslam, 120. 
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General Eisenhower at the end of the war that loans in the form of $10.8 billion were 
provided to the Soviet Union, which made up around 2.25% of the “financing of the 
Great Patriotic War.”40  In the near future, a reviewer agreed that “we should mention 
what our allies brought us” but he believed it should also be pointed out “that it was very 
little.”41 
Although giving credit to allied support, speakers also wanted the war’s history to 
devote “special attention…to the exposure of the selfish, anti-Soviet military and political 
objectives and activities of the Anglo-American allies.”   Allied “treachery…against the 
Soviet Union” would be stressed, as well as their “tendency to inflate their military 
successes and downplay the victories of the Soviet Army.”  All the while readers would 
keep in mind that the “unpopular actions of the [capitalist] authorities” were not 
supported by the “democratic forces” of the masses living in future “liberated territories” 
throughout Europe.  Furthermore, in order to contextualize the military success of the 
Soviet Union, a detailed comparison was to be undertaken of the struggle on the Soviet-
German front and that of the allies.  The end result would showcase “the decisive 
character” of the Eastern Front throughout the entirety of the Second World War as well 
as “during individual periods and campaigns.”  Furthermore, Soviet military science, 
                                                 
40 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 51, l. 33-34.  This folder contained the records of a meeting from 14 February 
1958 on the structure of the second, third, and fourth volumes.  To date there are few notable studies of the 
allied Lend Lease program, including its impact on the Red Army, Soviet economy and war effort, making 
it difficult to ascertain the actual impact of Lend Lease support on the war on the Eastern Front.  Those 
interested on the topic can consult Mark Harrison, Accounting for War: Soviet production, employment, 
and the defence burden, 1940-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Hubert P. van Tuyll 
Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (London: Greenwood Press, 1989). 
 
41 The reviewer was Vice-admiral Nesterov, who participated in a reader’s conference at Sevastopol on 
October 25, 1962, which discussed the second and third volumes.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 222. 
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throughout the war, “and its influence on the development of the art of war of other 
warring countries” would be highlighted.42 
It was necessary to showcase fighting taking place in other theaters in the second 
period of the Great Patriotic War (or the third period of the Second World War – 
November 1942 – December 1943), as this period’s foundation was reliant on the 
“thwarting” of the German Blitzkrieg campaign the world over.  This was a time when 
the Soviet Union’s wartime allies (now labeled “former allies”) “on all secondary 
[fronts]” were able to repel “the attacks of the aggressor.”  The third period of the Great 
Patriotic War (January 1944 – May 1945) “the period of decisive victories,” coincided 
almost completely with the “fourth period” of the Second World War.  These “decisive 
victories” included the allied landings in Normandy, France.  Yet, it was contended that 
the battles during the first half of 1944 on the Eastern Front were essential for creating 
“favorable conditions for the invasion of Anglo-American troops into Normandy and as a 
result this operation became for them decisive, realistic and successful.”  Thus, the first 
“decisive” battle undertaken by the allies was only a success thanks to the actions of the 
Red Army on the Eastern Front – another relic of the Stalinist narrative.43  
While there was agreement in general, Sidorov, director of the Institute of 
History, argued against the proposed periodization and claimed it was too heavily reliant 
on the chronology of the military actions that took place.  As such, the war’s history 
relied on a “military character” and its periodization was defined by and concentrated on 
major battles and their alterations of the overall “methods of warfare” (defensive and 
                                                 
42 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 11, l. 36. 
 
43 Ibid., 24. 
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offensive actions).  Solely focusing on military aspects, it was argued, would fail to 
showcase the internal developments of the Soviet economy and armed forces, including 
how the anti-Hitler coalition was developed and how well the masses resisted the 
invasion, including “their creative” work in the rear.44   
These arguments point to a divergent view of the first period (1 September 1939 -
21 June 1941) of the Second World War.  It was considered invalid if the “criterion for 
the division” of periods was “the nature of warfare, determined by economic, social and 
political factors.”  That the transition from the first into the second period was the 
invasion of the Soviet Union did not follow “logically” nor did it serve the underlining 
purpose of continually emphasizing the decisive role of the Soviet Union throughout the 
entirety of the Second World War.  The invasion of the Soviet Union, it was noted, did 
not modify the “compositions of the parties at war” nor did it alter the initial progression 
of the greater Second World War.  The strategic-military character of the war did not 
change until the Red Army’s counteroffensive at Stalingrad in November 1942, since up 
until that point the axis powers waged an armed struggle that consisted mainly of a 
“strategically offensive character” while the allies continued to wage a war that was 
defined by a “strategically defensive character.”  While the “scale” of the conflict 
transformed with the entry of the Soviet Union, it also altered with the entry of the United 
States, as well as that of Japan, yet “we are not inclined to say that in December 1941 a 
new stage of the Second World War began, as the nature of the armed struggle remained 
the same.”45   
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Therefore, it was suggested to emphasize the “offensive” and “defense” nature of 
the armed conflict, the change of which the Soviet Union helped facilitate.  
“Methodologically,” it was contended, without the Soviet entry into the war its character 
would not have been transformed, moving from a strategically defensive orientation to a 
strategically offensive one.  That change only took place after “the heroic struggle of the 
Soviet Armed forces during one and a half years.”  Therefore, the argument was 
presented that if speakers wanted the USSR to continuously play the most important role 
in the entire Second World War, which was the “only correct point of view,” then there 
could not be any distinct periods that did not include the Soviet war effort.  Thus, the 
initial period of the Second World War needed to begin on 1 September 1939 and range 
through 18 November 1942, with the end of Soviet defensive actions at Stalingrad.46   
In summarizing some of the conclusions around the periodization question, Boltin 
endorsed the idea that the Great Patriotic War “was the main determining event 
throughout the entirety of the Second World War.”  Making such a statement 
automatically negated the idea that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war did not alter 
its periodization, thus leaving the commission to conclude that the Soviet entry did merit 
consideration for the beginning of a new period.47  Accordingly, the periodization of the 
war hinged on the activities of the Eastern Front.   
Boltin characterized how the Soviet Union during 1941-1945 waged a “just” and 
“liberating” war that carried a “progressive significance for both the Soviet Union and for 
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all of humanity” while the war waged by the axis powers carried an “imperialistic 
character.”  He then separated the “ruling circles” of western powers from the people of 
their nations and claimed that while governments continued to pursue their imperialist 
aims, the people of those nations fought a “liberating” and “just” war as did the Soviet 
state – the only country where the goals of the people and government in power aligned.  
However, it was only with the Soviet entry into the war that the ongoing Second World 
War could be characterized as “liberating” and “just.”  Boltin seemingly separated the 
individual conflicts against the Germans by various nations and resistance movements 
from the entirety of the Second World War.  This meant the numerous individual 
campaigns waged against German occupations could be classified as “just” but it was 
only with the Soviet Union’s entrance into the war, assuming the role of “head” of the 
anti-Hitler coalition, that a shift in the nature of the entire Second World War occurred 
and it could in its entirety be classified as “just” and “liberating.”48   
In the end, the Second World War was broken down into four separate periods 
while the Great Patriotic War consisted of three.  The defeat of Japanese forces in the Far 
East would be considered part of the final period of the Second World War and included 
as “a special phase of our war of liberation against Fascist aggressors.”  It would not be 
part of the war against Germany but “of course, it will be considered part of the Great 
Patriotic War.”  Musheg Minasian, from the Frunze Academy, a veteran and doctor of 
historical sciences, disagreed, arguing such a view was “unnatural.”  He further 
commented: “Why do the people, [and] the party call this war the Great Patriotic War?  
Because it was a question of the fate of the country – will it continue to exist or not.  So 
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who can convince [us] that [in] the war with Japan, a minor part of the larger war, there 
was any discussion here about the fate of our country?”49  Nonetheless, the majority 
accepted all of the above proposals.  When published, some one hundred pages covered 
the war against Japan in the fifth volume.  Whether consciously or subconsciously, the 
endorsed periodization outline lined up correspondingly to that which Voroshilov 
described in his 1949 text.50 
 
Initial Feedback within the Commission 
By the time the next meeting took place, 28 December 1957, feedback already 
arrived with respect to previous discussions about the war’s periodization, among other 
topics.  Khrushchev’s emphasis on the importance of the Party and people, rather than 
Stalin, had filtered down through the system and its institutions so that criticism included 
a desire for there to be “greater detail…about the leading role of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, and more specifically to emphasize strongly the decisive role of the 
masses in the war.”51  Commission members agreed, pointing out the correctness of the 
suggestions and the need for more “detail and depth” to be presented when discussing the 
role played by the Communist Party, the Central Committee, as well as local party 
organizations.52  Agreement in general was not long in coming as the “decisive role of the 
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people, the masses” was argued to be “the task of the entire publication, all the volumes 
on the history of the Great Patriotic War.”53 
When it came to the “masses” speakers were conscious of the fact that it was not 
only the Soviet masses who had to be portrayed with agency.  Fokin emphasized that “if 
we gloss over the fact that the peoples of Europe – Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
France, etc., fought against fascism when Hitler’s troops attacked them, then we will 
offend the national feelings of these people.”  However, the “ruling circles” needed to be 
separated from the “masses” as Fokin argued that “the whole strategic line of behavior of 
the Anglo-American command throughout the war was determined by” imperialist aims 
and ambitions from beginning to end.  The masses, however, fought for “limited 
bourgeois freedoms” in their “struggle for national liberation.”54    
In drawing attention to the populations of conquered territories, Fokin was 
inclined to disagree with those who argued that the war of “liberation” only began in the 
summer of 1941.  Since those who opposed the Germans before the invasion of the USSR 
“by their struggle made a contribution to the fight against Hitlerism,” yet suggestions 
from commission members made it seem as if the history of the war was ignoring the 
contribution of other states while claiming “that the war became a war of liberation only 
with the entry of the Soviet Union.”  Fokin was interested in having the history of the war 
“emphasize the idea that even before the German attack on the Soviet Union the peoples 
of Europe contributed to the struggle against fascism, even if relatively little.”55 
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Although an emphasis on the contributions of others was stressed, Soviet 
involvement needed to be expanded.  Speakers reiterated the need to highlight more of 
the Party and the internal developments in the Soviet state.  Marshal of the Soviet Union, 
Vasilii Sokolovskii, emphasized the need to cover not only military events when 
discussing the first period of the war but also conditions in the Soviet Union.56  Since 
there was a need to explain the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Sokolovskii wanted to 
“highlight the political and economic situation” inside the state and the efforts on behalf 
of the Communist Party and Soviet government, “which aimed at the strengthening of the 
defensive capabilities of the USSR and the prevention of war...”  Pospelov immediately 
stepped in to justify Soviet actions in signing the pact by stating that the decision was 
correct as otherwise it would have led to a “single bloc” of capitalist states oriented 
against the Soviet Union.  Pospelov ultimately wanted the war’s unfolding to “proceed 
from statements” made by Stalin.  He supported a narrative that depicted Germany as 
being armed by the Western Allies in order “to equip a reliable guard of Europe against 
the communist threat.”  Since Germany proved unable to fulfill such a role, the line 
pursued by Soviet diplomacy on the eve of the war was correct.  By depicting Germany 
as able and willing to organize a “united front of all capitalist states” against the USSR, 
Stalin’s actions in the summer of 1939 were portrayed as robbing Germany of its ability 
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to wage an all-out war with Western support against the Soviet state.57  Consequently, the 
signing of the pact with Germany allowed the Soviet government to prevent an 
immediate invasion.  Others agreed that the pact was “not Stalin’s mistake” and it was 
part “of the fundamental pillars of our foreign policy after the October Revolution…to 
utilize the [inherent] contradictions of the imperialists” to oppose them.58  Consequently, 
the presentation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was highly reminiscent of the Stalinist 
period. 
Stalin was once again present when the liberating character of the war was 
brought up for discussion.  Moving away from Stalin’s old “formula,” which stated that 
the Soviet entry into the war did not initiate but rather “reinforced the character of a war 
of liberation,” would not be “entirely correct.”59  Simultaneously, Pospelov noted that 
“comrade Stalin’s speech at the meeting of the electors of the city of 
Moscow…forcefully emphasized that the Second World War emerged as the inevitable 
result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of a modern 
monopoly of capitalism.”  As opposed to the First World War, the beginning of the 
Second differed in that the Soviet Union, a socialist state, existed.  The justifications for a 
socialist state going to war could not possibly mirror those of “imperialist” or “capitalist” 
states represented by the Western Allies and the Fascist bloc.  Yet Pospelov would not 
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admit that the war had a “liberating” character from the beginning since he, as others, 
distinguished the “people” of those states forced to fight against German aggression from 
those in power – while the masses might yearn for liberation, their governments were 
seemingly bent on continuing their imperialist traditions.60   
Stalinist-era ideas and literature continued to influence the thinking of 
commission members.  In order to understand the imperialist character of the war, the 
speakers Z. Osipov and Andrei Kuchkin leaned on Stalin’s thoughts and Stalin era reports 
from sessions of the Supreme Soviet.  Osipov commented how a 1940 report mentioned 
that “the Soviet Union refused to become an accomplice of England and France in the 
conduct of an imperialist policy against Germany” at which point it was claimed that “the 
hostility of their [England and France] position with regard to the Soviet Union was 
intensified.”  These arguments maintained the Soviet importance to the war effort as head 
of the anti-Hitler coalition since defining the Soviet position as “just” meant those 
following the Soviet lead waged a “just” war as well, while the independent actions of the 
Western Allies were consistently portrayed as “imperialist.”  Thus, an argument was 
presented that the establishment of an anti-Hitler coalition was “only possible on the 
basis of a just war.”  A war “directed against fascism and the defeat of fascism, toward 
the destruction of fascist ideas on the enslavement of the entire world and to create a 
fascist regime throughout the entire world” was “objectively…from the beginning a just 
war, a war of liberation.”  However, Kuchkin went further and claimed that even if in 
1939 there was no anti-Hitler coalition, by simply fighting against Hitler, no matter their 
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“imperialist ambitions,” the Western Allies were waging a just war.61  This notion was 
supported by pointing out how “patriots” inside states attacked by Germany, including 
Poland, Norway and France, led by communist movements, “bravely resisted” the 
German invasion and how in France, among other states, “communists created a specific 
program for a war of liberation and to free enslaved nations.”  While it might “sound 
seditious,” Kuchkin stood “behind Stalin’s assessment” of the war’s nature based on 
Stalin’s speech from 9 February 1946.62  Even though England, France, and America 
sought “imperialist, expansionist objectives,” the very fact that they fought against 
German Fascism and attempted to destroy it, meant that from the very beginning the war 
was a just war and of a liberating nature.  “Objectively,” it was argued, the western 
powers fought against fascism and helped to defend socialism in the Soviet Union, even 
if “subjectively” they wanted to expand their “imperialist” ambitions.  As a result, 
Stalin’s postwar evaluation of the nature of the conflict was treated as “deeply 
principled” and “well thought out.”63 
Debate, however, continued over the correct “formula” of the war with Evgenii 
Zhukov claiming that “with respect to the first stage we all agree, that the war was 
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imperialistic on both sides.”  Once again Stalin was referred to in that his “formula that 
two imperialist groups went against each other – is correct.”  Pospelov immediately 
retorted that such a statement was “contrary to the formula, which says that it was a war 
of liberation from the very beginning.”  The arguments continued to lean on two Stalinist 
positions that opposed each other.  In order to break the stalemate Lenin was once more 
inducted into the debate.  “Lenin said of wars: on the one hand, war was liberating, on the 
other – aggressive.  We need to identify the nature of the war to draw a clear line from 
the beginning to the end.  The war became a war of liberation from the side of the anti-
fascist coalition.”  No true conclusion was reached at the end of the meeting, which took 
place on 15 January 1958, aside from the fact that an amendment was needed on the 
formulation of the war’s nature.64  A black and white binary of the war’s nature appeared 
the preference.  The next meeting held on the 7 February 1958 only reasserted that there 
was “confusion” surrounding the characterization of the war, especially in regards to the 
year 1940.  It was argued that if the commission accepted the idea that the war carried a 
“liberating character” from the very beginning, then the question arose of how did the 
Europe of 1940, practically fully under German control, need to be portrayed.  In such a 
scenario it appeared that England, as the only viable opponent against German 
aggression, waged a war of liberation all on its own.  Furthermore, “if we recognize that 
the war from the very beginning was a war of liberation, then it means we have to reject 
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numerous decisions of other communist parties…since these parties admitted that the war 
carried an imperialistic character.”65  Once more, no definitive conclusion was reached.   
Although speakers routinely rallied behind the Stalinist narrative, there were some 
exceptions.  One of the more objective discussants was Musheg Minasian, who 
previously authored a book on Operation Bagration – the Red Army’s offensive in June 
1944 that destroyed Germany’s Army Group Center.66  Minasian was conscious of the 
changes taking place in the Second World War’s historiography.  He wanted authors to 
include an explanation for the various changes readers would encounter throughout the 
war’s official history rather than simply having “declarations” made.  “It should be 
explained why for ten years our propaganda claimed one [thing], and now all of a sudden 
makes a 180-degree turn.”  While professional historians could hazard a guess as to 
where the changes in the historiography of the war were coming from, others needed 
clarification.  There were already those who opposed the “new interpretation of the 
character of the Second World War” that was being proposed by the commission.67  
Thus, Minasian was conscious of not only the changes the war’s historiography was 
experiencing under Khrushchev’s administration, but the impact it would undoubtedly 
have on the general reader who would soon be presented with a new version of events 
than what they were used to as a result of over a decade of propaganda. 
With the conclusion of the first few meetings, it was evident that commission 
members consistently leaned on Stalin’s speeches, quotes and ideas in order to 
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understand how motivations, subjects and events needed to be portrayed and analyzed.  
Without the hand of Stalin to lead them, many members eagerly grasped onto aspects of 
the Stalinist narrative that was crafted during his time in power, but the often ambiguous 
or at times contradictory nature of the Stalinist narrative meant no decisions could be 
reached to the satisfaction of all parties involved, not even when Lenin was called on to 
offer a guiding hand.  The absence of an external voice meant no real conclusion could be 
agreed on as previous positions were repeated ad nauseam.  By 1959, in his article, Boltin 
claimed the war’s character was clear and did not “require further discussion.”68   
 
Discussions about the Content of the Second Volume 
 The second volume was described as carrying a “great significance for the present 
generation and for future generations, as well as people of other countries.”  The general 
reader wanted answers to key questions and issues and as such “a more truthful 
coverage” of the war needed to be presented.  Many considered this volume 
“undoubtedly the most difficult and complex” as it needed to explain “the most difficult 
issue” – the state and army’s failures throughout the first period of the war.69  A “distinct 
picture” would be outlined throughout the chapters to explain the “complicated” position 
the Soviet Union found itself in while concentrating on the Party’s reaction to developing 
events.70  The authors and editors needed to showcase “the crucial role of the people in 
overcoming the immense difficulties of the first period of the war,” both at the front and 
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in the rear, while discussing political and military mistakes.  The volume needed to 
“show that the [entity] which organized the people to overcome these difficulties, to repel 
the aggressor, the inspiring and guiding force of the people in all areas – in the rear, front 
and rear of the enemy – was the Communist Party.”  As such, this work was considered a 
“political document” and authors and editors needed to understand that “the evaluations 
that will be developed…will be considered by readers as the party line rather than the 
individual opinions of this or that author.”71   
 The official history needed to explain how the country withstood the German 
invasion, including who was to blame for initial failures, and how the Red Army was able 
to alter the situation at the end of 1941.72  Putting themselves in the place of the general 
reader, commission members understood that the public needed someone to blame for the 
initial defeats and clarification for why those guilty were not put on trial.  The rhetorical 
question was posed: “When for reading [German propaganda] leaflets they gave 10 years 
[in prison], why not judge [someone] for such outrages and crimes?”  Precision was 
required so that when Stalin was listed as one of the reasons for “strategically wrong 
decisions,” a demand was made for greater clarity in regards to which “decisions” were 
under scrutiny, “otherwise the reader will not have any idea.”73    
Although Stalin would receive much of the blame for how the initial period of the 
war unfolded, he was also, in some respects, the inspiration behind the admission that 
mistakes were made in the first place.  It was Stalin’s 1945 speech that mentioned how 
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the government made “not a few errors” which seemed to have paved the way for the 
authors and editors to label and debate these issues as “mistakes” in the first place.  
Although there were still limits on what could be said or admitted as they needed to 
approach the question of what happened in 1941 in a “deliberate” and “proper” manner.  
But, simply put, since “Stalin…said that mistakes were made.  We need to show where 
mistakes were made.”74 
Large issues that were previously ignored, never emphasized, “covered in a one-
sided manner or often distorted” were to be given the utmost consideration.  “Acute 
problems” needed to be discussed “without prejudice” but members were also conscious 
of the fact that significant issues had to be expressed so that “they can address political 
expediency.”  All the while those working on the volume needed to keep in mind that 
they had to “meet” Lenin’s “political outlines” and consider which groups would benefit 
from the disclosures the official history of the war would make.  Such thinking meant that 
limits were already in place on what could be revealed to readers.  Pospelov argued that 
not all “figures” should be published or analyzed.  Only “a few select battles” needed to 
be portrayed or some general figures given to showcase “what material damage the 
fascists caused us.”75  This lack of information would become one of the biggest 
criticisms for official reviewers and the reading public. 
Even with limits in place, there was a general reliance on the truth and substance 
of archival information and documentary evidence, which would eventually lead to “deep 
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insights into fundamental questions.”76  Some, however, considered all documents to be 
tainted by Stalin’s cult while others claimed there was plenty of documentation that 
“aimed to overcome the consequences of the personality cult.”  There was, however, 
some hesitation in publishing all relevant documents with the caveat that “their use needs 
to be restricted.”77  Speakers leaned on the need for discussions and debates to resolve 
contested issues, “falsifications,” specifically those revolving around the prewar period 
and the initial period of the war, and to finally reach correct conclusions.78   
Discussions revolving around the situation in 1941 needed to not only address 
Red Army miscalculations, as that would mean ignoring how simultaneously the Soviet 
Union and its armed forces were able to endure and overcome German aggression.  
Portraying the successes enjoyed by Soviet forces in 1941 was needed “for our friends” 
and would serve as a “warning for our enemies” that in spite of enormous difficulties the 
Red Army was able to resist an attack that “no other system could have withstood” when 
considering how much territory was lost and the numerous “sacrifices” sustained in the 
process.  However, this idea was challenged by Sokolovskii, in a September 1959 review 
discussing the third volume, when he stated that “It is incorrectly asserted that for the last 
century no European state knew the type of losses on their territory and their economic 
production.  It is known that during the First World War (not to mention the Napoleonic 
wars) a number of European countries (Belgium, France, and others) fully or to a large 
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degree lost their territory.”79  Nonetheless, the idea that the Soviet system withstood an 
invasion and occupation that no other state could have survived has continued to define 
the ability of the Soviet state to endure and eventually triumph over Germany. 
No matter to what degree the initial period of the war was dissected, Stalinist 
ideas continued to shadow most discussions.  The question of what created the 
groundwork for the eventual victory in the war had to touch on the foundational aspects 
of the Soviet system, including the “collective farm system,” which “created the 
conditions necessary in order to withstand a severe test [of our system]” as a result of 
which “our country was ready for a large war.”  Industrialization prepared the state “for 
the long and difficult ordeals of war,” as the creation of the “second metallurgical base in 
the Urals…created during the Five-Year Plans” allowed for an eventual ability to lose as 
much land as the Soviet Union did and still triumph over Germany.  As a result, the 
Soviet population’s culture “rose” to such an extent that Soviet farmer-tractor workers 
were able to “quickly” master captured enemy tanks and used them against the 
Germans.80  Thus, the Stalinist narrative, which highlighted the necessity of 
industrialization, collectivization, the Five-Year Plans in general, and Soviet ingenuity, 
was once more leaned on to find reasons for Soviet success and victory. 
Stalin himself, however, was presented in a less than a glorious light, by speakers, 
when it came to Soviet foreign policy.  It was due to Stalin’s underestimation of the 
“advancing threat of war” and an “incorrect assessment of the military-political situation” 
that neither the economy nor the army were put in a state of combat readiness.  Even if 
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the Soviet state contained the necessary material infrastructure to defeat Germany, thanks 
to Stalin, it was also thanks to him that the international situation was incorrectly 
interpreted and the opportunities open to the USSR and Red Army were not utilized “in a 
timely manner” which led to needless losses that could have been avoided.81   
Some, however, took a middle ground when it came to Stalin and the lead up to 
the war.  Fokin accused recent studies by historians, although did not mention any 
specific names or titles, of holding “Stalin guilty of everything, they put everything on 
Stalin’s shoulders, all other difficulties and mistakes, committed in other instances by 
other hands, are in some ways swept away.”  Such a “one-sided” analysis “undermines 
the authority of our Party.”  Fokin claimed that previous publications “completely lost 
sight of the tremendously positive work, which was done by our Party in the period when 
our country was preparing for war, in particular the training of the armed forces and the 
great work done by Stalin and other members of the Politburo, and the Central 
Committee as a whole, I mean the preparation of the country itself and [our] industry and 
the training of the armed forces...all of these things are overlooked and what is 
emphasized is that our country appeared unprepared for war, the armed forces were not 
deployed because they were forbidden from being deployed.”82   
Others were of a similar mindset as an unnamed speaker argued that the second 
volume needed to show “that the Party and government, given the threat of a war 
brewing, did significant work to prepare the country and the armed forces to repel the 
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imperialist aggression against the USSR.”  Stalin was described among the leadership of 
the Party and state as “correctly assess[ing] the imperialist nature of German fascism and 
[he] had no illusions regarding the temporary nature of the Soviet-German agreement and 
the likelihood of the outbreak of a war by Germany against the USSR.  Stalin’s errors, as 
head of the Party and government, consisted of the fact that he held the party line as 
much as possible trying to delay the timing of an armed conflict between the USSR and 
Germany, he overestimated the deterrent effect of political and diplomatic factors and 
underestimated the political adventurism and treachery of the leadership of Fascist 
Germany.”  As a result, Stalin failed to “properly assess” Germany’s preparations on the 
border of the Soviet Union and make the “necessary conclusions about the immediate 
danger threatening the USSR.  From this followed the organizational mistakes which 
predetermined the belated transfer of the national economy to expand production of 
military equipment and weapons, and a delayed alerting of the armed forces.”83 
Additionally, Fokin commented that earlier histories spoke of “the massive 
heroism of the workers, soldiers, and individual commanders and show[ed] the names of 
these people, their deeds, but we somehow completely omitted showing the leadership of 
our Party.”  Since Stalinist publications continually praised Stalin, Fokin argued that “we 
had Stalin, he solved all our issues, [and] thanks to him everything was done.”  But as a 
result of Khrushchev’s secret speech “we decided to repudiate this line [of thinking].”  
Taking Stalin’s place would be the Party Central Committee and members of the 
Politburo; but another issue arose in that some of the former members of the Politburo 
were “discredited themselves politically and we are now trying to keep silent about 
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them.”84  Although repudiating the idea that Stalin “solved all our issues,” such a frank 
admission of attempting to “keep silent” about discredited Politburo members once more 
displayed relics of the Stalinist period where personalities were omitted, forgotten, or 
simply written out of histories due to their past transgressions.85  But unlike during the 
Stalinist period, Fokin had reservations about pursuing such a policy in that he was 
unsure of how accurately the war’s initial period would be described if the volume was to 
“remain silent in regards to these names and will not disclose how the Central Committee 
distributed forces, who received what, who led which industry, in order to more 
completely show the management of the Central Committee of the Party.”86 
With Fokin wanting others to share in the blame for the disastrous start to the war, 
he indicted the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, whose decisions 
“were often not consistent with the situation” the Red Army and country found itself 
facing.  For instance, when troops were forced to retreat directives were issued from the 
high command about initiating operations against enemy territory and to encircle enemy 
forces, disregarding the situation Red Army forces found themselves in on the ground.  
These orders resulted in a “counterproductive” outcome, as was evidenced with the 
encirclement of the South-Western Front around Kiev in the fall of 1941, which featured 
one of the largest encirclements of Soviet forces.  Here, Fokin admitted, “major mistakes 
were made.”  Similar miscalculations were evident in the winter campaign during 1941-
1942, when “as a result of misallocation and misuse of forces,” instead of concentrating 
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Red Army forces against just Army Group Center, “strategic reserves” went over to the 
offensive against all three German army groups resulting in a dispersed effort, which 
“resulted in unaccomplished operations in multiple directions.”87  Comparable mistakes 
were responsible for the retreats in the spring of 1942, which eventually led to the battle 
for Stalingrad.   
In concentrating on these major issues Fokin wanted to “properly assess” them 
and “draw…correct conclusions” as well as show how Soviet forces were able to 
overcome the circumstances they found themselves facing.  Instead of “denigrating our 
Soviet command” he wanted to explain “that our lack of experience led to the fact that we 
allowed a number of mistakes and gradually in the course of the war, through an 
accumulation of experience, we became strategically wiser, operationally competent, and 
then were able to solve problems more correctly, which led to success and eventually to 
victory.”88  Thus, the second volume, with Fokin as head editor, was supposed to describe 
the evolution of Soviet military art, progressing positively from initial mistakes, due to 
inexperience and unrealistic orders from above, to eventual victory thanks to lessons 
learned on the field of battle – in part a reiteration of the Stalinist narrative that portrayed 
the Red Army as a force that learned from 1941 and 1942, became a “cadre army,” and 
went on to defeat the Wehrmacht.   
In detailing how the Party’s leadership led the army into turning the character of 
the war from being defense-dominated into offense-minded allowed the war’s history to 
emphasize the “decisive” role played by the Soviet Union as this became “one of the 
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most important tasks of the entire…work.”  Inside this narrative, the Western Allies were 
allowed a place with respect to their contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany.  The 
Great Patriotic War could not be presented in a vacuum, thus the allied war effort had to 
be outlined and juxtaposed against Soviet importance.  In order to show the significant 
role played by the Soviet Union “critical issues of the inter-allied relationship” needed to 
be included in chapters detailing the war’s progress.  “International policy” was 
subordinated to military strategy so that chapters dealing with major military operations 
by the allies would also feature Soviet relations with the allies as they unfolded – thus 
keeping a Soviet voice in all chapters, even if they dealt solely with the Western Allies.89   
The second volume’s concentration on the military progression of events, from 
the beginning of the invasion of the Soviet Union through the Red Army 
counteroffensive around Stalingrad, was to be encapsulated by two defining features: the 
initial “failure of Blitzkrieg” and “the creation of the conditions [needed] for a radical 
change in the course of the Great Patriotic War.”90  Both represented victorious Soviet 
achievements and concentrating on them helped conceal mistakes and defeats.  In 
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examining the reasons presented for the Red Army’s failures in 1941, it becomes evident 
that they mirrored those offered by Stalin during the war itself.  Fokin claimed that “when 
analyzing all the documents related to the state of the Soviet armed forces, we must 
recognize that our army at the beginning of the war in terms of technical equipment” was 
“inferior to the German army” and lacked motorization.  While the Wehrmacht was able 
to “quickly maneuver” Soviet forces “very slowly carried out regroupings, slowly massed 
troops on decisive directions and, as a result, although having superior forces, had a 
difficult time against attacks by weaker German groups.”  Even with their “fighting 
ability” being “hindered” by the state of their equipment, Fokin still praised Soviet force 
for “significant successes…during the Battle of Smolensk” and Moscow, which forced 
“the German army…over to the defensive.”91 
Speakers claimed that after initial retreats and withdrawals of Red Army forces, 
Soviet military art was developed enough in these first months of the war to find a 
“correct solution to tactical problems both in defense and offense.”  Thanks to the Party’s 
leadership and the people’s sacrifice and struggle, by the end of 1941 conditions existed 
for a major defeat of Germany’s Blitzkrieg campaign.92  The Battle of Moscow would 
serve as both the point where Soviet defensive power stopped the Germans before the 
capital and the Red Army’s offensive abilities were on display in the hundreds of 
kilometers German forces were pushed away from Moscow with the winter counter-
offensive, passing the “initiative” to the Red Army.93   
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Although the above encapsulated a victorious image of Red Army actions 
throughout 1941, attempts to address fundamental questions related to the reasons for the 
Red Army’s initial defeats proved inadequate.  Fokin explained how at a previous 
meeting “there were mentions that we had no plans for war, so everything was done 
without a plan.  But plans for covering [the border] were developed, and if they had been 
promptly put into place, they would have changed the nature of the war and as a result the 
situation on the front would have developed differently.”94  It quickly became evident 
that as a result of the limited publications available on the war, including continued limits 
placed on archival access, there were more questions than answers when it came to the 
Second World War, even fundamentally simple questions such as the existence of 
wartime plans were contested and debated.   
When the topic of war plans was brought up again it was in the context of 
attempting to disprove that the German attack on the Soviet Union was part of a 
“preventive war.”95  Sokolovskii suggested that “maybe we can say that there were no 
defensive plans for the Soviet state.”  He was rebuffed by Army General Vladimir 
Kurasov, who stated that “we had a plan for the defense of the country’s borders” and 
Sokolovskii immediately countered with “we had nothing.”  No real conclusion was 
reached aside from a “voice” calling out that “to say that we did not have a defensive 
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plan is akin to having proof that we were not at all prepare for war” which “is historically 
inaccurate.”96   
To offset this deficiency in knowledge, Fokin proposed utilizing the experience of 
competent military leaders like Zhukov, Vasilevskii, Timoshenko, or a “host of other 
comrades who were directly connected” to the events in question so as to provide a 
deeper analysis in order to discover and disclose the causes of the Red Army’s failure and 
“to correctly present them politically and highlight [them] in our work.”  Similar 
questions remained to be resolved around Stalin’s role in the initial period of the war, 
which Fokin hoped the committee could help solve “so that we can get back on the right 
track.”97 
In a future meeting the issue of strategic plans was taken up by Pospelov as he 
and other speakers attempted to figure out how to discuss Soviet prewar planning without 
giving credence to prewar German propaganda that emphasized a need for a preventive 
war against the USSR.  Pospelov shifted attention and blame onto the shoulders of 
Voroshilov, who proclaimed in speeches, before the start of the war, that the Soviet 
Union would “not allow the enemy to enter our homeland but we will beat him there, 
from whence he came.”  These “ideas” became the cornerstone of “the Soviet state’s 
military-political documents, in accordance with which we built our military-economic 
and strategic plans.”  As a result, Pospelov said, “it turns out that we had a strategic plan 
of attack against the territory of the potential enemy.”  However, if such an idea were 
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allowed to permeate the pages of the war’s official history, “then the entire world press 
would begin to attack us, claiming that Hitler was, well, to some extent he was correct 
when he spoke about a preventive war.”98  The above simply could not be allowed to 
enter the canon of Soviet history when it came to the Second World War – and it never 
did as the first volume, when published in 1960, omitted any references to a preventative 
war with respect to the Soviet Union.  Pospelov sided with Sokolovskii who claimed that 
a “strategic plan to take the war to the enemy’s territory before the war did not exist.”  
Soviet historians did not have to prove a negative but they did want support from a non-
Soviet source.  Pospelov proposed utilizing “a fascist historian” to show that whatever 
plans the Soviet Union had were “late” in implementation and “imperfectly developed.”99  
To support such a notion he suggested utilizing History of the Second World War by Kurt 
von Tippelskirch, whose translated book appeared in Russian in 1956.  Tippelskirch, as a 
source, would appear in every volume of the official history.   
Explanations for Soviet defeats also relied on the factor of “surprise,” which 
became an important topic for the commission.  Fokin argued that “today the [question 
of] surprise has many different points of view.  There is a point of view that there was 
without a doubt surprise, and that surprise for the border troops was a sudden attack by 
the German-Fascist army against our country.”100  However, there was also enough 
information showing that commanders of fronts, armies, corps, and even divisions 
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located in the border districts “clearly saw the situation as it was developing…they 
clearly knew” German forces were being arrayed against the Soviet border.  Furthermore, 
when these commanders requested to place their troops on combat alert they were 
rejected by the General Staff and People’s Commissar of Defense.  Why this rejection 
was authorized Fokin could not explain.  He could only point to existing documents that 
showed “Stalin did not allow troops to be brought to full readiness in accordance with 
existing plans,” which meant “at the moment of attack the troops were taken by surprise, 
although the leadership of the armed forces” knew about a coming invasion.101 Soviet 
intelligence had already supplied detailed information to the General Staff and Stalin, 
enough to give a clear idea of the strength of German forces, their locations and their 
groupings.  The multi-sided nature of this issue meant this was another topic in need of 
discussion and resolution by the commission before any type of decision could be made 
in regards to how much of a surprise the invasion was and for whom.   
An additional complication in understanding how much of a “surprise” the 
invasion was dealt with the fact that although officially rumors of war were denied, the 
fleet issued an alert for battle readiness on 19 June.  This alert was in response to 
continued German violations of Soviet airspace and since the navy was relatively 
independent and lacked the importance of Soviet land forces, they was able to get away 
with this alert.  Sokolovskii, however, continued to argue that “in general the army did 
not know that there was an invasion being prepared nor did the fleet…the country did not 
know about this.  There was, of course, information, but in general no one knew.”  
Reference was made to the TASS announcement from 14 June, which “resulted in a 
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psychological calm” that disarmed the country mentally when “Stalin said that the 
Germans would not go to war…”102  Consequently, it was claimed that the country was 
lulled into a false sense of security, not only by believing that war was not on the horizon 
but also by having faith in the prewar propaganda that claimed future battles would be 
won with little blood lost and mainly take place on the enemy’s territory.103   
When the war did begin, in spite of Stalin’s mistakes, it was “the organizational 
role of our party” that picked up where Stalin failed; “notwithstanding that we found 
ourselves in a hostile environment, the will of the Party, the will of the Soviet people was 
able to radically alter the situation, and our material capabilities were set in motion.”  
This version of events was argued to be “evident from the documents which we have 
familiarized [ourselves with].”104 
Sokolovskii sided with Fokin with respect to discussions of “surprise,” a deeper 
and more nuanced analysis was required.  Because previous publications regularly lauded 
Red Army training and preparation, Sokolovskii contended it was easy enough to present 
“positive results” achieved in the field but the reasons for Red Army failures merited 
attention.  Simply blaming the failures of 1941 “on suddenness of a treacherous attack – 
will result in nothing…we will be laughed at” as the reading public will “say the 
commission has not seriously come to address such an important issue.”105   
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In an attempt to dig further into the reasons for the failure of 1941, Sokolovskii 
found a scapegoat in the introduction of commissars into the Red Army, both in 1937 and 
1941.  He viewed the doing away of one-man command soon after the German invasion 
as a sign of distrust toward the command personnel of the Red Army “in a difficult 
moment.  A hard month has passed and we introduce commissars.”  Furthermore, the 
“desired results” with the introduction of commissars was never realized and soon one-
man command was reintroduced.106   
One of the authors, Boris Tel’pukhovskii, disagreed as he believed that the 
introduction of “military commissars in connection with the outbreak of war was entirely 
correct.  This was necessitated by the situation which prevailed at the front.”  More so, he 
questioned whether it was a correct decision to “abolish military commissars on the eve 
of the Great Patriotic War.”  Tel’pukhovskii believed the introduction of commissars 
corresponded to the outbreak of war in general, rather than a response to initial Red Army 
failures.  This argument also supported the idea that Stalin had no clue war was coming 
nor was he preparing an invasion of Germany since if he did not trust the Red Army high 
command then he would never have done away with dual command on the eve of the 
war.107   
In response, Sokolovskii brought Lenin into the debate stating: “Lenin spoke of 
one-man command in the army, when there are two people – there is no unity of 
command.”  Of course, this was not exactly accurate on Lenin’s position on commissars 
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and dual command during the Civil War.  Tel’pukhovskii seemed hesitant to oppose a 
Leninist position and responded that “with the help of the Central Committee we will find 
the correct solution.”  However, he further commented that “it seems to me, as all of us 
here and myself passed through the war, that if we develop this thesis, why was it needed 
to introduce military commissars, it must be said that a number of officers at the 
beginning of the war…were not on top of the situation.  It was necessary to help 
commanders…so that they could master the art of war…and gain the necessary authority 
so that during the war our cadres could mature.”  And after their “maturation” the system 
of military commissars was abolished once more.108  Tel’pukhovskii received support 
from the historian N. Shatagin, who insisted that “there is no doubt that the introduction 
of the institution of military commissars in July 1941 was an absolutely correct, 
necessary, and appropriate measure, which played a crucial role in strengthening the Red 
Army and enhanced its fighting abilities in the first, most difficult and crucial period of 
the Great Patriotic War.”  When initially the Red Army “wavered” and its commanding 
officers were “lost” it was deemed necessary “to raise the authority of 
commanders…with the help of party representatives in the form of commissars” – thus 
another reason was presented for how and why the Party managed the initial period of the 
war, rather than Stalin, and helped the Red Army alter the situation at the front.109  The 
second volume, when published, presented the introduction of military commissars as 
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just one of the measures taken by the Central Committee to “strengthen the Party’s 
influence in the Armed Forces.”110 
While some topics proved contested territory, others were considered simply 
incorrect or wholly missing.  Analyzing some of the military operations from the initial 
period of the war, Sokolovskii commented on the “incorrect portrayal” of the Battle of 
Smolensk, which was depicted as if the Wehrmacht was defeated by the Red Army.  The 
Germans, he argued, “were delayed during the battle for Smolensk and suffered heavy 
losses.  They were detained for a period of about two months, but they did not suffer a 
defeat.”111  Sokolovskii’s stance was rather objective.  Although the Battle of Smolensk 
could be argued to have been a pyrrhic victory for the Germans, it was still a Red Army 
defeat.112  The analysis of battles and events in 1941 seemed skewed and committee 
members were conscious of how readers might misinterpret what was being emphasized 
and why.   
Smolensk was a well-known operation, so hiding an analysis of one of the most 
important German encirclements would have been a difficult prospect.  Yet somehow, 
commented V. Zhelanov, there was no discussion of the Red Army’s general retreat, 
including the German occupation of numerous parts of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet 
failure to hold on to the Crimea.  “There is nothing said about the leaving of the Baltics, 
Belorussia, Moldovia, the Northern Caucasus, Ukraine.  Even in chapter 15…‘The 
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Heroic Defense of Stalingrad and the Caucasus’ it states: ‘The failure of the German-
fascist commander’s plans to capture the Caucasus’.”  It appeared as if the German 
advances resulted in achievements and progress but according to the war’s history they 
“reached failure.”  Without mentioning the territory the Red Army retreated from it 
would make it that much more difficult to later describe which territory Soviet forces 
were able to liberate.113   
The exclusion of critical topics for discussion combined with selective language 
continued to create problems.  The second volume listed the fourth chapter as covering 
the “Strategic Defense (July – September)” and the tenth discussed “The Offensive 
outside Moscow (December 1941)” but several months were missing and there needed to 
be “compliance” of the events being covered.  Questions were raised about the creation 
of a “periodization” within the first period of the war to cover 21 June – 9 July, labeling it 
“The Initial Period of War,” then listing 10 July – September as a period of “Strategic 
Defense.”  However, the Moscow Counter-Offensive only began in December, thus at 
least a two month gap needed to be addressed.  The suggestion for labeling the gap “The 
Failure of the German-Fascist Offensive” was proposed and accepted and authors were 
encouraged to utilize it in the volume.114  The chosen title glossed over the Red Army’s 
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failure to contain the German advance until December but utilized Stalinist rhetoric to 
portray the German push toward Moscow as the culmination of failed offensive 
operations while Soviet defensive operations were successful in halting the German 
advance. 
Deliberations over the Battle of Moscow were also of a controversial nature.  
There was general agreement that the decisiveness of the battle which ended Germany’s 
Blitzkrieg needed greater attention.  The defensive and offensive phases signaled the first 
time the Germans were defeated, contrary to the successes they enjoyed against France, 
Norway and the Balkans where “in one to two months” they were victorious conquerors.  
Sokolovskii claimed that the Germans issued orders for withdrawal a day before the 
beginning of the counteroffensive on 6 December.  Such an assertion gave credence to 
the idea that Soviet operations throughout 1941, before the Moscow Counter-Offensive, 
were enough to exhaust the Wehrmacht to the point of giving up its offensive but 
simultaneously he was aware that such a claim might “belittle the worth of our 
counteroffensive outside Moscow.”  More so, if the “high command” had not ordered a 
counteroffensive along the entirety of the Eastern Front, the exhausted condition of 
German forces on the Moscow direction might have resulted in a further drive by the Red 
Army to the west and caused a greater defeat to Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Center.115 
Tied in with the counteroffensive, Sokolovskii wanted the inaccurate notion of 
“general winter” playing a “decisive role outside Moscow” to be done away with and 
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considered it “nonsense.”  He explained that, “If we look at the winter, there were [the 
following] conditions – deep snow, huge frosts, it was easier to defend than attack.  Thus 
this statement is totally incorrect.  Furthermore, the counteroffensive shows to what 
extent our army was united and capable and general ‘winter’ had absolutely nothing to do 
with it.”  Mentioning winter as a factor “in passing” was fine, but it should in no way be 
concentrated on or portrayed as “decisive.”116      
Although the Soviet point of view with respect to the war’s initial period 
dominated commission deliberations, there was some interest in discussing the German 
side.  Pospelov wanted an analysis of the German Armed Forces to be incorporated into 
the war’s history.  But his desire for their inclusion relied on Stalinist era arguments in 
describing how large German tank formations “made it possible for [the Germans] to 
achieve deep penetrations” as well as “the presence of a large air force, which led to the 
loss of a significant part of our air force on the first day of the war.”  Finally, he argued 
that the demobilized state of Soviet forces, compared to Germany who had “the economic 
potential” of her “occupied countries,” and Hitler’s army, “which had all the equipment 
of Europe,” spelled success for the Wehrmacht and retreats for the Red Army.117 
As German forces occupied Soviet territory, arguments were made for a portrayal 
of the Soviet population as unintimidated by German atrocities against the locals, which 
in effect meant support for Soviet socialism; this line of thought would create problems 
when it came time to analyze the partisan war in the German rear since it meant omitting 
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German occupation policies, which were a large part of the propaganda effort during the 
war itself.  While the Germans “managed to break the will of the people in other 
countries” those in the Soviet Union “knowing what socialism is, knowing what 
opportunities and prospects socialism opens for them, defended the socialist system.”  
Thus the “invincible force” of the Soviet system was “inextricably linked with the people, 
the people’s support for the party, faith in the party, right and justice of the party.”  
Without such support, it was argued, the Red Army would have been unable to achieve 
victory outside Moscow and during the Battle for Stalingrad.118   
The official history needed to emphasize both the population’s support and the 
continued strengthening of the Red Army resistance “with the greatest pathos,” even 
while conditions at the front continued to deteriorate, so as to serve as a warning to 
anyone in the west “who think that they will be able to intimidate the Soviet people, that 
they will arrange a surprise attack.”  The history of the war needed to counter western 
propaganda and highlight how the Soviet Union, while only producing 8 million tons of 
steel, was able to sustain “something unprecedented in the history of war.”  More so, in 
the midst of the Cold War the Soviet Union was now producing “54 million tons of 
steel,” its armed forces were equipped with ballistic missiles and socialism proved its 
scientific sophistication with the launching of satellites, thus the USSR “cannot be broken 
by any treacherous attack, [or] any provocations.”119  
 
                                                 
118 Ibid., 83-84, 85. 
 
119 Ibid., 84-85.  This might have been in reference to secret TASS documents that stated in 1952, thanks to 
Soviet steel production, “Eisenhower decided against a preventive war.”  Hopf, 185. 
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The First Two Volumes in Print 
By the time the first two volumes were published, the first in 1960 and the second 
in 1961 with a print run of 125,000 and 180,000, respectively, the periodization debate of 
the Great Patriotic War was over.  The first period covered 22 June 1941 to November 
1942 (the encirclement of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad).  The second ranged 
from 19 November 1942 until the end of 1943 and included the destruction of the 
German Army at Stalingrad as well as the failed German offensive around Kursk in the 
summer of 1943.  The second period saw the Red Army win and retain the “strategic 
initiative” for the remainder of the war.  Finally, the third period extended from 
December 1943 until the end of the war, when the “Armed Forces of the Soviet Union 
moved from offensives in separate directions to a general offensive on the entire strategic 
front.”  This periodization fit well enough into the greater Second World War.  The three 
periods of the Great Patriotic War were sandwiched by an initial period from 1 
September 1939 until the entry of the Soviet Union into the war and were concluded by 
the war in the Far East against Japan, making a total of five periods.   
The periodization of the war also catered to the breakdown of the six-volume set 
and what was included in each volume.  The first covered the initial period of the Second 
World War (1 September 1939 until the invasion of the Soviet Union, 22 June 1941), the 
second and third volumes covered the next two periods of the war while the fourth, 
ranging from 1944-1945, consisted of enough topics to consume the next two volumes, 
 203 
with the final tome covering the lessons of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World 
War in its entirety.120   
All volumes contained a list of editors and authors who contributed to its 
publication, but no individual was ever listed as author for specific chapters or 
subsections.  Multiple-authored works meant authors were somewhat anonymous and no 
one could be individually blamed or praised by the public for a specific chapter or 
subsection in such a collective effort.   
The first volume encompassed the interwar period, covering the rise of Nazism in 
Germany and discussing the “support” Germany received from the “ruling circles” in the 
United States, England, and France as well as the obstacles Fascist Germany encountered 
on its way to unleashing a Second World War.  Chapters on the Soviet Union analyzed its 
growing strength, both internally and on the international arena, the failure of the creation 
of an anti-Soviet bloc, as well as the unleashing of “fascist aggression” by Italy and 
Germany during the period of 1935-1938.  Chapters were then devoted to the beginning 
of the Second World War with Germany’s invasion of Poland, where England and France 
were portrayed as betraying the Polish people and no mention was made of the Soviet 
invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939.  A later five page subsection discussed the 
“liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia” and claimed that only after the 
destruction of Poland’s government did Soviet forces receive orders to enter Eastern 
                                                 
120 In addition, a six-volume set of documents was to be published as well, entitled Dokumenty Velikoi 
Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg.  Boltin, 111-112. 
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Poland in order to safeguard the population.121  The annexation of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia was portrayed as a “victory” of socialist revolutions in the three Baltic States. 
Discussions outlining the “strange war” in Western Europe and the numerous 
German invasions that soon followed throughout Europe were juxtaposed with Soviet 
attempts to “strengthen” her border areas with respect to both her eastern and western 
borders.  The final chapters dealt with German preparations for an attack against the 
Soviet Union, the internal politics of the Soviet state, the military-economic potential of 
the Soviet state and the Red Army’s standing – technological and theoretical – and border 
forces on the eve of the war.  Looking at mentioned personalities, the major concentration 
was directed on Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Hitler, Mussolini, Petain, and other major 
political figures on the international arena.    
The second volume was broken down into three parts, the first discussed in five 
chapters the “perfidious” invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany and her “satellites,” 
including the “breakdown” of Germany’s Blitzkrieg campaign.  The “Forced Retreat of 
the Red Army,” following the invasion, was covered in twenty-two pages.  Further 
retreats were portrayed as part of a “strategic defense” during the summer campaign, 
including the initial development of the partisan movement in the enemy’s rear, masking 
the chaos that the frontline was engulfed in and offering a minor discussion of the 
defense of Smolensk, the fighting toward Leningrad and in Ukraine, especially the 
“heroic defense of Odessa.”  The concentration here reflects a view of the war that 
focused on events that could be presented as victories, even if in the end they turned out 
                                                 
121 G. A. Deborin et al., Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945, Vol. 1 
(Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1960), 247. 
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to be defeats.  Smolensk was seen as a “pyrrhic” victory for German forces since the 
encirclement was never complete and tens of thousands of Soviet troops escaped, while 
Leningrad was besieged and made for an eventual tale of endurance and courage in the 
face of Germany’s genocidal campaign, and finally Odessa was never outright conquered 
but rather evacuated due to circumstances along other sectors of the Eastern Front that 
made its defense no longer tenable.  The volume was practically silent with respect to 
prisoners of war.  Soviet POWs merited a minor mention in the aftermath of the 
Smolensk encirclement when the authors admitted that it was mainly soldiers and officers 
from the 16th and 20th armies that fell into German hands as prisoners, but no figures were 
provided for readers.122  
The next two chapters of the second volume discussed the economic mobilization 
initiated in the wake of the invasion and the creation of the anti-Fascist coalition, as well 
as the resistance German forces encountered to their rule throughout occupied territories 
in Europe.  The fifth chapter once more focused on the war on the Eastern Front and 
discussed the “Heroic Defense of Moscow” that finally stopped the German advance in 
the East in 1941.  Seemingly omitted was any discussion of the beginning phases of the 
Holocaust, the millions of prisoners of war the German army took, or the numerous 
encirclements (aside from Smolensk) that the Red Army suffered through on the way to a 
successful defense outside Moscow.  Defeats were omitted or portrayed in the best 
possible light to focus attention on Soviet endurance and bravery in the face of 
Germany’s “perfidious” invasion. 
                                                 
122 Fokin et al., 76-77. 
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The second part of the second volume continued with the Red Army’s winter 
counteroffensive, highlighting German weaknesses and defeats and masking previous 
Red Army failures as stubborn defensive operations while the entire nation’s opposition, 
including the partisan movement, to the German invasion was strengthened.  The final 
parts of the second volume looked at the beginning of the German advance on Stalingrad, 
thus putting the Red Army once more on the defensive as the German army regained the 
strategic initiative.  The evacuation of the Crimea was allocated seven pages while the 
Kharkov operation that ended in defeat and another encirclement was discussed in six.  
The chapter on “The Heroic Defense of Stalingrad” stood in contrast to the simpler 
“Defense of the Caucasus,” a chapter that also encompassed battles along the Western 
and North-Western directions of the Eastern Front as well as the enemy rear.  The final 
chapters discussed continued economic alterations within the Soviet economy, everyday 
life and culture of the Soviet people, military actions in other theaters of operations and 
the lessons developed from the first period of the Great Patriotic War.  Once more, 
political figures were concentrated on more than others, including Lenin, Khrushchev, 
Stalin, Hitler, Churchill, and Roosevelt.  Simultaneously, there was mention of major 
military commanders, both Soviet and German, as well as partisans.  Andrei Vlasov was 
merited a minor mention, being described as a cowardly commander who betrayed his 
country and went over to the Nazis and as a result of whose actions operations by the 2nd 
Shock Army, which he commanded at the time, resulted in an “unfavorable outcome.”123 
 
                                                 
123 Fokin et al., 470. 
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Stalin’s death began to alter the memory and history of the Second World War 
and the culmination of those changes was most evident in Khrushchev’s speech at the 
20th Congress and the eventual decision to undertake an official investigation and 
publication of the war’s history.  In as much as the authors and editors wanted to create a 
new, in-depth, analytical and truthful look at the Soviet experience in the Second World 
War, by default, the end result was the realization that the war’s history was still tainted 
by Stalin’s cult.  Consequently, this publication aimed to do something more while 
admitting to being the mouthpiece of the “party line” as it described how the Communist 
Party was the organizer of the all-people’s struggle with the enemy, highlighting “its 
multifaceted activities in directing fronts, the partisan struggle in the rear of the enemy, 
[and the] economic and political life of the country.”124  Although collective authorship 
allowed for some debates to take place, the contested nature of the war’s history was not 
visible on the pages of the final product.  Undoing over a decade of propaganda and 
creating a new foundation for the history of the war with access to previously unavailable 
archival evidence was the initial goal, but few, if any, realized that the new history they 
were crafting was being built on the same tainted foundation created under Stalin.  Some 
commission members might have truly believed in Stalin’s analysis of the duplicitous 
nature and motivations of the Western Allies and the need for the non-aggression pact, 
undoing years of work by the likes of Litvinov who attempted to create a system of 
collective security.  Perhaps this was the correct Marxist-Leninist position that explained 
the motivations behind and unfolding of a new conflict against the imperialist forces of 
the axis powers.  Unfortunately, we cannot know for sure whether the repetition of ideas 
                                                 
124 Boltin, 109-110. 
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and terminology from the Stalinist narrative was done consciously or subconsciously or 
was more so the result of the fact that so little literature existed on a topic that was full of 
hosannas to Stalin and his military and political genius.     
 Although readers were constantly considered by the members of the commission, 
they were sent mixed signals about Stalin, Soviet motivations, the war’s nature and 
course.  From deliberations on the war’s periodization, which mirrored Voroshilov’s, to 
the “nature” of the Second World War and the Soviet Union’s “liberating” character, all 
discussions leaned and relied on Stalin’s ideas and narrative in one form or another.  
Commission members included true believers in Marxism and in Stalinism.  Debates 
continually referred to Stalin’s speeches, quotes, opinions and even admissions of 
mistakes as the foundation for further considerations and conclusions.  These initial 
meetings encapsulated the dominant voice of Marxist thinking and beliefs.  Stalin was an 
aberration who attempted to hijack the Soviet experiment and his poor performance in the 
war showed his inability to truly lead the nation, while when the party took over the Red 
Army eventually triumphed as Stalin took all the credit for the victory.  The Soviet 
system endured and outlived Stalin.  Yet Stalin’s presence throughout the war could not 
be avoided.   
Consequently, this initial attempt to write an “objective” history of the war can be 
shown to have been a failure.  Left unsaid was if an “objective” history was even a 
possibility, although it was assumed that the end result needed to be an honest and 
objective account of the Soviet war experience.  Internal discussions show a flexibility 
when it came to some contested issues, yet the overwhelming evidence points to the fact 
that the arguments utilized and the issues and events omitted point to a memory of the 
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war years that reflected Stalinist thinking more than any type of “Thaw.”  Furthermore, 
much about the war remained unknown and archival access, although initially promised, 
remained limited and was often obtained through state security organs who obscured the 
original source(s).  Whatever literature was available was lacking and it appears that a 
framework for how to write and what to write about the war was missing unless Stalin’s 
thoughts were involved.   
Often, as was evidenced, memories and ideas about the war clashed with the 
Stalinist narrative and current leadership’s needs.  Only a narrative deemed compatible 
with the current regime’s framework of socialist progress could proceed to publication, 
leaving the majority unhappy with the final product.  For all the honorable intentions the 
authors, editors, and specialists who gathered for these meetings had when it came to 
working on an official history of the Great Patriotic War, many realized the final product 
was continually marred by political expediency and Party needs.  Authors and editors 
were left to work with an established set of clichés, platitudes and accusations in their 
descriptions of events and personalities.  In the history of the war a simplistic and binary 
view of Stalin translated into exculpation of mistakes committed before and during the 
war or blame for them all.   
Therefore, although during the debates outlined above major problems that 
needed to be addressed, clarified and analyzed were mentioned, without Stalin’s 
intervention no consensus was reached.   At a meeting on 13 April 1966, Fokin, the editor 
of the second volume, claimed the achievements of the Communist Party, the armed 
forces and the population in general were “not adequately covered.”  The text lacked in 
its analysis of Soviet military art and ultimately failed to emphasize the decisiveness of 
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the Great Patriotic War within the progression of the Second World War.  For 
unmentioned reasons, materials that were promised to the commission never made it into 
their hands and “as a result we were not able to fully reveal the activities of the 
Politburo’s leadership policies, [and] the Central Committee of the Party.  We were 
unable to fully disclose the activities of the National Defense Committee, STAVKA, 
[and] the General Staff.”125 
The creation of the war’s first official history was done during a new period of 
anti-Stalinism, which all too easily witnessed blame directed at a dead man who could 
hardly defend himself or his actions.  Authors and editors wanted to highlight the errors, 
mistakes, and failures of the Red Army during the war’s initial period but could not begin 
investigating the real reasons for fear of making it seem that the Leninist system that won 
the war failed the people and did not prepare them well enough for their confrontation 
with Germany.  Placing the blame on Stalin allowed select members of the Politburo and 
commanding officers in Khrushchev’s ruling circle to be excused from blame.  However, 
without an overarching figure like Stalin, whom Khrushchev proved unable to replace, 
there continued to be more questions and arguments than solutions to the problems 
speakers encountered for debate.  Therefore, Khrushchev’s antagonism toward Stalin, 
and his administration’s reliance on Stalinist ideas and arguments about the causes and 
course of the war, was reflected in the direction commission members steered the war’s 
history.  Khrushchev could not deviate from the general narrative of the war’s origins and 
course created under Stalin, he could only assign blame to Stalin for well-known defeats 
                                                 
125 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 117, l. 2, 3-4.  Meeting held on 13 April 1966 to discuss preparations for the 
second edition of the second volume. 
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and miscalculations.  Without someone taking up Stalin’s external voice, commission 
members continued to steer along a familiar course.  Simultaneously, however, the 
contested nature of the subject exposes the ability of high ranking officials to engage with 
arguments and voice opinions that could not always be expressed in a public setting.  It 
also shows the collapse of a simplistic binary in that, since they suffered through the war 
themselves and continuously had the general reader in mind, they hoped for a way to 
appease and represent all parties involved, state, Party, institutions, and society.  
Unfortunately, the indoctrination they all suffered through under Stalin meant limits were 
already in place and obstacles continuously encountered as they proved unable to move 
beyond a deeply entrenched and readily recalled Stalinist narrative.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITIQUES DURING THE WRITING OF THE VOLUMES 
The manuscript of the second volume detailed a partisan action in the village 
Ugodskii zavod (Угодский Завод) where “allegedly on the night of 23 or 24 November 
1941 partisans from the Moscow region destroyed…the headquarters of a German 
military corps.”  Although documentation when it came to the partisan war was difficult 
to come by, due to the fact that it was an underground war, this episode was “accepted as 
fact.”  On behalf of the veteran’s commission, Lev Leshchinskii, a historian and member 
of the commission, was sent to the village to investigate the event, although he offered no 
reason(s) for why an investigation was needed in the first place.  After three visits, 
interviewing the locals and analyzing the location where the destruction of a German 
corps headquarters supposedly occurred, he could only conclude that while “something 
was burned there [and] someone was attacked” no evidence could be found for the 
original assertion.  German reports themselves, it was claimed, listed no such attack on 
any corps headquarters and the street and structures within the village could not support 
the losses reported by the partisans (some 600 officers and 103 automobiles were claimed 
disabled).  Further clarification was needed in regards to what actually happened.1   
This episode was just one of the “falsifications” and “exaggerations” detectable 
within the war’s history as during the publication process dozens of internal reviewers, 
including army, air force, and navy military commanders, historians, and commission 
members themselves, were asked for their thoughts on early manuscripts.  Many offered 
                                                 
1 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 76, l. 5-7.  This folder contained the stenographic record of the “Meeting to 
Discuss Material on the Partisan War in the ‘History of the Great Patriotic War’” held on February 23, 
1959.  This event was not included in the second volume when it was published. 
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praise, but numerous others voiced concerns.  Reactions varied and much of the feedback 
received showed that even after Stalin’s death and his denunciation at the 20th Party 
Congress, a population that was used to following the party line, no matter how 
contradictory, was hesitant in deciding what to believe.  In seeing the reverence that was 
reserved for the history of the war period the question arises as to why so many continued 
to rely on a version of the war that was crafted under Stalin even though criticism of 
Stalin himself was expected and even advocated by many.   
This chapter aims to provide a lens through which to view additional issues that 
became contested territory for internal reviewers and the authors and editors themselves.  
Many of the detailed complaints originated from those who themselves took part in the 
meetings during the publication process, thus providing evidence that the exchange of 
ideas and the production of the war’s history was neither solely a top-down or bottom-up 
project but one that consisted of constantly fluid concepts and ideas in the wake of 
Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s admissions.  More so, it shows that while attempting to 
broach a subject full of neglect and omissions some allowances were made even for ideas 
that many were still unsure could be endorsed.  The open discussions among speakers 
serves as a valuable look at what topics elicited praise and where corrections were 
thought needed.  The atmosphere created by Khrushchev’s Thaw offers an excellent 
example of the crossroads many found themselves facing when deciding how best to 
present the war’s official history. 
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Restating Objectives and the Political Atmosphere  
As early as May 1959 internal reviews based on manuscripts began to arrive with 
numerous criticisms, many based on the treatment of the war’s initial period.  
Recommendations were previously made to the authors and editors and although some 
were incorporated others were ignored.  A general critique claimed the war’s history 
carried “a significant number of factual inaccuracies and incorrect conclusions, which 
reduce” the research value of the work.2  The second volume, covering the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, received a vast amount of attention as it continued 
to present an “important task” for the editors.  The arguments employed were reminiscent 
of the “circular” voice that Yurchak pointed to in his study of the Soviet Union.  Instead 
of concentrating on how to improve discussions of issues that were deemed 
unsatisfactory, the best commission members could do was continuously reiterate what 
they had already proclaimed in previous meetings.   
In a 19 March 1958 meeting, it was once more voiced that the job of the volume 
was to create an “objective” look at the war’s initial period, “the most difficult period.”  
Colonel Efim Chalik, an author of military studies on the air force, claimed it was the 
responsibility of the authors and editors to showcase how “the Soviet people under the 
leadership of the Communist Party, sustaining an unprecedented blow” from Hitler’s 
army, and without bending to pressure from the German invasion, how Soviet leaders 
were able to harness their forces and create conditions “for a radical change [in the war].”  
This was a task that eclipsed the complexity and difficulties of the next two volumes.  
Authors and editors needed to “show no fear” when discussing “those major mistakes 
                                                 
2 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 391, l. 351-352. 
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that we made in the beginning of the war.”  On the contrary, events needed to be 
presented along the “party line” so as to deprive “our enemies of the ability to gloat, 
showing not only the difficult events but…how in this complex, difficult situation the 
Party and the Soviet people eliminated these problems.”3  There was renewed emphasis 
on “facts”, including “their truthful interpretation,” and keeping in mind what readers 
were interested in.  They not only wanted “answers to questions” and an explanation of 
“how events took place” but also an understanding of “why exactly they occurred.”  The 
war’s beginning needed to be clearly elucidated but already it was mentioned that the 
reasons for the initial defeats were not given a sufficiently viable explanation.  They were 
left “scattered throughout” when they needed to be focused and clearly presented in an 
“extensive and compelling” way rather than mentioned in passing.4    
Although much of the above was a repetition of what commission members said 
previously, there were additional extenuating circumstances that came to light in these 
follow up meetings.  It became apparent that there were limits in place as to what could 
be divulged.  Authors were reminded that they should not to get carried away with 
discussions and corrections over “minor details” building them up into “sensational” 
discoveries.  Instead, they were to reveal “deficiencies…because the creation of this type 
of a history of the war consists of showing a continuing process of growth, improvements 
and the rise of Soviet [military] art…”5  Miscalculations were thus supposed to be treated 
                                                 
3 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 55, l. 70-70a. 
 
4 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 29, l. 25; d. 391, l. 497.  The former folder contained discussions about the 
manuscript of the second volume, dated 12 June 1959. 
 
5 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 73, l. 49, 50.  This folder contained a discussion on the chapters of the second 
volume, dated 29 January 1959. 
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as part of a learning process rather than a reflection of systemic inadequacies.  The 
reasons presented for the disastrous beginning of the war usually revolved around Stalin 
in one form or another, but it was assumed that readers would want deeply detailed 
answers for what caused such “serious violations of elementary basics” when it came to 
“military theory and practice.”  Justifications needed to go “deeper” than simple 
admissions that there were “shortcomings” in equipment or combat education and 
training.  Readers would want to know the truth so that “mistakes will not be repeated in 
the future” but that would only be possible if the conditions that created the chaos of 
1941 are identified and eliminated.6  
One of the best indicators of the time at which this volume was being written was 
the suggestion to portray the clash between Germany and the Soviet Union not as 
“fascism” fighting against “socialism” but as “capitalism” opposing “socialism.”7  
Commission members wanted to “accentuate” that the Western Allies, although fighting 
to defeat Germany, did not join the “coalition” to protect “communism.”  They intended 
after the destruction of “Hitlerism,” to “destroy” the Soviet Union.  The emphasis on 
class warfare undoubtedly reflected the leadership’s framing of the international situation 
at the time.  Pospelov signaled that the “respected” heads of capitalist nations were 
considering a “repeat of history” and they were thinking that “Adenauer [chancellor of 
West Germany] will only fight against communism.  They seek to dominate the world, 
the enslavement of Europe.”  Thus not only was the portrayal of German intentions to be 
reflective of present needs and circumstances, but the arguments put forward quite 
                                                 
6 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 391, l. 310-311. 
 
7 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 41.  
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blatantly resembled Soviet fears and rhetoric from the Stalinist period, leaning on ideas of 
“imperialism” and the “enslavement of Europe.”8 
Continued suspicions of the west coincided with a fear among commission 
members about the “bourgeois falsification” of the Second World War in western 
publications.  In a 2 November 1959 meeting to discuss historiographical questions, 
Colonel Gurii Zastavenko, a historian, stated that “West German bourgeois historians 
have advanced as their main purpose the rehabilitation of Hitler’s Wehrmacht and the 
German General Staff…the works of bourgeois historians and publicists are advancing 
revanchist goals, appealing to the experiences of the Second World War for the 
preparation and the unleashing of a Third World War.”  In response, Soviet historical 
publications needed to “take a leading role” in “exposing the bourgeois falsifiers of the 
history of the Second World War.”9    
As a result, the initial period of the war needed to showcase the superiority of the 
“Soviet state and the socialist system” and to expose “all the falsifiers” who “mocked our 
army and our state.”  The first six months of the war gave proof of the “advantages” of 
the Soviet Union as it withstood attacks that “no other state could.”  Vasilii Moskovskii, a 
major-general and one of the official history’s editors, emphasized that while there were 
“many declarations made about the advantages” the Soviet state enjoyed, it appeared they 
were not “disclosed,” thus robbing readers of the knowledge and ability to understand 
                                                 
8 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 29, l. 27, 28. 
 
9 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 96, l. 12. 
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how the Soviet Union, her army and people were able to withstand the German 
invasion.10  
Considering how at this time fears were common about a hot war breaking out in 
the midst of a cold one, commission members attempted to come to terms with the 
contradiction of how the west could be downplaying the Soviet Union and Red Army’s 
capabilities in its “falsifications” of the war while simultaneously trying to learn from 
that same war effort in order to prepare for a future conflict.  To make sense of this 
inconsistency some believed that in the west only popular literature was falsified while 
“serious literature has no falsifications.”11  Within that serious, or scholarly, literature, it 
was claimed, were studies that were more favorable to and representative of the Soviet 
Union’s war experience.   
 
Comments on Weaknesses within the Multi-Volume History 
Reading through manuscripts, reviewers noticed additional contradictions in the 
representation of the prewar period, which commentators claimed retained the presence 
of a “duality” when discussing the situation the Soviet Union found itself facing.  The 
commission concluded from available documentation that “attempts by diplomatic means 
to attain a peaceful respite” before the German invasion “were wrong.”  Information was 
received from various intelligence sources – military attaches, diplomats, and spies – 
correctly predicting war, but diplomatic actions continued trying to avoid war.  Although 
preliminary steps were taken in case war broke out involving military measures to assure 
                                                 
10 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 29, l. 21, 22. 
 
11 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 96, l. 25. 
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a certain amount of readiness among the troops, the Party and government were portrayed 
as more concerned with winning time for military preparations to assume a significant 
character and in the process failing to predict the invasion.  The volume’s authors seemed 
unable to decide how to present the “assessment of the military-political activity of the 
Soviet government” as initially it was described as “positive,” but further in the text “a 
completely different characteristic” of the government’s activities was presented.12 
 Further inconsistencies and contradictions concerned Soviet defensive plans, 
German intentions, and the invasion itself.  It was pointed out that one page described 
how up to two-thirds of forces in military districts in the border regions were “included in 
the composition of covering armies,” specifically intended for defense in case of war, yet 
“after three pages, we read that for the purposes of defense…no grouping of forces was 
created.”13  Descriptions of the “scope and nature of the events that unfolded on 22 June” 
proved contradictory as well.  Initially the invasion was portrayed as “unexpected” for 
Stalin and the military leadership, while two dozen pages later the opposite was claimed.  
The inconsistency between the Soviet leadership, including Stalin, knowing that at some 
point in the future Nazi Germany would invade and the unexpectedness of the invasion 
contributing to the initial surprise and defeat of Soviet forces, needed to be addressed.14   
The contested nature of the war’s beginning was reflected in that the most 
“popular” question to arise from the comments received was in regards to the “causes of 
our failures in the initial period of the war.”  Readers wanted to know “who was guilty, 
                                                 
12 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 28, l. 14, 43. 
 
13 Ibid., 51. 
 
14 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 38-39, 40. 
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why did it happen [as it did]…why were our troops not combat ready in time and who is 
to blame for this, [and] what was the government’s position on this matter.”15  The 
answers provided in the manuscript were unsatisfactory and many found them 
“contradictory.”  Kuchkin commented on the initial descriptions of Soviet military art as 
being superior yet the start of the war saw numerous accounts of errors and blunders.  
The conclusion reached was a type of cognitive dissonance in that somehow Soviet 
military theory was superior yet an utter failure in the face of a German invasion.16  Such 
poor analysis needed to be amended and the “historical truth” preserved.17  Speakers were 
not interested in a quick “fix” to the shortcomings but preferred an explanation for the 
achievements and disadvantages the Red Army experienced and overcame, including not 
only Stalin’s failures, but also that of military commanders, such as Timoshenko and 
Zhukov.18 
With 1941 taking up a central position during discussions, more attention was 
needed to the causes for severe setbacks and “the element of surprise.”  Concerns were 
raised over the “wording” used to describe the apparent lack of surprise when the 
Germans invaded.  Those familiar with the “material” were “amazed” to see written that 
“there was neither political nor strategic surprise, while the documents and information 
tell a different story.”  Others, however, argued that there was no “state surprise” when it 
                                                 
15 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 28, l. 14. 
 
16 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 391, l. 383. 
 
17 Further topics that needed to be addressed included the Red Army’s “unsatisfactory mobilization, the 
poor readiness of the armed forces for repelling a surprise attack by the German-Fascist hordes” and a host 
of other issues.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 30, l. 45. 
 
18 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 73, l. 39; d. 75, l. 45. 
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came to the invasion as “already in January 1941” enemy concentrations on the Soviet 
border were being reported.19  
The idea that even after the signing of the non-aggression pact the Soviet Union 
still suspected that a future invasion by the Wehrmacht was imminent was reinforced by a 
1948 publication, which stated: “the Soviet government never for a moment forgot that 
sooner or later Hitler’s Germany would attack us.”20  Without outright discrediting this 
text, the nature of the surprise that Germany achieved could not be addressed.  Another 
argument was made that the “surprise” achieved by Germany could be labeled as being of 
a “tactical character.”  As such, the government “knew that Hitler sooner or later would 
attack” but mistakes were made in attempting to determine “the time of this invasion.”21  
Unfortunately, no matter what form “surprise” would take, that the initial period of war 
contained few “offensives against the Fascist aggressors” due to inadequate preparations 
meant there were few opportunities to champion Red Army actions.22 
While Soviet activities were at the heart of the second volume, German actions, 
including an explanation for the attack against the Soviet state, were also discussed.  
Objections were raised.  The history of the war should not limit Germany’s actions to one 
reason when discussing the invasion.  Initially the manuscript stated that the “main goal 
of the Nazi invaders…was to capture the infinite riches of the Soviet Union.”  
Simultaneously, however, it was mentioned that “the main goal was the destruction of the 
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20 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 39; Falsifiers of History (An Historical Note) (Moscow: Soviet 
Information Bureau, 1948), 43.  
 
21 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 40. 
 
22 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 30, l. 45. 
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Red Army and the acquisition of Soviet territory.”  Pavel Zhilin, who would author a text 
on German preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union in 1965, agreed that 
Germany’s “political goals” – the “elimination” of the Soviet Union – “should be pushed 
to the forefront.”  Leaning on Khrushchev’s thoughts in regards to the matter, it was 
suggested that Hitler’s goal was a “class war” and the destruction of “the world’s first 
socialist state,” with Hitler playing the “role of executioner.”23   
In conjunction with a focus on German intentions, German advantages needed to 
be highlighted before attention was drawn to Soviet military or political mistakes and 
miscalculations.  Only after presenting Germany’s preparations, “treachery” and the 
surprise the Wehrmacht was able to achieve, could arguments be introduced for 
“incorrect” Soviet political assessments and further errors committed as a result.   
Additionally, the reasons behind the actions of Germany’s “satellites” – Romania, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Finland – during the invasion were missing.  The goals of 
each satellite needed to be presented and an explanation offered with respect to what they 
achieved in declaring war on the Soviet Union.24  It was necessary to show these states 
with some agency rather than simply as puppets and fulfillers of Germany’s needs.25   
General Aleksei Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff during the war, 
aimed to provide a somewhat objective explanation for the war’s disastrous beginning, 
                                                 
23 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 29, l. 26-27.  Pavel Andreevich Zhilin, Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila 
napadenie na Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: Mysl’, 1965). 
 
24 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 35-36, 59. 
 
25 When published, the second volume treated Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland as German allies and 
vassals along with whom Germany utilized the technical and economic abilities of occupied Europe to 
attack the Soviet Union.  Fokin et al., 9. 
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yet one encased in Stalinist thinking.26  Speaking at a 12 June 1959 meeting, Antonov 
commented that the manuscript described how on the eve of the war the government “had 
developed a political-military plan for the defense of the Soviet state.  At the heart of this 
plan was the idea of active defense, it was meant to conduct an offensive war by waging 
it on the territory of the enemy.”  The recycling of “active defense” was not emphasized 
by Antonov, who moved on to state that in his opinion it might be “better to say that there 
was a military-political doctrine, not a plan, but that on the basis of this doctrine the 
General Staff worked out how to concentrate and deploy our armed forces in the initial 
period of the war.”  Since this “doctrine” was presented by the army to the government in 
the autumn of 1940, there was a limited amount of time for all ideas to be implemented.  
It could then be argued that troops within border districts were only able to occupy 
positions according to defensive plans when fighting had already flared up on the border.  
Consequently, the unfolding of the German invasion and the events that followed meant 
that any “covering plan was foiled, while the concentration and deployment of troops, 
coming from the depths of the country, was not carried out according to plan, but 
subordinated to a rapidly changing and escalating situation and was carried out through 
administrative procedures.”27  As such, the Red Army’s poor deployment in the border 
                                                 
26 Aleksei Innokent’evich Antonov joined the Red Army in April 1919, participating in battles in the South 
as chief of staff of a brigade.  After the Civil War he continued to serve in various staff positions, finishing 
the Frunze Military Academy in 1931 and the Military General Staff Academy in 1937, working in the 
Frunze academy the following three years.  During the German invasion Antonov was working as deputy 
chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District and by August 1941 he was the chief of staff of the 
Southern Front.  He served in similar capacities on other fronts throughout 1941 and 1942 and in December 
1942 was appointed first deputy Chief of the General Staff, he assumed the position of Chief of the General 
Staff in 1945-1946.  A. O. Chubar’ian, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina.  1941-1945. Illiustrirovannaia 
entsiklopediia (Moscow: Olma-Press Obrazovanie, 2005), 33-34. 
 
27 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 29, l. 3-4; d. 586, l. 221. 
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districts benefited the Germans and needed to be assessed and presented in the official 
history.  While Antonov did not outright dismiss mistakes made by the General Staff, he 
was cognizant of the fact that the ever-changing situation at the front meant that there 
was little the General Staff could do to reverse the situation facing the Red Army.   
“Active defense” as a description of the Red Army’s actions in 1941 was 
criticized by Filipp Tamonov, one of the authors of the first and second volumes.  He 
complained about the “high tone” and “pathos” of some speakers when it came to 
descriptions of the Red Army’s defensive operations.  Tamonov commented that when 
“teachers of higher military educational institutions” covered the period of 1941 as one of 
“active defense” they were strongly opposed by their students and “pinned…to the wall.”  
Questions were raised, such as: “You speak of active defense, then why did they leave 
major cities and advanced to Stalingrad, up to the banks of the Volga?”  Tamonov 
considered the “remark…entirely just” and noted the “decision of the 20th Party Congress 
and the speech of comrade Khrushchev,” which “firmly corrected us: Comrades, we were 
forced to retreat under the blows of the enemy.  Our subjective desire to show the 
heroism of [our] defense and the heroism of our troops, our soldiers, and the heroism of 
our workers rising to overcome difficulties – this is understandable, but at the same time 
it seems to me that we do not in any way have a right to forget about the huge crisis of 
defense, which we faced in the summer of 41 and 42.”28   
This line of thinking meant omitting “minor details” while continuing to describe 
the “significant errors and shortcomings, which affected the entire strategic situation” 
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throughout 1941 and Germany’s continued offensives in 1942.29  When in October 1941 
there were some thirteen armies defending the Moscow direction, their front was “broken 
through in three days and many formations of these armies found themselves 
surrounded!”  While Red Army troops fought “fiercely and with pathos” they also 
retreated with many becoming prisoners of war.  Tamonov exclaimed, “We cannot not 
write about this.”  A similar situation developed in the summer of 1942 with nine armies 
of the Southern and Southwestern fronts pushed to Stalingrad with numerous 
encirclements of Soviet troops taking place.  While some members wanted to showcase 
the retreats during the first two years of war in a “better light,” Tamonov argued that 
“thirteen years after the war ended” the “difficulties” of the time needed to be shown “in 
the form that they actually took.”30  That meant an additional discussion of the unrealistic 
missions assigned to Red Army forces by the “command staff” during the Moscow 
Counter-Offensive that underestimated the German Army’s defensive capabilities and 
overestimated the Red Army offensive abilities, leading to “large errors” as a result of a 
“lack of skills.”31 
The greater hurdle for Soviet forces, argued Petr Gorem’kin, Major-General of 
engineering and artillery and consultant for the institute of Marxism-Leninism from 
1958-1960, was the mobilization of German troops and equipment, which located 
“favorable” points for “breaking through our defenses while we had a ban imposed, if the 
enemy opened fire, started to bomb our troops, airfields, cities – do not respond until 
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‘special instructions’” were issued.32  Thus, the advantage the Germans enjoyed was the 
ability to mobilize their forces before the Red Army, and pick which weak points to break 
through while the Red Army was deprived of its strengths due to enemy surprise and the 
limits Stalin and the General Staff placed on their actions as a response to perceived 
German “provocation.”  In connection with these discussions, a comment by the former 
partisan, Ilia Starinov, emphasized how the chapters devoted to the initial period of the 
war “bypass the General Staff and the People’s Commissariat of Defense, who carried 
much guilt” for the failures of the Red Army.  “This was clear to everyone,” said 
Starinov, “especially those who were caught at the front…the General Staff had power, 
even without reporting to Stalin to undertake a number of measures.  This was not done, 
and you cannot avoid this mistake.”33  Likewise, Rodion Malinovskii placed blame on the 
Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense, Efim Shchadenko, accusing him of 
mismanaging the selection of critical staff appointments whom he did not think needed to 
have higher operational training.34 
Mentioned causes for Red Army failures in 1941 required contextualization and 
explanations, while attention also needed to be devoted to what variables ensured the 
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various armies and army groups and finish the war as commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.  He also 
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Soviet state’s survival.  Otherwise, readers will remain “in the dark about all of our losses 
at the front” while discussions mainly addressed “the Party and government.”35  
Generalizations were abundant while facts were missing, like the names of army 
commanders or important personalities that helped ensure the running of state 
institutions.36  The evacuation of industry that followed the German invasion was an 
undertaking where officials needed to ensure factories, materials, workers, managers and 
their families were safely evacuated into the depths of the country.  Often it appeared that 
these “comrades” who “were engaging with large questions particularly in the intense 
period” of 1941 and 1942 “when troops were withdrawing, and we had to deal with 
evacuations” did not merit any mention, similar to the lack of names and recognition that 
could be found in Stalin era texts on the war period.37  Previously, Stalin seemingly 
dictated all aspects of the war effort, now it became a difficult task to separate and 
delineate what responsibility major Party, government and military figures carried. 
A topic that received almost no attention but merited a mention in a letter by a 
commission member, historian Andrei Kuchkin, in a review of the second volume’s 
manuscript, was women during the war.  At the end of his November 1960 letter, 
Kuchkin commented that the war’s history needed to discuss the role of women in the 
                                                 
35 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 75, l. 33. 
 
36 Generalizations could be found in reference to Stalin, other high ranking party members, who were never 
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Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany,” a role that was seemingly “forgotten.”  A 
discussion of their participation needed to be mentioned in all volumes (all volumes was 
underlined).  Whether serving on the front lines or in the rear (in industry and on 
collective farms) their contribution to the war effort needed to be “strongly 
emphasized.”38 
Omissions, combined with contradictions, continued to devalue the work of the 
authors and editors, especially regarding inconsistencies with how the Germans were 
portrayed before the Red Army’s counteroffensive outside Moscow in the winter of 1941.  
Initially the Wehrmacht was described as “exhausted, bled white, powerless to carry out 
maneuvers” – undoubtedly this description played up the defensive capabilities of the 
Red Army.  Yet, before the Red Army’s counteroffensive, German forces had a “one-
and-a-half times superiority in manpower, more than twice as many artillery and mortars 
and a superiority in tanks as well.”  The described exhaustion of the Wehrmacht did not 
line up with a superiority of its forces over those of the Red Army.  “Diminishing the 
enemy’s strength and his combat capabilities before our counteroffensive” cheapened the 
Soviet victory.  While the Red Army “inflicted great losses on the enemy” to “belittle the 
power of the enemy and his combat capabilities before our counterattack is wrong, this is 
not beneficial, since it reduces the significance of the enemy’s defeat...”39  Both ideas 
played off Stalinist positions; one championed the idea of an “active defense” exhausting 
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the Wehrmacht throughout their 1941 campaign while the other portrayed a Red Army 
counteroffensive outside Moscow devastating Germany’s Operation Typhoon.  
Unfortunately, one claim negated the other and the contradiction was readily apparently 
to some internal reviewers.  Antonov reiterated the usual party line and claimed that 
victory was achieved thanks to the “organizing activity of our Party, which, despite the 
extremely difficult situation and the severe consequences of the initial period of the war, 
was able to overcome all difficulties and to organize a defeat of the enemy.”  Mints 
echoed this sentiment and seemed eager to criticize the manuscript while insisting that 
the portrayal of the counteroffensive outside Moscow seemed the “result of a miracle, 
and not the result of military art and the organizational activities of our Party.”40   
While concentration on the Party might have been lacking, Stalin continued to 
have a dominant presence throughout the war’s history.  Speakers believed the 
supremacy of Stalin’s cult was responsible for the weak representation of the role of the 
Party, Council of Ministers, and State Planning Commission, among other state 
organizations.  This required immediate amendment.  But not all criticism relied on a 
negative view of Stalin.  Some believed that Stalin’s role as leader was offered “one-
sided coverage…with a main emphasis on the negative aspects and errors of his 
activities, especially” on the eve and throughout the opening phases of the war.41  Thus 
the presence of Stalin’s cult was noticed by some but so was the new shift under 
Khrushchev, where Stalin was continually on the receiving end of accusations when it 
came to Red Army mistakes.   
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Veteran Military Representatives Speak Out 
Veteran Red Army commanders were also present in these meetings and voiced 
their thoughts about the importance and limits of the war’s official history.  The limited 
publications on the war by Soviet historians and authors was a problem for Admiral 
Sergei Gorshkov, a member of the drafting commission and a reviewer, who commented 
that “before the publication of this work, our book market was flooded by translated 
historical literature, which in every possible way distorted the history of the war, the role 
of the Soviet people, [and] the role of the armed forces.  Our military publishing house 
very easily and widely published these translated materials.”  The appearance of the 
multi-volume history marked a major contribution “to the education and solidarity of 
views in the learning process of our people.”  This work was of “great importance” and 
was supposed to serve as a tool for the education of the youth, the General Staff and the 
officer corps in general.42   In fact, Pavel Rotmistrov, the famous commander of the 5th 
Guards Tank Army at Kursk, wanted military institutions to switch over to this history of 
the war for future studies.43   
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While some saw immediate worth in the war’s official history, others, like 
Sokolovskii, believed decisive military operations were portrayed weakly.  There was 
general dissatisfaction in how the Red Army’s victory was being portrayed.  It was as if 
Germany’s defeat was accomplished “without a rudder or sails,” lacking any concrete 
descriptions of leadership, and such a portrayal was deemed “unnatural” and needed to be 
corrected.44  Sokolovskii insisted that the second volume “contains a large number of 
significant deficiencies, both factual and editorial, reducing the informative research 
value of [this] labor.”45    Simultaneously, Gorshkov claimed that while this was a 
“major, good, [and] useful work” it still somehow “downplayed” the “importance” of the 
war “for the country, its prestige, for our people, [and the] training of military personnel 
and civilians.”  There was a distinct lack of development when it came to “a number of 
operational and strategic issues” and a reinforcement of these subjects with “essential” 
illustrations from the war was needed.  Examples were also lacking when it came to 
failed operations.  One speaker mentioned that “it is always necessary to show what our 
mistakes were.  Did we at least take apart one operation that was unfavorable to us?”  
Often Red Army commanders and soldiers developed military knowledge in the “midst 
of battles” and “it is necessary to show this, so that from bitter experience this will 
become a learning [experience] for youth, and for ourselves.”  Addressing such 
inadequacies “will be how we train our personnel, especially our young cadres.”   
Unfortunately, this reflective suggestion was followed up with the comment that authors 
“should not exaggerate the flaws.  Of course, this work does not avoid shortcomings, but 
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one should not exaggerate them, we should not belittle the scholarly value of this 
labor.”46  Consequently, the final product in the form of the six-volume history of the war 
continued to regularly omit or mask defeats as “heroic” defensive operations. 
Not only did failed operations need to be mentioned and highlighted but so did the 
officers who were responsible and needlessly wasted their soldier’s lives.  Generals Pavel 
Batov, Dmitrii Kozlov and STAVKA representative Lev Mekhlis escaped any criticism 
for their roles in the many casualties sustained during the loss of Kerch, the evacuation of 
which was described as “being carried out without losses.”47  There was general 
agreement that descriptions and presentations of both high ranking and lower level 
commanders was lacking.  It was argued that “we are often left with an outline that is 
separated from the people.”  The result was a featureless mass, which “must not be 
faceless,” rather than a Red Army full of heroic commanders.  To offset this deficiency, 
the commission wanted to include “literary portraits of marshals, to show their creative 
signature” throughout the history of the war.48  However, some commanders, like 
Malinovskii, received what appeared to be preferential treatment from the editorial board 
as his mistakes were omitted, undoubtedly due to his relationship with Khrushchev and 
position as Commissar of Defense in the 1960s.49   
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Similar to Malinovskii, other personalities, like Zhukov, appeared to stand out.  
At one point Boltin needed to defend authors and editors against accusations that they 
were diminishing Zhukov’s contributions.  The controversy centered on Zhukov’s role in 
the defense of Leningrad in 1941 and the offensive around Stalingrad in 1942.  Stalin 
ordered Zhukov to take over for Voroshilov in Leningrad in September 1941.  But 
Zhukov’s presence in Leningrad was limited and the authors believed that meant he could 
not have played a “crucial role” in the defense of the city, while others opposed this 
conclusion.  Opposition to a more objective look at Zhukov’s career could have been 
influenced by wartime propaganda and Zhukov’s glorification during the war or possibly 
a backlash against Khrushchev’s sidelining of Zhukov after he was no longer useful to 
the new premier – or a combination of both.  Zhukov’s role was also diminished when it 
came to the operations around Stalingrad as Zhukov was not directly responsible for the 
supervision of the fighting in and around the city but only served as a STAVKA 
representative.  Here Boltin could be seen fighting against the narrative that was crafted 
during the war itself and ingrained in Soviet minds in regards to the role played by 
Zhukov.  Boltin went as far as to claim that Zhukov’s role in the war was being 
exaggerated, rather than objectively analyzed, and vehemently denied any type of 
“silence” where Zhukov was concerned.50  Consequently, the commission was attempting 
to walk a fine line that illustrated the greatness of the Red Army, including its soldiers, 
political officers, and commanding generals, while trying to ascertain to what degree the 
lessons developed attempting to achieve victory could be described – which meant 
dealing with failed battles and campaigns.   
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Combined with the above limitations there was a continued lack of attention and 
figures when it came to Red Army losses, which greatly undermined the final product.  
Without adequate discussions of casualties, Soviet officers had to rely on Western 
sources which were considered “falsified,” thus creating what commission members 
believed was a skewed view of the war’s history and Red Army progress.51  While enemy 
losses were provided, Red Army casualties were often missing or rarely offered, which 
“could undermine the reader’s trust in the contents of the volume” as well as subvert the 
true nature of the war and the heroic descriptions of the Soviet war effort.  As an 
example, it was purported that the Germans lost more than two thousand planes and 463 
tanks in the battle for Stalingrad, yet losses for the Red Army went untallied.  Similarly, 
the manuscript claimed that the summer campaign in 1942 cost the Germans over one 
million casualties among soldiers and officers, yet no equivalent information was offered 
for the Red Army.  Although some might have wanted to avoid raising questions about 
the losses suffered by Soviet forces, others argued that the world should know the “huge 
losses the Soviet people suffered, which were not comparable to the casualties of the 
allies and yet our people persevered and defeated the enemy.”52  If under Stalin casualties 
were kept a national secret, under Khrushchev general numbers were utilized as a reason 
for the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and a propaganda tool to warn future enemies 
of what the Party, army and population were able to overcome.53 
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Minosian feared the general reader would think they were being taken for a “fool” 
when presented with statements such as “killed in battle, wounded, encircled and then 
captured, we lost several times more than the German army.”  No concrete figures were 
offered for the Soviet side while “absolute” numbers were presented for German 
casualties.  The same applied to recorded casualties throughout all the volumes as 
mention was made of German losses but comparable Soviet data was absent.  Fokin 
responded that this was done “as ordered,” although on whose orders was never 
specified.  Minosian wanted to reach a certain “point of view” that the reader could agree 
or disagree with on their own, but in order to reach that point figures and statistics were 
required.  Western European military literature was used as an example.  It was “replete 
with dozens of figures” when it came to the Second World War, without similar statistics 
provided by Soviet sources to either confirm or deny Western publications, questions 
would continue to plague Soviet assertions.  With silence and omission, the default 
conclusion would be that Western European figures were recognized and not denied.  
Minosian wanted to avoid putting the reader in a position where they were required to 
“guess” what the correct version of the war was.  Western figures were “clearly falsified” 
since they provided “astronomical” numbers when it came to Soviet military casualties.  
More genuine numbers needed to be offered.  When looking at Soviet figures “they 
convey a strong impression but they are several times fewer than those presented by 
German falsifiers of history.  Here we need to think about how to present these losses, 
otherwise we will not be able to explain to our people why after 1 July 1941 the balance 
of power changed in the German favor.”54 
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A lack of casualty figures meant a vital explanation for poor Red Army 
performances during specific counteroffensives was missing.  Without mentioning Soviet 
losses as a result of retreats and encirclements, including failed counterattacks, the 
weakened condition of units was omitted from analysis thus contributing to an 
incomplete understanding of why Soviet formations at times performed so poorly.  Even 
a successful counteroffensive, like that outside Moscow, needed to be described with the 
“serious shortcomings” that Soviet forces experienced in order to fully understand “the 
reasons for why the assignment to defeat the main forces of Army Group ‘Center’ were 
not fully achieved and the operation was not completed.”55   
Furthermore, authors were taken to task for “exaggerating the merits of the 
enemy” which only led to the “denial or denigration” of the Red Army’s “strength and 
efforts” throughout the war.  Where information was presented about the arrival of new 
units on the field of battle there was no mentioning of “their actual order of battle, 
armaments, material provisions…the timing and the process of concentrating,” or the 
often unfavorable conditions these units encountered when entering combat.56  In some 
respects it could be argued that simply listing the number of divisions and armies 
transferred to the front was a reliance on the abilities of the Stalinist state to create large 
numbers of units through its organizational abilities and, in theory, be able to equip them 
thanks to Stalin’s industrialization policies.  But simply mentioning the transfer of units 
left out much of the context of how quickly they were created and trained, in what 
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condition they arrived, to what extent they were equipped, against whom they were 
employed, and what results were achieved. 
 
The Navy and Air Force Critique 
 Some of the most vehement criticism toward the war’s history came from 
representatives of the navy and air force, who accused authors and editors of being 
unable to clearly explain how the navy, air force and air defense forces contributed to the 
country’s victory.57  The majority of the Red Army was composed of land forces, and the 
war’s history clearly reflected that fact.  Numerous commission members spoke up about 
this lack of attention to other branches, culminating in the comment that the lack of 
information on the air force “is very upsetting on behalf of our pilots.”58  Similarly, the 
actions of the navy were “underestimated.”  Aside from a general lack of analysis when it 
came to the navy, there were “a lot of errors” and a need to clearly present the results and 
“outcome of the fighting the navy participated in.”59  There were entire chapters devoted 
to both the navy and air force when the volumes were finally published, but they were 
hardly adequate.60      
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The navy held a high opinion of its actions on the eve of the war thanks to the 
previously mentioned order, issued on 19 June, which increased the combat readiness of 
the fleet, resulting in a better overall performance compared to the army and air force.  
Unfortunately, there was no mention about the navy’s participation in the defense of the 
Volga and little to nothing was mentioned about submarines and their impact on the 
war’s course.  Naval representatives further argued that the navy helped sustain the 
defense of Odessa and Sevastopol for as long as it lasted – one naval commander claimed 
that “it should be noted that the army units defending Sevastopol contained up to 60-70% 
sailors.”  This could not be “ignored, because this will be the duty of the fleet in the 
future.”61  Similar to the arguments used by commanders of land forces – that battles in 
1941 delayed the German advance on Moscow – so it was argued that the Black Sea 
Fleet’s efforts at Odessa and Sevastopol ensured that the enemy was delayed in its attack 
on Sukhumi, which in turn meant that the Wehrmacht could “not develop his operations 
against the Northern Caucasus trying to breakthrough to the Caspian Sea.”  In some 
respects the fleet represented the essence of what Stalin and Soviet commanders tried to 
instill into the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, which was to stand to the death.  Since the 
fleet had “nowhere to go, it stayed to the death, it was its permanent course of action, at a 
time when other forces could maneuver.”62 
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 Admiral Filipp Oktiabr’skii touched on the inadequate and erroneous presentation 
of the defense and evacuation of Odessa.63  Although he pointed to the inevitable 
situation the Red Army found itself in, Oktiabr’skii never said how futile the Red Army’s 
actions were, cloaking his disappointment with the inability of STAVKA and the Odessa 
Fortified Region to see the reality of what was happening on the ground.  Furthermore, in 
agreement with others, he argued that the navy played a leading role in defensive 
operations, exclaiming that “during the entire 8-month defense of the main naval base 
[Sevastopol] the fleet played the major role, while the army helped in the defense.  The 
main strike force of the entire defense was the ship, shore, and anti-aircraft artillery and 
the fleet’s aviation.”64   
 The coverage of Odessa and Sevastopol was partly contested as some thought the 
latter did not receive enough attention.  This could be explained by the fact that the 
defense of Odessa was emphasized as it was a city never truly defeated but given up by 
Soviet forces due to the progress of German troops along the rest of the front which left 
the city cutoff from other Red Army formations, while Sevastopol was eventually lost 
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with the majority of its garrison.65  In the second volume, a chapter subsection was 
entitled “Battle for Ukraine. The Heroic Defense of Odessa” while Sevastopol was 
featured in broader discussions about defensive operations in the Crimea and Kerch.  In 
general, the comments from naval representatives strongly attest to the fact that the navy 
was portrayed as playing a secondary role in the war and was continually treated as a 
subordinate character in the war’s history.  Although the Red Army’s land forces did play 
the central role in the war effort against the Wehrmacht, from the above comments it is 
apparent that even when the navy did play a decisive role in specific battles, it was still 
secondary to the army.  A similar situation developed when it came to the air force. 
 Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Aviation, Sergei Rudenko, spoke on 
behalf of the air force.66  He was critical of the lavish praise hoisted on the Luftwaffe to 
the detriment of the Soviet Air Force, which he viewed as the “main drawback of the 
second volume.”  Specifically, “the unrestrained praise of German aircraft” reinforced a 
narrative that portrayed the Red Army’s unenviable position in the summer of 1941 as 
“mainly due to the actions of the German Air Force…the material itself leads to the 
conclusion” that the Luftwaffe “had total supremacy in the air, the German air force 
bombed everyone and everything.  If not for this situation, front commanders would have 
fought perfectly and would not have given up to the enemy so much territory.  Such an 
approach is not objective and does not correspond to the historical truth.”  As it stood, the 
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history of the war’s initial period did little more than blame German aviation for Soviet 
mistakes while avoiding and masking the true reasons for the Red Army’s failure.  He 
insisted that the portrayal of German air superiority needed more concrete factual 
material as too often “it is simply stated: ‘the German air force held sway throughout, 
constantly bombing,’ but no data is provided on losses caused by our troops to the enemy 
air force.”  At the very least, insisted Rudenko, the war’s history could discuss which 
raids German aviation carried out and point to the casualties sustained, human and 
material.67   
Rudenko highlighted the lack of specific figures offered for either German air 
supremacy, Soviet losses, or German losses in the air due to Soviet actions – all of which 
would have undoubtedly cast the Soviet Air Force and Red Army in a bad light.  There 
was an overreliance on discussing advantages enjoyed by the Luftwaffe while writing off 
Soviet defeats and failures under the umbrella of German air superiority.  Rudenko 
commented that some 3,000 aircraft operated along the entirety of the Eastern Front 
against land, sea, and air forces, and, considering the size of the frontline, it was difficult 
to imagine the Luftwaffe gaining aerial supremacy over every kilometer of the front.  
“And to say that…German aviation broke our army – this looks wrong and not by chance 
is the data not presented.  If given, this data could debunk the artificial aura created 
around Fascist aviation, which in actuality was not that strong nor did it do so much.”  
Rudenko pointed out that in the future “air strikes will be immeasurably stronger than in 
1941, and it is necessary to speak freely about it in order to avoid the appearance of 
panic” and “fear of aviation,” which he himself witnessed when two German 
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Messerschmitt appeared and forced an “entire division…to ground.”68  If figures could 
not be provided for every operation, then they should be mentioned “for both sides at 
least on the most important directions.”  Otherwise, discussions about the “superiority” of 
either side had no basis in reality.  Showing how Soviet forces were outnumbered “will 
be to our advantage, and then we can say that in a certain period of time, in a certain 
location the Germans had so many airplanes fighting, and we had this many.”69   
Rudenko was also concerned with the “excited talk” of the enemy’s mistakes he 
found within the pages of the manuscript.  He did not want attention drawn to such 
matters and thought they should be omitted from “our circle” as it “detracts from our 
successes and diminishes” Soviet opposition to the Wehrmacht.  Descriptions of German 
tactical and strategic miscalculations, allowing Soviet forces to hold off enemy advances, 
did a disservice to Red Army accomplishments and to “promote” such a portrayal of 
events did not “benefit” the Soviet Union.70 
Rudenko accused the third volume of containing a large gap when it came to 
“specific characteristics of air operations” that would showcase “where, when and what 
specific assistance the air force provided to [ground] forces and how their aid affected the 
progress and results of individual battles, operations and in general the period of the war 
under observation.”  Rather, the material that was included dealt with “platitudes” and 
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“general non-descriptive phrases” such as “struck a powerful blow” and “successfully 
completed its air blockade.”  Such a contribution to discussions of the role played by the 
air force was said to be a “product of the author’s low awareness of aviation matters,” 
which was a result of archival materials from the headquarters of all-arms armies 
containing limited information on the participation of the air force throughout the war.  
Consequently, “authors clearly show little interest” in analyzing and presenting a more 
in-depth and contextualized understanding of the role played by the air force.71  
Others were in agreement and insisted that German claims of achieving air 
supremacy in 2-3 days by destroying the Soviet Air Force on the ground was purely an 
invention of “German propaganda,” which “penetrated” not only the Western European 
narrative of the war but could be found “on the pages of our press” as well.  Soviet pilots, 
it was argued, retained a “wonderful,” “political-moral” factor even though Soviet 
aircraft were “four years older when compared to the Germans” thus putting them at a 
disadvantage – an argument that echoed the Stalinist narrative.72  The Soviet Air Force’s 
doctrine was challenged, somewhat objectively, and the Luftwaffe was claimed to have 
been “better led.”  While Soviet air assets were spread out the Germans “acted with a 
fist…We separated our huge number of aircraft between multiple all arms armies” thus 
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precluding the ability to achieve air superiority where it was needed.  German victories in 
the air were therefore the result of actions by concentrated numbers, while their 
opposition was taken apart piecemeal as it was sent to challenge German fliers in the 
skies with inadequate numbers or cover.  “This is the reason,” it was argued, “for the 
military success of the Germans in the air.  This success was not because the Germans 
had a numerical advantage and not because they destroyed thousands of our aircraft on 
the ground.  The secret of their success was the centralized control of their aviation, at a 
time when the management of our aircraft was de-centralized.”73   
This assessment reiterated where the fault for the war effort could be found.  If the 
“management” of the Soviet Air Force was centralized then those higher up the chain of 
command, the General Staff and Stalin, were at fault, yet in de-centralizing control over 
aircraft it was once again Stalin and the General Staff that were held responsible.  
Unfortunately, such a critical appraisal of the Soviet Union’s air force and abilities 
against the German Luftwaffe could not be presented in the same form on paper.  
Immediately after stating the above it was claimed that “we cannot write in this work that 
we had a badly managed air force compared to what the Germans had.  We always said 
that our Soviet military knowledge was superior to the Germans, and yet suddenly in 
regards to such a crucial issue as the management of our aviation we state that we were 
greatly inferior to the Germans in this respect.”74   
Such a response, however, went against the objectivity and transparency Rudenko 
clamored for. For him, one of the most important outcomes of the war’s history was to 
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understand what issues might be encountered in a future war.  He believed Red Army 
troops were not trained well enough in 1941 and wanted to offset that deficiency when it 
came to future conflicts.  Consequently, he claimed that “substituting an evidence-based 
evaluation of the role of German-Fascist aviation are unfounded cries about her power 
[that] result in fear of aviation, which was one of the biggest vulnerabilities in the training 
of our troops in those days.  To silence this is unacceptable not only from the point of 
view of objectivity, but also in terms of educating our troops and the population.”75  It 
was evident that Rudenko understood the United States had a vast fleet it could put in the 
air, which would put to shame the Luftwaffe’s capabilities in 1941.  Simultaneously, 
however, it could also be argued that Rudenko was trying to salvage the reputation of the 
Soviet Air Force as well as utilize a Stalinist narrative that never gave credit to the 
Luftwaffe for its accomplishments.   
Finally, Rudenko was adamant that the achievements of the Soviet Air Force were 
being omitted from the history of the war.  He wanted examples to be “shown of 
organized resistance to German aviation, the impact of such measures like camouflage, 
night operations, [and] the role of anti-aircraft defenses.”  Submitted manuscripts, 
unfortunately, lacked any such illustrations.  “In general, the second volume consists of 
an exaggerated assessment of the role of German-Fascist aviation which is not objective 
and politically harmful.”  In contrast, there was nothing mentioned “about the actions of 
Soviet aviation against the enemy’s forces on the field of battle and its targets in the rear.  
Not one word is said about ground attack aircraft.  If we describe the actions of enemy 
aviation and are silent about the actions of our own air force, then we can come to the 
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conclusion that our aviation was not operational.”  Here Rudenko circled back to his 
original argument, lacking adequate contextualization of the actions of the Soviet Air 
Force meant readers will inevitably come to the conclusion that “the air force is 
responsible for our miscalculations in 1941.”76 
The lack of lessons to be drawn from actions on the ground and in the air, 
especially in 1941, when admittedly Soviet “military art was not at a high level,” was a 
disservice to the Soviet state.  All too often, however, authors were afraid of addressing 
the problem head-on or simply generalized as with the statement that “the huge losses 
[we sustained] were not worth the successes we achieved.”  Such frank yet concise 
admissions, as it turned out, had no place in a work that was supposed to analyze and 
explain the situation faced by the Red Army.  Worse, the failure to describe and examine 
failed operations continued to limit the lessons that were supposed to be derived from 
previous experiences.77     
 
Heroism in the War 
While the navy and air force might have been upset about being overlooked, 
descriptions of the land forces also came in for criticisms, including discussions of 
frontline heroism.  There was a lack of “facts about [the] heroism of communists at the 
front.”  An incident from August of 1941 was presented, as an example, when “the Party 
Central Commission of Ukraine for the defense of Gomel allocated a battalion of 
communists from the Donbass to the 21st Army.  This battalion on the outskirts of Gomel 
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was able to delay the enemy for 8 days, fighting heroically.  Almost all of them were 
killed and only withdrew when they were ordered by their commanders to leave this line 
[of defense].”  Such selfless and heroic events needed to be “underlined” and once again 
pointed to the utilization of Stalinist era concepts and notions about what defined 
“heroism.”78   
Researchers at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR 
were adamant that the heroism of soldiers, partisans and underground fighters in the 
enemy rear were insufficiently highlighted.  Although authors provided entire lists of 
distinguished soldiers and officers, the “substance of their exploits” was missing, a 
weakness noticed by other reviewers as well.  There was a “serious shortcoming” found 
in the chapters devoted to military actions, especially in the initial period of the war.  In 
the section on the Red Army’s retreat in the summer of 1941, ground troops somehow 
merited “no examples of heroism,” only heroic acts by pilots in the Baltics and outside 
Leningrad were discussed.79  Similarly, heroic feats were missing on the sections that 
dealt with the battles of Smolensk, Kiev and Odessa.  There was no mention of the 
creation and implementation of the people’s militia units and destruction battalions 
although it was “known that they both made their contribution in the struggle against the 
enemy.”80  
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Authors and editors were reminded that the history of the war needed “to explain 
to the general reader who has not finished the Military Academy why things were done as 
they were and not otherwise.”81  Others concurred that the average reader “who is not 
familiar with the course of the events in that period, the summer of 1941, will have a hard 
time understanding the situation from this material.”  After the war’s beginning, the Red 
Army was portrayed as enduring “enormous difficulties” in a “disastrous” situation while 
Soviet soldiers exhibited “amazing massive heroism” that was “not evident anywhere 
else.”82       
Heroic descriptions that were incorporated into the narrative appeared implausible 
to commission members.  The exploits of the commander of the 85th Tank Regiment, Lt. 
Colonel Alabushev, were described: He “covered the retreat of his regiment with one 
tank, in which he was located by himself, for five hours” and supposedly “repulsed” 
some 20 enemy tanks.  However, questions arose of what a regimental commander was 
doing acting as a rearguard for his unit, resisting enemy attacks for hours, and who 
assumed command of the regiment in his place.  It was concluded that “it is not possible 
that he did this.”  Another example was Senior Lieutenant Semiachko, who held back “a 
large enemy force” and “forced a column of 30 Fascist tanks to flee, destroying 8, while 
hooking one up with a cable and pulling it to his regiment.”  The commission’s reaction 
was that “such cases did not happen” – when published, the official history of the war did 
not include either of these “heroic” actions.  Instead, it was believed “that our work 
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would be enriched with a larger number of [examples] of modest heroism.”  Examples, it 
was suggested, should include mention of the 28 Panfilovtsy, “this is mass heroism, on 
the approaches to Moscow – they alone defended our land and delayed a large number of 
the enemy.”83  Accordingly, the commission would have substituted one fantastical tale 
with another dating from the Stalinist narrative of the war – a heroic feat already part of 
the collective memory of the war that most believed and would not question.  
Interestingly, when published, the second volume admitted in a footnote that five of the 
28 Panfilovtsy heroes remained alive.  This admission was somewhat forced as it was 
linked to the testimony provided by one of the survivors which unsurprisingly continued 
to support the rest of the official myth, portraying the stance of Panfilov’s men as heroic 
with the destruction of eighteen German tanks and their inability to advance against 
staunch Red Army resistance to the death, although not for all, as it turned out.84 
Stories of heroism seemed to ignite regular debate among commission members, 
or at the very least gave them reasons for criticism.  Pospelov was unhappy with the 
description offered of the heroic feat of Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia, comparing it to a 
“protocol” with its “dry” description of events and people.  Leaning on literature 
produced during the war, he advocated including “excerpts from documents published in 
Pravda.  [Like] Lidov’s wonderful literary, political and artistic article ‘Tania’ with 
Strunnikov’s photo – Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia with a rope around her neck as soon as 
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she was removed from the gallows.”  For Pospelov, it was “necessary to remember these 
documents” as they “enrich[ed] the work” and he advocated for their inclusion.85   
Other commentators wanted an expansion of the list of heroes as the general 
reader was already familiar with figures like the Panfilovtsy, Mares’ev, and 
Kosmodem’ianskaia.  “There are plenty of partisans who did even more than” 
Kosmodem’ianskaia – this was perhaps a criticism of the selective process used to 
highlight martyrs during the war’s initial period – and it was “necessary” to describe the 
numerous examples of heroism that were witnessed during the war as they were not 
“accidental” nor “isolated phenomenon.”  The propaganda around Mares’ev concentrated 
not only on his struggle to get back to Soviet lines but also the fact that he received 
prosthetics and once more took up the fight with the enemy in the air.  But, “did we only 
have one Mares’ev?  The facts show that we did not have just one Mares’ev.  We need to 
show more heroes, who performed no less than the well-known heroes, they should not 
be forgotten.”  Similarly, there was more than one Matrosov, who threw his body on an 
enemy embrasure.86  “It was repeated by Naderin before [Matrosov].  Even before on the 
Volkhov Front by Gerasimenko and many, many others.”  Although the war’s history did 
not need to reveal all the circumstances behind each heroic achievement, as many 
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examples as possible needed to be mentioned since it was deemed necessary to show 
“new heroes” to reveal “new names” and “new feats.”87 
The heroic nature of the Soviet rear also came up for discussion.  Publications that 
appeared in the USSR describing a Soviet worker who “did not leave his work bench for 
48 hours, fulfilling the plan by 300 or 600 percent” were not enough.  Fokin commented 
that, “This is how the entire working class acted…this is not an example of heroism.”  
Not even mentioning how soldiers sacrificed themselves by covering enemy embrasures 
with their bodies was enough anymore.  Individual heroic deeds were the norm, they no 
longer evoked the same sense of achievement from the public.  The bravery and 
patriotism of the masses, however, still needed to be addressed.  They needed to come in 
all forms and sizes, including “not only rank and file heroes – peasants, soldiers, but also 
commanders, who organized the work on the front and in the rear.”88  As it turned out, 
however, revelations about the gallant actions of soldiers within the war’s history were 
minimal, while the “courage” and “heroism shown by commanders of formations who 
undertook decisions during difficult battle conditions” were lost amid the fog of lists of 
operations, armies and divisions.  Discussing the actions of courageous and competent 
commanders could create a tool to use against “bourgeois historiography” that would 
show “that we had intelligent command members, who in difficult conditions made smart 
decisions, correct decisions…”89  Here it appeared that there was a move away from the 
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self-sacrificial narrative of the war years to a desire to showcase the knowledge, 
intelligence, and ingenuity of lower-level officers in how they waged war as an example 
for future military cadres.  There were plenty of examples of heroic soldiers and pilots, 
but the men who wielded them as a weapon were shadowy figures on a bloody canvas.   
Thoroughly highlighting the heroic actions of Soviet citizens and soldiers meant, 
aside from putting the Party at the forefront, a discussion of “shortcomings…as well as 
mistakes and errors.”  The Party needed to be shown as the force behind the mobilization 
and organization of all Soviet people, helping to “successfully overcome difficulties and 
mistakes.”  The history of the war needed to have this “idea of the superiority of our 
Soviet governing system” permeated throughout and through this superiority would be 
showcased the unity of the front and rear, the Party and the people, as well as the ethnic 
unity to be found among the peoples of the Soviet state.  For Fokin, “These are big 
questions of principle that must be reflected in each section, whether it is a section on the 
front or rear of the country.  Within our work should be displayed the inclusivity of 
Soviet patriotism in all its forms.”90  Describing the heroism of the Soviet war effort, and 
showcasing the unity achieved among the various nationalities, in effect served the 
purpose of drawing more attention to the Party and its leadership, which provided needed 
guidance and offered examples of heroism to be emulated by the population.   
By the time of publication, the second volume regularly touted the heroic nature 
of Soviet resistance, usually in a general sense, as the official history commented that 
during the summer of 1941 there were “thousands of examples of mass heroism” among 
Red Army troops during the border battles.  More specific mentions might include the 
                                                 
90 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 60, l. 11. 
 253 
defense of or battle over cities, like Odessa and Rostov, but usually naval or infantry 
units would be mentioned rather than soldiers or commanders. 91  Even Zoia 
Kosmodem’ianskaia merited limited attention as the author’s simply described her as 
fulfilling a “sacred oath” to her “homeland to fight against the invaders to the last breath, 
and she carried this oath, like a banner, to her heroic death.”92 
 
Style, Language, Citation, and Analysis 
Accounts of heroic achievements were not the only parts of the war’s narrative 
that were described as “dry.”  A general critique of the writing style mentioned that the 
language used throughout the text was “dry, unemotional, not vivid,” which was a 
“disadvantage for our publications” as the subject was of great interest to the reading 
public.93  Descriptions of the battle for Stalingrad lacked examples of “heroic deeds of 
commanders and Red Army men” while the text was considered too bland to describe an 
event of “great importance…it should be spoken of more vividly, colorfully.”94  Lack of 
memoir literature was partly blamed for the narrative’s blandness.  Leshchinskii, a 
historian, considered it “a great sin for our discipline” that “memoir literature” was not 
being cultivated.95  Unlike their German counterparts, the likes of Zhukov and Eremenko 
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had yet to publish their memoirs, thus it was believed it was “easier” for the Germans to 
write their histories of the war.96   
Reviewers also believed the “terminology” was “muddled” and commented that, 
with respect to the tone of the published volumes, it was “better to solidly argue 
principled positions and [make] less declarations.”97  Additionally, there were numerous 
“insufficiently critical” and “poor” phrases used throughout the text, including those that 
led to direct contradictions.  For instance, the enemy was described as “exhausted,” “bled 
white,” or “fully depleted” and later in the volume they are once more advancing and 
achieving victories.98  Another contradiction was found when “an excerpt is presented 
that…‘our attacking infantry almost standing straight and without any losses was able to 
break through the enemy’s defenses’…and…after indicating that all of the enemy’s 
defenses were breached on all three fronts, all of a sudden it is claimed that…‘all 
subsequent battles were of a no less fierce character’?!”99  The contradictory nature of a 
“fierce battle” that sustained no losses was not lost on at least some readers.   
                                                 
96 Unfortunately, while publications like memoirs would increase the source base with which to create a 
more in-depth narrative with vivid descriptions, Marshals, like Andrei Eremenko, published accounts that 
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generals while omitting the value and achievements of others (like Marshal of the Soviet Union Fedor 
Tolbukhin).  He recommended Eremenko “show the truthful role of each army and division” and “show the 
fighting qualities of commanders and their formations” based on the victories they were able to achieve.  
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staff of the 6th Guards Tank Army during 1944-1945.   
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Fokin defended the work as one of “quality” but argued that the “dryness” 
encountered throughout was due to the authors being military historians and it was “our 
misfortune, that our military authors have often dealt with purely military books, with 
books on the art of war and these authors were interested in questions and problems 
within the art of war.”  The multivolume history, however, was of a “different character” 
that military historians had yet to adjust to and this remained an inherent problem the 
commission needed to address.  Given to a general reader in its present form the war’s 
history “will strain his thoughts, and he will be left with the impression that this is a 
military book, but we need to affect people’s minds and hearts.”  Emotions needed to be 
inserted into these pages so as to leave a lasting impression.  “That is our main goal and 
our challenge...we need to correctly squeeze out all that is possible, not only in the 
content but in the form of presentation, so that it is vivid, intelligible material, maybe 
even so that at times tears will appear, because these events are full of drama, because 
tens, hundreds of thousands of people died, often as a result of errors, and often 
deliberately sacrificing themselves so as to defend this or that boundary…I appeal to 
you…when you work on this material, think, so that the material is dripping blood, blood 
that was shed, then our goal will be achieved.”100 
Aside from content and style, the “scholarly” character of some volumes was 
further affected by the omission of needed citations.101  Others, however, were 
overburdened by footnotes and references, but they often led to secondary source 
material with the vast majority leaning on “Documents and Materials of the History of 
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the Great Patriotic War Department” – a general citation for any documentation that was 
at the commission’s disposal.  This reference, it was argued, “does not disclose the origin, 
nature and location of the original storage of documentation” that was being utilized.102  
Lack of evidence was regularly encountered throughout the volumes.  While directives 
were mentioned and reproduced, the source material was not cited and this was “a 
weakness of all of our military chapters.”  Even force correlations, when they were 
present, sometimes went without citations.  Finally, even if citations were provided there 
was still a question in regards to the original source being listed since some information 
remained “secret” and its “nature” remained questionable.103 
Skurikhin, a commentator who was only listed by his last name, argued that the 
volume of general facts and figures that were presented – although seemingly never 
enough when it came to casualties sustained – often seemed to overpower the analytical 
voice of the authors themselves.  Throughout several chapters “the author succumbs to 
the facts of the events which he has to write about, under the weight of fronts, armies, 
divisions, etc.  As a result of the author being unable to cope with so much material he 
embarks on a path of simple descriptiveness, stringing together facts one after another 
without adequate generalizations, analysis, and conclusions.”  Boltin even pointed out 
that one section was written as if it was “from the point of view of a newspaper pamphlet 
from today” as the author utilized the phrases “now, today” forgoing any disconnect 
between the war and the present.  The figures and statistics that were provided presented 
an additional complication as they simply offered facts without adequate analysis.  Thus 
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authors acted as “informers” of details while no real conclusions were drawn from the 
information.104  The manuscript lacked “depth” when it came to the balance of forces or 
the battle actions themselves.  Authors were unable to showcase the real nature of the 
war.  Rather, readers were presented with flashes of “divisional numbers, armies and 
that’s it.”  It was “sad” that a history of the war featured “no war.”105  Once more, 
without a guiding voice to direct where attention and concentration was needed, the only 
thing authors were capable of was to list units and figures, detailing the war through 
simple dates and facts that linked one event to another without any analysis or scrutiny.   
Descriptions of orders issued were provided in support of the above, as when, for 
instance, a new defensive boundary was described as ordered to be built, no follow up or 
analysis was offered.106  At times, there was no indication that defensive works were even 
built; “Maybe they only existed on paper, but in reality they did not start construction.”107  
Another complaint was directed at the descriptions of engagements.  After an initial 
discussion of “the strengthening and building of defensive lines in the rear of active 
troops” an analysis of the ensuing fighting was offered with the end result that previously 
mentioned “boundaries” were lost but “not one word is said about…what state they were 
in, how were they used and whether they played a role” in defensive operations or were 
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simply never utilized.108  Similar deficiencies were found when discussing orders and 
directives – there was no examination regarding whether they were “correct or not.”  The 
consequences of these orders needed to be revealed, followed by an evaluation, so that 
there was an “organic connection” between the chain of command and the results on the 
ground.109  Otherwise, there was a continued lack of understanding whether the Red 
Army was functioning decisively and correctly and if orders that were issued and fulfilled 
should have been assigned in the first place, including what goals were achieved as 
opposed to what was expected. 
There was a consistent disconnect between the information that was presented and 
an analysis that should have followed.  In one instance a plan was presented as approved 
by Stalin, a citation to an archival source was included, but nothing more was ever said 
about the plan nor did the author “return to this plan again, [he] even forgot about it.”  
But the question arose, “why did they need such a plan?”  Such a lack of analysis was 
deemed unworthy of an official publication.  “This way of presenting material cannot be 
called scientific…Our publication should be scientific and popular by the character of its 
presentation and its substance must be based on strict conclusions and built on iron 
logic.”110  STAVKA orders were presented but some objectives proved unrealistic, yet no 
explanation was offered for why STAVKA assigned unreachable goals.  “What was this 
– a mistake?  And if this objective was actually assigned by STAVKA, we need to say on 
what basis was this assignment given.”  Similar issues were evident with other state 
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organizations, but specifics about how decisions were made or carried out were 
continually missing.111 
 
Presentations of Battles 
A missing analysis of orders and battles translated into continued problems with 
descriptions and examinations of individual battles as “the implementation of operations 
was not shown.”  Previously army headquarters could not disclose such information, but 
with the war more than a decade removed the opportunity to present such material was 
now available.  It was purported that “we can more fully, historically and truthfully focus 
on strategic goals and expand the display of operational and strategic solutions to 
problems.”112  “Articulating” the specific “features” of each battle gave the reader a 
needed context to understand why a battle was won or lost and helped in understanding 
the “negative” aspects of each confrontation with the enemy on its own merits.  But such 
in-depth analysis was absent, especially from battles in 1941.   Another limit was the 
predilection of authors to concentrate on polemical attacks.  Too much attention was 
“being paid to bourgeois historians…instead of assessing the situation” as it developed in 
the summer and autumn of 1941.113  An objective assessment of the German invasion 
would have helped in attacking “bourgeois historiography,” as information indicating the 
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Red Army’s unpreparedness on the eve of the war served as proof against the idea of a 
“preventive” war on the part of Soviet forces.114   
Discussions centered on the “course of military operations” contained “no names, 
no heroics, [and] no people.”  Attention was drawn to the evacuation of Crimea, which 
listed “six names.”115  In the end it was “unclear” who actually fought in the Crimea 
against the Germans.  Providing the names of a German commander along with a few 
Soviet snipers and drivers made it “clear that the description is one-sided” and 
uninteresting for the general reader.   “Narrative descriptions” needed to be “reduced” so 
that the heroic actions of “specific people” could shine through.  “Positive” aspects, even 
of failed campaigns, needed to be presented as the “negative” could not stand as the sole 
representation of an entire operation – something positive needed to come out of each 
distinct campaign.116 
Descriptions of the 1941 campaign were missing defining characteristics, nor was 
there pride in Red Army achievements.  Absent was the first use of the Katiusha rocket 
system that came to epitomize the Soviet war effort and powerful artillery forces in 
propaganda reels.117  The presentation on the Battle of Smolensk, considered an 
important turning point in 1941, proved a disappointment.  Although the chapter in 
question was entitled “The Battle of Smolensk” the actual city of Smolensk was 
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“somehow missing” in the midst of the coverage of the actions along the Smolensk 
direction.  The city “disappeared during the many listed right, left flanks, the 
characteristics of the front’s fighting, etc.”118  Battles needed to be “approached from the 
point of view of a disclosure of its characteristics,” since every confrontation with the 
enemy was guided by particular circumstances and “occurs under certain conditions.”  In 
this case, descriptions of heroic actions by individual soldiers and units were present but 
an “operational picture of the struggle for Smolensk is not given” – the heroism portrayed 
was certainly included to take attention away from the fact that an operational narrative 
was missing.  The battle needed “to be shown clearly, convincingly, vividly, in all its 
developmental dramatic beauty.”  Yet, when going through the material readers did “not 
feel the dynamic quality of the battle and there is not even a clearly expressed plan of 
battle.”  Soon after, “the reader encounters conclusions.”119   
In conjunction with Smolensk, which was turned into a pyrrhic victory for the 
Wehrmacht, additional Soviet operations during 1941 went either missing or were 
lacking in descriptions and analysis.  Soviet advances around Dukhovshchina and El’nia 
were missing.  Both were considered some of the first noteworthy rebuffs to the German 
advance in 1941.  They might have achieved little in the long run, but as a morale boost 
they were undoubtedly significant.  If the Battle of Smolensk was poorly presented, the 
defense of Odessa in Ukraine, one of the few successful defensive actions by the Red 
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Army against both Romanian and German forces, was absent with nothing “said about 
this heroic defense.”  This criticism might have in part been addressed by the fact that the 
second volume, when published, had a chapter subsection devoted to actions in and 
around Odessa.120   Another major Red Army victory, the retaking of Rostov, was “dryly 
described.”  The first large population center to be liberated from the Germans by the Red 
Army lacked any context regarding the events surrounding its defense or the 
counteroffensive that led to its liberation.  There was no description of how the Germans 
behaved themselves, what the population lived through, what Soviet soldiers found when 
the city was liberated or “what resonance was there within our country and abroad” after 
the retaking of Rostov.  This was one of the first substantial defeats suffered by the 
Wehrmacht and Boltin pleaded with the commission that “we need to turn these facts into 
a living historical narrative, rather than description of protocols.”121   
Covering one of the most significant events, the chapter entitled 
“Counteroffensive outside Moscow,” concentrated on the entirety of the Eastern Front, 
listing armies on both sides, describing their advances and defensive actions, while 
seemingly neglecting the situation outside Moscow itself.  The Moscow counteroffensive 
consisted of numerous operations that were interconnected but it was pointed out that 
operations were covered individually and lacked any type of interaction or coherence in 
regards to the greater strategy or objective(s) that needed to be achieved, including 
cooperation between armies and fronts.  Portrayals of the fighting not only obstructed the 
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reader’s understanding of the situation, but failed to accurately portray the progress made 
by Red Army forces outside Moscow.122   
This was one of the most “fundamental” questions in need of investigation as “to 
this day historians do not have documentation, which could sufficiently disclose and 
prove what constituted the idea behind the counteroffensive outside Moscow in 
December 1941, when and by whom was it planned, was there even a plan for a 
counteroffensive or did it develop of its own accord.”  This claim could not stand as it 
was “impossible to depict the battle of Moscow as a result of accidental 
circumstances.”123  Although directives existed, including notes, reference maps, and 
plans for “counteroffensive” operations by forces before Moscow, there was a continued 
lack of documentation.124  Due to the lack of archival information and literature, there 
was no consensus on whether this counteroffensive was a result of local battles against 
the Germans transforming into a greater offensive due to events on the ground or whether 
the counteroffensive was pre-planned and carried out with pre-designated targets in mind.  
In the earlier mentioned General Staff study of the Battle of Moscow, Stalin’s 
abilities were emphasized first and foremost.  They were stressed as being the reason why 
the German offensive was worn down before the gates of the capital, which, as a result of 
Stalin’s ability to gather resources and reserves at needed point(s), led to an eventual 
counteroffensive at a decisive moment and resulted in a German defeat.  Nowhere in the 
study were there references to initial plans that specifically spelled out how far the 
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offensive was to continue, where and when to halt, or what specific targets were to be 
met.125  Leshchinskii pointed to Stalin’s attitude toward written orders as a possible 
reason for the non-existence of documentation relating to the Moscow Counter-
Offensive: “I know for a fact that when the central headquarters of the partisan movement 
presented a plan of its activities, Stalin wrote in the margins about one point…: ‘This is 
necessary, but which idiot attached this to paper.’”126  In effect, the silence that was 
evident around the war’s history was so all encompassing that something as grandiose as 
the planning of the Moscow Counter-Offensive was contested territory as some were 
unsure of its origins.  It was admitted that “it seems to us that some organizing principle 
from the STAVKA of the high command was evident” but “we cannot find documents in 
regards to this question.”  It was possible that veteran commanding officers could shed 
light on the situation and Fokin observed that “it is highly desirable and necessary for 
participants of these events to talk to us, so that they can give comprehensive information 
about what STAVKA and the fronts were doing.”127 
 The disappointing treatment of well-known operations meant those expecting new 
or original information to be forthcoming about the war were dissatisfied.  Discussions 
touched on the unoriginality of the chapter covering the Battle of Moscow.  Previous 
works already discussed this turning point and it was insisted that the authors of the 
chapter added nothing new, even though they were supposedly privy to the use of 
previously unavailable archival source material.  A lack of original information on the 
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planning and progress of the Moscow Counter-Offensive meant those insisting it was 
conducted without an overall plan and that “the forces available were mismatched for the 
assignment they received” might be correct, thus lending credence to the idea that the 
counteroffensive was a result of conditions that were out of Soviet control.  Without 
evidence to the contrary, there was little authors endorsing the idea that the offensive 
outside Moscow was unplanned should fear from the conclusions they drew.128   
The chapter covering the offensive outside the capital only discussed the “purely 
military” situation, including the “disposition of troops” and the “objectives” but omitted 
“preparations and the course of the offensive” as well as the “planning” stages, part of 
which were dictated by the activities, both defeats and victories, sustained and achieved 
by the Red Army in October and November of 1941.129  Undoubtedly, the disastrous 
encirclements at Via’zma and Briansk (October 1941), resulting in over half-a-million 
prisoners of war, were not something Soviet authors wanted to dwell on, thus limiting 
discussion about the conditions that facilitated the beginning of the Moscow Counter-
Offensive. 
 Other major operations and campaigns came under similar scrutiny with respect 
to planning and progress as well.  Minasian pointed out that “there are always people who 
claim that there were no plans and that everything happened spontaneously…”  The 
organization of the Lvov-Sandomierz and Iassi-Kishinev offensives were presented as if 
they occurred spontaneously as well.130  These assertions were met with a stern reply: 
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“We must put an end to this talk – was there a plan or was there not.  Everything has its 
limits.”  Going to an extreme, some even argued that throughout the war “no campaigns 
were planned” – a direct opposition to the Stalinist narrative that considered all the 
aspects of the war preplanned by Stalin’s genius.131   
Such a seeming abuse of the history of the war was becoming a problem for some 
members of the commission.  The military historian Vasilii Moskovskii had enough of 
the continued discussions around this subject “from the first day of work” and the lost 
hours to debating the issue.  He insisted from his own experiences that such 
documentation existed: “We had the task of creating a museum to Stalin.  I received 
eleven boxes of materials at comrade Stalin’s dacha and worked with these materials.  
There were maps belonging to Stalin and Vasilevskii and there were plans of a 
counterattack…to say that there was no planned counteroffensive outside Moscow is 
unprecedented, it is nonsense.”132   
Discussions revolving around descriptions of battles throughout 1941 seemed to 
consistently point to inadequacies.  One reviewer believed further research needed to be 
devoted to the Kiev “catastrophe” in order “to draw the correct conclusions about this 
operation.”133  Issues were encountered with the reasons for the failed Soviet offensives 
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around Leningrad.  Descriptions of operations undertaken outside Leningrad in 1941 
omitted any results in regards to territory gained or lost and losses sustained.134  Thus, 
there was no “indication of the major cause of failure,” which was purported to be a 
consequence of consistent head-on attacks “with huge losses” and no real results.  The 
counteroffensive outside Tikhvin (located in the Leningrad Oblast) received more 
analysis and attention than the fighting outside Moscow, which appeared to be “discussed 
in passing.”  Throughout these operations, the names of front commanders operating 
along the frontlines went mostly unmentioned.135   
 Inadequate discussions of campaigns continued through 1942 and, unsurprisingly, 
Stalingrad received an enormous amount of attention within the war’s history.136  
Chapters devoted to Stalingrad in submitted manuscripts lacked any mention of the 
infamous “Not One Step Back!” order No. 227.137  This order came up for discussion and 
A. Emel’ianov, one of the editors, described how it had consistently been evaluated 
purely “in terms of propaganda and agitation, as a document which demanded an 
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speech Fokin commented how in the struggle against Stalin’s cult “all Stalinist language in regards to the 
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137 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 74, l. 7.  This was amended in the published second volume, perhaps thanks to 
these discussions, where order 227 was discussed it was portrayed as a “motto” that was adopted by “every 
military unit, every soldier and commander” and “strengthened” Soviet “military resistance” as soldiers and 
officers saw the renewed danger that their Motherland was once more under.  Fokin et al., 430-431. 
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intensification of political work among troops.”  However, there was another “side” that 
needed to be mentioned.  Specifically, the execution of regimental and divisional 
commanders as a result of their soldiers retreating without authorization appeared as a 
“normal requirement in wartime.”  However, too often the conditions which Soviet troops 
were operating under were forgotten, as when commanders lacked the ability to 
communicate in a timely manner with their superiors in order to carry out assigned 
orders.  “It often happened that army commanders lost all communication with divisional 
commanders…if we look at this aspect of the order, we can see that the excessive 
brutality that was utilized was not always justified by the reality…of the fighting.”138   
Consequently, some viewed order No. 227 as a continuation of Stalin’s repressive 
policies toward military cadres, an argument that was not mentioned in the war’s official 
history.  Nor was the accusation made that “order 227 was an attempt by Stalin to shift 
the blame for the failure of the Kharkov operation, which he was mainly responsible for, 
onto the army.”  This operation consisted of a failed Soviet offensive in the spring of 
1942 against the German Sixth Army that occurred mere days before the Germans were 
supposed to launch an offensive of their own.  “This order was, in fact, an insult to the 
army, an insult to soldiers and all officers.”  Emel’ianov argued that order 227 was linked 
to the 1930s when Stalin’s article “Dizzy with Success” was published and blamed lower 
level party functionaries on their excesses with regard to collectivization, similar to how 
order 227, among others, blamed officers and soldiers for the Red Army’s disastrous 
situation in the summer of 1942.139   
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139 Ibid., 81, 82.   
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A weakness that ran through all military operations was a lack of attention 
devoted to the development of military art.140  More in-depth descriptions of major 
engagements were needed as they lacked contextualization “within Soviet historiography 
and their implications for the entire course of the Great Patriotic War.”141  It was 
emphasized that the volumes exaggerated the Battle of Stalingrad yet the “the Battle of 
Moscow, where we essentially started to defeat the Germans, is underestimated,” as were 
aspects of the Battle of Kursk.142   
Unfortunately, since the Battle of Stalingrad spanned two of the six volumes, it 
did overshadow other operations.  This could have been influenced by Khrushchev’s 
administration and those military men who found themselves in the limelight after having 
served with him at Stalingrad.  Thus, it must be kept in mind that Stalingrad, aside from 
being a decisive encounter between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, served as a 
cornerstone for Khrushchev’s biography throughout the war years, including the leading 
marshals that found their way to his side (such as Eremenko and Malinovskii).  Their 
participation in the battle often decided their future career paths (unlike many of the 
participants of the failed Rzhev offensive that simultaneously occurred to the north).143  
Thus the commission at times found itself at a crossroads, they needed to highlight 
Khrushchev’s wartime career but such an emphasis meant a heavy concentration on the 
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142 RGASPI, f. 72, op. 22, d. 916, l. 26.  In all, the chapter covering the Battle of Kursk, the fifth in the third 
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143 For details on the Rzhev offensive, see David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s 
Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). 
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Battle of Stalingrad, thus prompting future issues with readers who commented on the 
prominence of Stalin’s name and its derivatives throughout the volumes.144 
Finally, both authors and editors point to chapter length limits to partly explain 
the poor presentations of individual battles.  Organizational restrictions limited the 
amount of information that could be conveyed and were a recognized problem.  Sections 
that were allocated dozens of pages at times only took up less than ten, in part to due to 
lack of materials or the sensitivity of the subject.  The section on the failed Soviet 
offensive at Kharkov in 1942 was supposed to comprise twenty pages but only took up 
eight-to-nine – in its final form it encompassed six pages.  In trying to cover up or simply 
omit the “shortcomings” of the Red Army’s actions outside Kharkov “nothing is 
understandable – neither the course of military actions, nor our mistakes.”  Although 
soldiers and commanders “behaved themselves heroically” – the commander of the front 
was killed in action (which was enough to be considered “heroic”) – throughout the 
operation, their names were absent.  Leaving out a significant portion of the failed 
operation’s narrative explained why so much space went unutilized.  The end result was 
an inability to give an accurate and objective “impression” of the situation Red Army 
forces faced.  The conclusion reached was that “If you have never read about these 
events, do not know anything [about them] then after reading such an account, you will 
remain a person not well versed in these events, you will not understand why it happened 
and what happened.”145   
                                                 
144 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 32, l. 15-16; d. 586, l. 170.  The former folder contained a discussion from 11 
January 1963 which looked at corrections to the already in print texts of the first and second volumes. 
 
145 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 74, l. 73.  In addition, the limited discussion of the failure outside Kharkov in 
1942 might have been a reflection of the authors and editors knowing that Khrushchev played a role in the 
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A similar situation was encountered in the presentation of the defensive battles 
along the Voronezh direction which led the enemy into the Donbass.  Twenty pages were 
earmarked for the section but only eighteen were utilized – in the end this subsection of 
the second volume’s ninth chapter was covered in seven pages.  Again the mistakes of 
Soviet forces were “not highlighted” and the “difficulties” encountered were missing.  
Authors themselves complained in reply.  I. Zhabkin claimed “We need to say something 
about everything and I have the right to write up to twenty-three pages.  I would be happy 
to show heroics and name members of the Military Council…but where is the space?”  
When suggested changes were implemented to one chapter Zhabkin was “reproached” by 
Tel’pukhovskii, one of the editors, because he “talked too much about military actions.”  
Partisan activities were also left out as there was not enough space – thirty one pages 
covered activities in the enemy rear throughout the second volume.  The Stalingrad 
direction was privileged over that of the Northern Caucasus, where more German forces 
operated in more directions but they could not all be equally covered due to imposed 
limits.  In part, this was to be expected from an effort that consisted of numerous editors, 
but more so from a topic and subject that was previously so poorly treated and now 
needed to be covered and analyzed through multiple angles with many diverging points 
of view while keeping censorship in mind.  The initial manuscript for the second volume 
was 1500 pages, Fokin, the editor of the volume, commented that the maximum should 
                                                 
operation, even though later in his memoirs he continually tried to present himself in the best light by 
shifting the blame of the Red Army’s failure to others.  Khrushchev, Commissar, 1918-1945, 299, 378. 
 
 272 
only be 1200, thus 300 pages would be cut.  “This must be done, while we will be tight 
with words, ideas will be ample.”146  
 
Debating the Partisan War in the Rear 
The history of the partisan movement became another contested territory.  As 
previously debated, its beginning needed to be portrayed as a spontaneous reaction to the 
invasion, rather than an answer to German occupation policies.  From discussions and 
debates commission members engaged in, it appears the Soviet narrative relied on a 
portrayal of the partisan movement as spontaneous and a confirmation of the population’s 
loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union.  Conversely, Western histories, it was argued, 
depicted the partisan movement as a reaction to German excesses in the rear against the 
local population.   
However, among commission members, there was a desire to show the nature of 
the German occupation as its depravity and cruelty were a cornerstone of Soviet 
propaganda during the war.  Here commission members were met with a dilemma – if 
they offered an analysis of the German occupation then there was another reason for the 
“spontaneous reaction” of the masses, but by avoiding a discussion of the occupation they 
were leaving out an essential aspect of the war experience.  One suggestion was for the 
development of the war in the rear to be presented from its beginning as a “people’s 
movement,” a grassroots initiative to oppose the German occupation that was coopted, 
organized, and led by the Party.147   
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Such a suggestion was quickly opposed.  Proposing that the partisan movement 
“was organized spontaneously at the beginning of the war…will be a mistake.”  One 
speaker went so far as to proclaim that “not one partisan unit during the Great Patriotic 
war arose spontaneously.”  Party responsibility was said to have extended past the initial 
organization of partisan detachments to including their becoming “numerous” and 
eventually forming into an all-people’s movement.  Fokin argued that the Party, after all, 
“based on the experience of previous wars, understood well the role and importance of 
the partisan movement…and when the Party was preparing for this war” it had the 
“partisan struggle” at the forefront of its preparations.  The men and women that came 
under the heading of “partisans,” those who remained or found themselves in the enemy 
rear, “were Communists, Komsomol members, Soviet citizens” who were “brought up” 
and led into battle “by our Party.”  Due to the Party’s preparation of the country 
“ideologically” for future struggles against “bourgeois” elements, any partisan struggle 
that erupted in the initial period of the war needed to be attributed to said “ideological” 
preparations.  Fokin thus argued that the Party called on the people to rise up in the 
struggle against the invader, “the people responded to this call and the Party headed this 
national movement.”148   
An unnamed speaker leaned on a Leninist position and quoted him as stating that 
“the partisan movement is a military movement.”  The beginning of the partisan war in 
the enemy’s rear was a result of soldiers left behind enemy lines, soldiers who were as 
yet “not shown objectively” in the role they played in organizing partisan detachments.  
An unnamed veteran argued that when coming out of encirclement, military personnel 
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“did not find Party workers in many areas” and, as a result, had to take the responsibility 
of creating partisan groups onto themselves with the help of the local population.  Where 
partisans already existed “we integrated into these groups.  Soldiers were at the time an 
important link in the development of partisan groups, and the partisan movement.  
Therefore, we cannot belittle this role.”  Trained soldiers, it was contended, played the 
“decisive” role in the initial organization of the partisan movement as workers simply did 
not have the knowledge or knowhow to start such an organization behind enemy lines.149   
Throughout the entire debate around to what extent partisan groups were a 
spontaneous creation, there was never an indication that the history of partisan formations 
and their members needed to be studied on a case by case basis, including their 
ideological character.  In many respects this would have proven impossible since so many 
partisans perished, especially in 1941 and 1942.  Thus the majority of the arguments that 
took place revolving around their origins circled back to the idea that those who left their 
ordinary lives and choose to go “into the woods away from the Germans” were 
spontaneously creating what became the partisan movement, which “was done by left 
behind underground organizations, and some spontaneously.”  There was no room for a 
collapse of this binary and numerous speakers and former partisans continued to tiptoe 
around the paradox that if “much of the partisan struggle” was “spontaneously” created 
then it could not be initially organized and led by the Party.  A minor concession with a 
caveat was made by Tel’pukhovskii who insisted that “we should present the partisan 
movement in broad political terms, show more party-political and mass work, which the 
partisans waged.  If such extensive, mass party-political work was not conducted, then 
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the partisan movement would not have been so broad.”  In cases where groups were 
created spontaneously, where party-political work was missing, “there detachments did 
not work well and began to break apart.”  Consequently, according to Tel’pukhovskii, the 
Party’s leadership was not only responsible for organizing and broadening the partisan 
movement but also served as a unifying force that helped keep unit cohesion.150 
An entire session was organized on 23 February 1959 to review the 
documentation available on the struggle in the enemy’s rear and ensuing discussions 
revolved around defining who exactly could be considered a “partisan.”  Starinov, a 
famous veteran partisan, argued that “people who gave bread, hid our people” and 
undertook a variety of risks “need to be included in those we list as partisans.”  
Distributing leaflets could get someone killed just as quickly as carrying a gun but those 
leaflets “weakened the rear of the enemy” more than a firefight in the woods that few 
would ever hear about.  Figures available for fighters did not necessarily include all those 
working in the enemy’s rear in different capacities, “we need to show that we had a 
national partisan movement that was wide in scope and was not confined solely to armed 
struggle…those who gave a piece of bread were not risking only their own lives but that 
of their families.  These people should be included in the lists, otherwise it will be unfair 
to people who actually fought but without weapons.”151   
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Starinov’s remarks were opposed by the argument that the partisan movement 
differed from partisan warfare.  While the movement included partisan warfare, and all of 
the other activities mentioned above that aimed to destabilize the German rear, it was 
argued that “a mandatory element of the partisan movement” was the “armed struggle” 
without which “we cannot talk about a partisan movement.”  Stalin’s name and speech 
were invoked in an attempt at clarification, but, argued Tel’pukhovskii, decisions on who 
could be considered “partisans” needed to be made on a case by case basis and were 
better left to the regional and district commissions to decide since they had first-hand 
knowledge of all the people and work that was done.   
The concept of an “all-people’s war” was then discussed, as it surpassed and 
encompassed both the partisan armed struggle and the partisan movement in general, 
including all actions that either inhibited the German occupation and war against the 
Soviet Union or helped the Red Army against Germany.152  Thus, instead of having to 
decide who was and was not a “partisan,” or needing to address the intricacies of the 
politics of the German occupation and Soviet collaboration, everyone who found 
themselves behind enemy lines could simply be described as having participated in the 
“all-people’s war” effort.   
 
Looking at discussions revolving around initial internal reviews and commentary 
on the war’s official history brings to light the numerous shortcomings not only in the 
war’s narrative but also within Soviet society.  As the line separating fact from fiction 
was partly excised during the war by journalists and censors, the war’s narrative became 
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one that could frequently be amended to suit Stalin’s needs.  After Stalin’s death and 
Khrushchev’s succession, a similar process was evident as Khrushchev and a select group 
of officers reaped the benefit of their growing importance to the war effort while Stalin 
became a pariah, posthumously accepting whatever blame deemed necessary as a new 
official history was created.  Other important personalities continued to be omitted with 
the end result that the majority of the war was conducted by a faceless mass, only 
reinforcing the stereotype of eastern “hordes” so often heard about from German 
accounts. 
The debates that took place within the commission showcase that the war’s 
history was a contested territory and some of the most heated exchanges took place 
among the commission members themselves and official reviewers, who were made up 
of high ranking war veterans and military historians.  Authors and editors were 
consistently reminded that there was a lack of literature on the war period, more so, what 
literature did exist was composed of translated foreign publications, domestic productions 
tainted by Stalin’s cult or dry, factual descriptions of well-known events and actions that 
lacked any type of in-depth analysis from which current and future generations could take 
away lessons.  The war’s history needed to serve a number of functions but the final 
results proved a failure of historical science as Stalinist concepts and censors clashed 
with a more liberal view on what “truth” and “objectivity” needed to encompass within a 
new official narrative of the war. 
It did not go unnoticed that Red Army operations were presented one-sided in 
terms of victories with little to no mention made of defeats, thus stifling attempts to 
indoctrinate future officers in how wars should be waged and what errors avoided.  
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Mistakes needed to be disclosed and analyzed but no operations that were “unfavorable 
for us” were discussed in any meaningful context.  The severity of the situation in 1941 
and 1942 were well known but mistakes needed to be highlighted so that “bitter 
experience[s]” on paper could be “training for [the] youth.”153  The glaring errors 
committed in the heat of battle had to be presented so that future military cadres could be 
trained on the blood of their forefathers instead of their own.  Casualty figures and force 
correlations continued to be omitted so that no real examination was available, nor was 
the validity of orders developed and issued by STAVKA or any other state organization 
examined. 
Although the portrayal of the Party was considered weak, descriptions of its 
ideological work in the armed forces and the rear of the country were commended.  
However, that minor praise only led to further indictments.  The beginnings of the 
partisan war was poorly described and scattered throughout the entire second volume 
while “the struggle of party organizations” in the partisan underground were “not fully 
disclosed” nor was there the needed concentration on the Party’s political work 
throughout the occupied regions with respect to the population under enemy occupation.  
Worse, missing was an in-depth understanding of the “whole theoretical foundation, the 
essence of the war” in the rear and “its political significance.”154   
As these initial reviews and comments were received it appeared that many 
reviewers and commission members were unhappy with the choices made by the authors 
and editors.  Some campaigns and battles overshadowed others, undoubtedly in part due 
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to the participants and their current positions within Khrushchev’s administration.  The 
navy and air force were quite vocal about the dominant position of the ground forces 
throughout the war’s narrative and the ignored contributions of pilots and sailors.  Where 
objective positions were taken, as with respect to how best to represent the situation the 
Soviet Air Force found itself in in 1941, there was an immediate limit placed on what 
could be disclosed to the public in order to not undermine previous claims and reverse 
earlier positions developed under Stalin’s guidance. 
An examination of fundamental issues, like the planning and implementation of 
the Moscow Counter-Offensive, or an analysis for why certain orders were issued and 
what their implementation resulted in compared to expected results, was continually 
missing.  It appeared that authors reiterated facts, figures, and details without adequate 
explanations or contextualization to help steer readers along the war’s course.  And while 
some wanted emotions and “blood” dripping from the pages of this unmoving historical 
“protocol,” the end result was a document with seemingly more weaknesses than 
strengths.  A lack of diversified heroic figures and feats, a faceless officer corps, ignored 
operations and failed campaigns, and the continued presence of Stalin and a reliance on 
his ideas and speeches continued to permeate the pages of the war’s official history.   
Throughout these discussions and critiques of the initial volumes of the war’s 
history could be seen the “hypernormalization” of text that Yurchak discussed.  
Historians could no longer offer opinion or analysis but rather relied on being the 
transmitters of knowledge rather than its creators.  A tendency to “shift” discussions “into 
the past” combined with limits on archival access and a continued reliance on previous 
texts, whether citing Stalin or Lenin, meant a lack of original or new “authoritative 
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language.”  Instead, arguments were consistently built on “prior temporalities” where 
information, whether new or old, was “presented as knowledge previously asserted and 
commonly known.”155  As such, the war’s narrative continued to lean on past ideas.  Any 
debates that arose were settled by leaning on familiar concepts without any new analysis 
or an examination of evidence that might potentially endanger the foundations of the 
Soviet system.
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CHAPTER 5 
READERS’ RESPONSES TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE WAR’S OFFICIAL 
HISTORY 
In 1963, on the anniversary of Victory Day, Pravda published an excerpt from the 
fifth volume of the war’s history discussing the storming of the Reichstag.1  The head 
editor of Pravda, Petr Pospelov, received a letter in the middle of June 1963 written in a 
rather harsh tone claiming that one of the participants in the capture of the Reichstag, 
battalion commander K. Samsonov, portrayed a falsified version of events “from 
beginning to end,” as the author himself (and his friends), also participants, could testify.  
The veteran claimed that “the cult of personality did its criminal job.  It is no accident 
that for 18 years within memoir literature it [the storming of the Reichstag] has not been 
corrected…”  At least a dozen letters were received attacking this article.  In this case it 
was asserted that Samsonov placed the soldiers of his battalion front-and-center in the 
story of the taking of the Reichstag while the involvement of other formations, and their 
participants, was absent.2   
This chapter analyzes a number of letters received from readers by a variety of 
outlets.  Readers sent hundreds of letters to newspapers, journals, high ranking party and 
military representatives and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the publisher of the 
volumes.  In addition to the content of the letters themselves, to whom they were 
addressed also helps ascertain the author’s intended target(s).  Furthermore, there were 
sometimes replies attached to original letters.  The replies written, and presumably sent, 
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to the original authors help to establish to what extent those on the receiving end offered 
support or condemnation of their own against letter writers.  In analyzing the reaction of 
readers to the publication of the first official history of the war it becomes clear that this 
was a subject many, if not most, were fascinated by yet at the same time treated as 
contested territory.  Most interesting to note is that some of the most vociferous 
accusations made against the history of the war were lodged by two participants of 
previous commission meetings, Lev Leshchinskii and Ilia Starinov, the latter of whom 
was removed from the commission for his views and ideas on the war.  Leshchinskii was 
a historian and veteran of the war, including a participant in the partisan movement, and 
Starinov was one of the most famous partisans who participated in operations from the 
Russian Civil War, through the Spanish Civil War, and the Second World War.3  He was 
involved with the creation of the war’s official history for close to 4 years.  Their 
denunciations of the war’s history, and the intended targets of their letters, show how 
Khrushchev’s Thaw allowed for alternative narratives, with certain limitations, when it 
came to Soviet history and Stalin, including what readers and participants of the war 
continued to view as their right with respect to the memory of the war. 
 Aside from the usual mentioning of shortcomings that many noticed, whether 
omissions, inaccuracies or general weaknesses, the most important topic and thread that 
could be found in most complaints, consistently, was the impact that Stalin’s cult of 
personality had on the war and its historiography.  Much of the feedback received fell 
into three categories: those that were happy with the final product, those who thought 
Stalin’s cult and wartime narrative was still being utilized as the foundation of the war’s 
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official history, and a few who asked why Soviet failures needed to be publicly exposed 
in front of enemies and friends.4   
 The war’s history was lauded as a needed antidote to what was previously written 
and the publication was commended for highlighting the fighting qualities of the Red 
Army along with its description as an international force made up of many distinct 
nationalities all eager to achieve the same end goal.5  When it came to criticisms, 
feedback touched on all aspects of the history of the war, from major generalized 
statements to individual details of names and locations.  Many pointed out incorrect 
information and asked for additional clarification.  Often the names of settlements, 
workers, and various other facts needed to be corrected even though it was contended that 
“during the preparation of the volume all facts were taken from documents” and were 
checked.6   
 
The Purges and Stalin’s Continued Impact on the War’s History 
Stalin’s previous dominance within Soviet history was a continued topic for 
criticism.  Although discussions over manuscripts had ended for the first few volumes, 
commission members continued to send in thoughts and opinions about corrections, 
additions and omissions that should be made in future editions.  Some readers insisted 
that the war’s history “upheld” Stalin’s cult.  A 10 January 1962 letter from A. 
Timofeevskii, a member of the editorial commission, contained desired amendments and 
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corrections to be implemented in the first volume; sections discussing Stalin’s “authority” 
and “popularity” needed to be reduced.  He believed “Stalin’s thesis about the escalation 
of the class struggle was not only wrong, but also caused great harm to the Party and the 
state.”  These erroneous ideas “caused great confusion” within the Party’s ranks.  
Timofeevskii argued that Stalin was himself responsible for encouraging the spread of his 
cult which resulted in “sycophancy, fraud, servility, careerism, etc.”  Guilt for the 
repressions, however, should include figures aside from Stalin, specifically, Molotov, 
Malenkov and Kaganovich needed to be portrayed “as perpetrators of massive 
repressions” rather than having their actions justified.   Others, such as previously 
mentioned Arkadii Sidorov, director of the Institute of History, as well as a participant in 
commission meetings, similarly thought that the decision by the editors to excise “the 
remnants” of Stalin’s cult was a necessity.  To help in the process it was also suggested 
“to list the most important names of the leading figures of the party and the Soviet state” 
who became victims of Stalin’s cult at the height of the purges, while members of the 
armed forces who suffered in the 1938 purges were to be mentioned later.7 
The repressions of the 1930s, when millions suffered, were portrayed in the war’s 
official history as an evolution of the Party when half-a-million vydvyzhentsy assumed 
leadership positions throughout the country.  This notion was condemned and it was 
argued that “there is a strong suggestion for the reader that, in fact, the main idea in terms 
of what happened to our cadres in 1937-1938, consists not in the destruction of many 
thousands of honest people, senior officials of the Soviet state, but in the promotion 
[выдвижении] of young people.”  The history of the war, in addressing this topic, 
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contained a quote from Stalin that discussed the above mentioned figure of half-a-million 
“young workers” being “promoted” and it was asked: “Do our comrades understand, that 
in providing this quote [and] this number, that it (mostly) also reflects the number of 
‘vacancies,’ freed by the destruction of the Party’s and government’s cadres?”8  
Consequently, Stalin’s views on the necessity of the purges were reiterated within the 
pages of the official history rather than criticized by the authors – although it was 
mentioned that this new cohort of workers did not have enough experience and training.9 
One of the most passionate and confrontational letters, highly critical of the war’s 
history and the presence of Stalin’s cult, was sent to the editorial board of the newspaper 
Izvestiia, undoubtedly with the hope that at least some part of it would be printed to raise 
awareness of the mentioned weaknesses.  The author, a candidate of historical sciences, 
member of the Communist Party since 1931 and a Lieutenant Colonel, was Lev 
Leshchinskii, a member of the commission himself.  He complimented the first three 
volumes, which contained a “large number of new factual materials” written by “authors 
who spared no effort” in “vividly” describing “the historic feat of the Soviet people, who 
saved mankind from the fascist plague.”  Yet simultaneously, he could not leave 
unmentioned the fact that Stalin’s cult left a large “impact” on the war’s history, which 
included “dogmas, concepts, illustrations, and other materials from the period of the cult 
of personality.”  Even though they were published after the decisions of the 20th Party 
Congress, Leshchinskii argued that “any excuse is made to quote Stalin’s speeches and to 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 94, 95.  David Brandenberger in part sees the purges, of the Old Guard and the military, among 
others, as “unintentionally cripp[ling] the party’s ability to mobilize their society,” which in turn “forced 
party ideologists to intensify…their embrace of the personality cult…”  Brandenberger, Propaganda State 
in Crisis, 248. 
 
9 Deborin et al., 427.   
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attribute to him personally NKO [People’s Commissariat of Defense] orders.”  
Furthermore, Stalin’s quotes either replaced the author’s voice or reflected it with the end 
result that Stalin’s role was being consistently promoted instead of written out or 
contextualized.10  Going a step further, it was believed the war’s official history was 
actually “impos[ing]” Stalin’s cult on the reader.11   
Leshchinskii argued that the cult was being “advocated,” something that was 
“reflected not only in justifications and the praising of Stalin, popularized by the many 
quotations from his speeches [and] a full gallery of his portraits and pictures…but also in 
historical interpretations…and selected groupings of materials which the party 
[previously] condemned.”12  Starinov, in his letter to the Presidium of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, went so far as to count how 
many times Stalin’s name and photographs appeared throughout various volumes and 
believed Stalin was continually being praised with “primitive clichés.”  According to 
Leshchinskii and Starinov, the tools advocated for dealing with Stalin’s presence within 
the war’s history seemed to heavily rely on Stalinist thinking and dogma from the period 
of the cult, especially when the question of his illustration was brought up.  Leshchinskii 
wrote that “it is known that one illustration may influence a reader more than a thousand 
words.”13  There were also concerns that quoting Stalin, or at times simply utilizing his 
                                                 
10 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 82, 96, 97. 
 
11 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 171; d. 309, l. 87, 89, 91, 95, 102. 
 
12 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 96. 
 
13 According to Leshchinskii, Stalin’s image appeared 12 times in the three volumes.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 
22, d. 309, l. 102.  According to Starinov, in the first volume his photographs could be found “up to 50 
times” and “derivatives of his name can be found ‘on 80 pages…up to 400 times.’”  In response the editors 
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name, meant “upholding” Stalin’s cult.  “Stalin’s false statements” were presented by the 
authors as they assured readers “that Stalin ‘outlined the harsh truth’ about ‘temporary 
military failures’ and even supposedly ‘revealed the reasons for these failures.’”14  These 
were direct quotes from the published second volume where Stalin’s speech from 
November was presented as outlining the previous four months of fighting on the 
German-Soviet front – the official history’s authors made no attempt to correct or 
contextualize Stalin’s words, admissions or omissions.15   
In response, the editors only confirmed that Stalin’s continued mention was due to 
his being “Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), Chairman of the 
State Committee of Defense, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the 
USSR, Supreme Commander and People’s Commissar of Defense of the Soviet Union.”  
In a written reply to Starinov, the head of the Department of World War II history, 
Boltin, wrote that as a result of the “strengths” of Stalin’s “positions his name cannot be 
erased from history” and claimed that the third volume was “free from attempts to glorify 
Stalin and even more so to revive his cult.  Stalin’s name is mentioned in the text of the 
volume only during the presentation of military, political and international events that 
took place during the second period of the war.”16  In addition, “derivatives” of Stalin’s 
name were unavoidable in the third volume, argued the editors, since the first chapter 
“describes the fighting at Stalingrad and in the Stalingrad area, including the actions of 
                                                 
insisted that “no one considers it a glorification” if the names of Hitler, Mussolini and Antonescu were 
mentioned.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 158, 167, 170, 171. 
 
14 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 88. 
 
15 Fokin et al., 252-253. 
 
16 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 150, 171. 
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troops of the Stalingrad Front, shows numerous feats of soldiers and residents of 
Stalingrad…the editors could not replace the word ‘Stalingrad’ with any other (the 
volume was published before the renaming of the city), and it is unlikely it would be 
correct [to do so].  But is it possible to treat this as a glorification of Stalin?”  In the 
opinion of the editors – “no.”17  Nonetheless, in writing to Izvestiia, Leshchinskii’s 
criticisms laid bare the fact that the war’s history was not representative of the changes 
the 20th Party Congress was supposed to have signified.  His voice joined those attacking 
the continued use of not only Stalin’s illustrations, but that of Molotov as well.18 
For Leshchinskii, Stalin’s cult was tied to the official history’s presentation of the 
purges of the Red Army, the description of which ran counter to the decisions of the 
Party and “historical truth.”  And this contradictory presentation became the “guiding 
principle” when covering other issues, like defensive operations and the “causes of our 
defeats in the initial period of the war.”  Furthermore, Leshchinskii contended that 
Stalin’s guilt was “artificially downplayed” since the repressions were only mentioned 
during coverage of the war’s initial period.  Nothing was said about the continued impact 
of the “decimated cadres for the entire period of the war” nor was there any discussion or 
analysis about the continued repressions that were carried out as the war progressed.19  
Mentioning these victims of Stalin’s purges “would only be logical, as it would allow for 
a more scientific look at the entirety [of the repressions] generated by the cult of 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 170. 
 
18 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 80, 96, 97, 102; d. 586, l. 171. 
 
19 For instance, Dmitrii Pavlov, who was executed in July 1941 after being blamed for his front’s 
encirclement around Minsk, merited a single mention in the second volume, when he was listed as 
commander of the Western Front.  Fokin et al., 29.  
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personality from the moment of its creation in 1934 and up to its conclusion and 
condemnation in 1953 and to figure out its impact on the defense [of the nation]…”  
Leshchinskii argued that “the repressions – were one of the main causes of our defeats 
and casualties,” yet the first two volumes omitted “this obvious truth.”20  In some ways 
Leshchinskii’s letter illustrated the thoughts of a historian as he appeared to aim for a 
more balanced representation of Stalin and his crimes.  When he reflected on “the process 
of writing these volumes” he lamented how “scientific criticism was absent.”21 
 
Soviet Operational Art and the Initial Period of War 
Although he did not take part in commission meetings, among those writing to the 
editors was the well-known military theorist Georgii Isserson.22  Isserson’s “closed 
letter,” written in November 1960 and likely meant only for the eyes of the commission, 
concentrated on the development of Soviet operational art and strategy and partly 
attacked the impact of Stalin’s cult on military theory and theorists and the prewar 
doctrine that was championed by Voroshilov, among others, which claimed that future 
battles would take place on the enemy’s territory with little blood spilled. 
Isserson, the author of numerous research papers on military theory and a 
participant in the development of the theory of operational art in the prewar period, felt 
the descriptions in the first volume about military theory were neither factually or 
                                                 
20 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 93-94. 
 
21 Ibid., 80. 
 
22 For a recent monograph on Isserson and his contributions to Soviet military science, see Richard W. 
Harrison, Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G. S. Isserson (North 
Carolina: MacFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2010). 
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historically truthful, and in some areas even biased.23  He claimed “the authors writing 
about Soviet military science, are insufficiently acquainted with our literature on this 
subject and, in particular, with the theoretical and practical development of the General 
Staff’s defense academy,” which discussed and “fully developed” “the question of 
defense in depth in particular.”24 
Isserson praised the development of Soviet operational art, claiming that the Red 
Army’s “advanced” military theory on the eve of the war was at a “high level,” and 
included an ability to “foresee the possibility of deep operations into the enemy’s 
depths,” but he did not see the volume as having adequately addressed “the history and 
development of our military theory before the war.”  The discussion of the Red Army’s 
initial failures appeared a failure of military theorists rather than of actions on the ground 
and circumstances beyond the ability of military theory to envision and overcome.  
Isserson argued that military theory alone could not have foretold “the drama of the 
beginning of the Great Patriotic War,” nor should it “have been able to predict” the 
invasion “as it is the task of strategic and political policies and is beyond the scope of 
[military] theory as it stands.”25  Consequently, it appears that in part the authors of the 
war’s history found a scapegoat in Soviet military theory in order to explain away the 
disastrous beginning of the war.  Considering the majority of the most well-known 
personalities that worked on military theory in the 1930s were purged, Isserson appeared 
to be the only voice who could offer any type of opposition as he was one of the very few 
                                                 
23 He specifically referenced a subsection of the tenth chapter of the first volume, entitled “Soviet military 
thought on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.” 
 
24 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 222, 252. 
 
25 Ibid., 215-216. 
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to survive the purges and continue working in the field.  An issue that neither the official 
history’s authors or Isserson touched on was the difficulty of separating the developments 
made before and after the purges of the Red Army within military science as that would 
have meant highlighting how much military theorists suffered and to what extent their 
ideas were then forbidden from being propagated.  Instead, they were replaced by the all-
encompassing notion that all future conflicts would be settled quickly, with little blood, 
and on the enemy’s territory.  
A response was penned to Isserson with an attempted explanation.  The author(s) 
noted that Isserson’s letter was received after the publication of the first volume, 
otherwise his ideas and thoughts would have been utilized.  More so, it was emphasized 
that the preparation of the war’s history was practically a national affair.   
You had to know about [the fact] that a multivolume edition of the History of the 
Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 was being prepared.  We 
have repeatedly appealed to the public – through the press and by word of mouth 
– with calls for help.  You had an opportunity to offer us your help, your 
knowledge and experience.  We fully understand your scruples [about the text], 
but still believe that you should overcome them.  You would have been given the 
friendliest welcome by our collective.26 
 
The central premise of Isserson’s arguments against the war’s history was that he 
believed too much blame was being assigned to military theory in the prewar period, but 
it is conceivable that he wanted prewar theorists, including himself, to be excluded from 
those blamed for the war’s disastrous beginning.  In doing so it appears he was guilty of 
contradicting himself and assigning blame to the history’s authors when they were in 
agreement with Isserson’s assertions.  Thus, respect for Isserson did not translate into an 
outright acceptance of his ideas.  His “characterization of the development” of Soviet 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 199. 
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military theory, when discussing defensive problems the Red Army encountered on the 
eve of the German invasion, matched the official history.  Isserson argued that all 
theoretical work within the prewar Red Army was based on an offensive mentality.  The 
German invasion, however, created an environment where a “completely different 
orientation of strategic thought” was needed and could not have been predicted.  “In this 
specifically was our greatest mistake,” commented Isserson.  Similarly, the authors of the 
war’s history stated: “Our theory on the question of the development of defense was 
incomplete,” which complemented Isserson’s statements.27   
However, to the question of whether or not there were “flaws in Soviet military 
theory on the eve of the war,” the first volume answered in the affirmative.  In fact, the 
authors of the first volume mentioned the impact Stalin’s cult of personality had on the 
evolution of military strategy, concluding there were “a number of weaknesses and 
gaps.”28  Thus, contrary to Isserson’s claims, the authors believed that “significant 
deficiencies occurred” within the realms of military theory and these “shortcomings” 
could not be overlooked or omitted from the war’s narrative:   
Moreover, if we had not mentioned this we would have been met by 
condemnation from an overwhelming majority of our generals and officers.  
Among whom there are individuals who tend to sharply criticize the state of 
Soviet military-theoretical thought before the war more than is evidenced in the 
first volume.  
 
The real division between Isserson and the war’s history was the evaluation of prewar 
military theory.  Isserson defended it as being at a “high level” while the war’s history 
claimed it contained “significant deficiencies.”  Consequently, the authors and editors 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 197. 
 
28 Deborin et al., 439. 
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were following a rather narrow path in trying to not alienate high ranking veterans of the 
Red Army, nor Khrushchev’s administration, in how they described the events on the eve 
of the war.  Even so, there was at least some support for Isserson’s position as one major-
general wanted to “dwell” on the issues he raised, noting Isserson’s reputation and merits 
as an author of military-scientific works.29 
In a similar vein, another letter, written by a P. D. Mushchinskii to the head editor 
of the journal Kommunist, contained complaints against descriptions of Soviet military 
theorists, including military theory, and Stalin’s purges and cult.  The author contended 
that in viewing the contents of the first volume, it seemed as if the text was written before 
the 20th Party Congress.  This criticism was specifically applied “to the descriptions of 
the armed forces, their combat readiness, military equipment, as well as Soviet military 
knowledge and art,” which was still “not free of the spirit of the Cult of Personality.”  
Although Mushchinskii had no problem with the official history’s praising of Lenin and 
his development of “Soviet military science,” he objected to “several outdated positions” 
when it came to Stalin’s role in similar developments.  Because of the close positioning 
of Lenin’s name to Stalin’s, he argued that “from this it can be inferred that after Lenin, 
Stalin is the only person to develop Soviet military science (more so, since the authors of 
the first volume do not mention any other names).”  As a result, he considered the 
methodology utilized by the authors when confronting military issues to have been 
“borrowed from the Cult of Personality” with the end result that “their interpretations are 
erroneous and inconsistent.”  Mushchinskii opposed the previous and now official 
history’s narrative of the war, which highlighted Stalin’s ability to gather reserves and 
                                                 
29 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 195, 197. 
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pick the correct direction of a main attack by tracing and ascribing similar thoughts and 
actions to Lenin and in general as being “important tenets of Marxism about strategy.”30     
 A further disappointment for Mushchinskii included descriptions of the 
development of Soviet military science that excluded famous and well-known names.  
Specifically, the authors of the first volume wrote that “A great contribution to Soviet 
military science was made by our outstanding commanders and military leaders: M. V. 
Frunze, B. M. Shaposhnikov and others.”31  Although Frunze and Shaposhnikov were 
evident, many other important figures were missing:   
No one is going to deny the role of Shaposhnikov in the development of questions 
regarding Soviet military science.  The objection is to the fact that other equally 
honorable Soviet military workers and leaders are omitted.  B. Shaposhnikov is 
even put on a similar level as Frunze, yet Tukhachevsky, Kamenev and Egorov 
are unjustifiably forgotten in the pages of the first volume.  It raises surprise and 
even protest to see…the outstanding military leader and theorist M. N. 
Tukhachevsky is only mentioned in the first volume among authors of military-
scientific works and next to little-known teachers of military academies…how can 
these people be put on par with the fully-developed military figure of M. N. 
Tukhachevsky!  As can be seen among the pages of the first volume, there is no 
recognition of those Soviet commanders who were executed during the time when 
Stalin violated the law and are now fully rehabilitated.32   
 
Finally, there was a distinct absence of military district commanders, under whose 
leadership multiple inter-district military exercises were undertaken to showcase the 
development of Soviet military art.  The repressed commanders, Avgust Kork, Ieronim 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 75, 76.  Lenin was intimately tied into the development of Soviet military theory by the authors of 
the official history who also wrote: “A number of generally important military-theoretical problems were 
emphasized and affirmed by I. V. Stalin, particularly questions about the choice of direction for a main 
attack, about reserves and others.”  Thus the authors repeated practically verbatim ideas expressed 
throughout the war, within the General Staff study on the Battle of Moscow, and from Voroshilov’s work 
on Stalin’s role in the war.  Deborin et al., 437, 439.  
 
31 Deborin et al., 437. 
 
32 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 75. 
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Uborevich, and Iona Iakir, were missing from the entire first volume and the authors were 
“unjustified in ignoring them.”33   
 Not missing, however, was Stalin’s continued presence.  A quote within the 
official history mentioned Stalin “speaking at a meeting of the Supreme Military Soviet 
on 17 April,” he “spoke about the need for command staff to study modern war.”  This 
statement seemingly forced the reader “into a false conclusion that Stalin allegedly 
conducted the correct military policy in preparing the defenses [of the country], based on 
an understanding of the new demands of warfare.”  The end result was a “praising” of 
Stalin and extended to a portrayal of him helping in the “development of military 
science.”  Simultaneously, the official history was silent about the damage caused to 
Soviet military science as a result of the purges unleashed in the 1930s.  The deaths of 
prominent military theorists meant their views on deep operations as well as strategic 
defensive operations and withdrawals were discredited, leaving the Red Army in a 
vulnerable position.  The defeat of the Wehrmacht needed to be portrayed as “in spite” of 
Stalin’s cult, as the Soviet population “moved forward toward the building of socialism 
as well as military victory.”34   
Ignoring military commanders from the 1930s allowed authors to propagate 
another aspect of Stalin’s narrative.  When discussing the Battle of Stalingrad, it was 
claimed the Soviet counteroffensive against the German 6th Army “revealed the clearly 
huge capabilities of the armored and mechanized forces who were able to, in the short 
term, achieve a tactical breakthrough and maneuver in the operational environment to 
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encircle a large group of the enemy…”  Left unanswered was why it took so long for 
these “huge capabilities” to reveal themselves.  In his 19 July 1962 letter, a Lieutenant 
General Al’bert Shtromberg argued that this was wholly incorrect since “these 
capabilities were known even before [the war].  They were evident in a number of major 
exercises and maneuvers, starting in 1930 (in the Moscow, Belorussian, and Ukrainian 
military districts…).  They were studied and presented to listeners in our military 
academies, particularly in the Academy of the General Staff.  But in the Battle of 
Stalingrad these capabilities were confirmed in new, previously unseen scales, but that 
does not mean that they were firstly discovered here.”35  The war’s official history 
seemingly presented a Red Army learning through bloody battles to wage war.  This was 
an essential part of the Stalinist narrative that was reinforced by Korneichuk’s play The 
Front and became contested territory for some readers.  Here the authors of the official 
history reiterated the idea that outdated commanders were replaced by the time of the 
Stalingrad counteroffensive, at which point recently promoted junior officers showed 
what they learned from the past two years of wartime experience.   
In propagating the idea that military commanders learned their craft through 
battles, authors apparently felt no need to criticize those in the prewar period who 
championed the idea that a future victory in war would be achieved “with little blood.”  
Voroshilov was singled out for ridicule with a reader commenting that “Soviet people of 
the older generation remember that a victory with ‘little blood’ over a likely opponent 
was repeatedly proclaimed by K. E. Voroshilov before 1940.  Consequently, the authors 
of the first volume cannot keep silent that the so-called theory of victory with ‘little 
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blood’ had its supporters, even among some of those who held very important positions 
within our armed forces.”  Reasons given for the “introduction of the institution of 
military commissars in 1937” were also criticized by readers like the previously 
mentioned Mushchinskii.  They were described as “superficial” and the offered 
explanation was ridiculed as being similar to what was utilized under Stalin, “that is to 
say the institute of military commissars in 1937 was introduced to eliminate the 
consequences of the ‘sabotage’ of the ‘enemies of the people’ in the army and navy.  But 
such an explanation in light of the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses is 
erroneous, and even harmful.”36   
 Deborin, the editor of the first volume, penned a reply, which was forwarded by 
Boltin, to the letter received by the journal Kommunist.  It stated that some of the 
comments were “right” but they did “not take into account when the first volume of the 
history of the ‘History of the Great Patriotic War’ was written (1958-1960).”  However, 
the criticisms toward the “volume, arising out of the 22nd Party Congress…are clearly 
wrong.  Aside from this,” the author “would like details to be incorporated into the first 
volume which have no place within this book.  Of course, we will take into account the 
letter writer’s ideas in case a second edition will be published.  However, there is no 
discussion about that presently.”37   
 Thus, the introductory volume on the war’s history found new scapegoats in the 
form of military theorists in order for others to save face.  Errors from 1941 were partly 
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blamed on poor military-scientific theories that did not predict the opening phases of the 
German invasion.  This in turn partly absolved Stalin and the high command of mistakes 
and miscalculations that cost millions their lives.  Additionally, well-known and 
respected military theorists, including numerous commanders of military districts who 
were purged in the late 1930s, were barely mentioned as the Red Army’s evolution was 
attributed to bloody lessons from the field of battle or to Lenin who inherited the prestige 
that formerly belonged to Stalin. 
The biggest impact of Stalin’s cult continued to resonate with the portrayal of the 
war’s initial period and the “content and wording” that readers encountered throughout 
the war’s history.  Commented on the “wording” of the first volume’s introduction and 
initial chapters, a reader mentioned the use of the expression “hordes” of Germans and 
complained that “prior to the use of this expression, here and after, there is an emphasis 
that against the Soviet Union was pitted a multimillion-man army with the most 
technically well-equipped army of the capitalist world.  If these were ‘hordes’ (by 
definition – a messy crowd, mob, gang), it would thereby belittle the heroic struggle of 
the Soviet people and the power of its armed forces, which took four years to defeat these 
‘hordes.’”38  Consequently, the war’s narrative could not portray the German Army as 
technologically advanced, compared to the Red Army, as that would invalidate previous 
propaganda positions, nor could the Wehrmacht be portrayed as incompetent “hordes” as 
that would denigrate Soviet achievements.  Furthermore, he pointed out that the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 58.  Observations on the first, second, and third volumes of the official history of the war written 
by A. Shtromberg.  The word “hordes” is still tied to descriptions of the German Army as they are part of 
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“reference to a ‘sudden and treacherous’ attack by Germany” essentially repeated 
“Stalinist era justifications” similar to the idea that “the agreement with Germany 
provided a respite from inevitable war and time to better prepare for it, which required 
the greatest vigilance and readiness,” a not so veiled critique of the non-aggression pact.39 
Some viewed the purges as the root cause of the tragedy of the initial period of the 
war, including the egregious losses suffered by the Red Army.  “Workers and cadres 
promoted during the revolution, reared by Lenin, were replaced with those taken from the 
bottom by Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Kaganovich.  A commander of a 
formation was turned into a front commander in a matter of three-four years, while a pilot 
became the commander of the Air Force.”40   It was impossible to understand how “the 
real culprits” could so readily “shift the blame onto the shoulders of these honest people.”  
More so, limiting the guilt of Stalin and his closest associates meant “not only distorting 
the historical truth, but also resorting to the same ‘arguments,’ which were used before 
1953-56.”  Consequently, even when the problems the Soviet Union faced on the eve of 
the war were highlighted, “they are inevitably accompanied by the invisible presence of 
Stalin’s dangerous concept,” which tried to explain away the initial period of the war by 
leaning on the idea “that the aggressor is always bound to be stronger” than the defender, 
who was unprepared for the coming conflict – in effect reiterating the idea of a 
“peaceful” Soviet Union being attacked by a belligerent Nazi Germany.  This concept 
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40 This was undoubtedly a reference to Major General Ivan Kopets, who at the age of 32 became 
commander of the Western Front’s Air Force.  Three years earlier he was a captain and veteran of the Civil 
War in Spain.  The purges propelled him through the ranks and on the evening of the first day of the war he 
shot himself after the Western Front’s Air Force suffered devastating losses both in the air and on the 
ground.  Constantine Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of WWII on the Eastern Front 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 127. 
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was traced to Stalin’s speeches during the war, supplying a ready answer for the Red 
Army’s poor performance during the German invasion and becoming a part of the 
Stalinist narrative.  Stalin’s “vicious acts” were labeled “miscalculations” and only 
evident on the eve of the war within the multi-volume history.  Worse, in the wake of 
their being mentioned the focus immediately shifted to explanations that attempted to 
justify why and how these “miscalculations” were made.41   
Stalin’s cult precluded an emphasis on discussing mistakes, or even poor 
judgement, in the realms of domestic, foreign or military policy.  Sections devoted to 
these questions throughout the first volume, “represent quite a jumble of many different 
facts.”  There were “critical remarks” that portrayed a level of “disorganization, instead 
of reorganizing, reducing armaments, instead of rearmament, weakening of troop combat 
readiness, flagrant violations in terms of strategic and operational requirements, etc.”  
However, what continued to be omitted was a linking of all these “shortcomings” to 
Stalin’s cult as “there are no connections established” to these inadequacies within the 
Soviet system.42  As a result, too often Stalin, including those around him and within the 
army high command, escaped any direct condemnation.  
The shortcomings mentioned were “written off” and hoisted onto the shoulders of 
NKO workers, “propagandists, writers, etc.,” leading to the conclusion that the fate of the 
Red Army and Soviet state was not being decided by Stalin.  However, his actions and 
speeches, in concert with Molotov, were what set the stage for the war, and shifting 
“responsibility for preparations of defense, even for strategy, onto NKO workers [and] 
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individual commanders” was considered “strange.”43  These were not the only instances 
where responsibility was removed from Stalin and those surrounding him.  Blame for the 
Red Army’s inability to meet the German invasion on a level playing field “was shifted 
to the workers of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff” rather 
than being attributed to Stalin.  The explanations offered for initial defeats and forced 
retreats were laid out on the basis of “Stalinist explanations” with Stalin, once more, 
relegated to the role of “genius” who during this period “designated” roles, “exposed” 
weaknesses, and “directed” victory.  The role of the State Committee of Defense (GKO – 
which Stalin headed) was “exaggerated,” the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Union Republics and regional party committees were belittled.  As a result, “this 
not only leads to the excessive praise of Stalin, but to the defense and praise” of his 
associates.44 
Even where Stalin and his miscalculations were mentioned, readers had a hard 
time comprehending what lessons were supposed to be drawn from these admissions.  
Although Stalin was portrayed disallowing any movement of troops closer to the border 
on the eve of the war, thus constraining the Red Army’s ability to resist a German 
invasion, the overall tone pointed to this being a result of “a desire to keep peace,” a 
desire in contrast to the 20th Party Congress decisions, which clearly condemned Stalin’s 
actions.  Similarly, supporting the idea of the Soviet Union’s “peaceful nature” was the 
distribution of forces throughout the western border districts, which were not poised for 
offensive action.  This line of thinking was considered “absolutely unjustified,” even if 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 92. 
 
44 Ibid., 103. 
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true, since it was previously “imposed primarily by Stalin.”  Overall, criticisms directed 
toward Stalin were considered “insufficient” and too often they were “discarded while 
taking their place are evaluations from the period of the cult of personality which were 
previously criticized by the party.”45  Consequently, present needs for showing the Soviet 
Union as a victim of German aggression meant partly rehabilitating Stalinist 
justifications.   
The continued concentration on Stalin obscured other aspects of the war, 
especially in the initial period.  The implementation of an “active defense,” the creation 
of a war economy, the preparation of reserves, and the organizing of a partisan movement 
were described as if they were pre-planned and “done in accordance to Stalin’s directives 
and speeches” while readers saw “nothing about Stalin’s confusion” nor “about the 
weakening of the cult of personality which made it possible to organize a struggle against 
the Nazi hordes.”  Furthermore, “the reader will encounter very little about the initiative 
of the masses, about the independence of communists and non-party local, national, 
regional, and district, and army workers who selflessly overcome the evil inflicted by” 
Stalin’s cult.  Consequently, the Soviet leader was continually praised as a military 
theorist, similar to the postwar period, while his actions, such as the TASS announcement 
on 14 June, “which adversely affected the combat readiness of our troops, is treated as a 
wise course of action by Stalin and Molotov.”46  To the credit of the authors of the 
official history, this last accusation seems misplaced.  The authors noted that the TASS 
                                                 
45 Stalin’s cult was tied to numerous controversial decisions, including the taking apart of the Stalin 
Defensive Line, the chaos caused by the dispersal of troops during the initial period of the war, and the 
dangers associated with “moving troops forward to a new and unfortified border.”  Ibid., 87, 88, 89. 
 
46 Ibid., 87, 104. 
 303 
announcement was a “miscalculation” by Stalin which resulted in “a negative impact on 
the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces” as well as the “vigilance of command 
and political personnel.”47 
Leshchinskii insisted the second and third volumes contained “basically…none of 
the 20th Congress’s resolutions” but rather relied on Stalin’s narrative and publications.  
Stalin’s words were frequently quoted as both volumes praised him as a military 
commander and presented “a number of critical issues in the spirit” of his cult.  Whatever 
criticisms were visible, were there only to “cover up” aspects of his cult that were 
present.  Meanwhile, “the idea that, despite some mistakes, it was Stalin that led the 
entire struggle and achieved victory in the Great Patriotic War” confronted and 
undoubtedly confused readers.  The damage done by the leadership of the state was 
omitted and, worse, the “renegades” responsible were “unjustly glorified.”  The end 
result was that “these volumes on the history of the Great Patriotic War bear the heavy 
burden of the cult of personality while being presented as if they were written based on 
the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.  This complicates the restoration of 
historical truth and plays into the hands of our detractors, making it difficult to bring up 
our soldiers in the spirit of the 20th and 21st Congress of the CPSU.”48 
In describing Stalin’s leadership, Leshchinskii believed “what’s written is often 
the same as was evident during the period of the Cult of Personality,” which was greatly 
upsetting.49  Unfortunately, he could not give a detailed explanation as to why the war’s 
                                                 
47 Fokin et al., 10. 
 
48 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 102, 103. 
 
49 Ibid., 82. 
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history remained mired in the shadow of Stalin’s Cult.  “Every now and then we return to 
this issue and I am deeply worried about what has happened and I cannot be satisfied 
with any superficial explanation.”  Throughout the writing process for these volumes, 
much was done to prevent any type of criticism from being carried over onto the pages of 
the war’s official history.  At the end of his letter, Leshchinskii asked the editorial board 
“to organize a critique of the incorrect positions contained within the text of these books” 
as “it will help to eliminate the remains of the cult of personality within the historical 
sciences…and establish a deep scholarly work on the history of the Great Patriotic 
War.”50  Only in the mid-1960s would meetings be held to discuss the continued impact 
of Stalin’s cult on the war’s history, unfortunately the final result still contained many 
weaknesses. 
 
Partisans, Khrushchev and Stalin in the War 
The partisan movement also received a fairly detailed amount of criticism and 
discussion.51  The Party’s role in the evolution of the partisan movement came under 
review, as did that of Stalin, Khrushchev and local organizations.  Beginning with the 
prewar period, Leshchinskii’s letter raised concerns over the lack of attention to the 
“extermination in 1937-38 of the valuable, specially trained and battle hardened 
[partisan] cadres, about the destruction of large networks of bases, and the termination of 
                                                 
50 This letter was written on 27 April 1962, meetings held to discuss the cult’s influence on the war’s 
history took place 2-3 years later.  Consequently there is some possibility that Leshchinskii’s letter did 
influence the editorial board and committee members.  Ibid., 80-81. 
 
51 In February 1959 an entire meeting was devoted to discussing source material on the partisan war within 
the war’s official history, both Leshchinskii and Starinov participated in this meeting.  See RGASPI, f. 71, 
op. 22, d. 76. 
 305 
theoretical and academic work and the development of special equipment.  Not one of the 
volumes features the distortions in the leadership by Stalin, Ponomarenko and Malenkov 
in the partisan struggle.  There is no exposure of the repressions, whose victims during 
the war included a series of partisan commanders and commissars.”  Additionally, since 
many partisan formations began due to soldiers falling into German encirclements, and 
considering the lack of coverage in the official history of German encirclement 
operations in 1941, Leshchinskii pointed out the silence that greeted “the indiscriminate 
distrust which was spread about those people and soldiers who fought in 
encirclements.”52   
Aside from the important role played by former Red Army soldiers who found 
themselves encircled or in the German rear, another letter, written by a Stepan Surzhik to 
the editors of the official history, discussed the creation of partisan detachments from 
local party committees, the police, court, and prosecutor’s office, which the letter’s 
author witnessed first-hand.  As these detachments took to the woods, many other 
“ordinary communists” were “left to fend for themselves.”  Without assignments from 
higher officials, who presumably retreated with the Red Army, these men and women 
were left without any leadership and “subsequently were killed by the fascists.”  These 
issues – the creation of partisan detachments and the elimination of other communists 
that were left without direction – needed to be addressed within the war’s official 
history.53   While a “significant amount of time has passed since” the end of the war, 
                                                 
52 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 85-86. 
 
53 In September 1955 those imprisoned during and after the war for collaboration, including former 
prisoners of war who were liberated by the advancing Red Army, were amnestied by the Supreme Soviet.  
Additionally, after Marshal Zhukov presented a commission report on 29 June 1956 “the Presidium 
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wrote Surzhik, there were still numerous issues that the population was unfamiliar with 
that needed to be detailed and explained.  Boltin replied stating: “You correctly drew our 
attention to the…composition of the partisan groups in the border areas of the USSR at 
the beginning of the war.  Your comments will be taken into account in the 6th volume of 
the 'History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.’ Thank you for your letter.”54   
A letter sent to the editors of Pravda from a former partisan, a Spaniard who 
fought against the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union, complimented the efforts put into the 
creation of the first volume, which he found “interesting,” “useful,” and “well written” in 
its portrayal of the war against Hitler’s Germany, “which saved humanity from the brown 
plague.”  He was happy to see for the first time the Soviet Union’s role in the Spanish 
Civil War openly described and outlined as it explained “how the Soviet Union helped 
the Spanish people in the struggle against fascist invaders and Franco’s gangs.”  Yet 
simultaneously he thought the partisan struggle, which was “widely praised” on the “40th 
Anniversary of the Soviet state,” was completely absent from the first volume.  He 
wanted the portrayal of the partisan struggle to include an international dimension as 
those fighting against the German invaders of Soviet territory included “peoples from 
other countries,” who “would very much like to see the internationalism during the years 
of the Patriotic War, especially in the partisan struggle, to be reflected in subsequent 
                                                 
accepted its recommendation to amnesty, release, and compensate those Soviet POWS from the war who 
were still in prison camps.”  Hopf, 150, 180. 
 
54 RGASPI, f. 72, op. 22, d. 916, l. 2, 3.  Although the sixth volume included a chapter on the “War of the 
Soviet population in the enemy’s rear,” the 32 pages devoted to partisan activity mainly focused on the 
latter period of the war and were filled with references to numbers of units, numbers of active partisans, 
names of partisan and local party commanders, etc., without much references to the issues Surzhik brought 
up for discussion.  V. A. Vasilenko et al., Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-
1945, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1965), 251-282. 
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volumes.”55  Thus, Soviet efforts to show the unity of the people were lacking when it 
came to the international arena.  In part, this could signify a reflection of the continued 
Soviet interest in presenting the war as one that was mainly fought and won by the Red 
Army, rather than the allies, or even volunteers who joined the Red Army’s war effort. 
Further weaknesses were noted when it was pointed out that “not one name of the 
organizers of some of the largest partisan movements in Lithuania [was] mentioned...”  
Similarly, the Institute of Party History in Belorussia recommended “a fuller disclosure 
of the fighting in Belorussia by partisan and the local population against Nazi attempts to 
seize the harvest of 1943, indicating the names of those who performed major diversions, 
and highlight the activities of the Komsomol-youth groups in Minsk and other [cities].”  
All such comments were “taken into account for future editions.”56   
Leshchinskii voiced further concerns over the presentation of the partisan 
movement.  He focused on the ninth chapter of the third volume, which dealt with the 
expansion of the Partisan War in the enemy’s rear (November 1942-December 1943), 
and complained that it was “written at a low academic level and contains coarse 
methodological distortions.  In accordance with the flawed concept of the period of the 
cult of personality...it lacks the ability to educate the reader in a correct understanding of 
the source and driving force of the Soviet partisan movement, which were the socialist 
system and the correct leadership of the Communist Party of the masses.”  In general, he 
claimed that the party’s leadership within the partisan movement lacked analysis, a “fact” 
that “cannot [be] ignore[d].”  His emphasis on the importance of the Party mirrored the 
                                                 
55 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 20-21. 
 
56 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 85-86, 178. 
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party line during Khrushchev’s time.57  This focus on the partisan war echoed the 
discussions of the commission where they attempted to ascertain the “nature” of the 
partisan movement and the Party’s role, unfortunately it appeared that an emphasis was 
still missing.   
According to Leshchinskii, the partisan struggle in the rear of the enemy, as 
presented in the official history, was mainly stimulated and developed as a result of the 
occupation regime, “when Nazi atrocities could only strengthen the desires of the masses 
to fight.”  There were two opposing narratives revolving around the “motivation” for the 
struggle in the enemy’s rear.  “Our opponents claim that if not for the ‘excessive cruelty’ 
of the occupiers, then there would have been no partisan movement,” and this 
“dangerous” claim was not challenged or criticized by the authors.  “There is no feeling 
of an understanding of the popular nature of the struggle” nor was the “correct approach” 
taken in regards to the issues of the size of the partisan movement or the “national 
support” they were provided by the local population.58  He pointed to “miserly figures” 
that claimed “at the end of 1943 in Ukraine only some 12-15,000 partisans operated and 
in the occupied regions of the Russian federation – up to 40,000…”59  He insisted these 
figures did not include partisans that were not part of the central headquarters of the 
partisan movement or “the helpers of numerous partisan contingents…”60  Although a 
                                                 
57 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 83-84, 85. 
 
58 Ibid., 84, 85. 
 
59 Cited figures are from Petrov et al., 447. 
 
60 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 84.  An adjustment to figures was also requested where it was specified 
that during the period of May-July 1943 partisan detachments derailed not “several hundred” trains, as the 
war’s history claimed, but “more accurately – 1814.”  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 87-88. 
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critic of the multi-volume history and Stalin’s cult, Leshchinskii was reliant on some 
aspects of the Stalinist narrative as it was crafted from 1941-1945, which cited large 
numbers of partisans operating in the enemy rear as a reflection of not only the all-
encompassing nature of the war but also the popularity of the Soviet cause against that of 
the Nazis.  In retrospect, fully freeing oneself from the dominance of Stalin’s cult and its 
impact on the war’s narrative might be asking too much of any 1960s Soviet citizen, and 
Leshchinskii’s detailed criticism of the continued dominance of Stalin’s cult throughout 
the war’s official history speaks for itself in that he was able to engage with larger, more 
fundamental questions about the prewar period, the war itself and Stalin’s role. 
Starinov’s letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union encompassed at its heart a critique of the third volume, 
specifically the presentation of the partisan movement and Stalin’s cult.  The letter was 
most likely forwarded to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and provoked a 24-page 
reply, addressing many of his points.  Starinov emphasized that he viewed the role “of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine” in “leading the nationwide 
struggle in the rear of the enemy in occupied territories” as being diminished when the 
partisan struggle in Ukraine was described.  There was some truth to Starinov’s 
accusation.  Looking at the war’s history, the authors concentrated on the “Communist 
Party” and “Central Committee of the Party” rather than republican institutions.61  In 
                                                 
61 One section reads: “In the difficult struggle of the first period of the war, Soviet partisans gained 
experienced [as the] partisan command and political cadres developed.  The Communist Party carefully 
studied the experience [gained by the partisans] to compile and disseminate it, directing the activities of 
Party organizations in the enemy rear to further develop the partisan movement.”  Another claims the 
Central Committee of the Party played “A huge role in the development of the partisan movement that took 
place in early September 1942” which featured a “meeting of commanders and commissars of partisan 
detachments and formations.”  Petrov et al., 447. 
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general, the reply to Starinov presented an interesting view of the criticisms Starinov 
levelled against the war’s official history and the defense offered by the editors.  More 
often than not the latter followed the party line and stressed the importance of the 
Communist Party for the victory achieved over Germany.  Starinov was accused of 
“manipulating” facts, “distorting” parts of the text to suit his needs, making 
“irresponsible statements,” as well as utilizing “contrived allegations.”62   
Khrushchev’s importance during the war and for the partisan war effort was 
emphasized by both Starinov and the editors in their reply to him as Khrushchev himself 
touted his role organizing the partisan movement in Ukraine.63  The editors defended 
themselves by claiming that the activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine were 
discussed in the volume and pointing to how much Khrushchev’s role was emphasized, in 
part reflecting how the cult, to some extent, had transferred over from Stalin to 
Khrushchev – Khrushchev’s name was mentioned dozens of times throughout the third 
volume.64  In effect, if Stalin was overwhelmingly found throughout the second volume 
then the third exhibited a move from the continued dominance of Stalin’s role in the war 
to that of Khrushchev.  Starinov put forth the idea that Khrushchev was instrumental and 
performed “a great service in the establishment, improvement and maintenance of” 
equipment used during the partisan struggle against the Germans.  In October 1941, 
according to Starinov, on Khrushchev’s orders large numbers of mines with delayed 
                                                 
62 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 152, 156, 158, 166, 167. 
 
63 Khrushchev, Commissar, 1918-1945, 473. 
 
64 Although Khrushchev and the Communist Party of Ukraine were mentioned, they were really only 
visible on two pages of a twelve page section.  Petrov et al., 448-449.  That a new cult was developing 
around Khrushchev was noticed as early as March of 1956.  Hopf, 180.   
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action fuses were ordered produced, specifically for use in the enemy’s rear.  Buildings 
throughout Kharkov were mined on Khrushchev’s initiative that then “dealt huge 
irreparable damage to the enemy” after Kharkov was evacuated.  He described how 
“Nikita Sergeevich was personally interested in the course of manufacturing mines, the 
training of cadres, the progress of mining, and gave valuable tips on the technology and 
tactics of mining.65      
In rare instances Khrushchev’s declarations were utilized as support for or again 
positions in order to settle disputes, but these statements usually supported already well-
known positions rather than championing new, original ideas.  Thus, in response to 
Starinov’s claim that the number of partisan detachments was underestimated for the 
beginning of 1943, the editors replied that “the author of the letter is wrong…all 
information on the number of partisans in Ukraine, contained in this chapter, are taken 
from the memos of comrade N. S. Khrushchev to the central committee VKP(b), as well 
as the report of the headquarters of the Ukrainian partisan movement…There is no other 
[trustworthy] data on the number of Ukrainian partisans, including in the hands of 
comrade Starinov.”66 
                                                 
65 With Khrushchev’s permission, the mining of many objectives was carried out” at times to the “horror” 
of Red Army commanders who were watching mining operations going on before their eyes.  As did 
Starinov, others also commended Khrushchev as well as the chapters on the partisan movement in 1941-
1942.  Additional mention of Khrushchev’s role included letters he wrote to Stalin concerning “the 
question about the strengthening of agitation work in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” and 
another to “the Union of Sumi Partisans” that discussed how to strengthen the partisan movement in 
Ukraine.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 390, l. 156, 189. 
 
66 It was also mentioned that “Much of the material that characterizes the growth of the partisan movement 
in Ukraine was sent to the Department of History of the Great Patriotic War IML at the CPSU Central 
Committee Institute of Party History of the Central Committee Communist Party of Ukraine.”   RGASPI, f. 
71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 152. 
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Starinov also accused the authors of exaggerating the role of the Supreme High 
Command (STAVKA), which Starinov considered the equivalent of Stalin, to the 
detriment of individual commanders of armies and fronts.  The response claimed the 
contrary, insisting that STAVKA’s role in the war was not exaggerated and that the war’s 
history presented “often greater and brighter than any other works on the history of the 
war…the large and often decisive role of commanders of fronts, armies and individual 
commanders and superiors in the planning and implementation of major combat 
operations.”67   
The editors defended their portrayal of both the army and Stalin by describing the 
presentation of the planning phase for the Red Army’s operation to encircle the Germans 
at Stalingrad.  In “illuminat[ing] the process of the development of the counter-offensive 
with the aim of the encirclement and destruction of the enemy between the Volga and 
Don” the third volume “convincingly refutes” the previously dominant narrative of the 
war that “attributed the authorship of this plan personally to Stalin” and assigned 
responsibility to the “creative activity of the commanders of the Southwestern, Don, and 
Stalingrad fronts, the General Staff and the Supreme command…”   Moreover, the third 
volume depicted a STAVKA plan that was “significantly corrected” by “the Front 
Military Council” as the original plan detailed a “relatively shallow breakthrough in the 
enemy’s defense” while “the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front in opposition to 
this” suggested an operation that would “take place on a broader front” and “to a greater 
depth.”  “In this way,” argue the editors, “the content of the first chapter reveals that in 
planning one of the most important operations of the war the role of front commanders 
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turned out to be no less [important] than the role of STAVKA.”  Coincidently, when 
recording his memoirs Khrushchev echoes this version of the planning for the Stalingrad 
offensive when he claims that the idea for an encirclement of the German Sixth Army 
either originated with a report he submitted with Eremenko or was independently yet 
concurrently developed by his front’s military council and STAVKA.68   
The editors were partly correct, but what they did not mention was the fact that 
the “decisive role of commanders” was often centered around or directly connected to the 
presence of Khrushchev throughout the third volume.  Thus, for instance, the defense of 
Stalingrad mentioned Khrushchev in tandem with the commanders of the 62nd and 64th 
armies, Vasilii Chuikov and Mikhail Shumilov, respectively.  Similarly, the planning for 
and the implementation of the counteroffensive around Stalingrad centered around the 
commander of the Stalingrad Front, Eremenko, and the member of the front’s Military 
Soviet, Khrushchev.69  Simultaneously, the presence of STAVKA was almost as 
frequently encountered in the third volume as in the second. 
The editors took a similar position regarding the role of STAVKA and front 
commanders when it came to the Battle of Kursk.  “The commanders of the Voronezh 
and Central Fronts correctly and in a timely manner predicted the enemy’s summer 
offensive and on the basis of this recommended to STAVKA a plan of action by Soviet 
troops…STAVKA endorsed this plan and the troops achieved a decisive victory.”  
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Khrushchev figured at the center of these plans as well.  He was a member of the Military 
Soviet of the Voronezh Front.70 
The editors argued that Starinov was “deliberately” implying that “STAVKA” 
was the equivalent of Stalin and not a “collective body,” which in either case was “far 
from being praised in the third volume.”  Contrary to what Starinov claimed, the third 
volume “emphasizes the role of initiative ‘from below,’ the initiative of the front 
commanders.  This idea, not the idea of glorifying Stalin, as comrade Starinov is arguing, 
permeates the contents of this volume.”  Similarly, Starinov accused the authors of 
diminishing “the role of the masses in achieving victory” and replacing it “with a 
glorification of Stalin.”  The response was that “this accusation is completely 
groundless.”  From published reviews, there was a “unanimous opinion” that the 
“question of the masses in the struggle against the German-Fascist invaders in 1943,” was 
offered “fairly complete coverage.  Within the volume there is extensive factual material 
showing the heroic feats of soldiers and workers.”71  The editors of the war’s history 
believed if they did not overstate Stalin’s significance they did not play into the cult that 
was created under his leadership, but others appeared to believe that continuing to view 
the war in the spirit of the cult mean something wholly different. 
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Starinov’s Removal 
Close to the end of the reply to Starinov, some accusations were made that put in 
question the position of both parties involved in the exchange.  The contested nature of 
the memory of the war comes out most clearly in how Starinov was treated and how he 
viewed the publication of the war’s official history.  He worked with the commission as a 
“consultant” from its beginning in 1958 until his continued questioning of the war’s 
narrative forced his eventual removal on 31 October 1961 and his, in turn, denunciation 
to the Central Committee of the continued presence of Stalin’s cult within the war’s 
history.  Starinov’s career, spanning from the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, through 
the Winter War and the Second World War, mean his views of the final product in the 
form of an official history of the Great Patriotic War deserve some recognition.  Starinov 
commanded troops and participated in the partisan war in various capacities from 1941-
1942, helping in Kharkov’s defense and in blowing up enemy railroads, before being 
tasked as head of the military mission to Yugoslavia in 1943-1944 to advise partisans 
there, Tito’s in particular.72  
Boltin, the author of the response, claimed Starinov “did not sufficiently help the 
editors of the volumes correctly, from a Marxist standpoint, in highlighting the issues of 
the partisan movement.”  After his dismissal “comrade Starinov began to speak out – 
orally and in written form – with various criticisms of the labor, which he himself bears 
some responsibility for.”  Boltin summed up his thoughts at the close of his rebuttal: 
“Comrade Starinov’s letter is not written from an objective position and does not come 
from a desire to help overcome the effects of the cult of personality.  It is overall highly 
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biased and carries a demagogic character.  Wittingly or unwittingly, this letter showcases 
a misleading view of the Party Central Committee.”73  Meanwhile, Boltin and the rest of 
the commission continued to view themselves as Marxists capable of producing a 
“truthful” and “objective” work on the history of the war, which all participated in to one 
extent or another.  The use of a collective authorship and editorship meant personal bias 
could be avoided and prevented, or that a new Stalinist conformist could emerge out of a 
“consensus” view which Starinov seemingly could not abide.   
Boltin claimed Starinov authored the letter “due to personal motivations” that 
were a result of “the fact that the editors of the third volume…refused to allow comrade 
Starinov to be included as one of the authors of the chapter, which highlighted the 
development of the partisan movement in the second period of the war and did not agree 
with many of his fundamental positions on this issue.”  These “fundamental positions” 
included Starinov’s “deni[al]” of “the role of the party underground in the development 
of the nationwide struggle in the rear of the enemy, and the beginning of the partisan 
movement.”  Most likely Starinov disagreed with the idea that the central Party was 
instrumental in the beginning of the partisan movement and wanted local organizations to 
be highlighted for their role in the movement’s creation.  Boltin concluded by claiming 
that “Comrade Starinov tried to impose his erroneous views onto the editors…and when 
they were rejected, he undertook a never-ending ‘battle’ and wrote a complaint.”   
Boltin made further claims against Starinov:  
[he] completely denied and continues to deny the influence of the occupation 
regime on the growth of the partisan movement.  Simultaneously, he muddles the 
question of responsibility for the atrocities and heinous crimes that the fascists 
perpetrated in the occupied territory of our country.  Comrade Starinov opposed 
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the broad and comprehensive discussion of the “rail war” as a complex partisan 
operation behind [enemy] lines [against] railroads, and in general denied its 
value… Comrade Starinov repeatedly put forward groundless accusations against 
the Central headquarters of the partisan movement.  He tried to impose [the idea] 
onto the workers of the section of the history of the Great Patriotic War the 
incorrect idea that the TsMPD [Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement] 
not only did not play a positive role but also restrained the beginning of a partisan 
war, confusing partisans and engaging in fraud.  Meanwhile, as we know, the 
TsMPD, in fact, was the military organ of the Central Committee of the VKP(b).  
Thus the accusations against it are at the same time directed toward the leadership 
of the Central Committee of the partisan movement.74   
 
It appears both Boltin and Starinov utilized the only tools at their disposal that 
they were familiar with.  Starinov denounced the war’s official history, but he in turn was 
denounced by Boltin for his polemical attacks against not only the editors but various 
government organizations that took part in the war.  Neither side presented an objective 
view of the war.  Their personal experiences during the war and the political atmosphere 
they found themselves in dictated the framework of their arguments.  Starinov wanted his 
own personal experiences and memories to become representative of the evolution of the 
partisan movement in the enemy rear, while highlighting the important role Khrushchev 
played in the war effort, Boltin, however, continued to reiterate the party line, which at 
the very least appeased Khrushchev and the current administration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Ibid.  Starinov was put in charge of a “school” for partisan special operations training (VOSHON – 
Vysshaia operativnaia shkola osobogo naznacheniia) in August 1942, which came under the direction of 
TsMPD, so there’s a possibility that Starinov would have had something of an insider’s knowledge of the 
organization’s history during the war.  Chubar’ian, 550. 
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Contested Memories and Force Correlations  
Echoing the letter about the storming of the Reichstag, from the beginning of this 
chapter, were additional complaints about inaccurate portrayals of other military 
engagements.  An editor commented that in recounting the defense of Sevastopol, the 
soldiers of battery No. 35 were described as fighting to the last shell as “the defenders of 
the battery died heroically.”  As it turned out, the battery commander survived.  “He said 
that indeed they fought to the last shell, then blew up the battery, and retreated, but in all 
Soviet sources it is written that they die…”  Similar “inaccuracies,” it was claimed, were 
found throughout the war’s history.75   
Issues concerning recognition for famous or well-known operations became 
contested territory, especially considering the egos that were often involved on the part of 
members of military councils, like Khrushchev, and commanding officers.  
Consequently, the former commander of the 50th Army, Colonel-General Ivan Boldin, 
wanted “to specifically emphasize that the defeat of the German 9th Army and the capture 
of the bridgehead on the Desna River in September 1943 was not carried out solely by the 
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps but by all the troops of the 50th Army.”76   
                                                 
75 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 32, l. 12. 
 
76 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22; d. 586; l. 85-86.  Similarly, in the aftermath of the Soviet encirclement of German 
forces during the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, a T-34 tank was mounted on a pedestal in the center 
of the town of Zvenigorodka and the inscription memorializing the event read: “Here on January 28, 1944, 
the ring around the German invaders encircled in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area was closed.  The crew 
of a tank belonging to the 2nd Ukrainian Front 155th Red Banner Zvenigorodka Tank Brigade under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Proshin and including Lieutenant Evgeny Khokhlov, driver-mechanic Anatoly 
Andreyev and turret commander Yakov Zaitsev shook hands with tank-men of the 1st Ukrainian Front.  
Glory to the heroes of our country!”  Unfortunately, the inscription fully omitted the tankers of the 1st 
Ukrainian Front.  Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov believed “This oversight should be rectified, and the 
names of the heroes from the 1st Ukrainian Front who broke through to Zvenigorodka added…”   Zhukov, 
Marshal of Victory, vol. 2, 241.  In general this operation was rife with controversy as the commanding 
officer of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Ivan Konev, received the entirety of the recognition for the destruction of 
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A similar situation was described in a letter by a Vladimir Ter-David’ian to 
Pospelov, highlighting the inaccurate portrayal of the liberation of Rostov.  Ter-
David’ian was independently studying the combat path of the 28th Army, which liberated 
Rostov, and found that the history of the war described a battalion, under the command of 
Gukas Madoian, as the first to break into the city.77  In the ensuing fighting for the 
Rostov railway station, the battalion’s forces withstood dozens of enemy counterattacks 
without retreating, for which the battalion commander was awarded the title Hero of the 
Soviet Union.78  While Ter-David’ian did not dispute the merits and heroism of Madoian, 
he was upset that the history misrepresented the size of his force – in truth it was a 
composite unit made up of most of the rifle battalions within the 159th Independent Rifle 
Brigade, rather than a sole battalion.  As it turned out, the description offered within the 
third volume “denies the courage and valor of the soldiers of the other battalions of the 
159th Independent Rifle Brigade.”  Worse, on the 20th Anniversary of the liberation of 
Rostov a memorial plaque was installed that reiterated the false narrative found within 
the volume.  As a result, many of those who participated in the fighting and liberation of 
Rostov came to read the “inscription on the plaque with resentment” while those 
defending the version of Rostov’s liberation memorialized by the state “refer to the third 
                                                 
the majority of the encircled enemy while Nikolai Vatutin, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, felt 
insulted and overlooked.  
 
77 When Khrushchev was recording his memoirs, he recounted the 28th Army’s liberation of Rostov, which 
he described as being liberated “virtually without a fight.”  In fact, Khrushchev gave credit for the German 
retreat from the city to forces operating to the north of the city (the 28th Army was moving against Rostov 
from the south).  In looking at the “essence of the matter” the commander of the 28th Army, V. F. 
Gerasimenko, received credit for the city’s liberation although his troops “didn’t have to do anything 
special to accomplish that.  On the other hand, the general who led the offensive farther north and forced 
the Germans to abandon the city remained in the shadows and was not given any particularly honorable 
mention.”  Khrushchev, Commissar, 1918-1945, 480-481. 
 
78 Petrov et al., 98. 
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volume of the history of the war” as a source for support.79  The result was an inaccurate 
portrayal of Rostov’s liberation that when questioned utilized an inaccurate official state 
sponsored narrative for confirmation. 
A further major point of contention, as it was in previous meetings between 
authors and editors, was force correlation figures.  One letter pointed to the lack of force 
correlations between the Red Army and Wehrmacht “during the beginning period of the 
war, and in some cases in later periods of the war (beginning of the summer campaign of 
1942, before the battle on the Orel-Kursk, etc.).”  Figures for both sides were a necessity 
so that readers could understand the situation that greeted the Red Army when the 
Germans invaded.  While the official history stated that along a front of 2000 km there 
were nine “covering” armies, “there is no mention of the amount of soldiers, tanks, 
aircraft, artillery, etc., these armies were composed of.”  The reader, a Ia. Bran’ko writing 
to the editors of the official history, wanted to know why it was “not possible to present a 
detailed comparison chart of the ratio of forces that existed on 22 June 1941” when 
similar information was available for other periods of the war.80  Furthermore, some 
operations included figures of German troops, like the Orel-Kursk Operation, but 
comparable figures for Red Army troops were missing.81   
                                                 
79 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 585, l. 122-123. 
 
80 Information on the number of planes received by the Soviet Air Force in the first half of 1941 was absent 
as well. Figures were provided for the “beginning of the third German assault on Sevastopol…the balance 
of power at the start of our counteroffensive at Stalingrad” and the beginning of 1944.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 
22, d. 309, l. 285. 
 
81 Ibid., 284.  Similar issues could be found in other works on the Great Patriotic War, specifically, in 
Viktor Anfilov, Nachalo Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Voenno-istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow: Voenizdat, 
1962) and S. P. Platonov, Vtoraia Mirovaia voina 1939-1945, Voenno-istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1958). 
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The need for a clear understanding of Red Army losses concerned more than just 
an interest in analyzing how well or poorly the Red Army performed.  The “countless 
losses” suffered by soldiers and civilians were admitted but readers wanted to “be finally 
shown what the war cost us.”  Only casualties for select operations or periods of the war 
were provided, however, masking total losses for the entirety of the war.  Numbers 
needed to be cited by Soviet sources so that readers could “learn about our sacrifices 
from our own sources, and not to use data which was provided by our former enemies.”  
Foreign authors, wrote Bran’ko, estimated losses at 10% of the population of the Soviet 
Union, and provided troop losses for each period of the war, something that needed to be 
done by Soviet sources.  Moreover, there “should have been more room reserved for 
criticisms of foreign authors about Soviet military losses.”  Supporting this line of 
thinking was a letter addressed to Boltin from Colonel-General A. Zheltov, the latter 
wanted references to “unconfirmed German information [on] losses” to be removed.82  
Additionally, Bran’ko pointed specifically to the argument made in the second volume 
that German estimates of Red Army casualties in the Kiev encirclement were 
exaggerated.  The authors of the second volume claimed that the starting force of the 
South Western Front, which was defending the Kiev region, numbered 677,085 and due 
to the month long battles in the region, and the numerous forces that supposedly escaped 
the German encirclement, no more than a third of the original starting force could have 
been taken prisoner.83  But without corresponding Soviet information, claims by the likes 
                                                 
82 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 131, 283, 284. 
 
83 Ibid., 283; Fokin et al., 110-111.  Most German accounts give a figure of 665,000 Soviet prisoners of 
war.  For German figures on the Kiev encirclement, see David Stahel, Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for 
Supremacy in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 301.  The latest Russian figures for 
Soviet losses in the Kiev encirclement are 616,304 missing, confirming that German estimates were closer 
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of Kurt Tippelskirch, who “determined the losses of our forces only for the period of June 
1941 to May 1942 in numerous encirclements to be 2.8 million prisoners of war and more 
than 3,000 tanks and guns,” could be mistaken for the truth.84  Bran’ko thought it 
necessary “for a better understanding of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people…to 
include in the last volume several dozen tables.”85  
Readers were conscious of the evasive nature of the wording used in the war’s 
history, similar to the propaganda produced during the war, to hide the true extent of 
enemy losses.  For instance, the second volume mentioned how the offensive by the 
Soviet 20th Army resulted in the liberation of 212 settlements and the destruction and 
capture of “a large number of German soldiers and officers.”86  Lieutenant General 
Shtromberg referenced an example from the third volume: “During the winter campaign 
the Red Army destroyed or captured, in terms of trophies, tens of thousands of guns, 
mortars, tanks and aircraft…”87  Shtromberg insisted that “destroyed” and “captured” are 
two separate categories that could not be lumped together and neither could “mortars and 
tanks or mortars and airplanes.”  “Such a simplification may be acceptable in a 
                                                 
to reality compared to the claims by the authors of the second volume.  G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Velikaia 
Otechestvennaia bez grifa sekretnosti. kniga poter’ (Moscow: Veche, 2009), 85. 
 
84 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 309, l. 283.  Recent Russian estimates put Red Army missing and/or prisoners 
of war from 22 June 1941 – 30 June 1942 at over 2.8 million, once again verifying that German estimates 
were close to the truth.  Krivosheev, 60. 
 
85 These tables should include: 1. The balance of forces of the two sides before the war, before large 
strategic operations, where these ratios are not mentioned; 2. Comparative tables of our losses and German 
forces and the civilian population based on large operations and various periods of the war; 3. Comparative 
tables of military equipment, of industries and agriculture during periods of the war, [as well as] civilian 
and military casualties of both sides.  Ibid., 282.  Others also referenced force correlation inadequacies 
throughout the official history.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 221, 223. 
 
86 Fokin et al., 325. 
 
87 Petrov et al., 148. 
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newspaper article, but it is out of place in such a serious work as the ‘History [of the 
Great Patriotic War].’”88  The reference to a “newspaper article” could readily point to 
the memories still fresh in the minds of many of how the Sovinformburo covered the 
course of the war.  However, while such muddling of information from mouthpieces of 
the state propaganda apparatus under Stalin was expected, within government sanctioned 
publications on as important a topic as the official history of the war, by contrast, readers 
sought sophistication and more organized and scrupulous analysis than the finished 
product offered. 
 
Omissions and Heroes 
Although no history of the war could hope to discuss every facet and event, some 
readers were upset by the omission of important aspects of the war effort.  A retired 
invalid, who served as a commander of a reconnaissance tank platoon, wanted to know 
why two generals, who took part in the Kursk Offensive, were nowhere to be found 
within the pages of the third and fourth volumes.  Additionally, he wanted to 
acknowledge the grandiose work done by the army’s armored and artillery workshops, 
“these were truly factories on wheels, the guys did wonders in their repairs of tanks and 
artillery guns, as well as captured weapons, etc…I think it is necessary that in the last 
volumes of the History of the Great Patriotic War to highlight some type of supportive 
work which contributed to our victory over Germany.”89  A lack of attention to these 
workshops could have been a result of not wanting to point out the number of Soviet 
                                                 
88 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 204. 
 
89 Ibid., 225. 
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tanks and artillery in need of repair, which would point to enemy achievements and 
Soviet inadequacies. 
Another omission was noted in a letter regarding the 16th Lithuanian Rifle 
Division during the battle of Kursk.  The author, a P. Shtaras, senior researcher of the 
Lithuanian branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, highlighted the activities of the 
division commenting how “in the defense battles initiated by the enemy on 5 and 6 July, 
part of the 16th Lithuanian Division completely eliminated the enemy’s attempts to break 
through to the rear, kept the integrity of the connection of…two armies together and 
contributed to the overall failure of the German offensive.”  He added that, “for defensive 
and offensive operations in the Battle of Kursk, the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division was 
thanked by the Supreme Commander” as well as the front and army commanders.  “More 
than two thousand soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals.  Two were 
awarded heroes of the Soviet Union…” and yet the unit was somehow absent from the 
descriptions of the Battle of Kursk.90   
Additionally, Shtaras’s letter, written on 10 July 1962, brought up aspects of the 
Holocaust that took place in Kaunas.91  It should be noted that trials against mass killings 
in the Baltics took place and were discussed in reports throughout the 1960s.  Shtaras 
thought discussions “about the extermination of the Soviet people” needed to include 
“Fort IX,” also known in Kaunas as the “fort of death,” “because there fascist cannibals 
                                                 
90 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 181, 184. 
 
91 Readers also noticed that Nazi atrocities in general, during the early period of the war, were not fully 
documented.  While they were covered in Lvov, other cities were omitted.  RGASPI f. 71; op. 22; d. 391, l. 
341. 
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killed 80 thousand people of different nationalities: Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, 
Belorussian, and Lithuanians.  In addition to Soviet people, the Nazis destroyed in Fort 
IX citizens of France, Austria, Czechoslovakia and other occupied countries of Europe.”  
Preserved were inscriptions in different languages that littered the walls of the fort’s 
chambers.  “Here are some of them: ‘Here died 900 Frenchmen’, ‘We are burning bodies 
and awaiting death!  Brothers, avenge us!’”92  He considered Fort IX a “monument to the 
victims of Hitlerite terror,” which carried a significance for the entirety of the Soviet 
Union, “it should therefore be mentioned, even if briefly” within the history of the war 
since the volumes were in part representative of “the story of the resistance of the Soviet 
people to Hitlerite invaders.”93   
With respect to the Holocaust, another letter took issue with Auschwitz being 
assigned the description of most “terrible.”  Auschwitz, it was argued, was incomparable 
to death camps [лагеря смерти] that were made first and foremost for Jews [прежде 
всего для евреев] (a minor admission about the targeting of Jews for death), such as 
Treblinka, Sobibor, Chelmno and Bełżec.  In addition, in a comparison between “living 
conditions of Soviet prisoners of war in Komorovo and Auschwitz – it turns out that in 
the latter they were far better.”94  Thus, while some continued to portray the Holocaust as 
an event that touched all nations and nationalities within Germany’s grasp, others subtly 
hinted at Jewish victims being the dominant category. 
                                                 
92 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 179-180; Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock, eds., The 
Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-occupied 
Territories of the USSR, 1941-45 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 40-42. 
 
93 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 178-179. 
 
94 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 390, l. 35-36. 
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The silence that greeted much of the Holocaust was also evident when it came to 
Andrei Vlasov.  One veteran, who only signed his last name, Kovalev, wrote enquiring 
why there was no information offered about Vlasov’s Army.  “There is not a single word 
about it.  Why is that?  It is also history.”  Aside from the ROA (Russian Liberation 
Army), commented Kovalev, there were also battalions fighting in the German Army 
made up of Ukrainians, Tatars and others, yet “why is it necessary to write out this 
[information], it seems to me that this is not right.”  The question persisted in why these 
men decided to join the Germans and wage war “against their brothers, against their own 
Motherland.”  It was not because they were “upset by the Soviet regime,” claimed 
Kovalev, but then why take up arms?  Erroneous views about what exactly Vlasov 
represented also needed to be addressed.  The author explained that in talking with others, 
including generals, they held the mistaken belief that Vlasov went over to the Germans 
with his entire army.  This flawed notion “slanders honest soldiers and officers who were 
under the command of Vlasov.”  Such views needed to be corrected and addressed within 
the official history of the war, which was “obliged to give an answer and to draw firm 
conclusions” from the actions of Vlasov and his troops, both before and after he joined 
the Germans.95  Comparable to Vlasov, the controversial figure of Stepan Bandera went 
unmentioned but Ukrainian nationalists serving under Bandera, and others, were on a few 
occasions linked to the German occupation and accused of being German agents.96 
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96 Petrov et al., 439; M. M. Minasian et al., Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-
1945, Vol. 4 (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1962), 636. 
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Similar to the omission of any mention of Vlasov and his army, the previously 
mentioned Surzhik was also disappointed that nothing about prisoners of war from both 
the Red Army and the German Wehrmacht was included in the war’s official history.  
Surzhik wrote how “During the Patriotic War thousands of prisoners of war died in 
fascist death camps.  Stalin despised Soviet POWs, who had been captured not of their 
own will, but due to the high command's mistakes.”  Furthermore, he claimed that 
“during the Patriotic War not one partisan detachment had an assignment to free 
prisoners of war located on the territory of the Soviet Union temporarily occupied by the 
Germans, despite the fact that each detachment had their own special assignments from 
the main headquarters in Moscow, this is a gross inexcusable Stalinist [decision].”97   
Unlike the absence of discussions concerning Vlasov, the Holocaust, and 
prisoners of war, heroes from the war period came under more scrutiny from commission 
members themselves, and official reviewers, than from readers.  Matrosov’s feat and 
prominence, for instance, were not questioned by readers.  No one seemed to care why a 
Red Army soldier needed to sacrifice his life rather than defeat the enemy with skills and 
ingenuity or the weapons at his disposal provided by the state and armed forces.  The 
biggest concern revolved around who was the first to accomplish specific heroic feats.  
Letters that arrived questioned why it was Matrosov’s name that was attached to the 
selfless act of throwing himself over an enemy embrasure when others performed it 
before him and earned the same distinguished Hero of the Soviet Union award.  For 
instance, a teacher from the Kyrgiz republic, on 13 July 1963 wrote to the head editor of 
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Pravda asking for clarification about who was the first to perform the feat Matrosov 
became famous for throughout the Soviet Union.  The teacher’s friend, Chollonbai 
Tuleberdiev, was also awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union for covering an enemy 
embrasure with his body at the beginning of August 1942, on the right bank of the Don 
River while part of the Voronezh Front.  Matrosov’s feat occurred in 1943 and both 
received the same decoration; yet only Matrosov’s name was to be found throughout 
Soviet literature.  The author “received letters from different regional schools and 
republics in which pioneers and Komsomol organizations” asked for details “to ascertain, 
which of them was the first” to perform their heroic deed.  While Tuleberdiev performed 
his heroic feat before Matrosov, the press claimed the contrary.  The letter was forwarded 
to Boltin who replied that the volume on the history of the war that discussed Matrosov 
also mentioned a similar feat occurring previously.  He was not the first, and other 
instances were covered by the war’s official history.98   
Previously, a letter arrived at the end of April in 1962, mentioning similar 
sacrifices made by Sergeant V. Vasil’kovskii and private Ia. Paderin.   The deputy head 
of the second edition of the history of the war, A. Emel’ianov, replied and tried to explain 
that while both performed the feat before Matrosov, because the latter’s name and exploit 
fell into the hands of some “lucky journalist, who publicized them through the press,” the 
reading public became familiar with Matrosov before that of anyone else – what might 
have further illuminated Matrosov’s action was that it coincided with the 25th 
Anniversary of the Red Army.  While similar actions were described, even in major 
                                                 
98 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 585, l. 327-328.  The previously mentioned feat was performed by Ia. I. 
Bogdan, a Komsomol member.  Petrov et al., 134, 146. 
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publications, their deeds were touted within units on a local level as no other figure 
reached the heights and popularity of Matrosov.  This might have resulted from the 
numerous articles written about Matrosov and his feat being “displayed in fictional 
literature.”99  What became evident through these exchanges was that no one could 
pinpoint exactly why Matrosov’s name was attached to this act, and those writing letters 
were mainly interested in who should receive the glory for being the first rather than 
questioning why such self-sacrificial acts occurred in the first place or so often. 
 
The Allies and the Germans 
 When it came to the Western Allies and the Germans, ideas from readers 
contained a mixture of views.  Aspects of the Stalinist narrative were readily recycled, as 
when an undated letter sent to Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal by a reader claimed that “by 
June 1941” Germany conquered “almost all of Europe, putting its economy and partly its 
armed forces to serve in the war against the USSR.”  Simultaneously, in a list of 
recommended alterations, a reader wanted it emphasized that “the US sought to weaken 
and bleed both the Soviet Union and Germany.”  Meanwhile, Europe’s population, 
“fallen under the fascist yoke, looked with hope toward the Soviet Union,” a statement in 
tune with Ehrenburg’s articles from the war period, highlighting the liberating nature of 
the Soviet Union and Red Army.  While downplaying the role of the allies, the author 
also wanted to emphasize the role of communist and Komsomol members with figures 
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provided that would show that members of both organizations “were the first to protect 
the homeland.”100   
Stalin’s cult seemingly left its mark on the reasons some readers provided for the 
opening of the highly anticipated Second Front in Western Europe.  The allied landing in 
Normandy was portrayed as being due to Stalin’s ability to convince Churchill to finally 
move against Germany in France.  However, one letter quoted Khrushchev as saying that 
“the allies were themselves in a hurry because they were afraid of being too late.”101  
Thus, Khrushchev’s explanations were utilized against the Stalinist version of the war’s 
history, yet retained similar sentiments toward the goals of the duplicitous Western 
Allies.   
Readers were similarly unhappy with the portrayal of the Germans during the 
war.  The condemnation of how the enemy was depicted reflected a cross-section of 
Stalinist and anti-Stalinist rhetoric.  Although “the volumes contain a fairly extensive and 
systematized amount of material on fascism,” Leshchinskii insisted that “the study of the 
question of German militarism in all three volumes (with rare exceptions) essentially 
revolves around” Stalin’s speeches and orders that were issued by the People’s 
Commissariat of Defense.102  Similar to the position adopted by Stalin when he was alive, 
                                                 
100 In supporting the idea that the US wanted the Soviet Union and Germany to bleed each other dry the 
author of the letter indicated that Harry Truman’s speech during the initial period of the war should be 
utilized.  Churchill also came under attack for his incorrect claim of Germany’s war economy suffering due 
to the allied bombing campaign when in fact German production increased in 1943.  RGASPI, f. 72, op. 22, 
d. 309, l. 170, 177, 293.   
 
101 Ibid., 103. Letter sent to Army General A. A. Epishev by P. A. Aleksandrov, I. G. Starinov, and N. F. 
Avramenko and forwarded to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism on September 15, 1962. 
 
102 Furthermore, “there are no attempts to expose the German general staff, moreover, to articulately 
explain to the reader that this was a conspiratorial imperialist organization which has been recreated in 
today’s FRG.”  Ibid., 83. 
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“Hitler becomes the predominant figure [for blame].”103  Pinpointing the numerous 
problems in the official history’s analysis of the enemy reflected “the limited research 
[done], and at the same time, how representations of the period of the Cult of Personality 
continue to dominate” the narrative of the war.104   
 
Arguing for and Against the Stalinist Narrative 
For all the letters received that continually condemned the war’s history due to 
inaccuracies, half-truths or outright omissions, some argued that too much was disclosed 
and it was ruining the reputation of the Soviet Union.  An undated letter written to the 
Minister of Defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, discussed a soldier’s trip to Poland 
aboard the train “FRIENDSHIP.”  The author, who identified himself as a “veteran-
frontovik,” participated in the liberation of Poland and noticed a dramatic change in the 
attitude of the local population toward the Soviet Union.  Whereas before there were 
signs of “strain” between the two nations, in the present time “Soviet people…literally 
had flowers thrown at us.”  The reason, claimed the author, was the excitement “about the 
Soviet Union’s struggle for peace, everyone wants peace and Nikitia Sergeevich 
Khrushchev became the most popular and deeply loved person, like a passionate fighter 
for peace.”  This was most likely in reference to Khrushchev’s efforts at “peaceful 
coexistence” with the West and as a result it appeared that “Nikita Sergeevich’s authority 
                                                 
103 As an example, the Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel) was used to show that the “author” behind the 
operation “was not only Hitler, but also Heusinger, Zeitler, and Gehlen.”  Ibid.  A further clarification was 
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the reason for the German advance in the south in 1942.  RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 586, l. 87. 
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is second to none.  Everywhere that I have been, Poles in Polish newspapers have been 
asking to convey their best wishes for good health to the very dear friend of the Polish 
people, Comrade Khrushchev.”105   
While in Poland, the author encountered former Polish colleagues from the Soviet 
Army (by the end of the Second World War, two Polish armies were operating within the 
Red Army) who inquired about the first volume of the war’s history.  In previous 
conversations about the Red Army’s initial failures, the author often heard a parroted 
Stalinist version of the events in question.  The causes were linked to Stalin’s speech 
from 6 November 1941, in which he claimed that the temporary success enjoyed by the 
Germans was a result of their superiority in tanks and planes compared to the Red Army, 
who nonetheless held a qualitative superiority.  This explanation was even offered by 
historians the author encountered, and was partly expected, as “for the past 19 years this 
claim was part of our consciousness.”  However, a totally different explanation was 
offered by the war’s history.   The first volume claimed that the Red Army possessed a 
greater amount of tanks and planes than the Germans and, in fact, that many were of a 
lower quality than what the Germans possessed, a complete reversal of the Stalinist 
narrative.  Furthermore, in “reading the first volume an impression is made that our 
industry was producing obsolete planes and tanks, unfit for war, and it produced them in 
such large numbers that there was no place to put them and they fell into disrepair.”106  
Thus, a fear that was initially proclaimed by commission members was in fact coming to 
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 333 
fruition as readers began to question both the Stalinist version of events and a new 
narrative of the war that showcased the Red Army on the eve of the war in a poor light. 
The burden put on Soviet industries and the Red Army, including inadequate 
logistics, were highlighted as the author claimed how the “entire world learns from the 
first volume that only 27% of older model tanks were serviceable, and the rest were in 
need of repairs, but spare parts were only available for 11% of those in demand.”  
Consequently, when discussing the Red Army’s preparedness for the German invasion, it 
appeared that “despite all the claims of being ready to repel an invasion, the Soviet Union 
was in fact quite unprepared…Tanks were not repaired, tankers and aviators were not 
readied, planes were placed on worthless airdromes, and defensive structures were 
abandoned, while others were not prepared.”107   
The letter accused the authors of glorifying “German aviation…while ours is 
discredited” and claimed that “in fact the Germans had a large number of aircraft that our 
I-16 and even our I-15s were able to knock out” – an accusation that mirrored the earlier 
complaints of the Soviet Air Force representative, Rudenko, to commission members.  
The author seemed mired within the discourse that was crafted by the propaganda 
apparatus during the war itself.  He lamented how “a feeling of resentment” arises 
“against the authors who are denouncing our aviation and praising the Germans.”  In part, 
what becomes visible here was how inconsistencies of the Stalinist narrative were being 
constantly exposed and defended with no tangible progress in attempting to offer an 
original analysis of the war.  The author continued that “It is simply unbelievable that this 
volume was written by Soviet people.  To what extent they became carried away with 
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maligning our aviation is seen from the fact that they had forgotten about the pilots, who 
took the oldest training aircraft, U-2, renamed it PO-2 and turned it into ‘night bombers’ 
who were nicknamed ‘black death’ by the Germans.  Our authors have forgotten that our 
aviation devastated an Italian Corps outside Guadalajara.  No!  Our older aircraft were 
not as bad as they are described in the first volume, but we lost a huge number of them on 
the first day of the war.”108  Even with the evidence provided by an official history, a 
veteran of the war could not deviate from Stalinist claims about the superiority of Soviet 
technology and equipment compared to the Germans and instead pointed to ad hoc 
measures taken out of desperation by Soviet forces as they struggled against an 
unexpected invasion as proof of Soviet ingenuity.   
The letter accused the “editors of the volume” of justifying “in every way the 
General Staff, the People’s Commissar of Defense” while “defam[ing] the Party and the 
Soviet people.”  Interestingly, the author asserted that “even if what was written was true, 
then why give away our state secrets and sow distrust of the Central Committee and 
Party.”   In his interactions with his Polish friends, he cited one as saying, “having read 
the first volume of the History, our enemies rejoice and say: ‘Soviet comrades said that 
the tsarist government was criminally negligent in its preparation of the state for defense, 
yet their own preparations were worse than the tsarist [state’s].’”  This derision of Soviet 
technological abilities translated into ideas about current military capabilities with 
“enemies” of the Soviet Union “gloating and already predicting that our rocket 
technology will be on the level of our prewar tank technology.”109 
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Although the author, in discussing the war’s official history with others, found out 
that while “tens of thousands of people have already purchased the first volume…very 
few have read it” he nonetheless would have preferred that “this bitter truth only be 
known to those concerned with the preparations of the country’s defenses.”  He asked 
Malinovskii, “why should our state secrets and shortcomings be made visible to our 
enemies, so that they can gloat to our friends, so that they [feel] sorrow.”  He could not 
understand the reasoning behind why the party needed to be “defame[d]” and why 
commanders like Zhukov, Timoshenko and Voroshilov were being shielded when it was 
“their inactivity” that “exposed our army to a surprise attack by the enemy.  Why show 
flaws and not disclose the superiority of our socialist system: Indeed in general our tanks 
and planes were better than the Germans and the only advantage which the enemy 
enjoyed – was the surprise of their attack.  It is necessary to write about the real culprits, 
not to defame our tanks and planes.”  The foundations of the socialist system were more 
important than its cogs.  It was too soon to “reveal military secrets.  Soviet history should 
raise the prestige of the Party and the Soviet state, not humiliate them or reveal military 
secrets.”110    
A somewhat contradictory position was taken by another veteran, a Captain 
Sergei Grinev, who wrote to the Directorate of the Institute of History of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR on 10 February 1966.  Unlike the previous author, he wanted an 
unveiled history of the war, especially from the invasion through the battle of Stalingrad.  
He lamented that the oft-repeated line “no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten” was 
“not quite correct and does not fully reflect reality.”  The published volumes were “far 
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from perfect.”  Although they were entitled “History of the Great Patriotic War” the 
content contained “less war than politics, and I would like to see more military actions, 
development and implementation of strategies and tactics and individual battles and 
operations.”  The history presented in the published volumes was “far from being true – 
[far] from objective, no matter” that it was written by credible and authoritative 
personalities.111   
Red Army retreats in 1941 were weakly presented and little attention was devoted 
to details; the author could hardly find his corps being mentioned, less so his division or 
their history in the initial period of the war – undoubtedly this could reflect the author’s 
desire to see his own experiences become part of the collective memory of the war.  A 
more sentimental, and in many ways revealing, thought was expressed when he 
mentioned the numerous times he’s encountered the phrases “from Moscow to Berlin” 
and “from the Volga to Prague” but almost nowhere was there in literature, plays, movies 
or memoirs the phrase “from Brest to Moscow.” Memories of 1941 seemed to be absent 
from anything dealing with the war period.  Although not said outright, Grinev was 
pointing out not only the fact that most who encountered the Wehrmacht in 1941 were 
killed or taken prisoner and died in German POW camps, but also that battles and actions 
in 1941, before the Moscow Counter-Offensive, were simply not a part of the history of 
the war that authors either wanted to or could discuss.  Nonetheless, he wrote that “I 
know it is sorrowful to speak, talk, and show this, but we cannot remain silent about it.”  
Looking at the literature on the war it became the norm to consider the initial period, 
when defeats were regularly suffered by the Red Army, as a distinct and separate period 
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that was often absent.  The “war” that so many were familiar with seemingly did not take 
place in 1941 but only in the periods where victories were recorded.  Personally, 
however, Grinev considered “the first period of the war” with all of its moral, political, 
material and organizational weaknesses as a “war in the truest sense of the word” while 
the other periods were “a walk in a relative sense.”  He wanted to “unburden my soul” 
and express his memories of the war years that were continually missing from 
publications, both literary and scholarly.  He understood well enough that it was easier to 
point out shortcomings than to write a history of the war but, nonetheless, an honest 
account in all its bitter truth should have been the goal.112 
Readers, in so many ways similar to commission members themselves, were at a 
crossroads.  They wanted to praise the war’s first official history, they understood the 
war’s parameters meant all of its complexities could not be detailed or outlined, but 
important events, details, and descriptions were either missing or portrayed in such a way 
as to embarrass the Red Army and Soviet state in the eyes of the international 
community.  For some, the “truth” need not be shared if it cast doubt on Soviet abilities 
and the socialist system, better to let those in authority deal with the harsh realities of the 
war and make amendments for the future.  The reputation of the Soviet Union was more 
important than a humiliating discussion of Soviet weaknesses and inability to deal with 
the Wehrmacht in the initial period of the war.  Thanks to Stalinist propaganda readers 
could point to perceived victorious achievements that in truth masked early failures – like 
the need to utilize outdated planes and repurpose them due to the fact that most of the 
newly designed and created aircraft were destroyed in the war’s initial period.   
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, veterans wanted an unvarnished account of 
the war’s initial period, which they considered the “real war.”  Political discussions 
dominated the war’s history and the complexities of the Red Army’s evolution 
throughout the war were missing or hidden among lists of formations, operations, and 
organizations.  Readers wanted an analysis of 1941 that explained what happened in 
detail, but, as previously, they were met with obscure language and descriptions that hid 
the true costs of the German invasion, skipped over Red Army failures, and presented the 
war’s course as one of inconsequential defeats and loudly proclaimed victories.  
Furthermore, as much as it was hoped that the war’s history would become a lesson for 
future cadres about how to wage war, veterans also wanted the selfless heroic actions of 
their generation to serve as examples for the youth who might have to put their lives on 
the line in a future struggle.  Self-sacrifice was again perceived to be the norm, not a last 
desperate act of a population disillusioned by prewar promises and Stalin’s failures. 
 
The Stalinist narrative of the war continued to live on long past the former Soviet 
leader’s death.  Denis Kozlov sees the 1960s as a time that allowed for thousands of 
Soviet readers to express their ideas and thoughts on varied historical and political issues 
“openly” as many “regarded the official media channels as appropriate venues for such 
self-expression…people perceived reading and responding to literature as consequential 
political activities.”113  The same phenomenon could be detected in the letters that were 
received by a variety of media outlets when it came to the history of the war.  Letters had 
as their intended target either public outlets or important figures within the military and 
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government.  Most interesting is that much of the greatest criticism toward the official 
history of the war came from “insiders,” those with intimate knowledge of the military 
and participants in commission meetings.  Thus the war provided a contested territory 
where commentators from all sectors of Soviet society, more often than not veterans, 
debated the merits of the war’s official history. 
 More general commentary pointed to the continued relevance and reliance on the 
narrative of the war crafted during the war years and under Stalin’s direction, which 
could regularly be found in the terminology used by readers and commentators.  Some of 
the harshest criticisms, by the likes of Isserson, Leshchinskii, and Starinov, while 
attacking Stalin’s cult, continued to utilize aspects of Stalin’s wartime narrative.  Whether 
it was Isserson, who praised prewar Soviet theoretical developments, Leshchinskii, who 
upheld the notion of a widespread all-people’s partisan movement, or Starinov, who 
denied the impact of the German occupation regime on the growth of the partisan 
movement, each decided which aspects of the Stalinist narrative to attack or champion for 
their own needs and beliefs.  In some respects a full nullification of Stalinist thinking 
when it came to the war was impossible.  Considering the conditions that existed within 
the Soviet Union when it came to the war’s history, as outlined in previous chapters, 
veterans usually employed their own experiences to express doubts or question the war’s 
official history.  Leshchinskii, the most vocal about numerous topics, deserves credit for 
taking a stand and airing his grievances not in a private correspondence but in a letter 
addressed to a national newspaper.  His protest against the continued dominance of 
Stalin’s cult might have resulted in future meetings to address that very issue, which are 
covered in the next chapter.  
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Those opposed to a familiar history of the war believed that even when Stalin and 
his actions were criticized, it was simply a limited cover-up of the heavy presence of his 
cult.  The actions of Stalin and his inner circle appeared to be regularly justified with the 
blame being shifted onto the shoulders of military theorists, commanders and other 
scapegoats, thus once more absolving the leadership of their egregious errors on the eve 
of and throughout the war.  Stalin’s cult and the war’s history proved fertile ground for 
debates about the purges and their detrimental effects on the Red Army throughout the 
war, linking the after-effects directly to the poor performance of Soviet forces during the 
German invasion.  Following in the footsteps of Khrushchev’s denunciation, the war’s 
history, a collective effort, resembled previous “faceless histories of the Communist Party 
and Soviet Union” producing what Mark von Hagen described as “formulaic 
hagiographies of heroism and highly depersonalized narratives.”114 
A relic of the Stalinist terror and the 1930s seemed to be evident in letters that 
viewed an erasure of leading figures who were discredited as the norm, no matter the 
importance of their role in the war.  Readers, and former commission members 
themselves, were upset that Stalin’s cult seemed an ever-present phenomenon, including 
the presence of his photographs and illustrations.  The war’s history continued to absolve 
his crimes, and those of his immediate circle, while praising and highlighting his 
supposed accomplishments.  As Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky were written out of 
the histories of the revolution under Stalin, so it appeared that readers in the 1960s came 
to accept that aspect of Stalin’s cult and were eager to view any trace of the man himself 
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excised from the history of the war, no matter the size of his role or accomplishments.  
The public was accustomed to outright omission of those deemed ghosts, erased from the 
Soviet past, and expected the same to occur with Stalin.  Thus, citizens were often 
operating within the confines of the cult created by Stalin, almost a decade after his 
death.  As Stalin’s role was diminished, Khrushchev’s authority continued to rise.  If in 
the second volume Stalin’s name could be found on 36 pages, in the third volume that 
number lessened to 27.  Khrushchev’s name, however, which could be found on 31 pages 
in the second volume had grown to 41 pages in the third.  Thus, Stalin’s name could be 
more readily associated with the defeats of 1941 and 1942 while Khrushchev’s name was 
more prominent in a period of the war that witnessed mainly continuous victories.  The 
ideas of readers evident during Khrushchev’s “Thaw” reinforces the argument that 
Stalinist methods continued to be retained and utilized, not just by the Party hierarchy, 
but throughout Soviet society, making a regression under Brezhnev to something akin to 
Stalin’s Cult of Personality, an affinity that surrounded the Great Patriotic War itself, 
easier to understand.   
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CHAPTER 6 
STALIN AND THE STALIN CULT 
 As early as 1959, Andrei Kuchkin, commenting on the role of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in the official history of the war, stated that authors and editors 
were “ashamed” to mention Stalin’s name, while the zealous concentration on and 
references to Khrushchev resembled “sycophancy.”1  Undoubtedly he wanted Stalin to 
receive some of the attention and merit his leadership deserved and resented the dominant 
role Khrushchev was beginning to play, especially considering the significance the Battle 
of Stalingrad played in the war’s history.  Soon, however, attitudes began to change as 
Khrushchev’s term as leader of the USSR came to an end.   
With the release of multiple volumes on the war’s history, and the reception of a 
considerable amount of feedback, both solicited and unsolicited from reviews and 
readers, additional meetings were held as late as 1963 and 1964 to discuss the continued 
impact of Stalin’s cult of personality on the war’s history.2  There were over a dozen 
participants in these meetings, among them most of the head editors of the published 
volumes, such as Boltin, Fokin, Emel’ianov, Tamonov, Petrov, Tel’pukhovskii, 
Roshchin, and Vasilenko.  In part, these meetings appear to be a result of the aftermath of 
the 22nd Party Congress, held in October 1961, where Khrushchev once more launched an 
assault on Stalin’s name, cult, and those around him, continuing to disparage their 
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reputations, which then resulted in the removal of Stalin’s remains from the Mausoleum 
at the end of October 1961.3   
This chapter examines these meetings, including candid opinions and arguments 
as the zenith of the criticism against the continuing presence of Stalin’s cult, its influence 
on history and historians, and the continued limitations it imposed on the war’s history 
was reached.  Commentators were quite open during these meetings, at times more so 
than earlier, about Stalin’s impact on the Red Army during the purges in the 1930s, his 
flawed foreign policy decisions, the guilt of those working with Stalin, and numerous 
references to subjects that the official history of the war had omitted.  However, as 
frequently as Stalin continued to be utilized as a scapegoat for numerous failures, his 
mistakes were just as often contextualized and other culprits found to share in the blame.  
At no time were egregious errors, whether in the realm of foreign, military, or domestic 
policies, tied to the Soviet system in its entirety.  When Soviet foundations were 
questioned, it was through accusations of a “cult in reverse,” which signaled fears about 
the nature of the system since if Stalin was proven to have been guilty of all crimes, then 
the system failed to stop him and all Soviet accomplishments became void.  
Unfortunately, with Khrushchev’s ousting in 1964, the decisions reached during these 
gatherings, while resulting in sincere admissions, had little, if any, influence on the last 
volume of the war’s official history, published in 1965, aside from a new emphasis on the 
devaluation of Khrushchev’s contribution to the war effort.   
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The Stalin Cult’s Influence on Historians and History 
The meetings convened to address the presence of Stalin’s cult were characterized 
by pronouncements that reiterated previous ideas and positions.  Participants could 
“argue” and “actively express” their opinions as part of a “free discussion” but at the 
same time needed to be on guard against assessments that were too critical of Stalin’s cult 
and how it impacted the initial period of the war.  Authors and editors were reminded that 
their main task was the need to reveal “that the main actor” behind the victory of the 
Soviet Union in the war, operating both on the frontlines and in the rear, were the Soviet 
people.4    
From the numerous exchanges it becomes clear that conference participants 
understood reasonably well the impact the cult had on the history of the war, but could 
not escape it as they only seemed able to deflect it onto the next cult, that of Khrushchev.  
Tamonov, one of the authors of the first and second volumes, commented how “the 
problem of overcoming the consequences of the cult of personality in historical science, 
including in the history of the Great Patriotic War, is, as experience shows, very 
complicated and difficult.”  For Tamonov, the “complexity and difficulty of this issue” 
within history remained the need to not only offer a simple “correction of Stalin’s certain 
erroneous concepts and assessments, [but] a deep rethinking of the whole methodology 
behind history as a science, its return to Leninist principles of historical materialism, 
which were violated under Stalin.”  However, fighting against the harmful consequences 
of Stalin’s cult by simply deleting the name Stalin or Stalingrad from the war’s history 
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meant standing on an “anti-Marxist path in dealing with such an important issue.”5  Thus, 
years after the initial decision to publish an official history of the war that was supposed 
to be free of Stalinist influence, there was no real agreement as to whether Stalin’s cult 
had been excised or even how to begin qualifying such an evaluation. 
The first edition of the multi-volume history (the five volumes already in print), 
was “received positively” by readers, according to Boltin, but was not fully liberated 
from Stalin’s influence.  Removing the stains of Stalin’s cult was achievable, as the 
history “exclude[d] his name and epithets such as ‘brilliant commander’, [and] ‘great 
leader’” but evaluating the war’s course without the influence of Stalin’s cult was a more 
difficult prospect.  As Boltin explained, “we are still often unconsciously influenced by 
old formulations, which were born in the period of Stalin’s cult of personality.”  The 
corrections proposed to published volumes meant that “we did not yet do everything to 
overcome” Stalin’s cult.  Boltin commented that “our job implementing the Party’s 
decision to overcome the cult of personality in the history of the Great Patriotic War is 
not over, we need to continue it.”6 
Changes were already up for consideration as it was decided to remove all 
citations to Stalin’s book, O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza, which 
many relied on, including almost all references to it.7  Stalin’s name was also to be 
excluded; too often, it was argued, the text included the phrase “Supreme Commander 
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Stalin” when his name was “absolutely not needed.”  Furthermore, any institutions or 
enterprises carrying Stalin’s name were retitled.  As a result, a Leningrad factory named 
after Stalin was instead referred to simply as “Leningrad Metal Factory” while collective 
farms named after Stalin were renamed after the villages where they were located.  The 
title “Stalin prize,” awarded to numerous “heroes of socialist labor,” was replaced with 
“the national prize.”  Additional proposed changes included altering chapters that 
included the city name “Stalingrad.”  Instead of “The Heroic Defense of Stalingrad” it 
was suggested the chapter be entitled “The Battle of the Volga: The Heroic Defense of 
Soviet Troops.”  The phrase “The Battle of Stalingrad” was to be replaced with “The 
Battle on the Volga” while “fighting in the city” was to substitute “fighting in 
Stalingrad.”  While these proposed changes would reduce the mention of Stalin’s name, 
its complete elimination from the chapter and text in general was “impractical.”8 
A further alteration under consideration was the description of Stalin’s speech, 
summing up the initial six months of the war.  It was of “great significance” when it was 
made during the war.  Its description in the second volume mirrored how it was presented 
during the war, as a report that described “the harsh truth about the difficult situation, in 
which our country found itself, about our losses, temporary setbacks, reveal[ing] the 
reasons for these failures, etc.”  But in fact much of what was presented was skewed and 
“Stalin distorted the reasons and hid the real” causes of failure.  It was proposed that the 
speech itself could be referenced but its contents need not be detailed because “erroneous 
positions” were “repeated.”  The question was posed as to whether Stalin could have 
even presented the real reasons to the population as that would mean informing the 
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enemy of the chaos and disorder that had engulfed the government, society and army.  
While it might have been “inappropriate” to speak about the real reasons for the Red 
Army’s failures during the war itself, at the war’s conclusion “we gave a detailed analysis 
of the mistakes made in this period, and gave an assessment where lay the roots of [our] 
failure.”9  Unfortunately, speakers only mentioned generalities and excluded specific 
mistakes or Stalin’s responsibility for them.  This discussion fits in well with previous 
criticisms from readers and reviewers in that details about the initial failures of Stalin and 
the Red Army were still missing.  Unfortunately, no real conclusion on this issue was 
reached. 
Agreement was visible when it came to highlighting “the question of unity with 
our friends, of the fighting units of the Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, and Polish army” and 
the need to justify the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.  While some former allies were 
already new Cold War enemies, those states in Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union 
relied on in its fight against the West needed to have their narrative “respected.”  Such a 
move was judged to have “wide significance today.”10  One of the few places where Red 
Army losses merited mention in the official history were figures for those who died on 
Polish territory in the fall of 1944.11  Echoing these ideas were Soviet actions in Berlin – 
the taking of which cost the Red Army hundreds of thousands of casualties – in 1961, 
when Khrushchev donned his Lieutenant General uniform from his Stalingrad days.  At 
the end of the summer in 1961, the Soviets denounced NATO’s growing military 
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aggressiveness and in turn justified Soviet belligerence as a way to avoid a repeat of the 
disastrous initial period of the war, when Germany was able to surprise the Red Army.  
Similarly, the reaction to the Prague Spring in 1968 featured articles written by Soviet 
marshals who recalled the “blood debt” owed to the Red Army by the Czechs for their 
liberation from the Germans and the fear that the western borders of the Soviet state 
might once more be in danger of being breached.  Retaining control over Eastern Europe 
and preventing a repeat of 1941 was of “the highest priority for the defense of the Soviet 
Union.”12 
 
Stalin and the Prewar Period 
Considering the limitations imposed on the commission, their own biases, and the 
continued presence of censors, many of Stalin’s actions in the prewar and war period 
were defended, justified, contextualized or partially siphoned off onto the shoulders of 
others who shared the blame.  Among commission members, there was dissatisfaction in 
that attempts to expose Stalin’s faults were often reduced to simple silence.  It was as if 
he existed and then disappeared.  Stalin was head of the party and the state for over two 
decades and his speeches were often treated as representative of the stance state and party 
policies were to take.13  Writing that out of the history of the Soviet Union and the war 
and silencing Stalin, members argued, was impossible.   
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As an example, a publication by the Institute of International Relations was 
mentioned and it was emphasized that when it came to Soviet foreign policy “all the 
documents that had something to do with Stalin were thrown out.”  The result was a lack 
of understanding of Soviet foreign policy as the Soviet Union went “from being a 
political subject to a political object.”  Arguments ensued about the impossibility of 
writing a history of Soviet foreign policy by omitting documents that bore the stamp of 
Stalin’s cult.  Protesting against the cult was a must but in so doing Soviet “policies must 
not be disposed of together with Stalin’s mistakes.”  The Soviet Union’s foreign policy 
was elevated above both Stalin and Molotov and claimed to have been “the policy of the 
socialist state.  Just as the cult of personality could not change the socialist nature of the 
Soviet state, it could not change the socialist character of Soviet foreign policy.”14   
Studying available documentation on Soviet foreign policy in the prewar period, 
Tamonov concluded that the “political crisis” and “military threat” that existed from the 
time Hitler assumed power in Germany until 1939 meant that Stalin’s efforts to create “a 
system of collective security and the…strengthening of the country’s defenses was 
correct, as the conditions of a capitalist encirclement at the time made it impossible to 
carry out any other policy.”  Effectively, Soviet foreign policy was split into two.  The 
foreign policy of Maxim Litvinov was viewed as being “successful” and creating needed 
“conditions” so that when war did develop an anti-Hitler coalition was able to coalesce.  
But the foreign policy of Stalin and Molotov was regarded as a failure.  Stalin was thus 
praised for Litvinov’s efforts while Molotov’s failures earned him contempt as the 
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actions of Stalin and Molotov resulted in the failure of collective security.15  
Additionally, Stalin was declared guilty of erroneously analyzing “the internal state of 
Fascist Germany” when he stated in November 1941 that “Fascism would soon collapse 
under the weight of its crimes…in half a year to a year fascism will be finished.”  This 
was considered a “fundamental error” that undoubtedly influenced Soviet strategy.16 
Similar to ideas on Stalin’s role within the sphere of Soviet foreign policy, the 
military policy he implemented on the eve of the war included “a lot of inconsistencies 
and retreats from Leninist principles.”  However, much of what was accomplished under 
Stalin’s direction was nonetheless deemed correct.  For instance, when discussing the 
rearmament of the Red Army on the eve of the war, Stalinist wartime rhetoric was 
utilized in claiming Stalin’s policies transformed the army of 1939 “into a cadre army.”  
However, in conjunction with all that was “correct,” including developing a new 
doctrine, Stalin again “retreated from Leninist principles” when he introduced dual 
command (allowing commissars the same authority as military commanders) and carried 
out “unjustified repressions” directed at the officer corps while “overestimating the treaty 
with Germany” and the “combat readiness” of the Soviet Union on the eve of the war. 17   
Further inconsistent assessments of Stalin’s actions were evident when the non-
aggression pact with Germany was analyzed.  G. Lekomtsev viewed Stalin’s 3 July 1941 
speech as “correctly” justifying the pact, although there were “some examples of dubious 
benefits” present as well.  One of those “dubious benefits” was the allusion to having 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 65-66, 116, 117. 
 
16 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 111, l. 9.  This folder contained a record of a meeting to discuss lessons from 
the war on 20 April 1964. 
 
17 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 108, l. 65-66. 
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gained two years for the strengthening of the Red Army and Soviet Union.  It was argued 
that compared to Nazi Germany, those two years were not utilized to the utmost of their 
potential.  This argument was made from hindsight.  However, it might point to a 
subconscious reiteration of the idea that Stalin was able to foresee future developments, 
including Hitler’s attack.  Nonetheless, Lekomtsev claimed due to Stalin’s failure to 
correctly predict the timing of the invasion, the pact “led to a whole series of negative 
consequences that were mainly the result of the fact that this agreement was 
misunderstood and overestimated by Stalin.”  In addition, Stalin’s rhetoric against the 
Western Allies – claiming England and France were the aggressors while Germany was 
waging a defensive war – meant a disorientation of Soviet society and its leadership.18   
The aftermath of the pact witnessed repressions against Poles in 1939, which were 
omitted from the war’s history.  The repressions were said to have been “organized by 
Beria after the liberation of Western Ukraine and Belorussia” and continued to heavily 
affect Polish society.  While Stalin was blamed for the actions against the Poles, the 
division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union was not treated as a crime, 
only the “massive repressions” that left a lasting impression on Polish society as “Polish 
intelligentsia” were forced into “camps” on Beria’s orders.  Lekomtsev mentioned how 
“Polish comrades” noted that when Soviet scholars spoke about repressions they 
neglected those that occurred “against the Polish intelligentsia in Western Ukraine and 
Belorussia,” omitting mention of territory that previously belonged to Poland, and 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 82, 83-84. 
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lending credence to the idea that the Red Army was “liberating” former Soviet lands from 
Poland.19 
Thus, Stalin continued to be entwined with domestic and foreign policies of the 
state and commission members continued to experience problems separating one from 
the other.  Simply omitting Stalin seemed to be the preferred method when possible, to 
avoid any controversies or need for further questions, but the result meant a removal of 
not only agency from the Soviet state but also an understanding for why certain policies 
were adopted or specific positions advocated.  Where Stalin’s name and presence was 
still detectable, inconsistencies usually followed as members wanted to portray the Soviet 
state and government as an actor that aimed to benefit not only its own population but the 
world as well, yet was continually prevented from doing so by Stalin and members of his 
entourage, such as Molotov and Beria.  What they were unable to say was that Stalin 
headed a dictatorship that paid little heed to the consequences of his deeds and misdeeds. 
 
The Stalin Cult, the Purges and the Winter War 
The cult and Red Army failures were repeatedly tied to the 1930s and the purges.  
The campaign to root out enemies of the people among the armed forces during the 
repressions was described under Stalin as a “defeat of enemy agents” that resulted in an 
increase of the Red Army’s defensive capabilities and the Soviet Union’s overall 
“readiness to repel the enemy in 1941.”  Initially this line of thinking could not be 
challenged by historians.  Meanwhile, the purges resulted in “the devastation” of the 
military’s officer corps and the truth was not only silenced but “replaced with a lie” that 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 84-85. 
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transformed the damage done into a victory over “enemy agents.”  Such “outright lies” in 
turn “led to a number of wrong conclusions, which were the basis of an incorrect 
assessment about the prewar period and the first period of the war,” especially since the 
purges continued past 1937 with commanding generals tried and executed after the 
German invasion.20   
The purges, and the atmosphere they left in their wake, were also linked to the 
war against Finland.  The Red Army’s poor performance in the Winter War was blamed 
on Voroshilov, who held the post of People’s Commissar of Defense, and the institution 
of Military Commissars, which was introduced in May of 1937 – supposedly the result of 
Stalin’s mistrust of the officer corps – and abolished in August of 1940.21  Even though 
Voroshilov was obedient to Stalin, without whose “knowledge” he “did not undertake 
any principal decisions,” Stalin was never associated with the failure in the war against 
Finland or the initial period of the war against Germany.22  While the history of the war 
discussed the reasons for the early failures of the Red Army, Fokin, head editor of the 
second volume, insisted that “even now this question is not fully or deeply enough 
developed.”  He hoped the future sixth volume will allow authors “to think seriously over 
this matter,” including the period of the Winter War as this was when the preconditions 
of future Soviet failure at the beginning of the German invasion were laid out.  Stalin’s 
“real guilt” needed to be evaluated and revealed while not omitting responsibility from 
Voroshilov, or even Timoshenko and Zhukov, when it came to the numerous instances of 
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21 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 391, l. 313. 
 
22 Khrushchev’s memoirs contained similar ideas.  Khrushchev, Commissar, 1918-1945, 251, 256, 278, 
330, 654-655, 665. 
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egregious errors and failures that led to continued retreats.23  With Stalin’s cult 
denounced it now appeared that smaller personality cults, which developed around 
important figures within the Party and military leadership, had space to expand their 
influence.  It quickly became evident that there was no end to “personality cults.” 
Fokin described how the familiar Stalinist narrative of the initial period of the war 
employed four reasons to explain Germany’s triumphs.  Germany was prepared for war, 
the German attack was “sudden” and “treacherous,” there was a lack of a second front, 
and the Red Army had fewer planes and tanks even though they were better quality.  
“With these explanations,” said Fokin, “our reasons for failure are exhausted.”24  This 
remained a major theme that was insufficiently addressed within the published volumes 
and on which “more thorough work” needed to be done.  The scapegoating of Dmitrii 
Pavlov and the leadership of the Western Front was provided as an example of casting 
blame away from the “main culprit behind the indiscriminate withdrawal of our troops.”  
Initial Red Army retreats were said to have been a “phenomenon” that resulted from 
Stalin’s “personal failings.”25  Repressions against Red Army personnel “could not but 
                                                 
23 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 108, l. 53-54.  In analyzing where the blame lay for the Red Army’s position in 
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readiness.”  Furthermore, the Red Army’s lack of mobilization was also pointed to as being an important 
variable for Germany’s success in 1941, which Stalin was also responsible for.  Vasilenko et al., 190-191. 
 
24 Ibid., 51; Werth, The Year of Stalingrad, 82-83. 
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exacerbate…the dangerous situation” the Soviet Union found itself in as the German 
Wehrmacht invaded.26   
There was agreement among speakers that a major result of the Red Army purges 
was the surprise the Germans initially achieved and the success their military experienced 
throughout 1941 and 1942.  The purges, combined with surprise, resulted in initial 
German superiority and “confusion or insufficiently clear guidance from” higher Soviet 
organs.  There was an inability by the state to make good the “severe losses” within the 
army’s command cadres as well as the “leadership of the party, economy and Soviet 
labor.”  The invasion, exacerbated by the atmosphere left in the wake of Stalin’s purges, 
resulted in major Soviet defeats.27  The decapitation of the Red Army officer corps meant 
a climate of mistrust was left in its wake with a “severely weakened” command system 
that feared independence, initiative and creativity and relied on over-cautiousness and 
“excessive formalism.”28   
Aside from the destruction wrought against the command cadres of the Red 
Army, the purges also had a lasting effect on the partisan struggle in the rear.  In the wake 
of the Civil War, arms caches were created throughout Soviet territory based on the 
knowledge of those who participated in the partisan struggle during the Civil War and 
against “foreign military intervention.”  With Stalin assuming power and his cult’s 
influence permeating through all sectors of Soviet society, the repressions affected the 
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“cadres” and “material resources” of the former partisan movement.29  Hidden arms 
caches were destroyed and partisan commanders purged with the end result that the 
partisan movement needed to be rebuilt and rearmed from scratch after the invasion.   
Commission members readily admitted that the history of the war lacked needed 
documentation, a result of continued limits placed on archival information, and analysis 
when it came to the purges and their effect on the officer corps, the Winter War, and the 
beginning phases of the German invasion.  They were aware of Stalin’s numerous 
attempts to scapegoats the defeats of the Winter War onto Voroshilov and of the initial 
period of the war onto the shoulders of the Western Front command staff, yet 
simultaneously, they themselves did not want Stalin to assume full responsibility but to 
have it spread to high-ranking commanders who needed to share in the blame.  There 
were no attempts to suggest the system itself was in part or wholly responsible for what 
happened in the 1930s and 1940s, nor why discussions over Stalin’s cult and its 
continued impact on the war’s history were only now taking place rather than when the 
first volumes on the history of the war were being authored. 
 
Disagreements and Arguments over Stalin  
Ambiguous ideas did not only revolve around Stalin’s role in the war, but also 
included the origins of his cult.  During a session going over reviews and observations of 
the second volume, a speaker wanted to propose that additional material be included in 
order to highlight “the enormous damaged caused to the defense [of the country] by 
Stalin personally.”  There ensued an argument about whether or not Stalin’s cult could be 
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separated from Stalin himself.  The question was immediately raised by Pospelov, “you 
mean the damage caused by the cult of personality?”  The original speaker defined 
Stalin’s cult as a phenomenon “created by others around him” and described what he 
meant as “Stalin’s personal mistakes.”30  Mints interjected that, “The cult of personality – 
is the combination of all mistakes/errors,” a convenient rubric for which to lump all ideas 
under and omit any real analysis of the mistakes in question.  In the end, the consensus 
rested with the notion that the cult included Stalin’s mistakes and was a reflection of his 
personal behavior, rather than a phenomenon that was propped up or initiated by those 
around him – undoubtedly this would have meant an indictment of those currently in 
power.31   
Consequently, Stalin’s mistakes proved impossible to separate from his cult.  
Unfortunately, this explanation was never offered to the reading public or to members of 
the commission themselves.  Everyone knew of the cult’s existence but no one offered a 
definition by which to recognize it.32  As the original speaker concluded, if all mistakes 
and errors were included under the umbrella of the concept “Cult of Personality,” “then 
this needs to be reflected in our volumes” which at the moment featured discussions 
about Stalin’s mistakes rather than those of his cult.33 
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Commission members were not in total agreement about the evolution of Stalin’s 
cult, whether before, during or after the war.  For instance, Tamonov claimed that “during 
the war years” the cult was “strengthened,” “reigned supreme, and was not restricted.”  
This idea went against arguments made by others, which stated the initial period of the 
war saw a weakening of Stalin’s cult.  Following this line of thought, a minor breakdown 
of the system permitted other actors to take Stalin’s place and prop up the army and state 
in the face of the German invasion.  In opposing Tamonov’s position, the “Party” was 
invoked as being the leading figure during the beginning of the war when Stalin “did not 
intervene in the decisions of many questions,” which “were solved by Party and soviet 
organs, or directly by leading Party and government officials, acting on their own.”34   
Hence, it fell to the Party and its representatives to take over where Stalin could 
no longer exert control.  The editor of the third volume, Iu. Petrov, commented that 
during the initial period of the war “many members of the Party Central Committee” 
exhibited “great courage in arguing with Stalin” and mentioned how Khrushchev 
“aggressively sought” a stop to Soviet offensive operations around Kharkov in the spring 
of 1942, which eventually resulted in a German encirclement of Red Army forces.35  
While the Party’s leadership abilities were lauded, the military leadership came under 
scrutiny by Tamonov.  Others, however, defended commanders with the idea that the 
victorious end results justified themselves and a “very strong enemy” was defeated.  If 
the reason for considering the military leadership a failure rested on “unnecessary 
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casualties” it was an issue that stemmed from “excessive centralization and the 
limitations placed on collective leadership as a result of the cult of personality.”36  Thus, 
once again Stalin assumed the blame.     
 Stalin’s failures, especially in 1941, were argued to have been exacerbated by the 
fact that he created a system of rule, influenced by his cult, which left the military, along 
with other institutions, powerless while freeing Stalin of any responsibility to the Party 
and people when it came to the country’s defenses.  No matter the international situation 
that existed at the time, it was contended, measures could have been taken that would not 
have opposed the Soviet Union’s “political line” and could have resulted in a successful 
opposition to the suddenness of the German invasion – something the General Staff 
should have been responsible for (but due to its powerlessness could not do anything 
about).  The military establishment could not hope to submit to the Central Committee or 
Stalin any plans or recommendations to counter German activities on the border.  Taking 
into account the risks of a sudden invasion, and the political situation the Soviet Union 
was facing, meant a limited possibility of undertaking any initiatives to bring the troops 
to a heightened state of alert.  Whatever recommendations were made from lower ranking 
officers and generals on the ground in the western military districts for bringing troops to 
combat readiness Stalin categorically rejected “believing that their implementation may 
give rise to accusations by Fascist Germany that our country was preparing to attack…”37   
While mention was made of the fact that “Stalin and the General Staff” were 
“aware of the deployment of Germany’s armed forces on our border” more emphasis 
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needed to be placed on it so that relevant “conclusions” could be drawn.  It was argued 
that “if our party did not spare Stalin’s authority…then what reason do we have for 
treating so sensitively issues related to our military leadership.”38  Others saw a more 
complex situation arise when dealing with Stalin and the general staff.  The idea was 
expressed by the head editor of the sixth volume, V. Vasilenko, that while the initial 
military failures suffered by the Red Army could be explained away under the umbrella 
of German “surprise,” “the country as a whole was ready.”39   
The issue of surprise became a question of short-term versus long-term 
preparations.  It was the atmosphere left in the wake of Stalin’s purges and the 
propaganda provided by the Stalinist party line, which claimed “in the near future there 
will be no war” that heavily influenced the General Staff.  While the military leadership 
shared some of the burden there were reasons to “not…cast too much blame on the 
general staff” since they followed Stalin’s miscalculation, an “expression of Stalin’s 
cult,” and “therefore were not ready for war."40  Once more, agency was being taken 
away from other institutions and personalities while laying the majority of the blame on 
Stalin and his cult’s influence. 
Others disagreed and felt the General Staff deserved a fair amount of blame.  The 
Wehrmacht enjoyed a level of motorization that the Red Army lacked and this, to a large 
extent, dictated the length and breadth of German advances in the first two years of the 
war.  The Red Army’s lack of motorization, it was suggested, could be attributed to the 
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General Staff.  While Zhukov blamed Stalin for the war’s disastrous beginning, there 
were examples of Red Army commanders taking the initiative and altering the situation 
for the troops under their command.  The example of the navy was put forward, who 
received a battle alert and were brought to full readiness, as well as the air force in the 
south of the country, where aircraft were dispersed on aerodromes and suffered fewer 
losses.  Speakers argued that it was hard to believe that Stalin was the only one to blame 
for the lack of dispersed aircraft.41  Unfortunately, these arguments omitted the 
atmosphere left in the wake of the Red Army purges that left little initiative within Red 
Army commanders aside from some notable, although limited exceptions.  When dealing 
with military mistakes it was not only decisions made by the General Staff or by 
commanders on the frontlines that needed to be considered, but the limitations under 
which both operated as a result of Stalin’s previous decisions. 
With Stalin continuing to be blamed for the situation the Soviet Union found itself 
in during 1941, commission members claimed that Stalin’s decision-making process on 
the eve of the war was in part influenced by the inaccurate information he received from 
those around him, like Beria, who gave Stalin a “false orientation” and “deliberately 
misinformed the armed forces.”  The same Beria who via telephone told Admiral 
Oktiabr’skii, the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, that his report about the bombing of 
Sevastopol on the morning of 22 June by the Luftwaffe was nothing but a fantasy.42  
However, the question of whether Beria was following Stalin’s lead with respect to not 
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allowing Soviet forces to give in to what Stalin believed were provocations on the part of 
German generals or was acting on his own initiative remains unanswered.  
 When listing the reasons for Germany’s initial victory against the Red Army in 
1941 – the mobilization of the Wehrmacht, German “treachery” and the factor of 
surprise, mistakes committed by Stalin, Molotov and military leaders, the propaganda 
efforts of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and the mistakes of the General 
Staff – the “main determining cause” was nonetheless “associated with Stalin’s cult of 
personality.”  All of the above reasons can, in one form or another, be linked to either 
Stalin, the atmosphere he created in the country and around himself, or his misreading of 
the international situation.  There was agreement that “political reasons” needed to be 
stressed as the “main” causes for the failures of 1941, including the activities of the 
government and Stalin in the 1930s.  Those “comrades” who disagreed with the above 
characterization of the war’s beginning were invited to speak their minds.  However, it 
was pointed out that even though the impact Stalin’s cult had on the initial period of the 
war was continuously acknowledged, the chapters covering this period in the official 
history somehow omitted any mention of the cult altogether.43   
 Stalin’s cult played a large part in how the initial period of the war developed as 
its dominance “and Stalin’s reluctance to consider the opinions of other Party and 
government leaders” made it impossible for the Party to gain the time and ability “to 
correct these errors in evaluating the situation and prevent the serious consequences of 
the political blunders [that were] committed.”  Furthermore, mistakes “were the result of 
the excessive suspicion and distrust of Stalin and Molotov toward reports on the German 
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preparations for an attack on the USSR in the near future.”  But while Stalin and Molotov 
helped propagate the atmosphere of the cult, the military’s inadequate leadership had to 
also be placed in context.   
With sufficient information about the impending German attack on the USSR, 
they, as military leaders, were not able to sort out the created military-political 
situation and did not show enough courage and perseverance in order to prove the 
strategic feasibility of an advanced start of activities according to plans for 
covering the state borders.  They are directly responsible for the fact that in an 
environment of an immediate threat of war the border military districts continued 
to live and engage in combat training for peacetime, and proposals by more 
visionary commanders from border military districts about the need to bring the 
troops to battle readiness were rejected as a provocation.44 
 
Another variable tied to Stalin’s cult that needed further scrutiny was the TASS 
announcement on 14 June 1941.  It was blamed for being responsible for “wrongly 
orienting the Soviet people and the Soviet armed forces” and should be classified as 
“disinformation.”45  The country and its armed forces were lulled into a false sense of 
security.  The head of the Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Major General 
Dudarenko, commented in a letter that in his opinion Stalin’s announcement “to the 
world” that Germany had no intention of breaking the non-aggression pact was “the main 
reason of our defeat in the initial period of the war and our retreat into the interior of the 
nation.”  Stalin’s miscalculation resulted in a lack of preparation in terms of military 
industry and a delayed mobilization of the armed forces in the border districts where units 
were often caught engaging in “maneuvers” with officers on leave.46 
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The TASS announcement was highlighted as “one of the most important reasons 
that our army was taken by surprise,” which needed to be stressed and clearly outlined as 
“the population awaits this from us, the Soviet armed forces await this from us, they want 
to know the truth and we need to show this truth.”  With this in mind the question was 
raised as to whether it was possible to accuse Stalin of “treason.”  If the attack was not a 
surprise, and Stalin knew or even suspected that it was coming, he gave instructions and 
sent out directives that could be considered “criminal.”  Disagreement was not long in 
coming.  Since “comrade Khrushchev” previously testified that Stalin “politically 
misjudged the documents with Germany [and] incorrectly decided the question of the 
timing of the attack” this meant that for Stalin the invasion was unexpected and a 
surprise.  This issue, while a contested topic, was thought solved and “perfectly clear,” 
especially after Khrushchev’s disclosure.  It was decided to stop arguing and move on, 
while identifying Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union as a surprise, not only for the 
people and the army, but for the political leadership as well.47   
The factor of surprise was entwined with Stalin’s leadership to explain the reasons 
for the Red Army’s initial failures.  Since the country was put at ease by Stalin’s belief 
that an invasion was not about to begin, both the economy and the armed forces were not 
mobilized to their full potential.  “Necessary measures” for timely evacuation were not 
taken, nor was there a switch to a war footing or deployment of military assets to needed 
areas.  The “organizational arrangements” that were initiated at the time were due to 
continue for another year-and-a-half.  As a result, the “unpreparedness” of the Soviet 
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Union’s economy and armed forces only “came to light when the war had already 
begun.”48   
 While Stalin and his cult continued to receive a large amount of blame, there were 
also some who aimed to alter the collective memory revolving around Stalin and his 
actions.  Kuchkin wanted “a vivid, clearer and more intelligible position with respect to 
the parade on Red Square on 7 November 1941.”  He requested for a separation to be 
made between what the commission and country knew and what “actually happened” 
during the war since at the time “we did not know about Stalin’s mistakes, but with 
Stalin’s name…we went to battle, died on the front, covered embrasures of bunkers with 
our bodies, and the speeches of comrade Stalin in this period played a huge role inspiring 
confidence in the victory over Fascist-Germany.”49  The suggestion was for Stalin’s other 
actions and words to be momentarily silenced since they were not uncovered during the 
war, while what was known and acknowledged was that he inspired the country and the 
men and women of the armed forces to self-sacrifice and achieve victory.   
 Furthermore, Tel’pukhovskii argued that attacks on Stalin’s cult in defense of the 
“honor of the Party” needed to encompass other figures as well.  While Stalin was 
discredited “under the banner of a fight against Stalin’s cult of personality” there was a 
need to now turn against others, like Zhukov (this was a proclaimed on 29 January 1959, 
after Zhukov already lost Khrushchev’s support).50  Stalin could not be solely blamed for 
the incorrect “political assessment of the situation and the lack of preparation of our 
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country and army,” the blame needed to be shared by “those closest to him.”  While 
Molotov was already a well enough known name, there were calls for “expand[ing] the 
circle” beyond him.  Casting all blame on Stalin would support “critics of the Party,” and 
as a result whatever was presented in regards to the Stalin cult and the mistakes made on 
the eve of the war “must be illuminated in terms of the solutions of the July Plenum.”51   
Although discrediting Stalin’s cult was a necessity, there was also a fear that 
“fighting against the cult of personality” might inadvertently mean “fall[ing] into the 
camp of bourgeois historiography.”52  In response, there was talk of taking a middle 
ground, “we cannot blame Stalin for everything, if we cast all blame on Stalin this will be 
wrong, this will be the cult of personality from the other side.”53   
 
Praise and Prisoners of War  
 Weakening Stalin’s cult and salvaging the image and reputation of the Party was 
central to the mission behind the multi-volume history.  Even with all of the reviews and 
comments that were received after the publication of at least the first four volumes, while 
some could see the weaknesses of the work, others continued to praise what it had 
accomplished.  Tel’pukhovskii claimed that these volumes gave “a Marxist-Leninist 
assessment of the origin and character of the Second World War,” which was missing 
                                                 
51 This was undoubtedly a reference to the Plenum held in July of 1953 when Georgii Malenkov denounced 
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from previous texts.  The mistakes made before and during the initial period of the war 
were “objectively discussed” and the Communist Party took center stage as the 
organizing force behind the victory achieved in spite of the numerous mistakes and errors 
committed by Stalin and his entourage.  The multi-volume history was praised as being 
“the first time historical literature” provided “a comprehensive analysis” and critique “of 
the consequences of Stalin’s cult of personality and how the party overcame” them within 
the realms of the military, economy and foreign policy.54   
 An evaluation of the fifth volume credited the authors and editors with creating a 
history of the war that would resonate with “every conscientious reader” who after a 
careful reading will come away with the “belief that the main role” in the “historical 
victory” of the Second World War, and specifically in 1941, “was played by the masses” 
who were organized and led by the Communist Party.  Progress was assured since Stalin 
name appeared only eighteen times in the volume, where it was deemed “necessary” or 
where his actions were criticized and revealed the damage his cult caused (Stalin’s name 
actually appeared around thirty times in the fifth volume, although often in relation to his 
cult).  The volume, meanwhile, concentrated on the “massive heroism of the people at the 
front and in the rear, illuminating the role of local party organizations, emphasizing the 
many activities of provincial committee secretaries, members of the Central Committee 
of our Party, [and] front and army commanders in achieving victory over the enemy.”55 
 Aside from all the good the history of the war had accomplished, an aspect of the 
cult that undoubtedly merited a large amount of discussion, but which went practically 
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unchallenged, was the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war and Red Army troops who 
escaped encirclement.56  Soviet forces who, on their own initiative, crossed the front line, 
often “in a disorganized fashion,” were not met with gratitude by Soviet representatives 
but instead wound up having to go through filtration camps at the hands of SMERSH and 
the NKVD with some being forced to serve in penal companies and battalions.  Similarly, 
those who had no choice but to surrender to the Germans and found themselves in 
temporarily captivity, only to escape and return to Soviet controlled territory, or were 
eventually liberated thanks to Red Army advances, also went through filtration camps.  
They were assigned to “penal companies or battalions only due to the fact that they 
escaped captivity, fulfilling their military duty.”  Such an attitude toward army personnel 
was also attributed to the “harmful consequence” of Stalin’s cult.  The distrust that was 
associated with the high command of the Red Army was argued to have been a leftover 
of the 1937 purges and the continued suspicion of Soviet forces, from the rank-and-file to 
commanding officers, throughout the army and country was believed to be a continuation 
of Stalin’s cult.  A suspicion of all prisoners of war without exception meant a lack of 
“faith in the Soviet people.”  Yet simultaneously there was a distinct omission of how to 
discuss those who, after being captured, decided to fight with the Germans or joined 
Vlasov’s army.  Such thoughts seemed anathema when the idea was expressed that “as a 
rule” those who were captured “fought against fascism [and] remained until the end 
conscious Soviet people.”57   
                                                 
56 It should be mentioned that in the wake of Khrushchev’s speech against Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, 
a commission under Marshal Georgii Zhukov investigated imprisoned POWs.  As a result of the 
commission’s findings, “the Presidium accepted its recommendation to amnesty, release, and compensate 
those Soviet POWs from the war who were still in prison camps.”  Hopf, 180. 
 
57 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 108, l. 63, 138-139. 
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Fears of the Cult in Reverse 
By the conclusion of these discussions there seemed a real fear of the power being 
associated with Stalin’s cult.  There was anxiety that its exaggeration would give 
“nourishment for our enemies” who would claim that “Soviet historians themselves admit 
that everything they have is rotten” and could easily lead to the supposition that without 
Stalin’s presence “the victory of the USSR was won by chance” rather than the abilities 
of the military command, the organizational skills of the Party, and the will and 
endurance of the people.  This was an assessment that could hardly be allowed to stand in 
the midst of the beginning period of the Cold War.  Additionally, criticizing Stalin’s cult 
to such an extent could give it an all-encompassing negative quality, the cult in reverse.58  
Thus, when the question was posed of how advanced could the Soviet art of war be if it 
was commanded by Stalin, it meant for some that “one person is capable of nullifying all 
Soviet military art…from the development of military technology” to the “activities of 
military cadres.”59   
Opposition from the military to Stalin’s full removal from the war’s history, by 
the likes of Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovskii, was evident.  While it was 
correct, according to Malinovskii, to indicate that Soviet military theory contained 
                                                 
58 This was an observation shared by others during this period.  Smith, Remembering Stalin's Victims, 30. 
 
59 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 108, l. 133.  A precedent existed in some ways when it came to Soviet 
literature.  Almost as quickly as Khrushchev denounced Stalin did he begin to backtrack and soon the 
Soviet press claimed that there were attempts by “writers abroad” to “declare all Soviet literature of the past 
two decades ‘ruined’ by the cult of the individual leader…”  This was labeled a “slanderous anti-Soviet 
campaign waged by the enemies of Communism…to cast doubt on the world achievements of the socialist 
camp” and seemingly similar attacks against the Soviet military and its accomplishments were expected by 
some.  By 1966, the trial of the literary figures Andrei Siniavskii and Yuli Daniel made it apparent that 
literature that “could be used profitably by enemies of Communism” overseas, whether with or without 
permission, was now a criminal offense that could lead to time in prison and hard labor for the original 
author(s).  Cited in Rothberg, 23-24, 156. 
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weaknesses due to Stalin’s cult, high ranking commanders, such as Grigorii Kulik and 
Dmitrii Pavlov, made mistakes of their own that the Red Army had little time to correct 
or recover from before the onset of hostilities.60  Proposed, instead of a full nullification, 
was to show how Stalin retreated “from Leninist theory” and perverted “the teachings of 
the CPSU.”  In the wake of the German invasion, and the minimization and weakening of 
his cult, previous ideas and theories, with the help of the organizing abilities of the Party, 
took the lead and directed the Soviet Union and Red Army to victory.  Boltin insisted that 
“if we say…that everything that was done by Stalin – everything was bad, then we 
denigrate all that was done in our state and even in our Party.”  Criticizing the cult and 
liberating history from its consequences were both a must, but Boltin warned that “we 
must not slide into a nihilistic position of indiscriminate denial bent on maligning all that 
was done by Stalin and on his behalf.”61 
Stalin’s cult proved too often to be a catchall for the issues and problems the 
Soviet Union and Red Army experienced before and throughout the war.  The end result 
was the “organizational system” of the Soviet Union, including armaments and “the 
preparation of cadres,” proved “extremely weak” due to Stalin’s interference.62  The same 
applied to views directed toward the planning and operations by the Red Army 
throughout the Great Patriotic War.  The many “errors” and their “hectic conduct” was 
almost solely attributed to the “negative influence” of the leader’s cult allowing for 
limited room to discuss what other variables might have influenced the poor performance 
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of the Red Army and the General Staff.  Looking at the operations around Kiev in 1941 
or Kharkov in May of 1942, Boltin pointed out that “the causes” of the defeats were the 
“harmful effects of intemperate actions of Stalin or his stubbornness, his personal 
character, etc.”  Such an analysis omitted an examination of the root causes that led to 
these Red Army failures.  One of the most important reasons for the creation of an 
official history of the war, however, was for the military to learn from its mistakes so as 
to avoid them in the future.  But, as Boltin explained, “we actually do not disassemble 
these questions and often overlook moments associated with errors in strategic 
planning…if we do not have this, then this just adds grist to the mill of critics of Stalin’s 
cult of personality.”63 
   
The Turning of the Tide against Khrushchev and Censorship 
 Fears of assigning too much blame to Stalin were soon forgotten as his partial 
rehabilitation began.  A meeting convened in 1965 to look over the “results of the 
publication” of the multi-volume history paid tribute to the educational value of the work 
for the “Soviet people and youth” as well as officers and generals.  This was a “major 
work, which is a big step in the development of historical sciences” but one that 
contained “significant shortcomings” in need of addressing.  Already concerns over 
descriptions of Stalin were evident as after Khrushchev’s removal from power he became 
a target while Stalin was slowly rehabilitated.  Members of the editorial commission 
argued that there was a one-sided portrayal of Stalin’s leadership role in the war and only 
the negative aspects were highlighted, especially before and after the beginning of the 
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invasion.64  Further retreats from previous anti-Stalinist positions were also evident.  “In 
the work the name of I.V. Stalin is referred to mainly where shortcomings are mentioned, 
and where successes are mentioned STAVKA and the supreme command are mentioned.  
But Stalin commanded the STAVKA.”  Thus, there was a need to rethink how Stalin’s 
activities and actions should be portrayed in the future.65  One commentator mentioned 
that it was worth talking in detail about the fact that too often the name “Stalin” was 
crossed out throughout the pages of the volume and replaced with “STAVKA.”  Instead, 
he wanted to “specify to not write ‘STAVKA but ‘Stalin’” as there were “things that 
needed to be given as is.”66  These thoughts and attitudes were predated by 
recommendations as early as 1959.  One reviewer commented that the pages of the third 
volume read as if “the authors and editors…are ashamed to mention the name of 
Stalin…for example, they speak of ‘the people’s commissar of defense,’ but the name of 
the people’s commissar – the reader is left to guess on their own.”  Simultaneously, some 
chapters and sections of the initial volumes, which were published before the October 
Plenum of the Central Commission in 1964, exaggerated “the role and activities of N. S. 
Khrushchev during the war” and there was the comment that “the name of N. S. 
Khrushchev is too zealously mentioned, even where it is not required.”  The end result 
were platitudes that “smell[ed] like sycophancy.”67 
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65 Ibid., 265; d. 585, l. 93. 
 
66 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 117, l. 34.  The speaker was A. Burliai and these comments were made on 
April 13, 1966 at a meeting to discuss a second edition of the second volume of the war’s official history. 
 
67 RGASPI, f. 71, op. 22, d. 585, l. 39; d. 916, l. 28. 
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 As a byproduct, there was some concern that the third volume, which dealt with 
the German defeat in Stalingrad, devalued the importance of the counter-offensive 
outside Moscow in the winter of 1941.   Reviewers lamented how a battle that “defined a 
radical change” within the Second World War, was “so miserably” portrayed.  It 
appeared that the battle for Stalingrad received most of the glory with some concern also 
arising over how the battle of Kursk was being presented.  The significance of the victory 
achieved at Kursk was argued to have been poorly examined and its greater meaning for 
the course of the war was missing.  The reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht were 
described “superficially” with the end result that “significant improvement” within the 
text of the volume was needed.68   Reinforcing the argument that Stalingrad received too 
much attention in the war’s official history was the fact that the fighting for the city 
encompassed chapters within two volumes, something no other battle merited. 
Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964, a move approved by both 
Stalinist and anti-Stalinists, and almost immediately his role in the war was opened to 
criticism.69  The tide was turning against the previously lauded examples of 
Khrushchev’s contributions to the war effort.  Although letters as late as the middle of 
1965 can still be found supporting Khrushchev, as when a veteran of the war who 
participated in the Battle of Kursk reflected that “Some say that there is too much talk 
about Khrushchev…I do not share such views with the comrades.  No matter what you 
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say, he was a member of the Military Council of the front, and hence carried a grandiose 
political responsibility.”70  Nonetheless, statements at meetings made about the history of 
the war included how “the first volumes published before the October plenum of the 
Central Committee (1964)” offered “undue exaggeration of the role and activities of N. S. 
Khrushchev during the years of the war…”  Speakers highlighted the absence of other 
military leaders but instead of mentioning the exaggerated role of Stalin it was once more 
Khrushchev who received criticism.  There were many members of military councils 
throughout the war but only Khrushchev was singled out.71  Lieutenant General of 
aviation N. Zhuravlev commented about the same issue asking if the omitted names of 
some heads of political departments meant they discredited themselves while others, 
those who were mentioned, were by default “given preference.”72  In a more subtle 
change that in so many ways was a reminder of Stalinist times, at the end of 1964 a 
correction was proposed to footnotes where Khrushchev’s name appeared; references to 
the former premier were to be removed.73  In the same vein, illustrations of Khrushchev 
were also slated for deletion, not only from the Soviet edition but the Hungarian and 
Polish editions as well.74 
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The continued work of censors was another throwback to Stalinist times that was 
evident throughout the production of the war’s official history.  Censors continued to 
abide by “old concepts,” similar to the prewar period when they were concerned with 
military secrets “and the suppression of any kind of economic, technical, or military data 
that would aid foreign powers in planning an attack on the Soviet Union.”75  Figures for 
non-ferrous metals, for instance, could not be discussed because “this has not been 
mentioned in any other book as of yet.”  Similar to how during the postwar period 
authors could only rely on information that was already published, evidence and sources 
that had yet to be utilized in any publications were treated as national secrets.  In 
addition, there were still issues to clarify in terms of consistency.  Because authors and 
censors continued to rely on Stalin’s speeches, whenever facts did not coincide – as when 
the figure of shells produced in 1944 by the Soviet Union came into conflict with figures 
mentioned in Stalin’s speech from 9 February 1946 – needed to be clarified before they 
could be published.76  A speaker lamented such an “understanding of the assignments of 
historical science,” where “people are living with old concepts” and, worse, “are 
aggressively seeking to impose these concepts on researchers.”77 
 
                                                 
75 Similar issues were encountered when authoring the Soviet experience of the First World War.  Petrone, 
201-202. 
 
76 In general there were numerous differences in the figures provided throughout the history of the war.  It 
was noted that two volumes listed the number of artillery pieces that were utilized in a few major 
operations throughout the war and the figures differed by the thousands. Where one figure listed for the 
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The Last Four Volumes in Print 
By 1965, all the volumes of the war’s official history were published.  The third 
and fourth volumes (published in 1961 with a print run of 180,000 and 1962 with a print 
run of 178,000, respectively) began what would become a narrative of inexorable Soviet 
offensive operations, culminating in the eventual taking of Berlin.  Any unsuccessful 
operation, like that of the Red Army’s failure to hold onto Kharkov in the spring of 1943, 
were masked as failures of German forces to encircle and destroy their Red Army 
counterparts in meaningful numbers.  When it came to allied support, Lend-Lease 
merited a few minor mentions, although specific numbers were absent and Soviet 
accomplishments and sacrifices were treated as more than enough payment for what was 
received.   
In general these volumes concentrated on the “beginning” of the “expulsion” of 
German forces from Soviet territories, and eventually Eastern and Central European 
territories as well, including Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, 
Greece, and Yugoslavia.  Major accomplishments included the defeat of German forces 
around Stalingrad, the breaking of the Leningrad Blockade, the defeat of German forces 
around Kursk and the destruction of Germany’s Army Group Center in Belorussia.  
Individual chapters were allocated to the war in the air, the actions of the Soviet navy and 
the “all people’s war in the rear of the enemy.”  The third volume offered a look at the 
significance of the Red Army’s victories on the international arena while chapters in the 
fourth discussed all other theaters of operations, including the “expulsion” of German 
troops from Italy, France and Belgium as well as the war in the Pacific and Asia (covered 
in seventy pages).   
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The controversial topic of the Warsaw Uprising, which occurred in the summer of 
1944, was discussed in the fourth volume.  The Polish attempt to wrest control of 
Warsaw from the Germans before the arrival of the Red Army was portrayed as an 
“unplanned” event.  Since the Soviet government was never made aware of the uprising 
before its beginning, and the war’s history claimed no efforts were made by the Poles to 
coordinate any actions with the Red Army, the Home Army’s actions were labeled as 
“reckless” since they endangered the population of the Polish capital – as a result the 
Soviet government needed to “dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure…”78   
Throughout both volumes, the concentration remained on political figures, with 
Khrushchev, Stalin, Lenin, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Hitler receiving heavy mention (the 
fourth also featured Ion Antonescu and Tito).  Interestingly, in the third volume the 
military commander who received the most attention was German General Erich von 
Manstein, while in the fourth it was General Eisenhower.79   
The fifth volume (published in 1963 with a print run of 223,000) brought the war 
to its conclusion.  Major Red Army operations were covered as Soviet forces moved 
toward the Vistula and Oder Rivers, into East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Konigsberg, and eventually Berlin itself.  The international situation 
close to the end of the war merited a subsection when the Crimean conference was 
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discussed in fourteen pages, sandwiched by sections dealing with Soviet advances against 
the Wehrmacht throughout German territories.  Major sections within the volume were 
devoted to the Soviet economy, both at the beginning of 1945 and its eventual transfer to 
a peacetime economy.  A twenty-nine page chapter then discussed the Soviet Union’s 
fight for a “democratic world,” including its participation at the conferences in San 
Francisco and Potsdam.  The final part of the fifth volume outlined the Soviet Union’s 
role in the fighting in the Far East against Japan, which was portrayed as the “decisive” 
role in the defeat of Imperial Japan.80  Once more, the concentration stayed with political 
personalities and while Zhukov’s name could be found on seven pages, the likes of 
Generals Montgomery and Eisenhower could be found on twelve and eighteen, 
respectively. 
The final, sixth, volume (published in 1965 with a print run of 201,000) attempted 
to reiterate much of what the previous volumes had already discussed.  The “Great 
historical victory” of the Soviet Union’s population was presented to readers, including 
the technological and industrial achievements as well as the political and ideological 
power of the Soviet state that sustained the war effort on behalf of the Red Army on the 
frontlines and in the enemy’s rear.  Resistance movements, in Europe and Asia, were 
allocated twenty-eight pages, including the Soviet Union’s impact on their development.  
In comparison, the Soviet partisan movement and the Communist Party’s leadership of 
the partisan war was devoted thirty-two pages.  The “conclusion” of the volume 
concentrated on peaceful internal Soviet politics and how to avoid war in the future as 
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well as a number of chapters dedicated to “short” discussions about how the war’s 
historiography was presented in the Soviet Union juxtaposed with “capitalist” states and 
“fraternal socialist” states. 
Clearly the ideologues among the commission’s members won in the end.  
Figures like Pospelov and Kuchkin retained a flexible position when it came to Stalin 
while Khrushchev was premier.  They allowed mention of Stalin’s faults but, either 
immediately or soon after Khrushchev’s removal from office, both followed a more 
favorable line with respect to Stalinist achievements.  Others, like Minasian and 
Leshchinskii, held more objective positions when it came to Stalin and the war’s history 
– wanting to separate and contextualize Stalin’s impact on both the course of the war and 
its historiography in the postwar period.  Unfortunately, the official history could not 
conform or mirror the flexible positions that were evident in Soviet society due to it being 
a collective effort.  But debates over its creation and the reviews and feedback received 
from the public show a flexibility existed throughout all sectors of Soviet society.    
 
The personalities and events that became the cornerstone of the official history of 
the Great Patriotic War were in many ways a result of the initial narrative of the war 
crafted under Stalin and cemented by his cult in the postwar period, including those who 
found themselves close to Stalin and the decision-making process.  These “heirs” of 
Stalin could never fully disassociate themselves or their actions from Stalin’s cult and the 
country continued to suffer under ideological institutions that for all intents and purposes 
hardly changed since Stalin’s time in power.  This included generals in important 
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positions who regularly steered conversations away from their failures and concentrated 
on prestigious victories already familiar to the population. 
Soviet historians working on the war’s history were continually entwined within 
the cult, no matter if they left out Stalin altogether or included him, since any documents 
that dealt with the Stalin period and the man himself were tainted by his presence.  
Consequently, Stalin could not be wholly excluded when analyzing and authoring a 
complete history of the war.  Yet including him meant retaining an awareness that any 
history dealing with Stalin was inevitably prejudiced by his methods and cult and should 
never truly be treated as “objective.”   
Commission members struggled to understand whether the Soviet system could 
exist in Stalin’s absence without constantly employing his way of thinking.  In attempting 
to address Stalin’s cult, it becomes clear that Stalin could not be fully excised from their 
ideas and “formulations” – he was an inherent part of the state as it existed in the postwar 
period and their ideological thought process.  While Lenin replaced Stalin in some 
respects when it came to the war effort, it was still Stalin, his positions and actions, which 
ensured the Soviet Union’s survival and victory against Nazi Germany.  In part, thanks to 
his policies since the late 1920s, and the numerous propaganda efforts that inherently tied 
Stalin to all Soviet achievements, he was transformed into the founding father of the 
Soviet Union.  
Soviet historians and the majority of the Soviet population had internalized much 
of the language and ideas that they were continuously exposed to during the war years 
when it came to the war’s course and its history in the postwar period, when Stalin’s cult 
permeated each publication on the war and previous publications that did not adequately 
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feature the leader of the Soviet state were avoided or rewritten.  After Stalin’s death, 
historians who assumed prominent positions within historical journals and honestly 
thought their efforts to free historical science from Stalin’s cult was reflective of the 20th 
Party Congress proved “no defense against Stalin’s still well entrenched protégés.”81  
Undoing so much so quickly proved impossible in the atmosphere of Khrushchev’s 
administration. 
The commission responsible for the official history of the war could never hope to 
find the real reasons for the motivations that led to the Second World War or where the 
Red Army’s failures originated from as a full disclosure meant a greater indictment of the 
Soviet system in its entirety – from foreign policy decisions to military operational art 
and strategy.  Similar to how in the wake of Khrushchev’s revelations at the 20th Party 
Congress, which aimed to separate the socialist state from the evils of Stalin’s crimes, the 
war’s history only allowed a superficial analysis to take place with an initial separation of 
Stalin from that of the state.  From his prewar policies through the conclusion of the war, 
Stalin was an ever-present figure whose actions and decisions continued to incite debate.  
The multi-volume history continued to parrot an already familiar version of the war that 
featured an organizer of the victory, in this case the Party instead of Stalin, and 
emphasized the limitless heroism and self-sacrifice of the population.  Commanding 
generals who were allowed a voice in the war’s narrative magnified their own 
contributions while attacking Stalin and the system he implemented for any mistakes and 
miscalculations. 
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The “stubborn resistance” that was exhibited by the Party hierarchy in the 1950s 
and 1960s grew out of the inevitable repercussions that developed from an opening of the 
floodgates to Stalin’s crimes.  Those who worked at Stalin’s side would need to be 
judged guilty as accomplices.  If he was found guilty of incompetent handling of foreign 
policies and the international situation on the eve of the Second World War and the 
German invasion then so were those around him, and if his accomplishments within the 
realms of Socialism and Communism needed to be reassessed in light of exposed crimes 
and gross negligence then so, too, must those who stood at his side or simply remained 
silent and signed the relevant paperwork.82  
Soon enough even those first steps of greater intellectual freedom were opposed 
as Khrushchev began to partially rehabilitate Stalin.  In the shadow of the Hungarian 
Revolution, Khrushchev’s approach to Stalin’s memory changed.  Taubman describes 
how “At a massive New Year’s Eve reception for the diplomatic corps and the Soviet 
elite, he startled his audience by declaring that he and his colleagues were all Stalinists in 
their uncompromising fight against the class enemy.”83  Khrushchev’s inconsistent 
attitude toward Stalin was also evident in a speech featured in Pravda on 10 March 1963.  
While Stalin was presented as severely damaging to the party with “arbitrary acts and 
abuse of power,” Khrushchev felt the need to “pay credit to Stalin’s services to the party 
and to the Communist movement” and continued to present him as a devoted Marxist.84  
With Khrushchev’s eventual removal the new administration “prohibited unrestrained 
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criticism of Stalin and encouraged limited praise of his activities,” this stance lasted for a 
year and was followed with a moratorium placed on any criticism of Stalin’s “erroneous 
or harmful policies” while he was “exonerated of his miscalculations prior to and during 
World War II.”  As a result, by 1966 the history of the Second World War was rewritten, 
the Party’s new, or in this case old, line consisted of Stalin being aware of German 
intentions and taking the necessary precautions to meet the existential threat to the Soviet 
state.85  Similar ideas were echoed by the population at the end of the decade, Stalin was 
once more believed to have foreseen the war and attempted to do all in his power to avoid 
it.86 
The “Thaw” under Khrushchev allowed for the exposure of an initial idea that the 
history of the war needed a reevaluation, but the door to an objective understanding of 
how the Soviet Union found itself the target of invasion and was eventually able to 
triumph over Germany was soon closed with familiar rhetoric taking the place of 
extensive research and analysis.  A reexamination of events was allowed as long as 
Stalin, and a select few personalities deemed acceptable, were included as the central 
figures of any accusations made.  Thus the question of Red Army prisoners did not elicit 
much criticism as it was not the system that was attacked but rather Stalin’s abuse of the 
officer corps and the Red Army.  Any critique of the system at its core, however, was 
disallowed.  Many voices would continue to shout for “truthful” accounts and to demand 
that the phrase “nothing is forgotten and no one is forgotten” be adhered to, but only in 
the 1980s, when a new generation was coming to power that did not suffer and endure the 
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excesses of the Second World War, would an outlet once more appear for accounts that 
went against the status quo.87 
                                                 
87 “No one is forgotten, and nothing is forgotten,” according to Lisa Kirschenbaum, “became during the 
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EPILOGUE – THE WAR’S CONTINUING LEGACY 
The narrative that appeared during the war represented a “collective memory,” a 
collaborative effort undertaken by numerous correspondents, editors, literary 
personalities, as well as military and state representatives all attempting to follow the 
party line while cognizant of censors.  Because collective memory relies on 
simplification, the universalization of the war experience made it that much easier for all 
sectors of society to eventually build a cult around it.  Soviet citizens continued to rely on 
a version of the war crafted under Stalin in part because of the “perfect storm” 1941 came 
to represent. Famous and well-known authors turned into war correspondents and gave 
voice to an event that would touch every Soviet family and, in part, a tragedy that could 
not be hidden from the population or the international community.  The war’s beginning 
could only be represented as a deceitful betrayal that Soviet citizens needed to unite over 
and in so doing help the Red Army and their state achieve victory.  Tales of heroism and 
self-sacrifice became entrenched in readers’ memories, representative of the desperate 
situation the state found itself facing, and the portrayal of a black-and-white version of 
the war made it that much easier for many to internalize its narrative and make it their 
own. Germany’s invasion and the existential threat it unleashed created a break with the 
prewar period when it came to censorship that allowed a limited period of “freedom,” or 
what many perceived as “freedom,” and the forging of an unforgettable unity that the 
population had never before experienced on such a scale. 
In many ways Stalin’s cult was cemented by the Red Army’s victory in the “Great 
Patriotic War” and the position the Soviet Union found itself in, a superpower in 
opposition to the Western World.  As Stalin traced his status to his experiences as a 
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generalissimo during the war, so the war was ostensibly transformed into an object that 
remained outside the realm of criticism, similar to Stalin himself.  After the war, veterans 
tried but were censured if they attempted to voice their memories.  In many instances 
they adjusted their recollections to reflect a stylized and idealized version of the war’s 
narrative, sanctioned and endorsed by Stalin in the immediate postwar period.  The very 
title of “Great Patriotic War” portrayed an exceptionalism to the Soviet war experience.  
It was further encapsulated in a narrative that featured a lone Red Army facing the 
entirety of the German Wehrmacht and its allies, supported by the industrial and 
technological potential of occupied Europe.  Finally, the celebration of Victory Day a day 
after the rest of Europe’s main participants isolated Soviet victory from the West. 
In the post-Stalin period, the Party made use of the war’s history to authenticate 
and support needed myths.  The state’s control over methods of communication meant 
the Party dominated the transmission of public memory.  Whatever the Party conveyed 
into the public sphere was presented as “the sole, authoritative, unquestionable truth.”  
The end result was a “univocal account” that allowed for a modicum of fluidity when 
required, creating temporary “truths” that served immediate needs.1   
With Brezhnev’s eventual ascent to power the Stalin cult was, in part, 
reconfigured as the cult of the Great Patriotic War.  In late 1965 historians were urged to 
“render the complete historical truth” with respect to Stalin, which meant including 
“instances in which Stalin had held correct theoretical and political positions and had 
supported Lenin.”  Pospelov added that “Party history must be completely free of any 
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exaggerations regarding the positive as well as the negative role of Stalin in the life of our 
Party and our country…”2  The population noticed the changes taking place.  In 1969 
Pravda published an article for Stalin’s 90th Birthday Anniversary and received numerous 
letters in response.  This article became an outlet for reader’s thoughts on literature and 
history when it came to Stalin.  The turn taken in the wake of Khrushchev’s ousting was 
evident with a reader indignantly professing that recent publications have begun to 
unjustly “praise I.V. Stalin” as if guilt for the “destruction of innocent” party members, 
“Lenin supporters,” military commanders, and a host of others was undeservedly 
assigned to him.3 
While some opposed the Party’s move away from Khrushchev’s wholesale 
denunciation of Stalin, a more lenient view was reinforced by military commanders like 
Zhukov.  His memoirs, published in 1969, commended and sometimes praised Stalin’s 
leadership abilities throughout the war.4  By the end of 1969, Zhukov’s memoirs were 
lauded by many as a truthful depiction of events.  One reader claimed his memoirs should 
be entitled “[The] Truth about the Great Patriotic War.”  Zhukov’s depiction of Stalin and 
his actions was praised, and although Stalin might have been guilty of some “mistakes 
and miscalculations,” the guilt needed to be spread to the Politburo and the Central 
Committee as well.  It would not do to solely blame Stalin.  Readers were conscious of 
how the Party often took upon itself the glory of any success achieved, but when 
                                                 
2 Cited in Shapiro, 197. 
 
3 RGASPI, f. 588, op. 11, d. 1414a, l. 95.   
 
4 G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia (Moscow: Novosti, 1969). 
 388 
something went wrong it was Stalin and his cult who received the blame.5  A reader of 
Zhukov’s memoirs, in an undated letter, wanted to extend a “big thank you” to Zhukov 
for “objectively” writing the “whole truth” about Stalin.  No matter the negative 
connotations associated with Stalin’s activities after his death, the author claimed “Stalin 
remains for all of us Soviet people, a great, outstanding public and political figure, 
recognized and beloved leader of the Soviet people and the international communist 
movement.”6  Khrushchev’s indictment of Stalin was viewed by another reader of 
Zhukov’s memoirs as “unjust” and he claimed Khrushchev “slandered the most sacred 
for us, which the Soviet people believed, loved and valued.”7  There was no question 
about the cult’s existence as a reader commented that “Yes, the cult existed.  We created 
it, and first and foremost, those who throughout the years were close to Stalin.”8   
Others, however, attacked Zhukov’s memoirs, claiming they praised Stalin and 
descriptions of the Soviet leader as a talented military organizer went against the Party’s 
previous resolution, which “rejected Stalin’s command abilities” and recognized his ideas 
as originally the “military-theoretical work” of Lenin (which were supposedly 
“suppressed” and left unpublished during Stalin’s lifetime).  While Zhukov’s memoirs 
promised a “deeply objective” look at the war years, hopes for such a text were not 
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justified by the assessments Zhukov offered.9  In general, historians who drew too much 
attention to Stalin’s cult, and “overemphasized” his “errors and shortcomings,” were 
criticized while memoirs published by high ranking commanders portrayed Stalin “as an 
outstanding military leader.”10   
The six-volume history added to a conversation on the role of the Soviet Union in 
the Second World War and the war’s place in Soviet history.  The war entered the public 
sphere through an official channel in the USSR and throughout the Eastern bloc.  
Consequently, under Khrushchev, what became the official history of the war was soon 
coopted by Brezhnev and enshrined in a continuous flow of texts and another official 
history (a twelve-volume set) on the war effort.  Although the war’s official history was 
only one of many publications under Khrushchev, it set a standard that Brezhnev could 
build on with respect to the continued presence of Stalin and the transformation of his 
cult into the cult of the Great Patriotic War, which continues to this day.  Brezhnev thus 
continued in Khrushchev’s footsteps as the Party took credit for the war’s victory, with 
the population reminded annually by parades on Victory Day.   
War veterans continued to dominate the Party and Soviet society until the 1980s 
when Mikhail Gorbachev’s generation came into power.  The hold the cult of the Great 
Patriotic War had on the Party and society can in part be explained by the casualties 
sustained by the population and army during the war.  There were simply no other 
options for leadership positions as an entire generation made the ultimate sacrifice.     
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With Brezhnev in power, the initial period of the war was never objectively 
examined due to the perceived harm it would cause the Soviet state at home and abroad.  
Soviet writers were urged to portray the darkest period of the war in 1941 as the first step 
toward Germany’s eventual defeat.  Any attempts to concentrate on the tragedy of the 
first days meant taking attention away from Red Army victories.  Aleksei Epishev, the 
head of the Political Administration of the Army and Navy, only allowed historical 
studies that would be advantageous, failures were hushed up as defeats were turned into 
victorious episodes on the Red Army’s inevitable march toward Berlin.  State censors 
went to work and in analyzing narratives that dealt with the war’s initial period they 
seemingly followed in old footsteps that portrayed the entire war as one whose victory 
could be dictated from day one.11   
This view became enshrined in memorial complexes like that of Brest Fortress, 
which altered perceptions about the war experience.  By 1971, one visitor saw the 
memory of Brest transformed as a site that formerly housed “a modest exhibition of 
photographs and newspaper clippings” into a home for “Rows of granite graves, 
photographs of the ‘heroic defenders’ of the fortress, an eternal flame, immense statues, 
the works!”  A “tragic defeat” was reshaped “into an exploit of heroic defense” with the 
Party leading the people.  “It was incredible.”12  If Red Army defeats could no longer be 
portrayed as part of Stalin’s larger plan to defeat Germany outside the Soviet capital, then 
they would become representations of selfless Red Army heroism.   
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Soviet school children were ingrained with an appreciation of what their fathers 
and grandfathers accomplished and a connection to the war was passed down by parents 
to their children.  A veteran’s son commented that his father “shared his experiences with 
me in great detail to the point where I sometimes would think that all this happened to me 
rather than to him.”  The war experience was ritualized and became a constant 
companion for Soviet citizens from “cradle to grave” as they were turned “into ex post 
facto participants.”13  A former Soviet citizen recalled how during her childhood “War 
and hunger are the two words we hear everywhere: in our classrooms, in our news, in the 
conversations of babushkas on the benches of our courtyard.  They are nonspecific and 
worn out, something that happened not to individuals but to the entire country.”14   
Consequently, if under Khrushchev the official history of the war lacked any 
mention of failed military operations, then under Brezhnev all failures that could be 
mentioned were cloaked in an aura of victorious sacrifice.  All actions were once again 
part of a greater plan to defeat the Germans – conflating Stalin’s narrative with 
Khrushchev’s as the Party assumed Stalin’s role as “master manipulator” of events. 
During perestroika, debates about history were simultaneously linked to contested 
political issues.  But the “frankness” over past events in the 1980s did not mean an 
objective or more truthful history was finally produced.  The Stalinist period was a 
polarizing topic that cared little for the “truth” but rather relied on attacks against or a 
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defense in the name of Stalin.15  Often controversies, bordering on the sensational and 
masquerading as historical fact, ignited new debates and research on the initial period of 
the war.  Regrettably, this meant historians began to engage in discussions with 
journalists and amateurs who were more interested in unearthing scandalous material 
than contextualizing historical information.16   
Unfortunately, the further removed the events of the war became the more 
contested issues that should long ago have been put to rest appeared.  Sergei Kudryashov 
comments that in discussions during the 1980s and 1990s it became apparent that people 
with no real way of knowing the truth about the Panfilovtsy continued to vehemently 
defend the original version of the myth they were already so familiar with: there were 
precisely twenty-eight defenders opposing the German advance.17  The war narrative’s 
entrenchment in the minds of veterans and the continued exposure of Soviet and today’s 
Russian citizens to the heroic and self-sacrificial collective memory of the war has 
resulted in the defense of a history based on socialist realist ideals and emotions rather 
than facts and research.    
Under Yeltsin, Russia initially moved away from its Stalinist past as his 
administration never proclaimed a distinct position when it came to the history and 
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experience of the war years.  Military parades were abolished as the war became less 
prominent in media outlets.  When it made a return to the public sphere, it was 
accompanied by the disappearance of the Party’s role in the war, however, “the thesis 
surrounding the people’s unity remained in place,” supported by the Orthodox Church 
rather than the Party.18   
Under Vladimir Putin, the government turned to the Second World War for a 
ready source of patriotism.  In 2000 the wartime Soviet anthem was restored as the new 
Russian anthem and in 2003 a textbook critical of Stalin’s role in the war was removed 
from circulation.  Stalin was still intertwined with the war’s history thanks to a narrative 
that continued to link him to the victory achieved by the Red Army and Soviet Union in 
general.19  The presentation of Stalin under Putin came to represent a contradiction.  The 
image of Stalin and his regime as “criminal” stood in stark contrast to the victory 
achieved in the Great Patriotic War under his leadership.20  The Mayor of Moscow, 
Gavriil Popov, argued against such a simplistic binary in 2010.   He commented that to 
“overcome Stalin” did not mean exposing his “falsifications,” but rather to take a middle 
ground – leaving aside the question of whether an objective middle ground was even a 
possibility – and “see the whole war differently than how he wanted to impose it on us.”21   
                                                 
18 Ibid., 102. 
 
19 Geoffrey Hosking. “The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness,” Past and Present 
175, no. 1 (2002): 162; Stephen M. Norris, “Memory for Sale: Victory Day 2010 and Russian 
Remembrance,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 38 (2011): 209-210; Susan Corbesero, “History, Myth, 
and Memory: A Biography of a Stalin Portrait,” Russian History 38 (2011): 59.  
 
20 Arseny Roginsky, “The Embrace of Stalinism,” Open Democracy, December 16, 2008, accessed 
September 1, 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/the-embrace-of-stalinism. 
 
21 Gavriil Popov, “Pobeda. Stalin. Nomenklatura. Rossiia,” Sovershenno sekretno №5/252 (May 2010), 
accessed February 12, 2016, https://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2484/. 
 394 
The memory of the war under Putin became a “memory of Victory,” similar to 
Brezhnev.  Most recently another official history of the war, a twelve-volume set, was 
published.22  Putin’s administration fixated on a mythic event that underlined national 
unity, struggle, and perseverance – a narrative that many were already familiar with.  For 
Putin, as well as every family in Russia, an attack on the memory of the war was 
transformed into “a personal insult, a sacrilege” since all lost someone in the war.23  In 
2009, Dmitrii Medvedev announced the creation of a commission to battle the 
“falsification of history.”  More recently, Putin praised Russian journalists in their fight 
against “falsifiers,” highlighting that “victory in World War II came at a huge cost…no 
one has the right to revise its results and lessons.”24  Thus, the dead continue to serve the 
needs of the living as today’s remembrance of the war is dictated by a polished national 
memory – “the destiny of the dead” – based on a deceased majority of war veterans.  The 
general narrative continues to revolve around the themes of Russian exceptionalism, 
selfless heroism and victimization at the hands of belligerent enemies.25 Unfortunately, 
the portrayal of the war in a stereotypical black and white binary, initially evident during 
the war, continues to influence Russian historians and inhibits a more nuanced 
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understanding of the war’s events or the ability to engage in debates about an event that’s 
treated as sacrosanct.26 
In 2010, by the 65th anniversary celebration of Victory Day, Russian views on the 
war’s history as a defining moment were even more noticeable.  Vladimir Dolgikh, a 
former Central Committee member who chaired the council on veterans for Moscow in 
2010, was able to convince Moscow’s mayor, Iuri Luzhkov, that Russia’s Second World 
War veterans wanted their former leader associated with the victory.  Stalin was brought 
back into the celebrations and out of 2000 posters he was set to appear on 10 that were 
“officially-approved” throughout Moscow.  The decision, according to Luzhkov and the 
Moscow Committee, rested on “historical accuracy” – a similar idea to one expressed 
during the production of the war’s history when some noticed Stalin’s name was 
consistently missing.  Stalin was head of the Soviet Union during the war, so posters with 
his image pointed out his position and did “not necessarily…endorse his policies.”27   
The increasing popularity of 9 May speaks to how the war has continued to 
resonate with the population.28  The war offered inspirational examples for an “apathetic 
populace” that struggled with national identity and elderly war veterans were 
reinvigorated with self-esteem.29  However, the disappearance of veterans is making it 
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more difficult for the government to continue to propagate a positive image of the war.  
Some, it appears, have taken it upon themselves, either with help or of their own volition, 
to continue the tradition.  As early as 2012, Russian bloggers drew attention to fake 
veterans walking around Moscow and observing the Victory Day Parade on Red Square 
among top officials and the military by the Mausoleum.  A woman dressed as a colonel in 
2010 was dressed as a general in 2011.30  While the U.N. General Assembly has marked 
8 and 9 May as days for “remembrance and reconciliation,” Russians continue to treat 9 
May as a national holiday representative of Victory while the government continues to 
utilize the date as an occasion to fan the flames of “nationalist hysteria.”31   
Celebrations of Victory Day are reinforced by a heroic narrative many are 
acquainted with and continue to favor.  In a conversation between a librarian and a 
veteran who liked “to read about the war” the librarian asked “But why?  You yourself 
were a soldier in the war.  Wasn’t that enough?”  The veteran replied, “Oh, what kind of 
war was that?  I like to read about a real war that has heroism and brave deeds.”32  
Similarly, Soviet families developed strong connections with the memory of the war and 
its stylized narrative.  A “Soviet baby boomer” claimed that “I don’t want to know or to 
hear that Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya’s feats never happened.  The war was always a 
sacred topic in my family.  I continue to believe that the people fought for justice…and 
that the country and the people were united like never before.  For me the war is sacred, 
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and I don’t want to subject this to reexamination.”33  Undoubtedly the “sacredness” of the 
war was entwined with the numerous representations of heroic self-sacrifice that so many 
became familiar with.  Breaking away from those memories and feelings disconnected 
many with a nostalgia for a time of “freedom,” which featured a heroic history that had 
become the cornerstone of their understanding of the value and worth of the USSR’s 
accomplishments during WWII; the only event all can confidently celebrate.   
Even limited changes in everyday life, as experienced by those living in the 
Soviet Union during the war, resulted in at least the perception of freedom and a hope for 
future change.  Realizing promised changes to Soviet rule would not take place in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, Soviet citizens grasped onto the only “freedom” they had 
left, a history of the war crafted in a space that many perceived as unrestricted, even 
though in the aftermath of the limited changes witnessed in 1941 obstacles to actual 
freedom were consistently encountered.  No wonder the historian Mikhail Gefter 
commented that “Strange as it may sound, 1941 was more of a liberation than was 
1945.”34  Veterans around the world recall their time at war as the “happiest of their 
lives,” and states utilize that nostalgia and appropriate their memories for their own needs 
as they emphasize “national glory and national interest.”  One can also point to what Olga 
Kucherenko has called a “popular inertia,” arising from below, that has sustained many 
of the myths created during the war, through the Cold War, and to the present day.35  The 
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ideas established by correspondents and the mass media have been passed down through 
popular opinions and collective memory and have sustained themselves on real and 
invented sacrifices of Soviet citizens.  
Veterans preferred a familiar and idealized historical narrative.  The author Vasil 
Bykov commented on the attitude of war veterans in a letter in 1996: “No country in the 
world has such remarkable veterans as our native and beloved USSR.  Not only are they 
not promoting the truth and justice of the war, but on the contrary – they are most 
concerned with hiding the truth, most eager to replace it with mythologizing propaganda, 
in which they appear to be heroes and nothing else.  They like this inflated role of theirs, 
and would not tolerate any attempt to challenge it.”36  The living, it seems, needed the 
lies.  By entwining their wartime experiences with that of Stalin’s Soviet Union meant 
that invalidating the legitimacy of one risked nullifying the other.  The courage, heroism, 
and sacrifice of their generation would be left in the dustbin of history together with the 
“Soviet experiment.” 
Another author, Viktor Astafiev, in 1999 reflected how “everything connected 
with” the war “has been so confused, that in the end the ‘made up’ war eclipsed the real 
one.”  When he decided to leave the theme of war behind he commented that “it is 
difficult and pointless.  The young cannot understand, hardly anyone understands, and 
older folks don’t want to be reminded.  If you must write about the war, it should be 
about the one that was made up, where they look heroic, where it wasn’t the Germans 
                                                 
36 Cited in Oleg Budnitskii, “Jews at War: Diaries from the Front,” in Soviet Jews in World War II: 
Fighting, Witnessing, Remembering, eds. Harriet Murav and Gennady Estraikh (Boston: Academic Studies 
Press, 2014), 59. 
 399 
beating them, but them beating the Germans.”37  Thus the original narrative of the war, 
crafted in its fires and blood, continued to resonate and displace efforts to offer a more 
nuanced and objective account.   
In a 2015 Kommersant interview with the Director of the Russian Federation’s 
State Archive, Sergei Mironenko, the interviewer, Viktor Khamraev, questioned 
Mironenko about the 28 Panfilovtsy and the veracity of their heroic actions.  Mironenko 
commented that the original Krasnaia zvezda article was a fabrication that was repeated 
by many others.  Khamraev replied that “since my childhood I have considered them 
heroes, and I do not want to think otherwise.”  In turn, Mironenko stated that he did not 
care what Khamraev wanted.  “There are historical facts, there are documents, which 
confirm” that the story of the 28 heroes was nothing more than a Soviet journalistic 
creation.  A BBC article commented how despite a historical “debunking,” many 
Russians continue to believe the myth.38   
The inability to separate Stalin from the war also means that, following in the 
steps of post-Stalin leaders, Putin’s treatment of the war serves as a foundation for his 
attitude toward Stalinist policies, both foreign and domestic, in general.39  With today’s 
Russians defining themselves by the victory achieved in the Second World War, the 
                                                 
37 Cited in Angela Brintlinger, Chapaev and his Comrades: War and the Russian Literacy Hero Across the 
Twentieth Century (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2013), 215, 218. 
 
38 “Razoblachenie fal’sifikatora i izgotovlennoi im falyshivki neizbezhno,” Kommersant, April 20, 2015, 
accessed on May 30, 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2712788; Tom Balmforth, “Russian Archive 
Chief Out After Debunking Soviet WWII Legend,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 18, 2016, 
accessed March 18, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/mironenko-state-archive-chief-removed-from-post-
panfilov-legend/27619460.html; Mikhail Poplavskii and Ol’ga Alisova, “28 geroev-panfilovtsev: pochemu 
mif populiarnee real’nosti?,” BBC, July 9, 2015, accessed on April 6, 2016,  
http://www.bbc.com/russian/society/2015/07/150709_tr_panfilovs_myth_demise.  
 
39 Shapiro, 181-182. 
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memory of the war creates conditions by which not only is Stalin’s regime partly or 
wholly legitimized but also justifies Stalinist methods and excesses.  This includes 
collectivization, industrialization, and the purges while relegating the history of the 
GULag to being a “minor episode in a heroic Soviet history.”40   
The memory of the war produces a myopic vision of the past that does not allow 
for the idea that alternatives might have existed both for the Soviet Union’s evolution and 
how it waged war.  The city of Rzhev was witness to some of the most costly and 
disastrous operations conducted by the Red Army during the Second World War.  
According to Svetlana Gerasimova, numerous individuals, including regional authorities, 
petitioned to have the Battle of Rzhev commemorated “by awarding the city with a title, 
if not the title of ‘Hero city’, then the title ‘City of Military Glory.’”  Veterans of the 
fighting and local historians protested claiming “it was impossible to call what happened 
at the Rzhev – Viaz’ma salient ‘glorious’” but they were ignored.  This movement to 
honor Rzhev and the soldiers that fell in battle marked a convergence of numerous 
leftover customs and practices of the Soviet regime.  The tools and collective memory of 
the war at the disposal of regional authorities only allowed them to treat the battle as a 
“glorious” episode that needed to be honored.  The only way they knew how to recognize 
such Red Army heroism was through Soviet-era commemoration that inevitably clashed 
with definitions of “victories” like that of Stalingrad and Kursk.  In a repetition of what 
happened at Brest, once again a defeat was celebrated and commemorated.41   
                                                 
40 Dina Khapaeva, “Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Gothic Society,” Social Research 76, no. 1 (2009): 
368; Jonathan R. Adelman, “Introduction,” in Contemporary Soviet Military Affairs: The Legacy of World 
War II, eds. Jonathan R. Adelman and Cristann Lea Gibson (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 8-9. 
 
41 Gerasimova, 183.  Titles of current popular publications on the first year of the war in and of themselves 
offer a look into the contested memory of the Soviet experience at the beginning of the Second World War.  
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It might very well be that with the death of the last veteran the collective memory 
of the war, as well as remembrance and commemoration, will be defined in new ways.  
However, steps have already been taken to address this inevitability.  In 2012 the 
“immortal regiment” parade was instituted during Victory Day celebrations as Russians, 
including Putin, parade around holding photographs of their deceased veteran relatives, in 
essence taking their place within the memory of the war.42  In such a way, political 
expediency meets public emotional needs and each supports and reinforces the other in a 
cycle repeated thanks to regular public celebrations and commemorations.   
Russians today continue to grasp at a historic victory that was, is and will 
continue to be entwined with their Stalinist past.  Latching onto the memory of the war 
allows a generation of Soviet citizens who were never themselves victims to compete for 
historical victimhood.43  Currently, the war continues to play a prominent role in Russian 
memory as wartime and postwar rhetoric is recycled to meet new threats and reinforce 
                                                 
In several texts Red Army “victories” are the lens through which the authors have chosen to view the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union.  Vladimir Daines, 1941: God Pobedyi (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009); 
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“bitter lessons” and “bloody” “circles of hell.”  Mikhail Mel’tiukhov et al., Tragediia 1941: Prichiny 
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http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2016/0509/At-Russia-s-Victory-Day-a-brighter-spotlight-on-
USSR-s-immortal-regiment.  
 
43 Lovell, 11-12.  Lev Gudkov comments that “at present, people who lived through the war make up no 
more than 6−7 per cent of the population, they are mainly elderly and little educated women, most of whom 
have neither the means, opportunities, nor, most importantly, any motivation for transmitting” their 
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 402 
Russian needs with respect to bordering nations.44  The conflict in neighboring Ukraine 
has emphasized the fact that “memory wars” continue with no clear end in sight.  Most 
recently, Anatolii Torkunov, the rector of the Moscow State Institute for International 
Relations, commented that “the demonization of Russia’s history [by its neighbors] is a 
challenge to national security.”  As a response, at the third all-Russian congress of 
teachers of history and social studies, attended by more than 500 teachers, government 
officials claimed “that teaching history in schools is a matter of national security.”45 
The divisive nature of the Soviet past perpetuates an atmosphere where a 
genuinely “integral picture” is unable to “coalesce” around any other memory aside from 
“the war,” and even that collective memory is constantly being challenged by Russia’s 
neighbors on the international arena.46  Throughout Eastern Europe, Soviet history is 
presented as “false” and claims and counterclaims of “victimhood” continue to 
reconfigure memory so it fits into the “evolution of contemporary political identities.”47  
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Consequently, while Russia receives much of the attention, bordering nations are 
carrying on their own internal campaigns with respect to the collective memory of the 
war within their borders, often to the detriment of minorities as well as their relations 
with Russia.48 
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